

# DOWNLOAD PDF POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACE AND CLASS IN SOUTH AFRICA

## Chapter 1 : Class and Race: Marxism, Racism & the Class Struggle – WASP

*The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane @ Monthly Review Press New York and London.*

The black majority is poorer, has lower education levels, is more likely to live in informal dwellings, is less likely to have access to electricity or flush toilets and is less likely to own household goods such as a refrigerator than any of the three other racial groups. Average annual household incomes by race, source: The Census data on average annual household income broken down by race provides a very stark picture, portrayed in the graph on the right. The red bars show the distribution of the black population by income bracket. Most black South Africans find themselves in the five lowest income brackets, whereas most whites The two other minority groups, Coloureds and Asians, place between blacks and whites. Coloureds tend to be slightly more affluent than blacks, with many of them in the lowest income groups For example, while only 7. Another way of looking at income disparities is comparing the incomes of blacks, Coloureds and Indians to those of whites, keeping white income constant at Since the fall of apartheid, all three groups have become slightly more affluent Asians especially. The country currently has around 0. The aforementioned paper shows the Gini index by race since According to the Census, 7, of white households lived in informal dwellings against 1. Inequality, however, is highest in rural and urban formal areas. The Group Areas Act effectively reserved the best, most developed areas to whites. Residential segregation social apartheid was brutally enforced through forced removals and destruction of racially mixed neighborhoods such as District 6 in Cape Town. However, social apartheid remains very much alive in South Africa. Many urban blacks remain concentrated in densely populated and racially homogeneous townships, most of them located on the poor outskirts of major cities. Soweto, in Johannesburg, is the largest and most well-known township, with a population of over a 1. Soweto, however, has grown more socially diverse since the end of apartheid: Many other townships, however, remain poor with many residents still living in informal housing shacks. In the major urban centres, whites live in the most affluent suburbs. In Cape Town, the most affluent whites tend to live in the leafy and breathtaking suburbs along the Atlantic Ocean Sea Point , while the black and Coloured populations remain the windswept Cape Flats Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plains are two huge townships, one heavily black and the other heavily Coloured, in the Cape Flats. In these areas, the affluent white areas are found along the coast, while impoverished black sometimes Coloured townships are found further inland. Overall, Sandton is now New suburban developments in the Midrand, such as Vorna Valley, Halfway Gardens and Noordwyk, are black middle-class areas. Cape Town, however, remains one of the more segregated cities in South Africa. Whites, as noted above, are largely found in the affluent, leafy and hilly Southern Suburbs, the coastal areas Sea Point, Green Point, Blouberg etc or the elevated northern suburban town of Bellville. The Coloured population is heavily concentrated in the Western and Northern Cape provinces, for reasons which will be explained later. They form a plurality of the population in the City of Cape Town Although relatively few Coloureds live in the other provinces, there are heavily Coloured neighborhoods in both Joburg and Pretoria, in both cases formerly exclusive Coloured townships Eldorado Park, Westbury and Newclare in Joburg; Eersterust in Pretoria. In Durban, the densest concentrations of Indians are Chatsworth and Phoenix. However, there is small but sizable Indian population in Gauteng and some very small concentrations in some other major cities in the country. In Johannesburg, Indians make up an overwhelming majority of the population in Lenasia, a formerly exclusive Indian township. Black Africans Black population by ward, source: Wikipedia About eight in ten South Africans are black. Others, who now speak Sotho-Tswana languages, settled in the drier areas of the veld in the present-day Free State and North West, and others lived along the banks of the Limpopo River in the north, in areas bordering Zimbabwe and Botswana. In the days before European colonization, these peoples generally lived in small chiefdoms – although the Sotho-Tswana peoples concentrated in larger, hierarchical communities around water sources and trading towns. The correct term for

