

Chapter 1 : Political Conflict in South Asia – APYouthNet

Find out Political conflict that involved two world powers Answers. CodyCross is a famous newly released game which is developed by Fanatee. It has many crosswords divided into different worlds and groups.

Posted by Donald Ellis Like any social or political institution, ISIS needs communication strategies, information campaigns, propaganda, and technological access in order to manipulate its audiences, inspire volunteers, and complete the general tasks of public communication. ISIS is sophisticated and relies on any number of communication strategies in order to further its goals. He seeks to reestablish the caliphate and must convince others of the worthiness of this achievement; ISIS competes with al-Qaeda and must position itself competitively as the two groups compete for status and recognition. And, for lack of a better word, propaganda plays an important role in motivating and encouraging fresh recruits into the ISIS psyche so they will carry out brutal acts of violence and further jihadist propaganda. Essentially, ISIS uses two general strategies of persuasion. You can read more about ISIS persuasive strategies here. The first is based on the value of establishing cultural resonance between individuals and the traditions of Arabic and religious rhetoric. More specifically, sermons delivered by ISIS leaders exploit the rhythm and metaphors of liturgical sermons. These sermons have a long history and theory of oratory and narrative that defines the Arab world. ISIS leaders will invoke the structure of the Quranic verses – which include prayers, invocations, quotations, and sermons – all in the service of messages designed for religious or political purposes. The second predominant persuasive communication strategy is the adept use of various communication channels designed to reach targeted audiences. The Internet is able to handle longer disquisitions on politics as well as shorter messages and video. But the Internet is also full of misinformation, potentially poor security, rumor and innuendo, as well as a host of other mistakes and distortions. Consequently, the Internet has lost some of its power and effectiveness although it is still an important persuasive tool. You can read about it and retrieve a copy of Dabiq from its Wikipedia page here. The TV station makes for sophisticated possibilities with respect to programming and high quality visuals. Social media are often used very skillfully to create characters that signify historical leaders and powerful individuals who speak the language of jihad and express opinions and historical claims consistent with the ISIS political agenda. ISIS could not succeed without some communication and persuasive strategy designed to produce messages that direct their desired audiences toward a particular definition of reality. ISIS has been particularly adept at discovering effective channels of communication and exploiting them. And, of course, their use of traditional Arabic religious symbols and liturgy has been crucial to their success. But we should remember that all forms of communicative contact have security vulnerabilities capable of being breached. This is a breach we must step into in order to moderate, if not defeat, these messages.

Chapter 2 : Conflict Provention as a Political System - John W. Burton

Exploring how actors end up in conflict, conflict dynamics, peace negotiations, the international community's role in preventing or encouraging conflict, the role of non-state actors during and after conflict, and how political institutions can be used to consolidate peace.

December Politics are among the most ancient, enduring, and consequential sources of conflict, as they determine how power will be distributed among people, including over life and death, wealth and poverty, independence and obedience. Conflicts concerning these issues have shaped the ways we have interacted as a species over the course of centuries. At their core, as Hannah Arendt wrote, is the conflict that, "from the beginning of our history has determined the very existence of politics: If we define political conflicts as those arising out of or challenging an uneven distribution of power relational, religious, and cultural power, it is clear that politics happens everywhere. If we listen attentively, we shall hear amid the uproar of empires and nations, the faint fluttering of wings, the gentle stirring of life and hope. Some say this hope lies in a nation, others in a man. I believe, rather, that it is awakened, revived, nourished by millions of solitary individuals whose deeds and words every day negate frontiers and the crudest implications of history. Albert Camus In this sense, "the personal is political," yet the political is also personal, due to globalization the reach and speed of communication, reduced travel barriers, and increasing environmental interdependency. We can even identify an ecology of conflict, in which rapidly evolving international conflicts have the ability to overwhelm safety and security everywhere. Conflicts in Afghanistan, Sudan, Brazil, and East Timor can no longer be ignored, as they touch our lives in increasingly significant ways. We therefore require improved understanding, not only of the conflict in politics, but the politics in conflict. As our world shrinks and our problems can no longer be solved except internationally, we need ways of revealing, even in seemingly ordinary, interpersonal conflicts, the larger issues that connect us across boundaries, and methods for resolving political conflicts that are sweeping, strategic, interest-based, and transformational. A clear, unambiguous reason for doing so occurred on September 11, Good and Evil in Conflict Journalist H. Mencken wrote, decades before September 11, that "The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace in a continual state of alarm and hence clamorous to be led to safety by menacing them with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary. In addition to these, there are countless conflicts around the globe between rich and poor , despots and democrats, leftists and rightists, labor and management, natives and settlers, ethnic majorities and minorities, environmentalists and developers, each accusing the other of evil. The deepest and most serious of these conflicts are no longer confined to the boundaries of nation states, but affect everyone everywhere. Even outwardly minor disputes between competing communities can rapidly escalate into world crises, triggering the slaughter of innocents, rape, ethnic cleansing, economic collapse, the ruin of eco-systems, and hatreds that cannot be dissipated, even in generations. Each of these acts directly affects the quality of our lives, no matter how far away we feel from the actual fighting. Following these disasters come those who pick up the pieces and start over again. While it is always helpful to offer aid in food, clothing and shelter, the victims of these catastrophes also need to develop skills in resolution, recovery, reconciliation, and regeneration of community. Recovery requires acknowledgement of grief and amelioration of loss. Resolution requires the dismantling of systemic sources of conflict within groups and cultures that actively promoted violence. Reconciliation requires the ability to engage in public dialogue, and speak from the heart. Regeneration of community requires the creation of a new culture based on collaboration , compassion, and respect for differences. Together, these require an understanding of how assumptions of evil, even in petty, interpersonal disputes, lead to war and terrorism. In political conflicts, it is common for each side to label the other evil. Yet what is evil to one is often good to another, revealing that evil is present in miniature in every conflict. Blaming others for our suffering allows us to externalize our fears, vent our outrage, and punish our enemies, or coerce them into doing what we want against their wishes. It allows us to take what belongs to them, place our interests over, against, and above theirs, and ignore their allegations of our wrongdoing. Evil is not initially a grand thing, but begins innocuously with a constriction of empathy and compassion, leading

