

**Chapter 1 : Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention: Obstacles and Opportunities**

*Preventive diplomacy was presaged by Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, which allowed the Secretary-General to bring to the Security Council's attention threats to international peace and security.*

From the outset of the United Nations, Secretary-General Trygve Lie used the competence under this Article to gather information about situations, to establish contacts with those concerned, to send emissaries to look closely at situations, and to do whatever he could to head off or contain crises of international concern. But he had in mind that, if the opportunity presented itself, he might be able to head off disputes between lesser powers and prevent them from the gravitational pull of the superpowers contest. He would decide if his efforts might be useful. Judgment was always involved; there was no automaticity about his involvement. He used representatives, whom he sent out on special missions or outposted in particular situations. He had in mind the deployment of a ring of representatives around the world. His role in preventing a nuclear confrontation over the Cuban Missile Crisis must rank as the most spectacular example of preventive diplomacy in the annals of the United Nations. The UN archives contain dramatic materials on his efforts. I will revert to this later. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim continued the practice of preventive diplomacy. He had his successes in the border disputes between Iran and Iraq in the s. He resorted to appeals in dangerous situations such as the Arab-Israeli War. He acted speedily in dispatching UN peacekeepers to contain and control that situation and was praised for his efforts. He called for the maintenance of a comprehensive global watch over threats to human security and welfare, and established a unit within the Office of the Secretary-General dedicated to the collection and analysis of information intended to help the Secretary-General provide alerts to the Security Council over situations that could threaten or breach international peace and security. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali took over shortly after the end of the Cold War when there were hopes of a new world order. In January , the first-ever summit meeting of the Security Council requested a report from him on the future role of the United Nations in conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacekeeping, which led him to submit the widely-acclaimed *An Agenda for Peace*. Boutros-Ghali practiced preventive diplomacy in cases such as the war between Eritrea and Yemen, and he supported the establishment of the first ever preventive deployment of UN peacekeepers in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Secretary-General Kofi Annan furthered the work of his predecessors and submitted three reports on the topic. He exercised preventive diplomacy successfully in the border conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula. Current Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has taken forward the practice of preventive diplomacy at the UN, and has given courageous leadership on the issue of global climate change that would be put into the category of preventive diplomacy. He has also submitted reports to the General Assembly on preventive diplomacy. On 22 October, President John F. Kennedy announced that he had ordered a naval quarantine around Cuba to come into force on 24 October. American and Soviet naval vessels came into close proximity with a USSR submarine captain authorized, as is now known, to use nuclear weapons in defence of Soviet ships or in self-defence. On 24 October , in his address to the Security Council, U Thant stressed that what was at stake was the very fate of mankind. He called for urgent negotiations between the parties directly involved and informed the Council that he had sent urgent appeals to President Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev for a moratorium of two to three weeks. On the part of the United States, it would entail the voluntary suspension of the quarantine, especially the searching of ships bound for Cuba. He also appealed to the U. President and the Prime Minister of Cuba to suspend the construction and development of major military facilities and installations in Cuba during the period of negotiation. He offered to make himself available to all parties concerned for whatever services he might be able to perform. Soviet vessels continued on their way to the quarantined waters. That very day, U Thant followed up with an urgent appeal to the two leaders. He was concerned that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba might challenge the quarantine and produce a confrontation between Soviet and United States vessels, thereby destroying the possibility of negotiations. He therefore requested Premier Khrushchev to instruct any Soviet ships already sailing toward Cuba to stay away from the interception area for a limited time. He also asked President Kennedy to instruct

United States vessels in the Caribbean to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships. To each, he stated that if he received the assurance sought, he would inform the other side of it. President Kennedy immediately accepted his proposal, contingent upon acceptance by the Soviet Government. Premier Khrushchev also accepted the moratorium. He informed U Thant that he had ordered Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to stay out of the interception area temporarily. The next day, on 26 October, U Thant sent a message to Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba informing him of the encouraging responses he had received to his appeals and asking that construction of major military installations in Cuba, and especially those designed to launch medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, be suspended during the period of negotiations. U Thant traveled to Cuba from 30 to 31 October for meetings with Cuban leaders. His visit was of importance inasmuch as it gave the Cuban leaders an opportunity to let off steam. As the agreement was being consolidated, President Kennedy, in his letter of 28 October to Premier Khrushchev wrote: This idea retains its value and should be revived. The United Nations has regional conflict prevention centres in some parts of the world, such as West Africa and Central Asia. It would be sound policy to establish more of these centres. Enhanced cooperation with regional and sub-regional conflict prevention mechanisms would also be worthwhile. It is also important to increase the staff of the Department of Political Affairs for preventive work. The Secretary-General, spearheading the roles of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and of his Special Advisers on the Responsibility to Protect and the Prevention of Genocide, should foster diplomacy of democracy and human rights at the country level. This would facilitate conflict prevention. The alleviation of extreme poverty is crucial, as is the empowerment of women. These are issues of strategy, as well as of justice. Enhancing human dignity is key to successful prevention. The idea of preventive diplomacy is one of the great UN ideas that will be around for as long as the world organization exists; for behind it is a simple faith that whatever might be done to prevent crises or conflicts should be considered. For further reading see: Ramcharan Preventive Diplomacy at the UN. Preventive Diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. About the Author Bertrand G.