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referring to black South Africans is a highly contentious topic, plagued by the legacy of apartheid. It is generally understood that usage of the word is punishable under hate speech legislation. Black South Africans are a linguistically diverse people. Linguistic groups often coincide with ethnic groups. The ruling African National Congress ANC, along with most other black political leaders, have long rejected tribalism and emphasized non-tribalism and black unity or Africanism. Most blacks are Christian, but they tend to be followers of African-initiated churches and practice a syncretic form of Christianity, combining with traditional pre-Christian beliefs. According to the Census, Smaller numbers were close to other churches: Zulu population by ward, source: Zulu-speakers make up a bare plurality of the provincial population Black areas in Gauteng, unlike in most other provinces, are linguistically diverse: Soweto is plurality Zulu, at There are also Zulu majorities or significant minorities in many other townships in the Johannesburg region: Responsibilities were divided by gender, with the men responsible for defense, caring for cattle, making weapons and tools and building dwellings. Women had domestic responsibilities and raised crops. However, Shaka had a major historical and cultural impact. Modern Zulu culture continues to lionize Shaka. Xhosa population by ward, source: The modern Xhosa heartland is in the Eastern Cape province, where they make up Black immigration to the Western Cape Cape Town was tightly curtailed and strictly controlled under apartheid, but the fall of apartheid in led to major Xhosa migration from the impoverished traditional areas of the Transkei into Cape Town and the Western Cape. The black population in Cape Town is almost entirely Xhosa. Some Xhosa migrated to the Witwatersrand, but they only make up 6. The Xhosa historically lived in villages on the top of ridges overlooking rivers, and lived by cattle herding, cultivation and hunting. Xhosa homesteads were organized around descent groups, with descent traced through male forebears. The Xhosa had close contact with Europeans in the nineteenth century, welcoming missionaries and educators. The Northern Sotho group is, in reality, an heterogeneous group uniting all the peoples in the northern Transvaal Limpopo speaking the Northern Sotho language, called "misleadingly" Sepedi, the language of the Pedi people a polity in the Northern Sotho group. The Pedi became the most powerful and important group, mainly due to their control of interior-coastal trade routes in the nineteenth century and relatively military strength. Many Northern Sotho moved, first temporarily and later permanently, to the industrial Witwatersrand in search of employment in the mines or as tenant farmers on white-owned land. In Limpopo, the geographical distribution of the Northern Sotho population "in densely populated rural areas or sprawling townships outside Polokwane and Mokopane" coincide with the boundaries of the former Lebowa homeland. The Tswana is one of the black ethnic groups in South Africa which extends across national borders: Tswana population by ward, source: Wikipedia Tswana chiefdoms were more highly stratified than those of other Sotho or the Nguni. Tswana chiefs gradually lost their power following clashes with Afrikaner farmers and formal integration into British and Afrikaner territory. Like many other black peoples in South Africa, the Tswana were forced to turn to migrant labour, often in the Witwatersrand, for their livelihoods. Some of the densest concentrations are found in sprawling townships outside of Mafikeng and the mining areas outside of Rustenburg and Brits. Like the Tswana and the Swazi, the Basotho population extends across the border into the landlocked mountainous kingdom of Lesotho. However, with over 3. Moshoeshe resisted Afrikaner expansion in the Highveld by welcoming French missionaries and successfully appealing to the British for protection, albeit at the cost of significant territorial cessions to the British. Lesotho, formerly known as the Basutoland Protectorate, gained independence from Britain in In the Free State, the Basotho population is largely located in the more populated and environmentally favourable areas further west. Specifically, it congregates around major cities: Bloemfontein, the gold mining town of Welkom, Sasolburg, Bethlehem and Kroonstad. The Basotho are the second largest Bantu-speaking group in Gauteng after the Zulu, with There are small Basotho minorities in the North West around the mining centre of Klerksdorp, Mpumalanga and the Eastern Cape a mountainous region just south of Lesotho, which was part of the Transkei homeland. Tsonga population by ward, source: Wikipedia The Tsonga, who make up 5. The wider Tsonga group includes several smaller ethnic groups including the Shangaan, Thonga and Tonga unrelated to another ethnic group also