ultimately to an inability to find the other within the self. It proceeds by replacing empathy with antipathy, love with hate, trust with suspicion, and confidence with fear. Finally, it exalts these negative attitudes as virtues, allows them to emerge from hiding, punishes those who oppose them, and causes others to respond in ways that justify their use. A potential for evil is thus created every time we draw a line that separates self from other within ourselves. This line expands when fear and hatred are directed against others and we remain silent or do nothing to prevent it; when dissenters are described as traitorous or evil and we allow them to be silenced, isolated, discriminated against, or punished; when negative values are exalted and collaboration, dialogue, and conflict resolution are abandoned and we do not object. At a more subtle level, identifying others as evil is simply a justification and catalyst for our own pernicious actions. By defining "them" as bad, we implicitly define ourselves as good and give ourselves permission to act against them in ways that would appear evil to outside observers who were not aware of their prior evil acts. In this way, their evil mirrors our diminished capacity for empathy and compassion, and telegraphs our plans for their eventual punishment. The worse we plan to do to them, the worse we need them to appear, so as to avoid the impression that we are the aggressor. The ultimate purpose of every accusation of evil is thus to create the self-permission, win the approval of outsiders, and establish the moral logic required to justify committing evil oneself. Allegations of evil are therefore directly connected with the unequal distribution and adversarial exercise of power. Rather, it was the "good" themselves, that is to say the noble, mighty, highly placed, and high-minded who decreed themselves and their actions to be good, i. In contemporary terms, if we, as individuals or nations, believe ourselves to be good and possess more power than others, we will naturally seek to justify our use of unequal power by indicating our intention to use it for the benefit of those with fewer resources who are less good. But without empathy, compassion, and power sharing, this will inevitably evolve into a belief that whatever benefits us must benefit them also. This will lead us to regard their criticism of our self-interested benevolence as ill mannered and ungrateful, and their opposition to our power as support for evil. We can then feel justified in wielding power selfishly and attacking them, or anyone who tries to curb our power or equalize its distribution. It is at this point that simple, natural, innocent, self-interest begins its descent into evil. At every step, it is aided by anger, fear, jealousy, pain, guilt, grief, and shame and the suppression of empathy and compassion. Yet all these dynamics occur on a small scale in countless petty personal conflicts every day, and are used to justify our mistreatment of others, including children, parents, spouses, siblings, neighbors, employees, even strangers on the street. Every dominant individual, organization, class, culture, and nation manufactures stories and allegations of evil to justify withholding compassion, using power selfishly, and violating their own ethical or moral principles in response to perceived enemies. Worse, these small-scale justifications can be organized and manipulated on a national scale to secure permission for war and genocide just as war and genocide give permission to individuals to act aggressively and resist reconciliation in their personal conflicts. For these reasons, we need to carefully consider how, as individuals and nations, we define our enemies, disarm our empathy and compassion, organize our hatreds, and rationalize our destructive acts through conflict. For example, we frequently combine the following elements to create circular definitions of "the enemy": Assumption of Injurious Intentions they intended to cause the harm we experienced Distrust every idea or statement made by them is wrong or proposed for dishonest reasons Externalization of Guilt everything bad or wrong is their fault Attribution of Evil they want to destroy us and what we value most, and must therefore be destroyed Zero-Sum Expectation everything that benefits them harms us, and vice versa Paranoia and Preoccupation with Disloyalty any criticism of us or praise of them is disloyal and treasonous Prejudgment everyone in the enemy group is an enemy Suppression of Empathy we have nothing in common and considering them human is dangerous Isolation and Impasse blanket rejection of dialogue, negotiation, cooperation, and conflict resolution Self-Fulfilling Prophecy their evil makes it permissible for us to be an enemy to them [Based partly on work by Kurt R. To begin, we need to recognize how evil is reflected in the language we use to describe our conflicts, enemies, issues, and ourselves. The Language of Conflict In every country, there are not only national languages and local dialects, but thousands of micro-languages, ranging from professional terminology to ethnic phraseology, popular slang, bureaucratic technicality, family vernacular, and generational jargon. There are, for example, distinct languages for organizational

management, political candidacy, ethnic minorities, social classes, economic cycles, and criminal pursuits. Each of these languages serves a unique purpose and produces unique results in the attitudes and behaviors of those who use them. There is also a distinct language of conflict. There is the conscious use of exaggerated statements to disguise requests for reassurance, as in stock phrases such as "you always," and "you never. When asked how we feel, we use words implying that we are being coerced by others, instead of words accepting responsibility for how we feel about what others have done. Our words contain judgments -- not merely about what others did, but of who they are. We say, for example, "He is infuriating," or "He made me mad," instead of "I am angry. These are all valuable interventions, but they do not address the underlying problem. A more careful examination of the language used in political conflicts reveals a deep set of issues. Psychologist Renana Brooks describes the ways language is used to reinforce abuse and domination in power relationships. She cites, for example, broad statements that are so abstract and meaningless they cannot be opposed; excessive personalization of issues so they can only be addressed individually; negative frameworks that reinforce pessimistic images of the world; and inculcation of a "learned helplessness" that assumes change is impossible. Mexican novelist Octavio Paz describes how this deterioration of language reflects a broader social and political decay: When a society decays, it is language that is first to become gangrenous. A similar asphyxiation occurs in the rhetoric of conflict as a result of distortions produced by adversarial assumptions in speaking and listening, the strangled expression of intense emotion, the coexistence of fear and rage, the weight and weightlessness of the issues, the craving for revenge and forgiveness, and the simultaneous exhibition of power and powerlessness, arrogance and humility, domination and dependency. Language in organizations can also become an instrument of domination and control, reinforcing assumptions of hierarchy, bureaucracy and autocracy. Even seemingly innocuous corporate expressions such as "upper management," "direct reports," "bottom line," "alignment," "getting people on board," "raising the bar," "lean and mean," "accountability," "pushing the envelope," and similar expressions reveal myths and assumptions that distort communications. In similar ways, the language of law is replete with terminology conveying arrogance, incomprehension, and hostility directed toward emotionality, vulnerability, artistic thinking, human error, collective responsibility, compassion, frivolity, redemption, play, and forgiveness. Language and Fascism Perhaps the best example of the deterioration of language and its use to reinforce power, arrogance, and domination in political conflicts is the rise of fascism in Germany. As Victor Klemperer brilliantly revealed in *The Language of the Third Reich*, the Nazis deliberately manipulated language in order to change the way people thought about politics and daily life. By using repetitive stereotyping, emotional superlatives, and romantic adjectives; hijacking or poisoning formerly positive terms such as "collective," "followers," and "faith;" transforming formerly negative words into positives, such as "domination," "fanatical," and "obedient;" militarizing and brutalizing common speech; discounting reason and elevating feelings; using "big lies" and doublespeak; and generally debasing and "dumbing down" ordinary language, the Nazis fundamentally altered the way people thought and behaved. This led Italian novelist and semiologist Umberto Eco to brilliantly define fascism as "the simplification of language to the point that complex thought becomes impossible. He began by profoundly defining propaganda as "violence committed against the soul," writing: Propaganda is not a substitute for violence, but one of its aspects. The two have identical purposes of making men amenable to control from above. Terror and its display in propaganda go hand in hand. The superiority of National Socialist [Nazi] propaganda lies in the complete transformation of culture into a saleable commodity. As Adolph Hitler made clear in *Mein Kampf*: Propaganda must not serve the truth. All propaganda must be so popular and on such an intellectual level, that even the most stupid of those toward whom it is directed will understand it. Therefore, the intellectual level of the propaganda must be lower the larger the number of people who are to be influenced by it. The size of the lie is a definite factor in causing it to be believed, for the vast masses of a nation are in the depths of their hearts more easily deceived than they are consciously and intentionally bad. As George Orwell wrote, in "Politics and the English Language," In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defense of the indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan, can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not square with the

