

## Chapter 1 : Sociology of religion - Wikipedia

*Prerequisites. Students who will have sophomore, junior, or senior status in the academic year and have a strong interest in medieval and Renaissance history, religion, and art; historic preservation, public history, urban design, and archaeology; or Italian language and culture are encouraged to apply.*

Theoretical perspectives[ edit ] Symbolic anthropology and phenomenology[ edit ] Symbolic anthropology and some versions of phenomenology argue that all humans require reassurance that the world is safe and ordered place “ that is, they have a need for ontological security. The inability of science to offer psychological and emotional comfort explains the presence and influence of non-scientific knowledge in human lives, even in rational world. Functionalism[ edit ] Unlike symbolic anthropology and phenomenology , functionalism points to the benefits for social organization which non-scientific belief systems provide and which scientific knowledge fails to deliver. Belief systems are seen as encouraging social order and social stability in ways that rationally based knowledge cannot. From this perspective, the existence of non-rational accounts of reality can be explained by the benefits they offer to society. According to functionalists, "religion serves several purposes, like providing answers to spiritual mysteries, offering emotional comfort, and creating a place for social interaction and social control. It provides social support and social networking, offering a place to meet others who hold similar values and a place to seek help spiritual and material in times of need. We cannot explain forms of knowledge in terms of the beneficial psychological or societal effects that an outside observer may see them as producing. We have to look at the point of view of those who believe in them. People do not believe in God, practice magic, or think that witches cause misfortune because they think they are providing themselves with psychological reassurance, or to achieve greater cohesion for their social groups. They do so because they think their beliefs are correct “ that they tell them the truth about the way the world is. Nineteenth-century rationalist writers, reflecting the evolutionist spirits of their times, tended to explain the lack of rationality and the dominance of false beliefs in pre-modern worlds in terms of the deficient mental equipment of their inhabitants. Such people were seen as possessing pre-logical, or non-rational, mentality. Rationalists see the history of modern societies as the rise of scientific knowledge and the subsequent decline of non-rational belief. Some of these beliefs, such as magic and witchcraft , had disappeared, while others, such as religion, had become marginalized. This rationalist perspective has led to secularization theories of various kinds. Sociological classifications of religious movements One common typology among sociologists, religious groups are classified as ecclesias , denominations , sects , or cults now more commonly referred to in scholarship as new religious movements. Note that sociologists give these words precise definitions which differ from how they are commonly used. For example, Charles Y. Glock is best known for his five-dimensional scheme of the nature of religious commitment. His list consist of the following variables: Secularization and Civil religion In relation to the processes of rationalization associated with the development of modernity , it was predicted in the works of many classical sociologists that religion would decline. In the United States, in particular, church attendance has remained relatively stable in the past 40 years. In Africa, the emergence of Christianity has occurred at a high rate. While Africa could claim roughly 10 million Christians in , recent estimates put that number closer to million. Furthermore, arguments may be presented regarding the concept of civil religion and new world belief systems. For instance, some sociologists have argued that steady church attendance and personal religious belief may coexist with a decline in the influence of religious authorities on social or political issues. Additionally, regular attendance or affiliation do not necessarily translate into a behaviour according to their doctrinal teachings. In other words, numbers of members might still be growing, but this does not mean that all members are faithfully following the rules of pious behaviours expected. In that sense, religion may be seen as declining because of its waning ability to influence behaviour. Religious economy[ edit ] According to Rodney Stark , David Martin was the first contemporary sociologist to reject the secularization theory outright. Martin even proposed that the concept of secularization be eliminated from social scientific discourse, on the grounds that it had only served ideological purposes and because there was no evidence of any general shift from a religious period in human

affairs to a secular period. Correspondingly, the more religions a society has, the more likely the population is to be religious. This points to the falsity of the secularization theory. On the other hand, Berger also notes that secularization may be indeed have taken hold in Europe, while the United States and other regions have continued to remain religious despite the increased modernity. Berger suggested that the reason for this may have to do with the education system; in Europe, teachers are sent by the educational authorities and European parents would have to put up with secular teaching, while in the United States, schools were for much of the time under local authorities, and American parents, however unenlightened, could fire their teachers. Berger also notes that unlike Europe, America has seen the rise of Evangelical Protestantism, or "born-again Christians".