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named Tonga. The Tsonga people spillover into neighboring Mozambique, where they likely make up a larger group than in the RSA. In the past, the Tsonga largely lived from fishing and crop cultivation but not cattle herding, because they lived in a fly-infested lowland. Many Tsonga migrated inland during the Zulu mfecane, during which some Tsonga clans were subjugated by Zulu warriors. Under apartheid, about 50% of the Tsonga population lived in Gazankulu, a self-governing homeland intended for the Shangaan-Tsonga people. Like many other blacks, a lot migrated to the industrial Witwatersrand and settled alongside other poor blacks in townships. The present-day Tsonga population who speak Xitsonga is split between Limpopo and Mpumalanga, the Tsonga population still coincides to a large extent with the boundaries of the former Gazankulu homeland. In Gauteng, the Tsonga largely lived in ethnically mixed townships, mostly on the northern outskirts of the city of Tshwane Pretoria. The Swazi are a predominantly Nguni people who account for 3.5% of the population. The Swazi population extends across borders into the kingdom of Swaziland, which has a population of 1.5 million. There are about 1.5 million Swazi in South Africa. The Swazi language is known in Swazi as siSwati, but it is also commonly called by its Zulu name isiSwazi. Swazi population by ward, source: The Swazi monarchs maintained their power through marriages with Zulu chiefs and other Swazi clans, payment of tribute to the Zulu monarchs when it was thought to be necessary and building a powerful army.

# DOWNLOAD PDF POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACE AND CLASS IN SOUTH AFRICA

## Chapter 2 : Download [PDF] southern africa political economic monthly

*Download The Political Economy Of Race And Class In South Africa written by Bernard Magubane and has been published by Monthly Review Pr this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on with Political Science categories.*

The article below begins our analysis outlining the Marxist approach to these critically important issues by examining the historical emergence of racism. This article can be downloaded as a booklet here. But for the black majority, the more things have changed, the more they have stayed the same. To all intents and purposes white privilege never died. Society today is more unequal than it was under apartheid. Half of all black households struggle to survive on less than R2, per month; half of all white households live on more than R10, per month. But it is not just economic inequality that keeps racism in the foreground. Racist prejudices are never far from the news. In January it was reported that white parents had pressured a private school in Gauteng to racially segregate the pupils. In December, the racist booking policy of a Cape Town restaurant was exposed when a black family was repeatedly refused a table reservation that a white friend then made with one telephone call. Earlier that year, there was outrage when pictures of white University of Pretoria students dressed as black domestic workers were circulated on social media, faces blackened and behinds padded. The emergence of the black-student led Rhodes Must Fall Campaign at the University of Cape Town that demanded the removal of statues from the colonial and apartheid era showed that white privilege continues to fuel a feeling of national oppression. This is felt most strongly in the elite universities that remain bastions of white privilege. The Rhodes campaign expressed itself in the language of Black Consciousness. But how do these ideas account for the continuation of white privilege and racism twenty-one years into black majority rule? Frequently, supporters of these ideas fall back on nationalism. Under apartheid, the nationalism of the ANC was progressive in overcoming the tribal divisions encouraged by the apartheid regime and by colonialism before that. But today, on the basis of majority rule, nationalism and nationalist theories can play a reactionary role. Because they cannot account for the continuation of white privilege and racism they end up relying on racist prejudices themselves – whites are born racists and that is that. The failure of nationalism to adequately explain the real basis of inequality and poverty in society today in turn allows space for tribalism, and even xenophobia, to grow. They are maintained by the class structure of capitalist society. Indeed, capitalism itself was responsible for the birth of racism. Before capitalism, discrimination against an entire people based on permanent prejudices of supposedly inferior ancestry, skin colour or other physical and mental characteristics did not exist. Historically, racism emerged to justify the Atlantic slave trade, an enormous source of profits for the fledgling capitalist class. Charting the development of racism against the ebbs, flows, twists and turns of the class struggle is the only way to understand why racism exists. This requires a Marxist analysis. The Marxist approach For Marxists, all ideas, including racism, are ultimately a reflection of social conditions. This materialist approach means ideas must be examined as products of historical development. Trying to understand any idea without a materialist approach is like examining the shadow independently of the object that casts it. To truly understand racism it is necessary to examine the specific historical circumstances that created it and which have maintained and modified it up to the present day. The most fundamental social conditions that must be examined are the relationship between classes which themselves arise depending on how society organises production. Different ways of organising production give rise to different classes. History has known a number of different forms of class society. But the common feature is a minority ruling class who exploits the working majority by expropriating it. This is the fundamental division in society. Different systems of belief or ideologies emerge to justify the position of the ruling class and to persuade the masses to accept their exploitation. Different forms of class society require different ideologies to justify them. However, the history of slave uprisings, peasant revolts, and the mass revolutionary struggles of the working class in our own time shows that the ruling class only ever partially