professed aims of the political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless villages are bombed from the air, the inhabitants are driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: The simplification, distortion, and abuse of language by turning it into propaganda is not restricted to fascist or Stalinist states, but is responsive to a far deeper problem, which is the forced, impossible effort to suppress half of a paradox or polarity, deny part of a contradiction, and obstruct inevitable changes. Alex Cary, for example, attributes the widespread use of propaganda to increasing conflict between democracy and corporate power: The 20th century has been characterized by three developments of great political importance: Yet the same distortion of language into propaganda can be heard in statements made by US political leaders prior to the war in Iraq, falsely collapsing Iraq into Saddam Hussein, accusing him of hiding weapons of mass destruction that could threaten US cities, linking September 11 to the Iraqi government, stereotyping Arabs as terrorists, demonizing international opposition to the war, and making "preventive war" seem necessary and inevitable. Similar distortions can also be recognized in ordinary conflict stories, which routinely demonize and stereotype our opponents, link them with events beyond their control, make them seem more powerful than they actually are, ignore the systemic sources of our suffering, personalize our problems, and trigger the fear and anger that make our stories successful. For this reason, it is important to recognize that evil is not something "out there," inside someone else, beyond our reach, or in poorer nations, but also something "in here," inside ourselves, within our reach, and happening every day in wealthier nations, including the US.

Chapter 3 : Political Conflict | OEF Research

A political conflict is a positional difference regarding values relevant to a society - the conflict items - between at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is being carried out using observable and interrelated conflict means that lie beyond established regulatory procedures and threaten a core state function or the order of.

Thus, a large number of riots for the United States will reflect the process of disruption and formation of a variety of structures of expectations. Some structures may be similar, such as the racial, social, and political structures in large and separate Northern urban areas, but many riots will relate to quite different structures as concerning the military draft, industrial anti-strike activities, or anti-religious textbooks in primary schools. The aggregation of conflict data for a society randomizes manifest conflict in a society with respect to any specific structure of expectations. This is true also for aggregate conflict manifestations across societies. Most crucial to the probability of conflict is that change influencing and affecting the interests, capabilities, or wills underlying a structure of expectations. Change in technology, economic development, education, communications, and so on can intensify and alter interests, produce differences in capability, and enhance or weaken will. They widen the gap between these elements and expectations, and increase the likelihood that some trigger will disrupt its structure. Simply put, change in the premises of a structure of expectations increases the probability of conflict. Change which alters power relationships promotes conflict. A balance of powers may be altered without manifest conflict. No trigger event may have disrupted the structure of expectations, or the structure may be sufficiently integrated to withstand considerable imbalance or shocks. However, if change continues, eventually even small events can cause participants to reorder the status quo. There is no one to one relationship between change and manifest conflict, only a probabilistic one. And this relationship depends on what is changing. There are three kinds of change of interest. The first is in the type of society. A transformation from traditional to exchange societies, or from traditional to coercive, vastly alters the configuration of power across society--the very basis of power and the central status quo of society. This is then the period of greatest conflict and violence for societies as their individuals reorder their statuses and class memberships. Shifts in type of society also produce different values, meanings, and norms, a different culture. Basic philosophical principles are modified, the view of truth and ethics shifts, and the legal basis of society is altered in a breakdown of the crystallized cultural system and the formation of a new system. Through history, the change of a society from one type to another has involved the most violence. A second kind of change occurs in the social consciousness of individuals. Expanding consciousness may lead to new aspirations and create a sense of personal, group, and class injustice. Manifest conflict may not occur because of the strength of opposing forces, such as government repression, but if such coercion is held constant, manifest conflict should increase with the rate of education. For those already educated and conscious of the world, however, additional education and communication should have only a marginal effect, unless they have been indoctrinated into one ideology and all communications stress one perspective, as in communist societies. Then newly available alternative views and facts should have tremendous impact. For this reason, among others, totalitarian societies maintain tight control over the content of education and all communication media. A third change is in the economy of a society. This multitude and potentiality for easy creation and disruption with minimal conflict such as quitting a job, allows us to satisfy more easily our many interests and to be cross-pressured by our different class-positions in many groups. We therefore should expect that the faster the rate of increase in economic development, the less the probability of conflict. The reason is that a variety of capabilities and potential structures of expectations are being created, and interests actualized. This diversity should make the balancing and compromise among specific interests easier. Only when changing interests are blocked, that is, when a growing social consciousness in society is not adjusted to, will the probability of manifest conflict increase. Thus, the ratio of the growth in social consciousness in society to its growing development provides a measure of the likelihood of conflict. This is a measure of the rigidity of the status quo. While independent of the separate structures of expectations across societies Section For whether a society is authoritative, coercive, or exchange will fundamentally determine the causes and conditions