Wilson is a writer on secularization who is interested in the nature of life in a society dominated by scientific knowledge. His work is in the tradition of Max Weber, who saw modern societies as places in which rationality dominates life and thought. Weber saw rationality as concerned with identifying causes and working out technical efficiency, with a focus on how things work and with calculating how they can be made to work more effectively, rather than why they are as they are. According to Weber, such rational worlds are disenchanted. Existential questions about the mysteries of human existence, about who we are and why we are here, have become less and less significant. Wilson [14] insists that non-scientific systems and religious ones in particular have experienced an irreversible decline in influence. He has engaged in a long debate with those who dispute the secularization thesis, some of which argue that the traditional religions, such as church-centered ones, have become displaced by an abundance of non-traditional ones, such as cults and sects of various kinds. Others argue that religion has become an individual, rather than a collective, organized affair. Still others suggest that functional alternatives to traditional religion, such as nationalism and patriotism, have emerged to promote social solidarity. Wilson does accept the presence of a large variety of non-scientific forms of meaning and knowledge, but he argues that this is actually evidence of the decline of religion. The increase in the number and diversity of such systems is proof of the removal of religion from the central structural location that it occupied in pre-modern times.

Ernest Gellner[ edit ] Unlike Wilson and Weber, Ernest Gellner [29] acknowledges that there are drawbacks to living in a world whose main form of knowledge is confined to facts we can do nothing about and that provide us with no guidelines on how to live and how to organize ourselves. In this regard, we are worse off than pre-modern people, whose knowledge, while incorrect, at least provided them with prescriptions for living. However, Gellner insists that these disadvantages are far outweighed by the huge technological advances modern societies have experienced as a result of the application of scientific knowledge. For example, he accepts that religions in various forms continue to attract adherents. He also acknowledges that other forms of belief and meaning, such as those provided by art, music, literature, popular culture a specifically modern phenomenon , drug taking, political protest, and so on are important for many people. Nevertheless, he rejects the relativist interpretation of this situation that in modernity, scientific knowledge is just one of many accounts of existence, all of which have equal validity. This is because, for Gellner, such alternatives to science are profoundly insignificant since they are technically impotent, as opposed to science. He sees that modern preoccupations with meaning and being as a self-indulgence that is only possible because scientific knowledge has enabled our world to advance so far. Unlike those in pre-modern times, whose overriding priority is to get hold of scientific knowledge in order to begin to develop, we can afford to sit back in the luxury of our well-appointed world and ponder upon such questions because we can take for granted the kind of world science has constructed for us.

Michel Foucault[ edit ] Michel Foucault was a post-structuralist who saw human existence as being dependent on forms of knowledge discourses that work like languages. In order to think at all, we are obliged to use these definitions. The knowledge we have about the world is provided for us by the languages and discourses we encounter in the times and places in which we live our lives. Thus, who we are, what we know to be true, and what we think are discursively constructed. Foucault defined history as the rise and fall of discourses. Social change is about changes in prevailing forms of knowledge. The job of the historian is to chart these changes and identify the reasons for them. Unlike rationalists, however, Foucault saw no element of progress in this process. To Foucault, what is distinctive about modernity is the emergence of discourses concerned with the control and regulation of the body. According to Foucault, the rise of body-centered discourses