**Chapter 2 : Background | UNRCCA**

*The work of the United Nations in conflict prevention extends well beyond traditional preventive diplomacy to involve a broad constellation of United Nations entities operating across a wide range.*

The United Nations has had wide experience in the application of these peaceful means. If conflicts have gone unresolved, it is not because techniques for peaceful settlement were unknown or inadequate. The fault lies first in the lack of political will of parties to seek a solution to their differences through such means as are suggested in Chapter VI of the Charter, and second, in the lack of leverage at the disposal of a third party if this is the procedure chosen. The indifference of the international community to a problem, or the marginalization of it, can also thwart the possibilities of solution. We must look primarily to these areas if we hope to enhance the capacity of the Organization for achieving peaceful settlements. The present determination in the Security Council to resolve international disputes in the manner foreseen in the Charter has opened the way for a more active Council role. With greater unity has come leverage and persuasive power to lead hostile parties towards negotiations. I urge the Council to take full advantage of the provisions of the Charter under which it may recommend appropriate procedures or methods for dispute settlement and, if all the parties to a dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties for a pacific settlement of the dispute. The General Assembly, like the Security Council and the Secretary-General, also has an important role assigned to it under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. As a universal forum, its capacity to consider and recommend appropriate action must be recognized. To that end it is essential to promote its utilization by all Member States so as to bring greater influence to bear in pre-empting or containing situations which are likely to threaten international peace and security. Mediation and negotiation can be undertaken by an individual designated by the Security Council, by the General Assembly or by the Secretary-General. There is a long history of the utilization by the United Nations of distinguished statesmen to facilitate the processes of peace. They can bring a personal prestige that, in addition to their experience, can encourage the parties to enter serious negotiations. There is a wide willingness to serve in this capacity, from which I shall continue to benefit as the need arises. Frequently it is the Secretary-General himself who undertakes the task. The World Court The docket of the International Court of Justice has grown fuller but it remains an under-used resource for the peaceful adjudication of disputes. Greater reliance on the Court would be an important contribution to United Nations peacemaking. In this connection, I call attention to the power of the Security Council under Articles 36 and 37 of the Charter to recommend to Member States the submission of a dispute to the International Court of Justice, arbitration or other dispute-settlement mechanisms. I recommend that the Secretary-General be authorized, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter, to take advantage of the advisory competence of the Court and that other United Nations organs that already enjoy such authorization turn to the Court more frequently for advisory opinions. I recommend the following steps to reinforce the role of the International Court of Justice: All Member States should accept the general jurisdiction of the International Court under Article 36 of its Statute, without any reservation, before the end of the United Nations Decade of International Law in the year In instances where domestic structures prevent this, States should agree bilaterally or multilaterally to a comprehensive list of matters they are willing to submit to the Court and should withdraw their reservations to its jurisdiction in the dispute settlement clauses of multilateral treaties; When submission of a dispute to the full Court is not practical, the Chambers jurisdiction should be used; States should support the Trust Fund established to assist countries unable to afford the cost involved in bringing a dispute to the Court, and such countries should take full advantage of the Fund in order to resolve their disputes. Amelioration through assistance Peacemaking is at times facilitated by international action to ameliorate circumstances that have contributed to the dispute or conflict. If, for instance, assistance to displaced persons within a society is essential to a solution, then the United Nations should be able to draw upon the resources of all agencies and programmes concerned. At present, there is no adequate mechanism in the United Nations through which the Security Council, the General Assembly or the Secretary-General can mobilize the resources needed for such positive leverage and

engage the collective efforts of the United Nations system for the peaceful resolution of a conflict. I have raised this concept in the Administrative Committee on Coordination, which brings together the executive heads of United Nations agencies and programmes; we are exploring methods by which the inter-agency system can improve its contribution to the peaceful resolution of disputes. Sanctions and special economic problems In circumstances when peacemaking requires the imposition of sanctions under Article 41 of the Charter, it is important that States confronted with special economic problems not only have the right to consult the Security Council regarding such problems, as Article 50 provides, but also have a realistic possibility of having their difficulties addressed. I recommend that the Security Council devise a set of measures involving the financial institutions and other components of the United Nations system that can be put in place to insulate States from such difficulties. Such measures would be a matter of equity and a means of encouraging States to cooperate with decisions of the Council. Use of military force It is the essence of the concept of collective security as contained in the Charter that if peaceful means fail, the measures provided in Chapter VII should be used, on the decision of the Security Council, to maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression". The Security Council has not so far made use of the most coercive of these measures - the action by military force foreseen in Article In the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the Council chose to authorize Member States to take measures on its behalf. The Charter, however, provides a detailed approach which now merits the attention of all Member States. Under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international peace and security. While such action should only be taken when all peaceful means have failed, the option of taking it is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security. This will require bringing into being, through negotiations, the special agreements foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter, whereby Member States undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council for the purposes stated in Article 42, not only on an ad hoc basis but on a permanent basis. Under the political circumstances that now exist for the first time since the Charter was adopted, the long-standing obstacles to the conclusion of such special agreements should no longer prevail. The ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a means of deterring breaches of the peace since a potential aggressor would know that the Council had at its disposal a means of response. Forces under Article 43 may perhaps never be sufficiently large or well enough equipped to deal with a threat from a major army equipped with sophisticated weapons. They would be useful, however, in meeting any threat posed by a military force of a lesser order. I recommend that the Security Council initiate negotiations in accordance with Article 43, supported by the Military Staff Committee, which may be augmented if necessary by others in accordance with Article 47, paragraph 2, of the Charter. It is my view that the role of the Military Staff Committee should be seen in the context of Chapter VII, and not that of the planning or conduct of peace-keeping operations. The mission of forces under Article 43 would be to respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual. Such forces are not likely to be available for some time to come. Cease-fires have often been agreed to but not complied with, and the United Nations has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore and maintain the cease-fire. This task can on occasion exceed the mission of peace-keeping forces and the expectations of peace-keeping force contributors. I recommend that the Council consider the utilization of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance. Such units from Member States would be available on call and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service. They would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and operation of such forces would be under the authorization of the Security Council and would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be under the command of the Secretary-General. I consider such peace-enforcement units to be warranted as a provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter. Such peace-enforcement units should not be confused with the forces that may eventually be constituted under Article 43 to deal with acts of aggression or with the military personnel which Governments may agree to keep on stand-by for possible contribution to peace-keeping operations. Just as diplomacy will continue across the span of all the activities dealt with in the present report, so there may not be a dividing line between