affecting our interests and capabilities, and our will. That which shapes our interests and power will pattern our conflict. Especially important in this regard is the coercive power that the elite are willing to employ. In modern states where the political system keeps and enforces the general structure of expectations, conflict is often between the political elite and those attacking their policies or the status quo. The more dominant the political system in social affairs, the more social conflict swirls around the extensions of government control. All modern state-societies are antifields to some extent, and the front between antifield and social field is the region of potential social storms. Whether in fact conflict will be manifest is another question. This depends on the force and terror the elite are willing to employ. Repression raises the costs of opposing the elite. However across societies there is a curvilinear relationship between elite force and manifest conflict. Where force is little used, the elite have high legitimacy and conflicts can be adjusted through traditional institutions. The increase in the use of force signals a decrease in legitimacy or a blockage of the demands of those seeking a change in policies or status quo. As legitimacy decreases, the political system increasingly is seen as the source of social ills and a change in elite or system as the solution. Thus, manifest conflict and repression will at first be positively related. However, if repression becomes extensive, elite terror widespread, and force systematically applied, then overt opposition becomes suppressed. Total repression is effective in establishing a conflict-free structure of expectations, as the surface harmony of the Soviet and Communist Chinese systems show, and as is clear from the harmony of concentration camps, slave labor camps, and prisons. Each type of power should generate a distinct range of conflict behavior. Moreover, each dimension of conflict should be associated with a particular type of state. The following sections will briefly describe what these types of conflict should be. That is, each conflict should concern a relatively isolated group, event, or issue. Since structures of expectations are overlapping and diverse, their formation or disruption should present a multiple spectrum of conflict manifestations, such as strikes, protests, demonstrations, riots, attacks on property, and so on. Issues may occasionally reach societal proportions, but the freedom to remove political elite and veto or influence public policy, and the conflict aggregating and defusing function of competitive political parties, provide mechanisms for conflict bargaining and compromise far short of revolutionary violence. Moreover, multiple group and class membership create cross-pressures inhibiting the formation of a societal wide conflict front. Pluralistic conflict is therefore intrinsic to the interactions and change within exchange societies. It is the normal friction associated with the multiple building and dissolution of implicit and formal contracts and groups in a free society. In an exchange society, conflict manifestations over-all will be at a constant but low level. If one measures the intensity of conflict from one state to the next, where such a measure takes into account the number of killed in domestic violence, the number of revolutions, coups, riots, assassinations, and so on, then this measure of societal strife should be inversely related to the degree to which a society is based on exchange power. Elite are granted the right to govern on the basis of widely shared religious or ethical principles. The political system is based on a consensus, on a legitimacy. Conflict behavior may occur between groups, bandit groups may prey on outlying villages, food riots may occur in time of scarcity, and peasants may revolt against exploitive landlords, even in an authoritative society isolated from external sources of change. Moreover, coups or palace revolutions may settle ambiguities in elite succession, or replace a ruler who has lost his legitimacy or "mandate from heaven. These may become quite violent, without attacking or bringing into question the legitimacy of the over-all order Gluckman, A problem for many authoritative states is that they are not one consensual society, but often two or more different subsocieties balanced against each other within a common political system. Such is the case with many African states, such as Nigeria. These divisions are communal, often based on racial, language, and tribal homogeneity and territorial separation. Where activities within communal divisions are left alone by the state, conflict will not occur. But where authoritarian rulers try to extend their legitimacy over such communities, violence is often the result. This conflict is acerbated if class and racial-language-tribal cleavages are the line of class division. If one communal division comprises the elite and the others the ruled, then violence is highly probable. Thus, authoritarian states will manifest communal and traditional conflict. This conflict behavior will comprise coups, revolutions, and successional revolts of communal subsocieties as well as apolitical banditry, family or class feuds, guild confrontations, and the like. Possible leaders of political opposition are jailed or disappear,

and subjects who voice or hint at dissent may be tortured and sent off to a slave labor camp for many years. Under these conditions, conflict manifest in exchange or authoritative systems will not occur. When the elite use overwhelming coercive power arbitrarily and effectively, overt opposition by its subjects cannot build up. But two varieties of conflict do occur. First, there is the violence of the elite or government against the masses. Execution, torture, jailing, and forced labor camps are endemic and widespread. Here, the number involved and the number killed will exceed those affected by all forms of strife in authoritative or exchange systems. Instability is common and elite executions, purges, and demotions are the standard way of maintaining power and policies. Within totalitarian political systems, the balance of political power comprises different elite factions, among which conflict is settled through eliminating or disarming the opposing elite. Conflict in coercive societies is manifested by class terror and repression, and elite purges. These are very broad, bereft of much detail at this point, and on the order of directional propositions. They emphasize the power basis of conflict, the role of interests and expectations, and the importance of the societal context. The next chapters beginning with Chapter 33 will subject these propositions to empirical test, and in the process flesh out their bones. Note that these eight propositions ignore frustration, deprivation, poverty, anomie as conditions or causes of conflict, which are the social science folk beliefs of our time. The next volume, Vol. Conflict In Perspective , will consider these popular explanations of social conflict, and relate their arguments to the conflict helix and propositions. Rummel, *The Conflict Helix*, For full reference to the book and the list of its contents in hypertext, click [book](#). Typographical errors have been corrected, clarifications added, and style updated. Simply consider the randomness of the Watergate exposure, ranging from the happenstances associated with the break-in procedures and discovery by the guard, to the digging by two Washington Post reporters, to a President who tape recorded his conversations. But who could have predicted a Watergate? I am using the term force as I previously defined it Section

Chapter 4 : Conflict - Wikipedia

The following is a list of ongoing armed conflicts that are taking place around the world and continue to result in violence.

Toggle display of website navigation Feature: The sharp uptick in war over recent years is outstripping our ability to cope with the consequences. From the global refugee crisis to the spread of terrorism, our collective failure to resolve conflict is giving birth to new threats and emergencies. Even in peaceful societies, the politics of fear is leading to dangerous polarization and demagoguery. It is against this backdrop that Donald Trump was elected the next president of the United States – unquestionably the most important event of last year and one with far-reaching geopolitical implications for the future. But one thing we do know is that uncertainty itself can be profoundly destabilizing, especially when it involves the most powerful actor on the global stage. Will he cut a deal with Russia over the heads of Europeans? Will he try to undo the Iran nuclear accord? Is he seriously proposing a new arms race? And that is precisely the problem. The last 60 years have suffered their share of crises, from Vietnam to Rwanda to the Iraq War. But the vision of a cooperative international order that emerged after World War II, championed and led by the United States, has structured relations between major powers since the end of the Cold War. That order was in flux even before Trump won the election. But Obama worked to shore up international institutions to fill the gap. In Europe, uncertainty over the new U. Nationalist forces have gained strength, and upcoming elections in France, Germany, and the Netherlands will test the future of the European project. The potential unraveling of the European Union is one of the greatest challenges we face today – a fact that is lost amid the many other alarming developments competing for attention. Exacerbated regional rivalries are also transforming the landscape, as is particularly evident in the competition between Iran and the Persian Gulf countries for influence in the Middle East. The resulting proxy wars have had devastating consequences from Syria to Iraq to Yemen. Many world leaders claim that the way out of deepening divisions is to unite around the shared goal of fighting terrorism. But that is an illusion: Terrorism is just a tactic, and fighting a tactic cannot define a strategy. Jihadi groups exploit wars and state collapse to consolidate power, and they thrive on chaos. In the end, what the international system really needs is a strategy of conflict prevention that shores up, in an inclusive way, the states that are its building blocks. The international system needs more than the pretense of a common enemy to sustain itself. With the advent of the Trump administration, transactional diplomacy, already on the rise, looks set to increase. Tactical bargaining is replacing long-term strategies and values-driven policies. A rapprochement between Russia and Turkey holds some promise for reducing the level of violence in Syria. However, Moscow and Ankara must eventually help forge a path toward more inclusive governance – or else they risk being sucked ever deeper into the Syrian quagmire. A stable Middle East is unlikely to emerge from the temporary consolidation of authoritarian regimes that ignore the demands of the majority of their people. The EU, long a defender of values-based diplomacy, has struck bargains with Turkey, Afghanistan, and African states to stem the flow of migrants and refugees – with worrying global consequences. On the other hand, Europe could take advantage of any improvement in U. Such transactional arrangements may look like a revival of realpolitik. But an international system guided by short-term deal-making is unlikely to be stable. Deals can be broken when they do not reflect longer-term strategies. Without a predictable order, widely accepted rules, and strong institutions, the space for mischief is greater. The world is increasingly fluid and multipolar, pushed and pulled by a diverse set of states and nonstate actors – by armed groups as well as by civil society. In a bottom-up world, major powers cannot single-handedly contain or control local conflicts, but they can manipulate or be drawn into them: Local conflicts can be the spark that lights much bigger fires. Whether we like it or not, globalization is a fact. We are all connected. Countries may wish to turn inward, but there is no peace and prosperity without more cooperative management of world affairs. This list of 10 conflicts to watch in illustrates some of the broader trends but also explores ways to reverse the dangerous dynamics. Syrian Abu Khaled looks at the rubble of his destroyed house in the rebel-held town of Douma on Dec. This was evident in the recent recapture of Palmyra by the Islamic State, just nine months after a Russian-backed military