necessarily involved a process of secularization. Pre-modern discourses were dominated by religion, where things were defined as good and evil, and social life was centered around these concepts. With the emergence of modern urban societies, scientific discourses took over, and medical science was a crucial element of this new knowledge. Modern life became increasingly subject to medical control – the medical gaze, as Foucault called it. The rise to power of science, and of medicine in particular, coincided with a progressive reduction of the power of religious forms of knowledge. For example, normality and deviance became more of a matter of health and illness than of good and evil, and the physician took over from the priest the role of defining, promoting, and healing deviance. The study suggests that religion is headed towards "extinction" in various nations where it has been on the decline: The model considers not only the changing number of people with certain beliefs, but also attempts to assign utility values of a belief in each nation. Luckmann points instead to the "religious problem" which is the "problem of individual existence. Two older approaches to globalization include modernization theory, a functionalist derivative, and world-systems theory, a Marxist approach. One of the differences between these theories is whether they view capitalism as positive or problematic. However, both assumed that modernization and capitalism would diminish the hold of religion. To the contrary, as globalization intensified many different cultures started to look into different religions and incorporate different beliefs into society. For example, according to Paul James and Peter Mandaville: Religion and globalization have been intertwined with each other since the early empires attempted to extend their reach across what they perceived to be world-space. Processes of globalization carried religious cosmologies – including traditional conceptions of universalism – to the corners of the world, while these cosmologies legitimated processes of globalization. This dynamic of inter-relation has continued to the present, but with changing and sometimes new and intensifying contradictions.

Chapter 2 : William Temple Foundation | Religion, Urban Change and the Environment

*Drawing upon detailed local sources, Dr Morris's study of the town and suburbs of Croydon concentrates on the impact of urbanisation upon the development of Victorian and Edwardian organised religion.*

The evidence is pervasive and clear, however, that religion has disappeared nowhere but changed everywhere. For those expecting its attenuation to accompany modernization, religion remains surprisingly vibrant and socially salient. This is particularly true in America, but in much of the rest of the world as well, where religion continues to be a potent factor in the emerging global order and its conflicts. It is in parts of Western Europe where individual religiosity has been radically transformed that the secularization thesis seems to work the best. Religion is a significant factor in voting patterns, ideology about public policy, and political careers. But pervasive evidence also exists for changes that many observers see as religious decline: Tolerance of "other religions" grows along with declines in specific confessional and denominational loyalties i. Responding to religious persistence as well as perceived declines, social scientists have created neosecularization perspectives, ostensibly faithful to contemporary facts as well as classical theory. They understand modernization not to involve the actual disappearance of religion, but perhaps as attenuation and certainly as changing religious forms in relation to other institutions. From the assumed benchmark of unitary religion in medieval Europe, scholars have argued variously that secularization involved the differentiation of religion from other institutional realms, the privatization of religious belief and experience, desacralization and the declining scope of religious authority, and the "liberalization" of religious doctrine See Dobbelaire, ; Chaves, ; Hadden, ; Hammond, , Wald, ; and Wilson, Secularization theory, including its amended forms, has yielded many fruitful observations, and the secularization debate continues with great vigor about both the reality and the usefulness of its perspectives see, for instance, Lechner, ; Stark and Iaconne, , Yamane, While we do not disparage its usefulness, we think that contested issues have narrowed so that, increasingly, facts are less in question as much as are definitional, methodological, and epistemological issues or perhaps attachment to received social science traditions. In this paper we consider the relationship between social change and religion using perspectives other than secularization. Specifically, we utilize perspectives from 1 broad currents of world-historical change, 2 communication and media studies, and 3 postmodernism. We assume that like other institutional realms, religion is embedded in a broad process of sociocultural change, and that in this process religion is not passive, as so often depicted in secularization or modernization theory. Like other spheres, it is a partly autonomous force, reflexively shaping and being shaped by that large-scale transformation. This paper does not offer either new empirical observations or different causal explanations of large-scale change patterns. Rather it uses contemporary analytic frameworks to develop a broad overview of religious change, while suggesting parallel changes in other social spheres that are all embedded in the large-scale sociocultural transformation now occurring. We are more interested in the last part of this trichotomy, even though its contours, salient features, and the very terms to describe it are less clear e. Pre-modern Traditional societies Spanning most of human history from roughly 8, B. Such local communities tightly bound space and time to particular places. In relatively self-contained communities, knowledge and beliefs were transmitted by oral traditions and strongly rooted in personal and local experience Innis, ; Ong, Such communities were highly aware of being surrounded by very different "others" in different villages and other places. People understood that human life and nature were ruled by powerful natural and supernatural external forces, but spheres of social life like religion were still relatively fused and unitary, as were other institutional spheres like the family, work, medicine, or politics. The masses of ordinary villagers only dimly recognized religion or much else as distinct from a seamless web of personal and social life. Religio-magical ceremonies, ritual, and practice were personally conducted between, and strongly identified with, known and intimate others. Indeed, there is little evidence that abstract somethings called religion, religious faith, or different religions existed as words or ideas before the s. Historical research suggests that people in traditional societies rarely understood themselves as participating in something that scholars of later centuries would label as religion, and particularly not as Christianity, Hinduism, or Buddhism Smith, To ask pre-moderns