succeeds in fooling the classes they exploit. But it is not only the class struggle between the ruling class and the exploited majority that has significance. The struggles between competing factions of the same ruling class, or two different exploiting classes, also play an important role in determining the development of society and the ideologies that emerge. For example the competition between the different imperialist capitalist classes in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, or the struggle between the rising capitalist class and the declining feudal ruling class in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is the conflicting interests of different classes that are the real social basis upon which racial prejudices, discrimination and oppression form. In the struggles between classes, differences of race but also gender, age, sexuality and religion are frequently given an antagonistic form leading to corresponding ideologies of racism, sexism, ageism, homophobia and religious prejudice. Engels dealt extensively with the roots in class society of oppression against women and the sexist prejudices this gives rise to; later writers have shown how homophobic prejudices emerged in the nineteenth century based on the form of the family in capitalist society. Dialectics means to examine the development of social conditions as processes and interactions. This means that Marxism recognises that ideas and ideologies can themselves interact with the economic forces that originally created them adding layers of complexity to social conditions. Engels explained the nuances that dialectics brings to Marxism as a method of analysis when he wrote: Other than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure – political forms of the class struggle and its results – constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc. There is an interaction of all these elements in which, amid all the endless host of accidents that is, of things and events whose inner interconnection is so remote or so impossible of proof that we can regard it as non-existent, as negligible, the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary. Otherwise the application of the theory to any period of history would be easier than the solution of a simple equation of the first degree. For once arisen an idea or ideology, even a prejudice, can take on a certain life of its own within limits. Under the weight of historical inertia ideas can persist long past their use-by date. So for example, whilst it is not possible to be born racist, it is possible to be born into a racist society and raised to accept prejudices that were created by the social conditions of a past period. Also, ideas and ideologies can be given a new content by changing social conditions even as the language they express themselves in remains unchanged. Ideas that were progressive in one period in history can become reactionary in another as they are adapted to serve different class interests. Different ideologies can intertwine. This has been the case with racism and nationalism, particularly in the social conditions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is only Marxism that can cope with such contradictions by basing itself on the real thread of continuity in changing social conditions and not the ideological shadows they cast. Marxism can accommodate and explain why sections of classes, under certain conditions, can support ideologies that do not correspond with their fundamental interests. Under the right historical conditions, ruling class ideologies of racism and nationalism can succeed in creating divisions amongst the working class and poor and prevent them from uniting against their common exploiter, the capitalist class. Today this idea is regularly distorted to write-off the entire working class of Europe. But even in the nineteenth century that Lenin was describing, at the height of colonial rule, he stressed that it was only ever a section of the working class that succumbed to this bribery. The weakness of the bourgeois method The ability of Marxism to illuminate the social conditions that create and nurture racism can be further demonstrated by comparing it to the weaknesses of bourgeois i. To describe them as bourgeois is not meant as an insult to the writers but a description of the weakness in their method of analysis. This weakness can be summed-up as the failure to consistently place the examination of social conditions, especially class relations, at the centre of analysis. Whilst bourgeois academics plunge into the depths of history, they begin to treat racism itself as an ahistorical phenomenon. In other words, as something that has always existed, rather than something that was brought into being under certain social conditions at a definite point in history. This means they cannot account for the emergence of new ideas and prejudices or the circumstances that cause them to change their form. Crucially therefore, they cannot point out the tasks