campaign had expelled the group. Western diplomats expressed horror and outrage yet failed to muster a concrete response. The evacuation of civilians and rebels ultimately proceeded, haltingly, only after Russia, Turkey, and Iran struck a deal. Neither the United States nor the United Nations was invited or even consulted. A cease-fire deal brokered by Russia and Turkey at the end of December appeared to fall apart within days, as the regime continued military offensives in the suburbs of Damascus. Despite the significant challenges ahead, this new diplomatic track opens the best possibility for reducing the level of violence in Syria. The war against the Islamic State is likely to continue, and there is an urgent need to ensure it will not fuel further violence and destabilization. Washington has backed both efforts while trying to minimize direct clashes between them. The incoming Trump administration should prioritize de-escalating the conflict between its Turkish and Kurdish partners above the immediate capture of territory from jihadis. If violence between the two spirals, the Islamic State will be the first to gain. The Islamic State still claims a caliphate across parts of Iraq and Syria, although it has lost significant territory over the past year. Even if it is defeated militarily, it or another radical group may well re-emerge unless underlying governance issues are addressed. The Islamic State itself grew from a similar failure in Iraq. It is spreading an ideology that is still mobilizing young people across the globe and poses threats well beyond the borders of Iraq and Syria, as recent attacks in Istanbul and Berlin have shown. To avoid worse, Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government need support and pressure to rein in paramilitary groups. Success in the current U. Besides the regular Iraqi Army, special counterterrorism forces, and federal police who are leading the effort inside the city, local groups are also involved, seeking spoils of victory. Moreover, Iran and Turkey are competing for influence by using local proxies. The longer the battle drags on, the more these various groups will exploit opportunities to gain strategic advantage through territorial control, complicating a political settlement. Iraq, with support from the United States and other partners, should continue military and logistics support to Iraqi forces pushing into the city and establish locally recruited stabilization forces in areas retaken from the Islamic State to ensure that military gains are not again lost. They will also need to jump-start governance involving local, and locally accepted, political actors. First aid officers carry an injured woman at the site of a terrorist attack on January 1 in Istanbul. In addition to worsening spillover from the wars in Syria and Iraq, Turkey also faces a spiraling conflict with the PKK. Politically polarized, under economic strain, and with weak alliances, Turkey is poised for greater upheaval. The conflict between the state and PKK militants continues to deteriorate following the collapse of a cease-fire in July. Since then, the PKK conflict has entered one of the deadliest chapters in its three-decade history, with at least 2, militants, security forces, and civilians killed as both sides opt for further escalation. In response, the government is once again jailing representatives of the Kurdish movement, blocking a crucial channel to a political settlement that must include fundamental rights protections for Kurds in Turkey. This, and the danger posed by the Islamic State, persuaded Ankara to send its first detachments of troops into both countries, sucking it further into the Middle East maelstrom. In the wake of the coup attempt last July, the government launched a massive crackdown, purging more than , officials. In November, Erdogan responded angrily to criticism from Brussels, threatening to tear up the March refugee deal by which Ankara agreed to prevent the flow of Syrian refugees from moving onward to Europe. Ankara is increasingly downplaying its Western alliances and scrambling to make arrangements with Russia and Iran. However, Turkey and Iran are still on a dangerous course, fueled by profound disagreement over their respective core interests in Iraq and Syria. Newly recruited Houthi fighters mobilize in the Yemeni capital of Sanaa to fight pro-government forces on January 3. Yemen The war in Yemen has created another humanitarian catastrophe, wrecking a country that was already the poorest in the Arab world. With millions of people now on the brink of famine, the need for a comprehensive cease-fire and political settlement is ever more urgent. Yemenis have suffered tremendous hardships from air bombardments, rocket attacks, and economic blockades. According to the U. All parties to the conflict stand accused of war crimes, including indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas. Saudi Arabia entered the conflict in March to counter advances made by the Houthis, a predominantly Zaydi Shiite militia viewed by Riyadh as a proxy for its archrival, Iran. Both sides appear locked in a cycle of escalating violence and provocations, derailing U. That same month, the Houthi movement and its allies, mainly forces under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, formed a new government. Despite the challenges, it may still be

possible to convince the parties to accept the roadmap as the basis for a compromise that would end regional aspects of the war and return it to an inter-Yemeni process. Women and children queue to enter a Unicef nutrition clinic at the Muna informal settlement on the outskirts of Maiduguri in northeastern Nigeria on Sept. Jihadis, armed groups, and criminal networks jockey for power across this impoverished region, where borders are porous and governments have limited reach. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al-Mourabitoun remain active while a new group claiming affiliation to the Islamic State is developing. All appear likely to continue attacks targeting civilians, as well as national and international forces. Mali is the U. Mali could face a major crisis this year, as implementation of the Bamako peace agreement threatens to stall. The recent fracturing of the main rebel alliance in the north, the Coordination of Azawad Movements, has contributed to a proliferation of armed groups, and violence has spread to central Mali. Regional powers should use the upcoming African Union summit in January to revive the peace process and possibly bring in groups that are currently left out. A leadership quarrel has split the jihadi movement, but it remains resilient and aggressive. Understanding the various ways women experience the conflict should directly inform strategies to tackle the roots of the insurgency. The Boko Haram insurgency, the aggressive military response to it, and the lack of effective assistance to those caught up in the conflict threaten to create an endless cycle of violence and despair. If regional governments do not react responsibly to the humanitarian disaster, they could further alienate communities and sow the seeds of future rebellion. States should also invest in economic development and strengthen local governance to close off opportunities for radical groups.