about most of the sociocultural forms we associate with religion today would simply be an unintelligible question. Much of the usual history of traditional societies is written about their integrative systems of empire, where legitimacy was conferred by oral vows of loyalty, and about their differentiated panoply of dynastic rulers, soldiers, scribes, priests, merchants, and sorcerers. This controlling layer maintained itself by coercively expropriating the wealth of rural village communities, but otherwise left the inhabitants of these villages free to control their daily lives and to participate directly in their more immediate political, sociocultural, and religious spheres. Early modernity Modern sociocultural systems originated in post Feudal Europe in the commercial and industrial revolutions, when centers of economic production gradually shifted from the countryside to burgeoning cities. Separate pre-modern communities began to form broader integrated market systems, as competitive production for commodity exchange gradually replaced production for consumption. Industrial capitalism, driven by trade and colonialism, began its slow world-wide diffusion. Midth century social theory described emergent modernity in terms of the progressive growth in scale and differentiation of social institutions and the compartmentalization and specialization of the social roles of persons Parsons, ; Smelser, --also the touchstones of neosecularization theory. More recent analyses of modernity emphasize: Two pervasive mechanisms drove these processes: Expert systems reflected the central ethos of the European Enlightenment, that scientific knowledge and rationality would tame the natural world and overcome the dogmas of tradition Giddens, Organizations became the emblematic social forms of modernizing systems, particularly the nation state, as face-to-face feudal relations gave way to nationalism, changing the boundaries of "us" and "others. Over several hundred years, organizations proliferated and became more distinct, and, as Foucault observed, the boundaries or "membranes" around prisons, hospitals, military barracks, factories, and schools thickened People were increasingly separated from households into groups with homogenous purposes and identities. Print communication, later augmented by electronic media like radio and television, fostered far broader solidarity than could the oral media of traditional societies. Printed texts increasingly shaped intellectual worldviews and national myths, as printed constitutions and laws literally helped constitute nations, laws, and national myths Meyrowitz, Like learning and work, worship and religious devotion became increasingly separate and distinct. Religion in larger organizations was distinguished from the shared worship with those one could see, hear, and touch, as in more traditional orders. People increasingly understood religion as activities, organizations, and beliefs as distinct from other institutional spheres, and by the 14th or 15th century it was possible for many Europeans to speak of my religion, religion in general, and other religions Smith, ; Meyrowitz, As with other institutions in modern systems, organizations or organized religion, as constituted by churches, denominations, and sects, provided the context in which to understand religious belief and practice. Modern religious organizations could unify people across broader spans of time and space utilizing printed holy texts of religious literature and doctrine, or expert systems of special religious knowledge created by theologians, clergy, and bishops. Religious belonging increasingly became a matter of accepting formalized religious doctrines, creeds, and confessional statements e. Our point is that much of the current controversy concerning religion is about changes in the on-going fates of the predominant social forms of religion, that emerged in modern societies as late in human history as the s. Late or High Modernity Early modernity carried the seeds of its own transformation. In our view such large-scale transformations are typically gradual and continuous with the past, rather than discontinuous, sudden, apocalyptic, or revolutionary. Electronic communication media continues to augment print, thereby facilitating globalization by making all nations and regions informationally permeable e. TVs, satellite communication, personal computers, and web pages Meyrowitz, Giddens contends that globalization is inherent in the fundamental social processes of modernism. The emergence of global-scale economies and institutional connections, however rational to those enterprises themselves, vastly increase the separation of time and space and the disembedding of social relations, often rendering social life incomprehensible to ordinary persons Even though a variety of expert systems dominate the production of knowledge and policy in modern societies, the dream of the Enlightenment, to replace irrational dogmas and superstitions of traditional societies with rational certainty, has failed abysmally. Because expert knowledge, including that of theologians, becomes more specified but about less and less, comprehending and living life becomes more and