necessary to end racism. The same weakness is reflected by some Africanist thinkers. Those that assert that the only racism is the very real prejudices of white people, held by all white people regardless of time and place, likewise treat racism as an ahistorical phenomenon. Part II The rise of capitalism and the emergence of racism Racism was created by the social conditions in Europe as capitalism began its long development. From the fifteenth century, the development of the Atlantic slave trade began a long process that would crystalize racist prejudices. But racism did not automatically spring into existence the moment the white proto-capitalist Portuguese merchants entered the West African market for black slaves in the s. The precise economic interests, the class strategies necessary to satisfy them, and the ideologies necessary to justify this shifted with the different phases of capitalist development. The master key to understanding racism is identifying these shifting economic interests and the ebbs and flows of the class struggle that arose from them. But before looking at how the economic interests of the capitalist class created and maintained racism, it is necessary to briefly look at the character of prejudice and discrimination in the feudal society that capitalism developed out of. The idea that prejudices based on ancestry and skin colour could be the basis for permanent discrimination were incompatible with the interests of the feudal ruling class and contradicted the ideologies that legitimised their rule. In feudal society the Christian Catholic religion was the dominant ideological prism reflecting social conditions. Everyone was born into their station in life from the king and the lords down to the peasants. Before capitalism in Europe there were no nation-states. Feudalism was composed of small-scale political entities united under a distant monarch or emperor. The mass of the peasant population, tied to a small area of land for life, without mobility, literacy, the existence of large-scale trade or a mass media, lacked the social conditions for a national consciousness to develop. Not only did the lack of a national consciousness rule out the feudal ruling class leaning on nationalism to justify their rule, it would have been impossible generally as the language and culture of the ruling class was often different to those that they ruled. It took the development of capitalist social relations and the rise of the capitalist class to exert the pressure toward the formation of nation-states. The chief necessity was the need for a sizeable national market that would allow the capitalist class to develop the scale of production in order to increase their wealth. Once this process was underway it stimulated nationalist ideologies to correspond with it. Conflicts over the character of the nation arose. Who was and was not to be included? Such considerations gave rise to nationalist and even racist prejudices to discriminate in answering these questions where there were not straightforward answers. This doctrine held that all people, whatever their ancestry or skin colour, were potential Christian converts. It was the duty of Christian rulers to try and bring them into the fold. This doctrine justified the economic interests of the feudal ruling class who could only increase their power and wealth through the conquest on new lands and the peasants that were tied to them by birth. The form of exploitation in feudal society saw the two as inseparable. Therefore religious conversion of conquered populations was demanded to square the circle between the ideological justification for the conquest and the necessity to maintain the peasants on the land. The social conditions of feudal society and the interests of the feudal ruling class gave pre-capitalist prejudice and discrimination their expression in religious terms. But this could be escaped through religious conversion. Indeed, the interests of the feudal ruling class demanded such conversion.