Chapter 5 : 10 Conflicts to Watch in “ Foreign Policy

Like any social or political institution, ISIS needs communication strategies, information campaigns, propaganda, and technological access in order to manipulate its audiences, inspire volunteers, and complete the general tasks of public communication.

In the literature on contemporary processes of globalisation there has been a widespread practice of referring to Asia in general terms. South Asia, being the cradle of four main world religions, is the venue of a rich and highly diversified social and political history. It is the home of almost one-fifth of the world population, with a large proportion of its inhabitants living in conditions of poverty. Although the British Empire at its zenith included almost the whole of South Asia, the present nation-states of the region have their own distinctive political legacies from the past. It is in the context of the foregoing observations that the present monograph must be evaluated. Recent developments witnessed in the region including the growing speculation on the establishment of an American military base in the Maldives and the increasingly pronounced alignment of India with the United States in its foreign relations “ both of which are likely to have a profound influence on tensions and conflicts in South Asia “ makes this publication even more topical. The importance of this monograph is considerably enhanced by the dearth of scholarly writings that deal with the subject of political convulsions in South Asia from comparative perspectives. In fact, the most recent work on this subject is Professor Stanley J. We also come across several collections of essays on South Asia “ end-products of international conferences and seminars “ brought together under the sponsorship of institutions that focus on objectives such as state-level policy formulation, prevention and resolution of conflict, protection of human rights, or responding to the threat of terrorism. In addition, there are monographs of global scope such as *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* authored by Donald L. Barash , and *Sustainable Peace: Roeder* which, confined as they are to specific themes, have drawn on South Asian experiences. When placed against this background of these academic writings, the present monograph could be considered as a highly commendable attempt to cater to an existing need for a general but intensively researched reader on a vitally significant aspect of contemporary global politics. The monograph begins with a descriptive model of political conflict in South Asia which identifies three broad categories of violent inter-group confrontations “ a Extra-regional those involving a South Asian nation-state and states outside the region, b International conflict between national entities of South Asia, and c Sub-national conflict between different groups within each national entity and anti-state insurrections. This broad comparative analysis of types of conflict and processes across countries is a difficult task which, however, is made to look deceptively simple in this book. The theme-based analysis referred to above is followed by several country-specific chapters that are not mutually exclusive in content. The writer also draws from a wide range of relevant literature and data with substantial projections to augment the analysis without interrupting the main trends and threads of interconnection between the chapters. In each of these chapters there is, however, a special focus on conflict situations that have figured prominently in the political affairs of the country concerned. Thus, for example, the chapter on political conflict in India has a special focus on the ethnic and poverty dimensions. The study of political conflict in Pakistan devotes special attention to an analysis of the extraordinary power wielded by the military in its political affairs. To refer, at random, to a few examples from this study to illustrate the nature of this diversity, there is the conflict in Kashmir that has continued to last, albeit with fluctuating intensity, for well over six decades, or the secessionist war in Sri Lanka waged from about the mids to mid, which could be place at one extreme in a scale of duration and intensity of violence, contrasted with conflagrations of relatively short duration between rival groups identifiable on the basis identities of religion, language, caste, tribe or social class that have occurred intermittently in many parts of South Asia in both metropolitan settings of mixed ethnicity as well as remote rural areas inhabited largely by tribal communities , at the other extreme of the scale. The present monograph, while devoting attention to the foregoing diversities, has also highlighted certain commonalities in their impulses, discernible in most conflict situations. South Asian experiences indicate that this phenomenon has taken many forms. The patronage given by the government of India to the secessionist

terrorist groups in Sri Lanka, and various other forms of cross-border Indian intervention in Sri Lankan affairs were key ingredients in the perpetuation of the Sri Lankan conflict. Likewise, over certain spells, the harsh suppression of the radical uprisings by the autocratic Nepali monarchy had the tacit support of Delhi and in all probability Washington. The Indo-Pakistan rivalry at the international plane has all along been intimately linked to the never ending Hindu-Muslim clashes in India. Again, there is widespread belief in Pakistan – a belief supported by several authoritative external observers – that the large-scale violence that brought about the overthrow of the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regime of Pakistan was instigated by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. The Pukhtun ethno-nationalist revolts against the government of Pakistan were intimately linked to the political turbulences in Afghanistan in which the former U. In addition, there are the subversive influences of some of the major global powers could also be discerned in the contemporary political affairs of the region – especially in its smaller national entities. The disproportionately high participation of youth has for long been recognised as an important feature of almost all forms of collective political violence. This, according to certain well known analysts like Samuel P. Placing this phenomenon under scrutiny, the author has suggested that phenomena such as socio-economic deprivation especially the lack of productive employment opportunities, the criminalisation of politics politician-gangland-police nexus particularly evident in the larger cities of South Asia, and large-scale corruption in public affairs, the inculcation of unrealistic aspirations by the globalised electronic media, tend to generate among the youth a mindset which psychologists refer to as "frustration aggression" which, under certain circumstances, induces a segment of the youth to participate in collective violence. Therefore what is important is that the book has analysed the "youth phenomena" more as a social conflict than an ethnic conflict. My own research on the political conflict in Sri Lanka as published in my book titled "Political Violence in Sri Lanka" confirms the argument. The book, considered as a whole, establishes a body of information and data which, though extracted from a wide range of sources, supports the analysis and the main arguments of the book in a tone and style that is easy to read and is engaging for the reader. Given the topical relevance of the issues dealt with, the book is of great interest not only to those in academic pursuits at advanced levels but to a general readership that seeks to gain an understanding of contemporary social and political affairs of South Asia. The book is of relevance to senior-level policy and decision makers. Since the main political conflict in Sri Lanka has not in any manner ended, I rank this book as a seminal contribution to an understanding of the complex causal connections in our own conflicts and to the formulation of policies both in internal affairs of the country as well as in our external relations. It is due to be released by the University of Peradeniya.

Chapter 6 : Political conflict that involved two world powers - CodyCross Answers Cheats and Solutions

Political conflicts can only support justice and serve as engines of constructive political, economic, and social development if the means and methods by which they are resolved promote just, collaborative ends.