more difficult. Both larger systems and personal life become infused with uncertainty. Traditional life was more objectively hazardous and risky than life in the modern world but, ironically, expert knowledge and abstract systems have increased the awareness of uncertainties and risks. Matters are continually open to change and doubt, and have probabilistic outcomes. Ulrich Beck therefore characterized modern societies as "risk societies," in which individual action and organizational policy are driven not by a sense of certainty or fate but by calculating the odds. What are some basic social change processes of the transformation to late modernity? Thus dual processes, both integrating and fractionating, shape the current sociocultural transformation. These are analytic categories that express and summarize the cumulative effects of other diverse factors and processes. Integrating processes have their sources in the rise of new information technologies and in sociotechnical forces that facilitate the spatial spread of ideas, money, products, and human problems of many kinds. For particular organizations, integration is often accelerated by threats from a broader competitive climate and the necessity of organizations to protect their viability or profitability by growth, mergers, or alliances. These processes are associated with the emergence of broad but abstract cultural themes that may threaten particular other ones. In the transition to late-modernism, these forces effect organizations of all kinds: Everyday life becomes more ambiguous or hollowed out, and growing contingencies lead people to withdraw commitments and legitimacy from large systems. Integrating processes may also threaten the everyday life of persons as organizations seek to survive by the efficiency of removing the costs of labor. Thus, there is often a congruence among consciousness, ambiguity, and practical necessity that amplifies attempts to preserve, revive, or reconstitute relatively micro, private, local, or subnational spheres of both personal and social life Featherstone, and Lasch, Next, we illustrate these processes with particular emphasis on religious change. We rely heavily on American evidence and case materials, but we think that the substance of our argument has wider implications. Growing large-scale relations in many spheres of social life began by the s, perhaps earlier. They accelerated and became more visible after World War II, understood as globalization by the s Robertson, Illustrations include the emergence of a world market system, multinational corporations, a world network of national governments and treaty organizations like N. Most of these are not religiously connected, but some are Boli and Thomas, Illustrating similar processes that elaborate broad religious structures across previously existing boundaries is not hard. Ecumenical ventures, like the National Council of Churches, represent a unifying effort, even it at times resorted to out of weakness. Such ventures, however, result in limited cross-boundary ties--given the extraordinary diversity of religious culture and doctrine in the United States. Organic mergers, such as that which gave rise to the United Church of Christ, have occurred, but are rare and usually viable only among organizations having common or compatible religious histories or cultures. Consultations, cooperation, and communion on practical, humanitarian, and even political matters--like the Christian Coalition--are more common, to which we would add new religious or quasi-religious enterprises like Promise Keepers and the Marriage Encounter Movement, which also transcend denominational boundaries. Wuthnow has documented the increasing organization and mobilization of religious resources across denominational lines, along with declining denominational conflicts and prejudices. Catholicism comes most easily to mind, and observers have noted both the strengthening of Papal supremacy, and the internationalization of Catholicism, so that it has not only "a structure centered on Rome, but also a remarkable increase in transnational Catholic networks and exchanges of all kinds that criss-cross nations and world regions, often bypassing Rome" Cassanova, ; see also Della Cava, In the shadow niches of Catholicism, both liberation theology base communities as well as Pentecostalism have become truly international, the one associated with radical politics and the other more apolitical Thomas, Even though formally apolitical, Pentecostalism, like other transnational Christian conservative movements, is neither escapist nor passive. Pentecostals use their religion to actively organize modern life and push for cultural transformations. In Latin America, for instance, while typically patriarchal, Pentecostalism stands staunchly against machismo culture. Turning to the non-Christian world, it is difficult to understand Islam as anything other than transnational. It dominates much of the world between Morocco and Mindanao, and it is the fastest growing religious affiliation in North America, perhaps in the world. We also note the enormous popularity of Buddhism in the West, particularly among American intellectuals, among whom it resonates