peacemaking and peace-keeping. Peacemaking is often a prelude to peace-keeping - just as the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field may expand possibilities for the prevention of conflict, facilitate the work of peacemaking and in many cases serve as a prerequisite for peace-building. Peace-keeping can rightly be called the invention of the United Nations. It has brought a degree of stability to numerous areas of tension around the world. Thirteen peace-keeping operations were established between the years and ; 13 others since then. An estimated , military, police and civilian personnel had served under the flag of the United Nations until January Over of them from 43 countries have died in the service of the Organization. The contrast between the costs of United Nations peace-keeping and the costs of the alternative, war - between the demands of the Organization and the means provided to meet them - would be farcical were the consequences not so damaging to global stability and to the credibility of the Organization. At a time when nations and peoples increasingly are looking to the United Nations for assistance in keeping the peace - and holding it responsible when this cannot be so - fundamental decisions must be taken to enhance the capacity of the Organization in this innovative and productive exercise of its function. I am conscious that the present volume and unpredictability of peace-keeping assessments poses real problems for some Member States. For this reason, I strongly support proposals in some Member States for their peace-keeping contributions to be financed from defence, rather than foreign affairs, budgets and I recommend such action to others. I urge the General Assembly to encourage this approach. The demands on the United Nations for peace-keeping, and peace-building, operations will in the coming years continue to challenge the capacity, the political and financial will and the creativity of the Secretariat and Member States. Like the Security Council, I welcome the increase and broadening of the tasks of peace-keeping operations. New departures in peace-keeping The nature of peace-keeping operations has evolved rapidly in recent years. The established principles and practices of peace-keeping have responded flexibly to new demands of recent years, and the basic conditions for success remain unchanged: As the international climate has changed and peace-keeping operations are increasingly fielded to help implement settlements that have been negotiated by peacemakers, a new array of demands and problems has emerged regarding logistics, equipment, personnel and finance, all of which could be corrected if Member States so wished and were ready to make the necessary resources available. Member States are keen to participate in peace-keeping operations. Military observers and infantry are invariably available in the required numbers, but logistic units present a greater problem, as few armies can afford to spare such units for an extended period. Member States were requested in to state what military personnel they were in principle prepared to make available; few replied. I reiterate the request to all Member States to reply frankly and promptly. Stand-by arrangements should be confirmed, as appropriate, through exchanges of letters between the Secretariat and Member States concerning the kind and number of skilled personnel they will be prepared to offer the United Nations as the needs of new operations arise. Increasingly, peace-keeping requires that civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police play as central a role as the military. Police personnel have proved increasingly difficult to obtain in the numbers required. I recommend that arrangements be reviewed and improved for training peace-keeping personnel - civilian, police, or military - using the varied capabilities of Member State Governments, of non-governmental organizations and the facilities of the Secretariat. As efforts go forward to include additional States as contributors, some States with considerable potential should focus on language training for police contingents which may serve with the Organization. As for the United Nations itself, special personnel procedures, including incentives, should be instituted to permit the rapid transfer of Secretariat staff members to service with peace-keeping operations. The strength and capability of military staff serving in the Secretariat should be augmented to meet new and heavier requirements. Not all Governments can provide their battalions with the equipment they need for service abroad. While some equipment is provided by troop-contributing countries, a great deal has to come from the United Nations, including equipment to fill gaps in under-equipped national units. The United Nations has no standing stock of such equipment. Orders must be placed with manufacturers, which creates a number of difficulties. A pre-positioned stock of basic peace-keeping equipment should be established, so that at least some vehicles, communications equipment, generators, etc. Alternatively, Governments should commit themselves to

keeping certain equipment, specified by the Secretary-General, on stand-by for immediate sale, loan or donation to the United Nations when required. Member States in a position to do so should make air- and sea-lift capacity available to the United Nations free of cost or at lower than commercial rates, as was the practice until recently. Peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation. In the aftermath of international war, post-conflict peace-building may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace. I have in mind, for example, projects that bring States together to develop agriculture, improve transportation or utilize resources such as water or electricity that they need to share, or joint programmes through which barriers between nations are brought down by means of freer travel, cultural exchanges and mutually beneficial youth and educational projects. Reducing hostile perceptions through educational exchanges and curriculum reform may be essential to forestall a re-emergence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed hostilities. In surveying the range of efforts for peace, the concept of peace-building as the construction of a new environment should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, which seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions.

**Chapter 3 : UNRCCA | United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia**

*Preventive diplomacy has been an enduring idea at the United Nations for many decades. Since Dag Hammarskjöld first articulated the concept over half a century ago, it has continued to evolve.*