Burton Introduction For those of us who identify with the dispute or conflict fields, and their theories and practices, the pressing question is: Interactive problem-solving conflict resolution can deal only with a few special cases, and can make little contribution to reducing the escalating levels of conflict and violence now associated with developed societies. It is primarily a research tool, for the facilitated process gives important insights into human behaviour, human relationships and problems associated with existing institutions. The significant and historical contribution that the theory of conflict resolution can make is to decision making - that is to the prevention of conflict - and ultimately to providing a philosophy and a political-social system that could replace those presently dominant. Indeed, taking account of the magnitude of environmental problems, increasing levels of deprivation and violence at all social levels, and dramatically the falling quality of life, civilizations have no option but to substitute long-term problem solving for their traditional short-term policies of interest group expediency. It follows that research needs to be directed towards improved decision making in all organizations including industry, and at all societal levels from the community to the international, rather than have an exclusive focus on interactive processes. Teaching needs to be directed towards potential and practising decision makers rather than having a concentration on students who seek conflict resolution careers. Furthermore, it needs to be noted that greater insights into decision making and into necessary institutional changes lead to more analytical and constructive facilitations. Going one step further, it could reasonably be argued that the final aim of conflict resolution studies is so to alter the philosophies that govern all existing behavioural disciplines that separate conflict studies would no longer be required. Our Inheritance Throughout the history of Western societies, the prime concern of national authorities has been the promotion of the interests of the groups they represent, initially land owners, then industrialists and other organized pressure groups, and, where it has had some influence, little-by-little, a wider section of the total society. Political institutions have evolved accordingly, resulting in party political systems that are adversarial and promote competition. Throughout, the goals have been "law and order" and interventions into the prevailing economic and social systems of the day designed to preserve those systems, and to promote further the immediate concerns of influential interests. Political systems, accordingly, have been preoccupied with increasing benefits for only some sections of the community, have been concerned with real income distribution only to the extent that it is politically necessary, and have given little attention to the longer term consequences of policies on the social and environmental future. Currently there is an increasing social demand for political decision-making processes at both national and community levels that will give less attention to special interests, and more attention to longer term societal concerns. The environmental future is a major worry, and inherited decision-making processes seem incapable of dealing with it. Past neglect of the social future has led in most societies to high levels of violence and to conflicts at all societal levels, national and international. Despite this social concern, however, the focus of authorities remains on the present. Environmental destruction is defended as a means of reducing unemployment. Attempts are made to suppress violence when it occurs, but little attention is given to its sources, how it can be avoided, effectively contained, and better still, resolved rather than just suppressed. Failure of this power-oriented system to respond to social concerns at its political level is due largely to the absence of any conception of an alternative system. Fascism, being an extreme form of capitalism, led historically to resource problems that could be solved only by aggression. Communism, with its emphasis on equitable distribution, failed because of an absence of sufficient personal incentive in work, and also because problems of total planning and management were beyond management capacity. Both factors led this system into a power political frame that neglected the future. The power political system of capitalism, undirected in its future and social goals, survives for the time being only in the absence of a viable alternative. Traditionally it has been assumed that in the domestic version of this power political model, a central authority with enforcement powers, is the ideal. The United Nations

Charter was drafted with the domestic model in mind. Chapter Seven anticipated contributions to a permanent force available to the Security Council. Aside from the failure of this force to materialize leading eventually to some members acting in the name of the United Nations we now know that this model has its defects. Domestic violence is at a high level in all societies. It is clear that it cannot be reduced without dealing with its root causes, and the political system makes this impossible. So also in international society. Problems of ethnicity, poverty and exploitation of various kinds are some of the deep-rooted problems that are sources of violence. Indeed, international conflict is largely a spillover from domestic conflict. The international system itself, having no effective central authority to promote special interests, and relying on functional co-operation between nations large and small, is probably less confrontational than the domestic. If preservation of the environment and protection of societies against self-destructive violence were to become political goals, far reaching changes would be required. Party-political decision making would require radical modification, if not elimination, rather than be accepted as essential features of "democracy". Major inequalities of opportunity would require attention. Quality of life rather than levels of exploitation of resources would need to be the measure of economic achievement. One has only to ponder the sources and remedies of specific problems such as street violence or ethnic conflict to be led into a whole range of questions that come under the heading of political philosophy. There are no ad hoc solutions to these specific problems. Indeed, for survival and to promote such long term goals, civilizations would need to seek and adopt an alternative political philosophy, and an alternative to the confrontational power political system. Anything less would be a delusion. The question before us is, therefore, not how can some particular process be more widely employed to help to settle disputes, but how can societies at all levels be transformed so as to become less wasteful of resources, more far-sighted and less confrontational in decision making - and, as a consequence, less violent and self-destructive. What kind of system can be an improved alternative to the interest-driven, power political system which Western societies have inherited and passed on to others? Our separate academic disciplines have not tackled this question. Each has had its own human construct designed to fit into the system. There has been, for example, "economic man" and a conforming "sociological man". These convenient inventions have led thought away from human behaviour, and, therefore, from a holistic approach to problems. The focus has been on some aspects of these - economic, institutional, legal, social, or political. It has been as though solving an artificially constructed part of a problem could lead to its total solution. Employment is a partial solution for street violence, as is education, ethnicity relationships, perception of social justice, a sense of participation in decision making and a sense of recognition and identity. All are relevant and all raise further political and social issues. The total social-political-economic-legal system must be the frame in which an analysis is made of the source of the problem and its remedies. As will be seen below, this is now changing, and broader perspectives are beginning to dominate the academic literature. In this paper I argue that the transformations required are within the field of decision making, a field that, by definition, affects all societal levels, and touches on all other fields of human relationships, including processes of intended change. However, the contemporary trend universally is for authorities and "leaders", especially at the highest level of decision making, to deny responsibility and to hand everything over to "the market" - in other words, to allow events to take their course, regardless of consequences. Failed decision making, a failed system, has led to an absence of leadership and even less concern with the future. To go against this defeatist trend we must articulate alternative decision-making processes that offer better prospects for formulating and achieving consensus goals. The Traditional Power Frame The history of societies is, as already suggested, a history of the promotion by dominant groups in their own short-term interests. Even a few decades ago the academic model of decision making demonstrated this. It showed a set of lines representing power inputs, meeting at a point, and another set of lines representing distributions of power, seemingly from that point Modelski, The decision-making process itself was of no interest, represented only by the point at which the power inputs and distribution met. In more recent years the decision-making process has become more sophisticated, but the power frame remains Deutsch, ; Burton a. While domestic and international law and politics have traditionally been studied separately, they have basic power and legal frames in common. There is little difficulty; therefore, in conceptualising domestic and international dispute settlement as being similar in principle. Power