culturally with the renaissance of mystical religiosity and spirituality. Of the world religions, Hinduism and perhaps Judaism, are the remaining ones with distinct, though greatly contested, national bases. Truly cross boundary ecumenical relations also exist among formations within historic world religions, if not between them. There are, for instance, the loosely connected World Council of Protestant Churches, and other Christian ecumenical efforts: Lutheran-Catholic conversations, Catholic Anglican conversations, and ecumenical conversations between the Orthodox and Western Catholic Church. But there are still deep divisions between, for instance, evangelical and liberal Protestants, Sunni and Shia Muslims, and Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhists. We argue in this article that as religions become truly transnational, there is, with notable exceptions, a process of disestablishment, whereby religions relinquish the most particularistic claims to legitimacy and privilege, and mobilize to protect universal human rights and democratic civil society. Witness, for example, the warm reception of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan cause by both secular and religious leaders around the world, or the expansion of humanitarian or environmental INGOs that are not explicitly religious.

**Chapter 3 : Brazil's Changing Religious Landscape | Pew Research Center**

*Introduction. The Foundation has long recognised the close relationship between urban change (brought about through globalisation and gentrification), acute environmental challenges and the new public resurgence of religion and interest in theology.*

Apply Now Introduction How do cultures and communities construct, preserve, re-purpose, and destroy spaces and places to achieve new political, social, or religious aims or to press new ambitions and sensibilities? How do urban and rural landscapes and sites come to play vital roles in the realization of political or religious ideas? How do cities as complex agglomerations of people, places, and activities develop and by what historical forces are they shaped? Centered in Rome, a city with one of the richest historical pasts in Europe, this program will provide students with diverse opportunities to explore these broader questions through the close examination of texts, images, sites, and landscapes produced during Late Antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and beyond. A central purpose of the courses in the program is to have students experience and explore the city and environs in depth and to learn how to integrate this experiential knowledge with academic sources of insight and information. Each course will therefore have a significant number of site visits inside and outside Rome as well as assignments that require independent exploration. Back to top Learning Goals Gain deep knowledge of the history and art of medieval Italy and its connections with the wider Mediterranean world. Learn to understand urban space and experience in the pre-modern world. Learn to integrate textual, visual, and topographical evidence to achieve a deeper understanding of individuals and communities. Learn to analyze and explain how spaces, structures, objects, and imagery were and are used to convey complex political, religious, and cultural messages. Gain practical skills and confidence in living in a modern urban environment. Gain practical skills and confidence in living and traveling in a non-English speaking environment. Back to top Prerequisites Students who will have sophomore, junior, or senior status in the academic year and have a strong interest in medieval and Renaissance history, religion, and art; historic preservation, public history, urban design, and archaeology; or Italian language and culture are encouraged to apply. Evidence of relevant interests through course-work or other experiences will constitute one of the criteria for selection. The two regular courses count towards the History major and Medieval and Renaissance Studies, and all three courses count towards European Studies concentrations. Though Italian language study is strongly encouraged of all participants a preliminary Italian course will also be available to program participants in Winter , an independent study may be substituted after consultation with the program directors. Building Power and Piety in Medieval Italy, CE 6 credits - First Five Weeks Through site visits, on-site projects, and readings, this course explores the ways in which individuals and communities attempted to give physical and visual form to their religious beliefs and political ambitions through their use of materials, iconography, topography, and architecture. We will also examine how the material legacies of imperial Rome, Byzantium, and early Christianity served as both resources for and constraints on the political, cultural, and religious evolution of the Italian peninsula and especially Rome and its environs from late antiquity through the twelfth century. Among the principal themes will be the development of the cult of saints, the development of the papal power and authority, christianization, reform, pilgrimage, and monasticism. The Eternal City in Time: Structure, Change, and Identity 6 credits - Second Five Weeks This course will explore the lived experience of the city of Rome in the 12th centuries. Students will study buildings, urban forms, surviving artifacts, and textual and other visual evidence to understand how politics, power, and religion both Christianity and Judaism mapped onto city spaces. How did urban challenges and opportunities shape daily life? How did the memory of the past influence the present? How did the rural world affect the city and vice versa? Students will work on projects closely tied to the urban fabric. Italian Encounters 3 credits Through a range of interdisciplinary readings, guest lectures, and site visits, this course will provide students with opportunities to analyze important aspects of Italian culture and society, both past and present, as well as to examine the ways in which travelers, tourists, temporary visitors, and immigrants have experienced and coped with their Italian worlds. Topics may include transportation, cuisine, rituals and rhythms of Italian life,