Are those hours spent understanding tribal dynamics a worthwhile investment? Spare a thought for the Canadian diplomats who spent months preparing for the G7 summit only to falter on the rocks of petulant world leaders ignoring the hard work. Yet, summit verbosity aside, traditional diplomacy at its best is imaginative because it does focus on the detail, and it is the knowledge of the detail that permits creativity and offers the opportunity to prevent conflict or stop fighting once it has started. Take the situation in Yemen today. While the conflict is often portrayed in the media as being between Iranian-backed Houthi rebels and a Saudi-led coalition, after more than three years of outright hostilities there are now myriad different armed groups involved in local and national battles – all of whom have some stake in local peace and many of whom will need to be included in any wider national settlement if it is to hold. But knowledge is limited: One of the reasons Saudi Arabia has become embroiled in a conflict is that the generation of Saudis who knew Yemen, who took the time to understand tribal dynamics, have moved on. Yes, they used that knowledge to create instability under then President Ali Abdullah Saleh, but they also supported him when they had to, and ensured that Yemenis did not starve as that was not – and is still not – in the interest of Saudi Arabia. Advert Assuming peace in Yemen is in the long-term interests of all, including those intervening directly on the ground, no outside power now has the necessary credibility to initiate talks or encourage grassroots dialogue. Can a new UN envoy who has spent little time in Yemen compensate by surrounding himself with people who understand Yemeni tribal politics but who are not partisan? Even making that judgement requires some local knowledge, and the battle for the port of Hodeidah in June this year demonstrates that even when great efforts are made to listen to all sides, painstaking diplomacy can be undermined by external actions. But there is still value in nurturing those contacts: Preventive diplomacy The practice of sending envoys abroad to represent your sovereign interests is long established. More recent is the idea that diplomats are involved in preventive diplomacy – seeking to prevent conflicts from breaking out. That was the aim of both the League of Nations and the United Nations: The invasion of Iraq, without prior UN Security Council approval, effectively ended that rights-based era before it had started. Bush famously ignored State Department advice in Iraq. Few diplomats knew Libya well enough to understand the repercussions of military intervention, and the then French president Nicolas Sarkozy and British prime minister David Cameron were both criticized for their limited political consultation. Yet the efforts of preventive diplomacy continue. It is easy to criticize their efforts and accuse them of being hamstrung by the limits of mandates set by the UN Security Council. But consider the options: For example, Edward Spears encouraged Lebanese independence in before the French were willing to grant it, and it was never clear to either the British or the French whose side Spears was really on – ostensibly a British envoy, he was a friend of De Gaulle. Traditional diplomacy at its best is imaginative because it does focus on the detail, and it is the knowledge of the detail that permits creativity and offers the opportunity to prevent conflict or stop fighting once it has started Such a scenario is almost impossible to imagine today, where the room for manoeuvre of national diplomats is limited by the ability – and demand – to immediately defer to capitals for decisions. So instead of a patchwork of national diplomats working together but always with their national interests in mind, we have a system of supposedly neutral UN envoys mandated by a degree of consensus but vetoed if they are likely to overstep some national red line. They do persevere and try to bring warring factions together as in Libya and Yemen, picking up the pieces of the consequences of less informed decisions. Equally important, they carry on the day-to-day work of diplomacy in, say, Lebanon, helping to preserve the fragile, negative peace that has prevailed there since French intervention, understanding the real danger in a situation that seemed to undermine the only potential candidate for prime minister in Lebanon, prevented potential conflict and allowed all actors to save face. Behind the scenes, the UN Special Envoy carries out endless meetings with all political factions, including the leadership of Hizbullah. On the border with Israel, the UN brokers regular contact between representatives of

the Israeli army and the Lebanese army. All of these meetings and dialogues help lessen the chances of conflict or at least the chances of conflict breaking out through error and misunderstanding. In complex negotiations, success can hinge on a certain individual daring to test the limits of the possible. But having the confidence to test those limits depends not on an ability to make instant character judgements but on a sound understanding of the situation on the ground in all its complexities. The danger today is that neither national governments nor UN envoys have the knowledge or the freedom of movement necessary for innovative solutions – and the current batch of political leaders do not have the patience or inclination to let them try. The war that never was: Three conflicts averted by smart diplomacy – The Gambia The brutal year rule of President Yahya Jammeh came to an end in , when he was defeated in a shock election result by the main opposition candidate, Adama Barrow. Swift mediation by neighbouring West African countries – backed by the credible threat of armed intervention – forced Jammeh to step down and enabled the peaceful transfer of power. The African Union, with UN support, intervened quickly, sending a mediation team led by Kofi Annan that pushed President Mwai Kibaki and his challenger Raila Odinga into a mediation process that ultimately halted the bloodshed. This article is from the September-October issue of *New Internationalist*. You can access the entire archive of over issues with a digital subscription. Please support us with a small recurring donation so we can keep it free to read online.

**Chapter 4 : Preventive Diplomacy at the UN**

*"In this careful study, distinguished former UN civil servant Bertrand G. Ramcharan traces the history of the practice of preventive diplomacy by UN Secretaries-General, the Security Council, and other UN organizations, and assesses the record of preventive diplomacy and examines its prospects in an age of genocide and terrorism."*

A UN Alliance of Civilizations Forum United Nations Headquarters March 20, Boutros Boutros-Ghali played many roles in a long and full life; some can be captured in the various titles that characterized his decades of public service. There were common threads that linked these official roles into a cohesive tapestry, but only those privileged to know Boutros on a personal level could fully appreciate the exceptional qualities that made him such a unique individual. I knew him for many decades as his physician, confidant and friend. He was a fiercely independent man, one of exceptional integrity and honesty, with an endearing, self-effacing humor. He possessed a rare modesty and humility that came from a long noble struggle to help his nation, family, friends, and a world in desperate need of his generous insights. The topic I have chosen for this Inaugural Lecture in honor of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, is one that was very close to his heart. There is a lovely story behind that response. For many years Leia, Boutros, my wife Kate and I would gather for a week-long retreat to discuss difficult issues that were likely to arise in the United Nations or other international debates. From these retreats came many long-term projects, including his commitment to Preventive Diplomacy. Boutros, in a remarkable gesture of confidence in the importance of creative ideas, and in the capacity of his physician to explore " and explain " the concepts of preventive diplomacy, asked, in , that I convene and Chair a plenary conference on the concept at the United Nations. Speakers were asked to present their arguments using the universally understood semantics of health, disease and medicine. Ambassadors, as well as the general public, often use common medical words, and diplomats can readily adapt these terms in explaining the evils of spreading discord, and the multiple methods employed in efforts to restore peace. Conflicts " like malignant tumors " can metastasize if appropriate therapy is not provided, can become endemic in innocent populations, defying early diagnoses. There are contagious effects in conflicts that may cause political paralysis, and the hemorrhaging of societal understanding leading to mental scars, post traumatic psychological syndromes, physical deformities, amputations, the terminology of sexual assaults and the escalation to epidemic levels of uncontrolled local feverish fighting. We talk of the search, usually futile, for instant cures, for DNA-like analyses of impending strife, of seeking the proper peace-keeping prescriptions for warring patients, of using quarantine and isolation to contain diseased states with diplomatic tools, of maintaining treatment protocols until remission is realized by adjusting the dosages of, for example, sanctions. So also, with Preventive Diplomacy, we suggested that it might be helpful to use public health cost-benefit examples to justify the large expenditures often necessary to alleviate conflict-prone situations. In conflict resolutions one tries to identify obstacles to " and blockages in " the search for peace as if one were diagnosing and treating an impaired circulatory system. We can argue for the long-term involvement of peacekeeping operations by citing preventive chemotherapy, and the public understands such analogies. These are but a few of the benefits of utilizing universally known medical terms to explain the often arcane goals and methods of diplomacy, goals that must now convince a citizenry that demands increasing transparency to sustain costly international interventions and relief operations. I edited the manuscripts into book form, and that text, in follow up editions and translations, is widely used in academic and diplomatic training programs throughout the world. One of the supreme creations of the human spirit is the idea of prevention. Like liberty and equality, it is a seminal concept drawn from a reservoir of optimism that centuries of epidemics, famines and wars have failed to deplete. It is an amalgam of hope and possibility, which assumes that misery is not an indefinable mandate of fate, a punishment only redeemable in a later life, but a condition that can be treated like a disease, and, sometimes, cured, or even prevented. During a lifetime in the practice of medicine " in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America, as well as my own country " I have seen the daily wonders of the healing arts: Caught up in hawkish rhetoric, diplomats and politicians too often embark on interventions without carefully considering the consequences. In working with Boutros to refine an approach