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## Chapter 3 : An overview of the political economy of South Africa | Kim Coetzee - racedaydvl.com

*It is a book that could be useful to all historians in South Africa when rewriting the history of our beloved motherland - It is a book that will give South Africans a better perspective of the Political History of the economy of the country.*

The author has compiled a reading list at the end of the essay for those who wish to learn more about post-apartheid South Africa. The end of the apartheid regime was a great human achievement. Yet the election of an African National Congress ANC majority with Nelson Mandela as the new president did not alter the enormous structural gap in wealth between the majority black and minority white populations. Indeed, it set in motion neoliberal policies that exacerbated class, race, and gender inequality. To promote a peaceful transition, the agreement negotiated between the racist white regime and the ANC allowed whites to keep the best land, the mines, manufacturing plants, and financial institutions. There were only two basic paths that the ANC could follow. One was to mobilize the people and all their enthusiasm, energy, and hard work, use a larger share of the economic surplus through state-directed investments and higher taxes, and stop the flow of capital abroad, including the repayment of illegitimate apartheid-era debt. The other was to adopt a neoliberal capitalist path, with a small reform here or there, while posturing as if social democracy was on the horizon. A few months prior to the democratic election on April 27, 1994, a transitional South African government was formed incorporating both the ANC and the National Party, which had been in power for 45 years thanks to whites-only voting. Even as racist laws were tumbling and the dignity of the majority black population was soaring, December 1, 1994, was the point at which the struggle for socioeconomic justice in South Africa was conclusively lost, at least temporarily. In addition, Michel Camdessus, then IMF managing director, put informal but intense pressure on incoming president Mandela to reappoint the two main stalwarts of apartheid-era neoliberalism, the finance minister and the central bank governor, both from the National Party. For the ANC to brag of a level of macroeconomic stability not seen in the country for 40 years is to ignore the easiest measure of such stability: In reality, the three currency crashes witnessed over a period of a few weeks in February-March 1994, June-July 1994, and December 1994 ranged from 30 to 50 percent, and each led to massive interest rate increases that sapped growth and rewarded the speculators. These moments of macroeconomic instability were as dramatic as any other incidents during the previous two centuries, including the September 1905 financial panic that split big business from the apartheid regime and paved the way for ANC rule. Domestic investment has been sickly with a less than 2 percent increase per year during the GEAR era when it was meant to increase by 7 percent, and were it not for the partial privatization of the telephone company, foreign investment would not even register. Domestic private sector investment was negative for several years, as capital effectively went on strike, moving mobile resources offshore as rapidly as possible. The reality is that South Africa has witnessed the replacement of racial apartheid with what is increasingly referred to as class apartheid—systemic underdevelopment and segregation of the oppressed majority through structured economic, political, legal, and cultural practices. Instead of the employment growth of 3-4 percent per year promised by GEAR proponents, annual job losses of 1-4 percent characterized the late 1990s. Adding frustrated job-seekers to that figure brings the percentage of unemployed people to 43 percent. White businesses wanted to escape the economic stagnation and declining profits born of a classic overaccumulation crisis. They felt besieged by international sanctions, and even more by the rise of black militancy in workplaces and communities during the 1990s and 2000s. It is here that the core concession made by the ANC during the transition deal is apparent. The deal represented simply this: Pretoria also cut primary corporate taxes dramatically from 48 percent in 1994 to 30 percent in 1997 and maintained the deficit below 3 percent of GDP by restricting social spending, notwithstanding the avalanche of unemployment. Across the racial divide, the poorest half of all South Africans earned just 9 percent of all income. The richest 20 percent earned 65 percent of all income. It is fair to assume that inequality continued to worsen after 1997. An estimated 10 million people had their water cut off, according to two national government surveys, and 10 million were also victims of electricity disconnections. In addition, two