urbanism, religious diversity, immigration, tourism, historic preservation, and language. Class discussions and projects will offer students opportunities to reflect on their own encounters with contemporary Italian culture. Italian Language 3 credits This course will provide instruction in spoken and written Italian with particular attention given to developing conversational ability.

**Chapter 4 : History, Religion, and Urban Change in Medieval Italy | Carleton College**

*Get this from a library! Religion and urban change: Croydon, [J N Morris] -- Dr Morris's exploration of the impact of urbanisation upon the development of Victorian and Edwardian organised religion is based on detailed study of local sources relating to the town and suburbs.*

And today Brazil has more Roman Catholics than any other country in the world – an estimated million. Smaller but steadily increasing shares of Brazilians also identify with other religions or with no religion at all, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of Brazilian census data. Between and , the number of Catholics in the country rose even though the share of the population that identifies as Catholic was falling. It also includes members of independent, neo-Pentecostal churches, such as the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and the God is Love Pentecostal Church, both of which were founded in Brazil. About 2 million Brazilians belonged to these other religions in . Finally, the number of Brazilians with no religious affiliation, including agnostics and atheists, also has been growing. In , fewer than 1 million Brazilians had no religious affiliation. Brazilian census data from indicate that total fertility rates for Protestants are about the same as for Catholics. Rather, the main factor in the growth of Protestantism in Brazil appears to be religious switching, or movement from one religious group to another. But the changes have been particularly pronounced among younger Brazilians and city dwellers, as shown in the tables below. Brazilian Catholics tend to be older and live in rural areas, while Protestants tend to be slightly younger and live in urban areas. Brazilians with no religious affiliation also are younger, on average, than the population as a whole and are more likely to reside in urban settings. The remainder of this report examines these demographic patterns in more detail.

Differences in the Religious Affiliation of Brazilians Age Generational change has contributed to the declining number of Catholics in Brazil. Younger cohorts are somewhat more likely than older Brazilians to be Protestant or to have no religious affiliation. In general, Catholics are more likely than other religious groups to live in rural areas. These gender patterns have become more distinct over time. For instance, the religious profiles of men and women were quite similar in the s and s. But over the past two decades, the share of women who are Protestant has ticked up, as has the share of men who are religiously unaffiliated. Education Looking at two education levels – completion of high school and less education – there are only minor differences in the percentages of Catholics, Protestants and the unaffiliated in each group. This is particularly true of Brazilians belonging to spiritist movements. Methodology The census estimates for , , and were drawn from a microdata subsample of the Brazilian census downloaded from the IPUMS-International data service at the Minnesota Population Center. Comparable microdata for are not yet publicly available. The classification of religious groups in this report is based on the classification schema used by the IBGE, though the nomenclature is somewhat different. The current report focuses solely on Roman Catholics, who number about million in Brazil as of . The difference of 3 million is partly accounted for by independent Catholics, such as members of the Brazilian Catholic Apostolic Church, who account for about , people. The remainder about 2. The age group adjustment reflects the fact that parents sometimes are hesitant to report a religious affiliation for an infant even though they will claim a religion for the child when he or she is slightly older. While some of this change may be explained by mortality and migration, it is at least partly due to parents being more willing to describe their older children as Christians. In order to compensate for this measurement bias, previous Pew Research reports applied the religious composition of older children years old to infants and young children years old in Brazil. To maintain consistency with Brazilian census figures for , however, no such adjustment was made in this report. If an adjustment was made to compensate for low religious affiliation rates in the youngest cohort years old of Brazilians, it would slightly raise the number of people in each religious group as of , including Catholics. It also would slightly decrease the size of the unaffiliated group. This report is part of the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures project , an effort funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts and the John Templeton Foundation to analyze religious change and its impact on societies around the world. Its growth could be due to a rising number of groups that are both historically Protestant and Pentecostal, or to other difficulties in classifying Protestant groups. It may be possible to break