to preventive diplomacy it was only natural for me to think of clinical and public health models in contemplating the disorders threatening the health of the world community as it emerged from the rigid alignments of the Cold War and groped for new organizing principles in an age of high technology, global economic competition and multipolar politics. For power balances, realpolitik, and the other blunt-edged tools of East-West confrontation simply did not fit the need for far more subtle, creative and prospective approaches to the problems complicating the search for peace. Wanton killing and brutality within supposedly sovereign borders, ethnic and religious strife, millions of starving or near-starving refugees, other millions of migrants fleeing their homes out of fear for their lives or in a desperate search for a better life, human rights trampled down, appalling poverty in the shadows of extraordinary wealth, inhumanity on an incredible scale in what was supposed to be a peaceful dawn following the end of the Cold War: There had to be a new mindset where diplomats would try to sense dangers before crises exploded, invest in early warning exercises, and intervene, if necessary, at latent stages of conflicts. Some problems – maybe most – may have no immediate solutions, but the good public health professional, using all the data of epidemiology and public persuasion, can be positioned to intercede effectively whenever necessary. Diplomats must learn to deal with causes before they are results, to probe societal and political problems when the stress is still manageable, to honor crisis avoidance even more than crisis management. But if preventive diplomacy was to replace traditional reactive diplomacy, there must be fundamental changes in our international approaches. At present only problems that attain crisis proportions seem to attract the attention of politicians or diplomats. Our leaders simply are not attuned to deal with incipient disorders at a time when prevention is possible. This will not change easily, especially because journalists, even more in an age of instant information overload, will always prefer to report dramatic conflicts and so-called resolutions rather than the non-story, in their minds, of an avoided tragedy. Preventive diplomacy emphasizes earlier diagnoses and new kinds of therapy. Underlying causes have to be attacked sooner rather than later, before they become fulminating infections that rage beyond rational control or political containment. This is the defining principle of this new preventive diplomacy, which argues that social detection and early intervention should be as honored in international relations as political negotiation and military response. In its pristine form, the idea is simplicity itself; it is reason opposed to irrationality, peace preferred to violence. In the reality of a disordered world, however, preventive diplomacy is incredibly more complex and, in some respects, controversial. People can disagree on how to define social health and political disease. The tensions between rights and obligations may seem to be intractable. Force sometimes can be necessary to achieve social progress, so it cannot always be condemned. But while violence may be understandable, it rarely leads towards lasting peace. The very breadth of this view of preventive diplomacy suggests that the term itself is far more restrictive than its purpose and conception. For diplomacy, as it has been practiced during most of a now-dying Industrial Age, had been centered on the idea of nation states dealing with each other on a government to government basis with the help of professionals specializing in secret negotiations and political conspiracy. Today, however, international relations have been utterly transformed by instant communication, by better informed and more active publics, by the spread of market capitalism, the fragmentation of politics and a veritable explosion of commercial transactions and nongovernmental activism. Even the supposedly bedrock principle of national sovereignty has been eroded. Furthermore, preventive diplomacy indicates the many disparate efforts aimed at the maintenance of international peace and security is not a matter for diplomats alone. For the current sources of human stress, community breakdown, and group violence are far too diverse and too deeply embedded in social change to be consigned to the windowless compartments of conventional diplomacy. Many problems do not move in a straight line but rather in endless gyres of cause and effect, so that a fall in coffee prices, for example, can trigger economic unrest, genocide, and precipitate fleeing refugees, starvation, cholera, dysentery and other diseases that overwhelm medical workers and relief organizations. The patterns Boutros and I discussed in the s concerning Rwanda and the Balkans have re-emerged decades later in Syria and Afghanistan, Iraq and the Occupied Territories of Palestine. The cycles of disaster and the search for solutions involve many different disciplines, including medicine, so that prevention calls for a symphony rather than a solo performance by a single profession like diplomacy. It also calls for a new kind of diplomat. But