bargaining and negotiation, judicial settlements and, in some extreme cases, the employment of force are common to both. There have been attempts, particularly at the domestic level, to speed-up legal procedures within this political power system, and to make them more readily available to the under-privileged. But these procedures do not supply the added dimension required. That is, they do not seek to reveal the hidden institutional and behavioural causes of conflicts. They seek mainly to take the burden away from courts. In addition, there are "peace studies" and movements that seek to reduce means of violence. There is an approach to disputes that rests on introducing "good will" into situations that are confrontational. There are community organizations that seek to deal with many social problems. These are all attempts to modify the dominant power structure of society. They seek altered attitudes and policies, though societies remain within the adversarial and confrontational power frame that governs social and political relationships. They have, therefore, an idealistic ring, and must be regarded as well intentioned but politically unrealistic. An Alternative Frame Obviously many disputes are settled within the existing system: Laws, conventions, judicial and out-of-court settlements can be effective in many, if not most, disputes within a given society and between societies. No less obviously there are many disputes that cannot be so settled. Despite legal norms, social pressures and deterrent strategies, murders do occur, violence is widespread within nations, and wars between and within countries are frequent. No amount of threat or deterrence prevents this. In the 1960s an alternative frame emerged in response to failures in deterrent policies, domestically and internationally. While it emerged out of extensions to decision-making theory, it represented a jump from the power political frame in which one party could, sometimes at great cost, impose its will on another, to a problem-solving conflict resolution frame. In this, the parties to a dispute were helped to identify the sources of their problem, revealing possible options that would satisfy their needs. Applied to decision making generally, it was a frame in which decision makers assessed the consequences of policies before decision were taken, rather than relying on coercion in the event of adverse responses Burton, ; Mitchell From the outset it was claimed by those advocating the alternative frame that: Law and order had not been established domestically, and internationally great powers were being defeated in their attempts to deter, and wars had followed. Deterrence does not deter sane behaviours, and the power political frame was unrealistic because no account was taken of relevant human factors: The only option, in politically realistic terms, was to resolve the social and behavioural problems that led to specific conflicts, and not try merely to suppress them or to settle them by coercion. Let it be noted that there is no normative connotation in this alternative. There is no moral or idealistic basis. There is, however, the assertion that there are certain human drives or needs that will be pursued, regardless of cost and consequences, which, as is argued later, cannot permanently be suppressed. In the light of these political and behavioural realities we have no analytical option but to differentiate between "disputes" that can be "settled" and "conflicts" that arise out of problems that must be "resolved" and to find the means or processes by which those situations that cannot be settled can be analysed and resolved by the parties concerned. The questions being posed in this article are what are these processes, what is the system these processes would imply, and whether such processes are applicable at all societal levels, from the family to the international. Attempts to merge the two approaches There is a reluctance by some scholars and practitioners to make a sharp distinction between disputes and conflicts, and to separate the negotiating process from the problem solving one. This may be a mistake. Mixing the two processes, negotiating compromises, or appealing to good will and to social responsibility to observe legal and social norms, can lead to outcomes that do not reflect behavioural needs, and, therefore, to agreements which are only temporary. Furthermore, practitioners in negotiation and legal processes may be tempted to apply their techniques to situations that have their source in basic human needs and thus require an analytical process. At least at the present stage of thinking, the less confusion there is about appropriate processes the better.

Chapter 7 : Search results for `Political Conflict` - PhilPapers

Political conflict and corruption make life harder for rhinos, with less protection from poachers. Find out more about rhino threats and how you can support our work to ensure rhinos thrive for future generations.

Share via Email For many years, some of the closest people to Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas kept whispering into the ears of western politicians and journalists that the real danger facing Palestinian society emanates not from Israeli occupation but from Islamic fundamentalism. The whispering has turned into shouting since Hamas crushed the security services in Gaza that were loyal to Mohammed Dahlan last month. Today, it is with the loudest voices they can manage that these same individuals are crying for help, appealing to Israel and its western supporters to protect secularism from Islam in Palestine. The advisers to Mahmoud Abbas hope to benefit from the fact that in the west secularism is often associated with democracy whereas religion in general is associated with authoritarianism. The idea is to divert world attention from the real causes of the current crisis between Fatah and Hamas. They speak of Fatah as a secular nationalist current that represents the aspirations of the Palestinian people to establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza while portraying Hamas as an integral part of an alleged global Islamicist movement that is a threat to world peace and modernity. The crisis between Hamas and Fatah has been the product of what Abbas and his men allege was a coup. All the west wants from Hamas is for it to recognise that Israel has the right to exist, disarm and renounce violence and recognise all previous agreements reached between Israel and the PLO. Hamas has not accepted any of these conditions and it is unlikely that it will ever do so. What Hamas believes in and struggled for today is exactly what Fatah once believed in and struggled for before it was derailed by the sort of men who surround Abbas today. Hamas, like Fatah once was, is a national liberation movement whose main objective is to return the Palestinians to their homeland once liberated from Zionist occupation and not a religious institution in the European-Christian sense. Western politicians know well that Hamas fits the description of a national Palestinian liberation movement and that it has little in common with some of the extreme manifestations of Islamicism elsewhere in the region or across the world. Characterising the conflict between Hamas and Fatah as one between religion and secularism or between obscurantism and enlightenment may fool a certain number of people in western society for a while. Religion and religious institutions in the European experience have indeed been associated in the western mind with hindrances to progress, freedom and democratisation. Some may find it implausible that Hamas, which is presented more as a religious sect than a political movement, is capable of democracy and good governance. However, the impact of such disinformation on the western public is likely to be very short-lived. An increasing number of journalists writing in the western press or commenting on radio or television is more informed today than ever before and is most willing to tell the truth about Palestine and Hamas. It is no longer possible to conceal the facts from the public. In the age of satellite television and internet the conventional media cannot afford to cut and paste or pick and choose what to inform the public about. Whether people like Hamas or hate it, and whether they agree with it or oppose it, the conflict is purely political and not religious or ideological. Political conflicts may be resolved through negotiations whereas religious or ideological conflicts may never be resolved.

Chapter 8 : Conflict Information and Analysis System

The question is "what are the causes of the conflict between US and Iran?" There are different factions within each country. Within Iran, there are the Islamists, Nationalists, Leftists (socialist or communist), and others.

Chapter 9 : Political Conflict, Extremism and Criminal Justice in Bangladesh | Crisis Group

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