down this category more accurately once microdata for the census are publicly available. For Protestants, it was 2. Both figures are above replacement value, the minimum level needed to maintain a stable population. A Country Survey of Pentecostals.

### Chapter 5 : SOCIAL CHANGE AND RELIGION: THINKING BEYOND SECULARIZATION PERSPECTIVE

*The aim of the colloquium is to bring together an interdisciplinary group of researchers to explore the interplay between religion, mobility, and urban change in the contexts of France and Britain. On the one hand, researchers have considered urban transformations, such as, suburbanisation and.*

African-American dance African-American dance , like other aspects of African-American culture, finds its earliest roots in the dances of the hundreds of African ethnic groups that made up African slaves in the Americas as well as influences from European sources in the United States. Dance in the African tradition, and thus in the tradition of slaves, was a part of both everyday life and special occasions. Many of these traditions such as get down , ring shouts , and other elements of African body language survive as elements of modern dance. These shows often presented African Americans as caricatures for ridicule to large audiences. The first African-American dance to become popular with white dancers was the cakewalk in African-American dance forms such as tap , a combination of African and European influences, gained widespread popularity thanks to dancers such as Bill Robinson and were used by leading white choreographers, who often hired African-American dancers. Groups such as the Alvin Ailey American Dance Theater have continued to contribute to the growth of this form. Modern popular dance in America is also greatly influenced by African-American dance. American popular dance has also drawn many influences from African-American dance most notably in the hip-hop genre. African-American art From its early origins in slave communities, through the end of the 20th century, African-American art has made a vital contribution to the art of the United States. These artifacts have similarities with comparable crafts in West and Central Africa. In contrast, African-American artisans like the New England-based engraver Scipio Moorhead and the Baltimore portrait painter Joshua Johnson created art that was conceived in a thoroughly western European fashion. Martin , mixed-media collage on rag paper After the American Civil War , museums and galleries began more frequently to display the work of African-American artists. Cultural expression in mainstream venues was still limited by the dominant European aesthetic and by racial prejudice. To increase the visibility of their work, many African-American artists traveled to Europe where they had greater freedom. In later years, other programs and institutions, such as the New York City-based Harmon Foundation , helped to foster African-American artistic talent. Augusta Savage , Elizabeth Catlett , Lois Mailou Jones , Romare Bearden , Jacob Lawrence , and others exhibited in museums and juried art shows, and built reputations and followings for themselves. In the s and s, there were very few widely accepted African-American artists. Pierce, Florida , created idyllic, quickly realized images of the Florida landscape and peddled some 50, of them from the trunks of their cars. They sold their art directly to the public rather than through galleries and art agents, thus receiving the name "The Highwaymen". Rediscovered in the mids, today they are recognized as an important part of American folk history. The sculptor Martin Puryear , whose work has been acclaimed for years, was being honored with a year retrospective of his work at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in November African-American literature African-American literature has its roots in the oral traditions of African slaves in America. The slaves used stories and fables in much the same way as they used music. These authors reached early high points by telling slave narratives.

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