diplomats, unlike physicians, have not fully accepted a preventive ethos and a disciplined method of using tools to avoid conflicts. If that thesis is valid, then the orchestra clearly needed a knowledgeable and committed conductor capable of promoting preventive diplomacy around the world. I had long suggested to Boutros that health and humanitarian issues should be the pragmatic as well as the symbolic centerpiece of the United Nations. If the Organization was founded to beat weapons into ploughshares, then the fiscal and political focus on military peacekeeping was misplaced. The basic question we discussed, over and over, was how to best present the arguments for an emphasis on preventive diplomacy. I suggested to him that the methodology of public health, and even the universally understood semantics and metaphors of medicine, provided a unique basis for a new type of diplomacy. Five hundred years ago, Machiavelli, utilizing an apt medical analogy, noted, When trouble is sensed well in advance, it can easily be remedied; if you wait for it to show, any medicine will be too late because the disease will have become incurable. As the doctors say of a wasting disease, to start with it is easy to cure but difficult to diagnose; after a time, unless it has been diagnosed and treated at the outset, it becomes easy to diagnose but difficult to cure. So it is in politics. There are several important lessons in that quote. The shrewd and cynical Machiavelli knew that health images would help make his message clear to a skeptical public, and he unapologetically linked medicine and politics as part of life. But how rarely are these evil forces exposed early enough, or fought with effective tools before predictable disaster strikes. In preventive medicine one begins by searching for fundamental causes, for the etiology of a disease, and for techniques that can interrupt transmission before serious signs and symptoms become obvious and irreversible damage occurs. If a fatal disease threatens to spread, health experts devise control programs based on careful research and laboratory experiments, sophisticated statistical studies and models, field trials and double-blind surveys that try to minimize biases and biological variants, which often contaminate the best intentioned projects. When deaths do occur, scrupulous postmortem analyses are customary, so that the errors of the past become the building blocks for a better approach to the future. One should, we both believed, be able to adapt this approach to the epidemiology of conflict. Diplomatic exercises should be subjected to similar probes and autopsies. Nations, particularly great powers and international organizations, must become humble enough to learn from failed efforts rather than merely defending traditional practices. If there are new actors in world conflicts, and a new global environment created by, among other factors, a communication revolution, then the therapeutics of international mediation must change. Unfortunately, public figures are obsessed with dramatic solutions, with a fire brigade approach that assures a continuation of catastrophes. The international system is always in transition and the contours of the post-Cold War age are still far from clear. But there are already a number of fascinating trends that are central to the development of the preventive diplomacy concept. One is a tentative shift in the direction of individualism that focuses international attention on personal human rights rather than only on the rights and privileges of national sovereignty. Medicine and public health also teach us that diplomatic tools are more effective than coercion. In the case of AIDS, for example, attempts to curb the disease through legal enforcement failed. Only persuasion, education, and cooperation had any success in altering lifestyles that contributed to the problem. In the same way, force has proven to be a poor treatment for violence. Indeed, military intervention and sanctions often do more harm than good. And that is the attraction of preventive diplomacy in international relations – to stop wars before they start. Even if, as we must fully expect, that noble goal proves elusive, this approach offers the best, and maybe the only viable alternative to the failed practices of the past. Even after conflicts have begun, this new diplomacy, based on a philosophy that focuses on root causes and promotes early involvement can help de-escalate violence and hasten the restoration of peace. The development of sanitation, vaccines, and, more recently, environmental controls have produced phenomenal progress against the enemies of health. In the case of human societies, the promotion of liberal democracy and individual rights marked an historic advance beyond such ancient concepts as slavery and the divine right of kings. It was for these many reasons we believed that 50 years after the founding of the United Nations, there was the possibility that the principle of prevention just might take its place as a significant improvement over inaction or coercion in dealing with conflict, and we were determined to try. We knew there were no final answers to offer; there cannot be in our finite and imperfect state. But in the presence of disease,

there is common pain that makes no distinctions of race or religion or class or wealth. No matter where medical disaster strikes, all the strands of shared humanity converge in shared suffering. A tumor or tubercular lesion or an arrhythmia present in an identical manner, and it makes no difference whether the patient is an ambassador or a street cleaner. I shall now provide, in some detail, ideas that Boutros delivered in a powerful keynote address to the UN Conference, where he used, as you will appreciate, many similes and analogies of medical parlance. Most of what I shall present here are direct quotes from his speech. Almost in the role of a public health professional, he opened his talk by noting that in matters of peace and security, as in medicine, prevention is self-evidently better than cure. It saves lives and money and it forestalls suffering. He defined the main types of such action available at the United Nations: The Secretary General can use negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or try any other peaceful means, which the protagonists may choose. To these techniques can be added confidence-building measures, a therapy that can produce good results if the patients, i.

**Chapter 5 : Preventive diplomacy - Wikipedia**

*The concept of preventive diplomacy has captivated the United Nations since it was first articulated by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld a half-century ago. Successive generations of diplomats and statesmen have invested in the idea that diplomatic efforts might be able to head off international.*