million people have been evicted from their homes or land since liberation in 1994. Gender relations show some improvements, especially in reproductive rights, albeit with extremely uneven access. These women are not paid for their role in social reproduction, which in a normal labor market would be handled by state schooling, health insurance, and pensions. This structured superexploitation is exacerbated by an apparent increase in domestic sexual violence associated with rising male unemployment and the feminization of poverty. Women are also the main caregivers in the home, and this entails bearing the highest burden associated with degraded health. With the public healthcare services in decline due to underfunding and the increasing penetration of private providers, infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, cholera, malaria, and AIDS are rife, all far more prevalent than during apartheid. Diarrhea kills 43, children a year, as a result mainly of inadequate potable water provision. Although a roll-out of medicines was finally promised by the Cabinet in September, Mbeki immediately poured salt in the wounds by denying in a New York Times interview that he knew anyone who had died of AIDS or was even HIV positive. Notwithstanding peace deals in central Africa and Liberia, concerns remain over how durable the interventions are, when they fail to grapple with underlying structural causes of failed states and interethnic conflict. The Lesotho Highlands Water Project has become the highest-profile example of third world development corruption. In spite of water scarcity there is little sign that these water development schemes will help, since the extremely high costs of water transfer are deterring consumption by poor people. The wealthiest urban mainly white families enjoy swimming pools and English gardens, which means that in some of the most hedonistic suburbs per capita water consumption is 30 times greater each day than in low-income townships, some of whose residents do the gardening and domestic work for whites. Rural black women stand in line for hours at communal taps in the parched former bantustan areas. The location of natural surface and groundwater remains skewed towards white farmers due to apartheid land dispossession. Other examples of residual apartheid ecology could be cited, including numerous unresolved conflicts over natural land reserves the displacement of indigenous people continues, the deleterious impacts of industrialization on biodiversity, insufficient protection of endangered species, and generous state policies favoring genetic modification in commercial agriculture. Marine regulatory systems are overstressed and hotly contested by European and East Asian fishing trawlers, as well as by local medium-scale commercial fishing firms fending off new waves of small-scale black rivals. Expansion of gum and pine timber plantations, largely for pulp exports to East Asia, remains extremely damaging, not only because of grassland and organic forest destruction—leading to soil adulteration and far worse flood damage downriver, as Mozambique suffered in 2002—but also due to the spread of alien invasive plants into water catchments across the country. One constructive, high-profile state program has so far slowed but not reversed the advance of alien invasives. Thanks to accommodating state policies, South African commercial agriculture remains extremely reliant upon fertilizers and pesticides, with virtually no attention given to potential organic farming markets. In these efforts, the environmental justice movement almost invariably fights both corporations and Pretoria. If outsourcing, corporatization, and privatization can work anywhere in Africa, they should in South Africa—with its large, wealthy markets, relatively competent firms and advanced infrastructure. However, contrary evidence emerges from the four major cases of commodification of state services: First, consider the mess created in the lucrative telecommunications sector, in which 30 percent of state-owned Telkom was sold to a Houston—Kuala Lumpur alliance. The cost of local calls skyrocketed, leading the vast majority of new lines to be disconnected. Meanwhile, 20,000 workers were fired. Attempts by the government to cap fixed-line monopoly pricing were blocked by the Texas-Malaysia joint venture with a court challenge and a serious threat to sell their Telkom shares in 2001. A pact on pricing and services between the two main private cellular operators and persistent allegations of corruption combined to stymie the introduction of new cellular and fixed-line operators. Second, in the field of transportation there have been a variety of dilemmas associated with partial privatizations. Commercialized toll roads are unaffordable for the poor. Air transport privatization led to the collapse of the first regional state-owned airline. The privatization of the Airports Company has led to security lapses and labor conflict. Constant strife with the ANC-aligned trade union has thrown port