Untitled Document Introduction Preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention and other forms of preventive action intended to stop armed conflicts before they escalate to widespread violence are the subject of intense debate. And despite their elevation to a norm in the United Nations, where they have been debated in the General Assembly and addressed in prominent reports from the Secretary-General, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention continue to face daunting obstacles. Drawing from recent high-level consultations on the topic, this piece considers some recurrent obstacles and emerging opportunities in relation to preventive action Muggah There is indeed a new appetite amongst United Nations member states and agencies to invest in preventive action. It has a certain economic appeal. The idea of devoting a relatively modest amount of resources to preventing violent conflict rather than investing in drastically more costly humanitarian, peacekeeping, reconstruction or stabilisation operations makes practical sense in a world facing a tumultuous economic slowdown Gowan Yet as appealing as they may be, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention continue to gain limited traction in policy and practice. While this partly stems from the difficulties associated with anticipating future challenges, the lack of uptake is fundamentally connected with the changing nature of violence. International diplomats and some practitioners have been comparatively slow to come to terms with the way the global burden of violence is changing and what this means for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. This is because complex inter-state conflicts gave way to large-scale civil wars, which are themselves being rapidly overtaken by smaller rebellions and mid-sized insurgencies large enough to cause significant damage on a national scale but too small to draw urgent diplomatic attention from United Nations Security Council members. Yet these nasty, protracted conflicts have become increasingly entrenched and geographically spread, thus lengthening the length of the average armed conflict Rangelov and Kaldor What is more, the growing scale and significance of chronic organised criminal violence, often sustained by trans-national crime networks, has recently raised new challenges about the definition of what constitutes armed conflict and to what extent this can be cleanly differentiated from certain forms of criminality Muggah Indeed, *The Global Burden of Armed Violence* by Krause, Muggah and Gilgen provides a more sophisticated assessment of the temporal and spatial dynamics of collective violence. It also points to new and innovative violence-prevention and reduction efforts in parts of Latin America and the Caribbean that involve new forms of mediation and pacification of criminal armed groups. It indirectly asks some tough questions: What international legal frameworks apply for such actors? What kinds of international involvement would be most appropriate, and which sorts of stakeholders or mediators are most likely to yield a positive resolution? And when is the intensity and organisation of violent settings ripe for preventive action, particularly preventive diplomacy? Defining Conflict Prevention and Preventive Diplomacy Before proceeding further into the discussion it is important to define preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention, two concepts that we address under the rubric of preventive action. To some experts in Sub-Saharan Africa, preventive diplomacy constitutes the consensual resolution of tensions and disputes while to others in North Africa it indicates a more regressive form of appeasement that allows underlying drivers of conflict to persist under a veneer of stability. The same holds true for conflict prevention, which certain diplomatic analysts perceive as including preventive diplomacy while development stakeholders commonly perceive it as a form of conflict sensitivity or peacebuilding, which are themselves contested concepts. These terminological disagreements stretch back more than two decades. Then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali differentiated preventive diplomacy from its cousin, peace-making, which he viewed as the resolution of large-scale conflicts through mediation and negotiation, and from its distant relative, peacekeeping. This early definition provides a core understanding of the goals of preventive diplomacy, which the United Nations and others have associated with a specific set of actions such as good offices, facilitation, mediation, conciliation, adjudication and

arbitration. Accordingly, it does not include what others refer to as conflict prevention, which primarily includes human rights, humanitarian and development assistance intended to ameliorate the underlying sources of conflict by improving the quality of governance, social and economic conditions, equality and the management of shared resources. That said, today conflict prevention continues to comprise a crucial form of preventive action which may have a role in creating local conditions which facilitate preventive diplomacy. Such infrastructures are designed from below and are intentionally embedded in formal and informal institutions at the grassroots. They combine networks of local community-based organisations, research and academic institutes, faith-based entities and political and social associations engaged in actively monitoring disputes and sources of tension, drawing attention to signs of trouble so that they can be ameliorated via conflict prevention or resolved through preventive diplomacy. According to such an understanding, they bring together a combination of preventive action efforts and help identify appropriate responses to various forms of collective violence depending on their character and dynamic progression. A Renaissance for Preventive Action? But the United Nations is not alone in advancing preventive action. Other international organizations have followed suit. Regional bodies have also increasingly taken up the language of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy Mancini National initiatives have also proliferated. Within the past year, the US government also began work on an Atrocities Prevention Board APB with a mandate to stop genocide-level violence and human rights abuses before they begin. As the prestige associated with conflict-ending or conflict-preventing mediation has risen in recent years, these countriesâ€™ as well as increasingly important players such as Qatarâ€™ have put sizable resources into preventive action. Many have also led prevention initiatives themselves and financed a widening array of private actors, particularly NGOs and for-profit mediation firms Eskandarpour and Wennmann Beyond more traditional peace and conflict-focused organisations such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Saferworld and International Alert, humanitarian and development agencies have also taken up the banner of conflict prevention. As with gender, climate change and other transversal priorities, conflict prevention and resolution have become core cross-cutting themes to be addressed through a wide array of humanitarian and development programmes in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Obstacles Confronting Contemporary Preventive Action The resurgence of preventive action has helped compensate for the previously-limited attention to these issues, but it has also engendered new ones. Certain obstacles remain that will impede the shift from preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention from ideas whose time have come to highly effective practices. Indeed, the rapid emergence of new stakeholders focused on conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy has generated challenges associated with coordination and quality control. While the diversity and heterogeneity of these new players may offer some exciting innovation, it also produces challenges of cooperation and mutual awareness. Indeed, there is a common complaint among officials, civil society representatives, religious leaders and activists in countries affected by chronic collective violence of being invited to an endless array of workshops, trainings, conflict resolution forums. What is more, progress in decentralising preventive action to the regional and local levels has yielded successes but also undermined the likelihood that conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy will occur. Research has long rallied around the benefits of localising preventive action â€™ emphasising the role of regional, national and subnational stakeholders rather than international experts with less familiarity of the local context. This localisation of preventive action has been heavily supported by regional organisations, national authorities, scholars and civil society representatives in chronically violence-affected contexts. While a positive and long-sought development, the increased role of regional bodies has confronted certain challenges. For example, regional institutions tend to be primarily concerned with the interests of their member governments and not necessarily non-state actors. They have thus strongly emphasised strict notions of national sovereignty in which many forms of prevention action are deemed to be inappropriate if not hostile. For instance, the Arab League and GCC did not begin addressing political instability until regimes in the Middle East were already rapidly deteriorating. Its preventive diplomacy agenda has, likewise, been steered away from drivers of violent conflict and instead focused on disaster relief, maritime security and partnerships, with mediation being one of several priorities, most of which bear little resemblance to preventive action ASEAN Not surprisingly, regional bodies, whether due to

political opposition among member nations or capacity and resource constraints, also tend to have fewer linkages with civil society. They are state-centric and slow to develop partnerships insofar as they are statutorily able to do so. This creates a situation in which appropriate prevention activities may be delayed or undermined. Furthermore, the evidence base for preventive action – the data showing how many conflicts have been averted and what methods work best – remains weak and unlikely to improve in the short term. Metrics of success for conflict prevention are notoriously hard to come by given that the optimal outcome – the absence of conflict – could hypothetically have been achieved without any intervention at all. When stakeholders agree that a conflict has been prevented, it is often unclear who ought to get the credit. Obtaining evidence for what does and does not work remains complicated for practical as well as political reasons. Research has suggested that confidentiality is crucial in some mediation processes, thus preventing researchers from observing or fully understanding the factors which did or did not lead to successful conflict prevention. Yet macro-level studies of preventive diplomacy yield only general findings regarding the types of actions, categories of mediators or approximate timing of effective interventions that correlate with success or failure. What might work when and under what conditions in a particular context – the types of questions practitioners mediating highly nuanced conflicts need to know – remains poorly understood. Of course, research networks are increasingly tackling such a challenge, and we provide recommendations in the following section for bolstering the evidence base. Opportunities for Moving Preventive Action Forward Each of the challenges above presents corresponding opportunities. Stakeholders that are fragmented can be better coordinated. The presumption that regional or national entities are inherently better at conflict prevention than international actors can be nuanced, and analyses of past experience and political arrangements can show where a regional or sub-regional body may be effective and where either international or highly local e. Moreover, the evidence base can be strengthened. An array of informed recommendations has emerged from the excellent work of the International Peace Institute, the United Nations, the World Bank, the Folke Bernadotte Academy and others. What follows is a collection of noteworthy recommendations, most of which emerge from the International Expert Forum event on preventive diplomacy and from the field Muggah. They propose the development of standardised frameworks and alignment of analyses across national, regional and international agencies. While sharing of conflict analyses can certainly help distill possible interpretations of a violent conflict, aligning perceptions is certain to result in more generic and potentially flawed analyses. By vetting and validating different analyses with stakeholders on the ground, it may also be possible to help identify – imperfectly and incrementally – elements of each analysis which may hold water and merit preventive or ameliorative responses. Align conflict analyses to local understandings and terminology Such analyses need not only be vetted with local stakeholders; they must also reflect their understandings of the conflict and the language they use to describe the dynamics at play. Overly intellectual and prescriptive studies of violent conflict causes may have analytical value but may not be as useful to mediators on the ground that are dealing not only with objective factors but with the local framing of those issues Ganson and Wennmann. Local narratives and connotations are crucial to grasp in any conflict analysis or form of preventive diplomacy or conflict prevention. Understanding the drivers of peace, which are as contextually-rooted as the drivers of conflict, is crucial for preventing conflict recurrence or for establishing conditions – particularly through infrastructures for peace – that make conflict unlikely even amidst periods of political, social or economic turmoil. Study the micro-determinants of success in preventive action Research related to preventive action has much further to go. The data limitations noted above make it unlikely that researchers will be permitted to observe, document and publish the factors which lead to a successful mediation effort. Nor are published accounts generally detailed or accurate enough, commonly representing one perspective from individuals promoting a particular narrative. Instead, academics and scholar-practitioners may wish to turn to subnational and local, even community-level, conflict resolution and prevention activities to understand what does and does not work i. Such studies can help close the gap between those who approach conflict and preventive action as a science and as an art. Begin a dialogue on coordination of preventive action The range of actors involved in preventive action is too diffuse and fragmented for any coordination body to step in and impose a degree of order. The subject matter at hand is also too sensitive, and stakeholders would rightly be concerned

about the ultimate goal of coordination and the use of any information they might share. However, there is an opportunity for a trusted stakeholder, likely a private foundation or widely admired NGO, to bring relevant groups together and discuss questions such as the following: Do you believe there is a need for increased coordination? What institution or set of institutions should host such a coordination mechanism? What would be its purpose and goal? Who should be included and excluded? How should sensitive information be safeguarded? These are just an initial collection of questions to be addressed in an open and participatory consultation process. Of course, the outcomes of any such dialogue would be far more meaningful if donors were willing to allocate financing for future coordination efforts in advance. Ensure sufficient and flexible financing for preventive action The question of donor agencies necessarily lends itself to a discussion of who pays for what and how. While donors have increasingly accepted the notion of preventive action, funding generally remains limited and earmarked for specific activities in specific countries. Yet the notion of preventive action is rooted in flexibility and in an ability to put resources where they are needed with little notice. Hence, the formation of a dedicated, multi-donor trust fund for preventive action which disallows earmarking for pet countries or projects could present one way forward which is gaining some momentum and attention. The opportunities noted above could, if acted upon, improve the evidence base for and quality of preventive action in violence-affected environments around the world. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The Role of Private Actors. Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development.

### Chapter 6 : Project MUSE - Preventive Diplomacy at the UN

*The United Nations Organisation (UN) is best endowed to conduct preventive diplomacy (PD) by preventing disputes and conflicts arising from interstate and intrastate relationships. The UN has the means to prevent such conflicts and disputes from emerging and escalating into armed confrontation.*

### Chapter 7 : Preventive Diplomacy in Africa: Adapting to New Realities | Crisis Group

*Secretary-General Guterres has called for a "surge in diplomacy for peace," pointing to the comparative value of preventive diplomacy in addressing the risks of violent conflict worldwide.*

### Chapter 8 : Diplomats – who needs them? | New Internationalist

*Notwithstanding semantic disagreements over preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention, norms, rules and institutions related to preventive action have proliferated since Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's first utterance of the phrase 'preventive diplomacy' in In , the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).*

### Chapter 9 : Preventive Diplomacy at the UN : Bertrand G. Ramcharan :

*Preventive diplomacy actions can be implemented by the UN, regional organizations, NGO networks and individual states. One of the examples of preventive diplomacy is the UN peacekeeping mission in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) in*