privatization into question. The increasingly corporatized rail service shut down many feeder routes that, although unprofitable, were crucial to rural economies. Thirty thousand electricity workers lost their jobs during the s. Potentially unnecessary new generation capacity is being created by private suppliers. While a tiny pittance is invested in renewable energy, the state is likely to expand nuclear energy, through new pebble bed reactors in partnership with U. Rates for residential customers have risen much higher as cross-subsidies came under attack during the late s. As a result of increasingly unaffordable rates, Eskom slowed the extension of the rural electricity grid, while millions of people who fell into arrears on inflated bills have been disconnected—leading to massive often successful resistance such as illegal reconnections. With tuberculosis and other respiratory illnesses reaching epidemic levels it is a cause for concern that those who do not reconnect their electricity are forced back to paraffin or coal fires for cooking, with all the hazards that entails. Fourth, virtually all local governments turned to a percent cost recovery policy during the late s, at the urging of the central government and the World Bank, largely to prepare for a wave of water and waste commercialization. Attempts to recover costs from poor communities inflict hardships on the most vulnerable members of society, especially women and those with HIV positive family members susceptible to water-borne diseases and opportunistic AIDS infections. Contracts have been renegotiated to raise rates because of insufficient profits; services have not been extended to most poor people; many low-income residents have been disconnected; prepaid water meters have been widely installed; and sanitation has been substandard. As a result of this consistent failure to deliver, alienation and discontent are obviously increasing. According to a late survey conducted by the liberal Institute for Democracy in South Africa, the number of black people who believe life was better under the apartheid regime is growing. Tragically, more than 60 percent of all South Africans polled said the country was better run during white minority rule, only one in ten people believed their elected representatives were interested in their needs, and fewer than one in three felt the current government was more trustworthy than the apartheid regime. Black people were only slightly more positive than white and mixed-race groups about the government, with 38 percent deeming it more trustworthy than before. Only 24 percent of black South Africans agreed with the proposition that the current government is less corrupt than the apartheid regime. For the 10 percent or so wealthiest whites and a scattering of rich blacks who enjoy segregation and insulation from the vast majority, lifestyles remain at the highest level in the world. This is evident to any visitor to the slightly-integrated suburbs of South African cities. Racial apartheid was always explicitly manifested in residential segregation, and after liberation in , Pretoria adopted World Bank advice that included an avoidance of public housing virtually no new municipal or even cooperatively-owned units have been constructed , smaller housing subsidies than were necessary, and much greater reliance upon banks and commercial developers instead of state and community-driven development. The privatization of housing is, indeed, one of the most terrible ironies of post-apartheid South Africa, not least because the man taking advice from the World Bank, Joe Slovo, was chair of the SACP. Slovo died of cancer soon thereafter and his main ANC bureaucrat, who was responsible for designing the policy, now works for a World Bank subsidiary. In addition to ongoing disconnections of water and electricity, the new slums suffer lower-quality state services ranging from rare rubbish collection to dirt roads and inadequate storm-water drainage. Globalization Made Me Do It! How did the degeneration of a once proud liberation movement occur so decisively, and so quickly? But three prior decisions were also crucial: Various other international economic incidents should be mentioned. In January , privatization began in earnest. Under these circumstances, GEAR was merely a set of fantasy projections, and the failure of macroeconomic policy is even sometimes conceded in Pretoria. He is still waiting for the payoff. But the rewards are few. The key variables are first, the financing of the fiscal deficit and second, the dependence on external capital for financing economic expansion. Consistent with his general zigzag approach to international financial management, Manuel loosened controls yet further in early . When Mbeki visited Malaysia on the eve of the Cancun WTO summit in September , he advocated that third world governments join forces with anticapitalist social movements: Independent left groups then insisted they would march more than 20, people from

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impoverished Alexandra township to the site of the summit in bourgeois Sandton. Leading activists in the black townships of Johannesburg and Cape Town were repeatedly harassed and detained by police—mainly illegally resulting in high-profile acquittals—for resisting evictions, electricity and water disconnections, and the installation of prepaid meters for services. When reparations for apartheid-era profits were being demanded by South African activist groups in the U. Such incidents have alienated a huge proportion of the progressive movements and the low-income population. Protests are regularly mounted against high-profile neoliberal events such as the World Economic Forum. Occasionally the pressure rises to such high levels that Pretoria concedes, as with a long-delayed plan to roll out antiretroviral medicines in November that followed court battles, periodic protests against pharmaceutical corporations, and a civil disobedience campaign targeting Mbeki and his health and trade ministers. The Sowetans who illegally reconnected electricity beginning in were rewarded in April by having their accumulated debts written off, as the minister responsible for privatization unsuccessfully attempted to undercut township militancy.

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