

## Chapter 1 : Essays on Plato's Psychology - Google Books

*Psychology Definition of PLATONIC IDEALISM: a general philosophical viewpoint stemming both directly and indirectly from the writings of Plato, which postulate that the phenomena of our world are to.*

It explains the possibilities of how the feeling of love began and how it has evolved—both sexually and non-sexually. Of particular importance is the speech of Socrates, who attributes to the prophetess Diotima an idea of platonic love as a means of ascent to contemplation of the divine. The step of this ascent is known as the "Ladder of Love". Socrates defines love based on separate classifications of pregnancy to bear offspring; pregnancy of the body, pregnancy of the soul, and direct connection to Being. Pregnancy of the body results in human children. Pregnancy of the soul, the next step in the process, produces "virtue" which is the soul truth translating itself into material form. Vulgar Eros is nothing but mere material attraction towards a beautiful body for physical pleasure and reproduction. Divine Eros begins the journey from physical attraction, i. This concept of Divine Eros is later transformed into the term platonic love. Vulgar Eros and Divine Eros are both connected and part of the same continuous process of pursuing totality of being itself, [4] with the purpose of mending human nature, eventually reaching a point of unity where there is no longer an aspiration to change. Most modern people would think of Eros as a concept rather than a god. This is an example of cultural relativity, because the modern interpretation of the term is different from the ancient Greek interpretation. Virtue is the result of pregnancy of the soul. This can be seen as a form of linguistic relativity. Some modern authors' perception of the terms "virtue" and "good" as they are translated into English from the Symposium are a good indicator of this misunderstanding. In the following quote, the author simplifies the idea of virtue as simply what is "good". Each step closer to the truth further distances love from beauty of the body toward love that is more focused on wisdom and the essence of beauty. Eventually, in time, with consequent steps up the ladder, the idea of beauty is eventually no longer connected with a body, but entirely united with Being itself. These two extremes of love are seen by the Greeks in terms of tragedy and comedy. According to Diotima in her discussion with Socrates, for anyone to achieve the final rung in the Ladder of Love, they would essentially transcend the body and rise to immortality - gaining direct access to Being. Such a form of love is impossible for a mortal to achieve. This is the type of love, that, according to Socrates, is practiced by animals. The love described as the one practiced by those who are pregnant according to the soul, who partake of both the realm of beings and the realm of Being, who grasp Being indirectly, through the mediation of beings, would be a love that Socrates could practice. One would be forever limited to beauty of the body, never being able to access the true essence of beauty. The offspring of true virtue would essentially lead to a mortal achieving immortality. Later in, Marsilio Ficino put forward a theory of neo-platonic love in which he defines love as a personal ability of an individual which guides their soul towards cosmic processes and lofty spiritual goals and heavenly ideas *De Amore, Les Belles Lettres*. The first use of the modern sense of platonic love is taken as an invention of Ficino in one of his letters. For a brief period, Platonic love was a fashionable subject at the English royal court, especially in the circle around Queen Henrietta Maria, the wife of King Charles I. Platonic love was the theme of some of the courtly masques performed in the Caroline era—though the fashion soon waned under pressures of social and political change. Seven types of love[ edit ] Throughout these eras platonic love slowly was categorized into different subsections, which were: Eros is a sexual or passionate love, or a modern perspective of romantic love. Philia is the type of love that is directed towards friendship or goodwill, often is met with mutual benefits that can also be formed by companionship, dependability, and trust. Storge is the type of love that is found between parents and children, and this is often a unilateral love. Agape is the universal love, that can consist of the love for strangers, nature, or god. Ludus is a playful and uncommitted love, this is focused for fun and sometimes as a conquest with no strings attached. Philautia is self-love and this can be healthy or unhealthy; which can be unhealthy if you are hubris if placed ahead of gods, and it can be healthy if its used to build self esteem and confidence. These different forms of love can be mistaken as any of the listed different loves. There is a type of porosity that allows love to filter through one type and into the next, although for

Plato love is to be of the beautiful and good things. This is due to the ownership of beautiful and good things equates into happiness. All beautiful and good things sit below truth and wisdom, for everyone looks to truthful and wise people as the truly beautiful for the effort of being considered beautifully good, and this is exactly why Plato suggests that love is not a god but rather a philosopher. Notably romantic relationships where a bond of love has been established. One of the complications of platonic love lies within the persistence of the use of the title itself "platonic love" versus the use of "friend". It is the use of the word love that directs us towards a deeper relationship than the scope of a normal friendship. Secondly, a study by Hause and Messman states:

*Psychology > History Of Psychology > History Of Psychology In Classical Antiquity > Plato's Psychology* Plato's Psychology The dialogues of Plato allegedly do no more than report the teaching of Socrates, but much of what is found in these works is surely Plato's own invention.

Their composition spans a period of years such that one must distinguish between the early, the middle, and the late works, with sometimes dramatic departures found across these periods. In the broadest terms, the dialogues address four core problems: How can one ever be sure that one knows anything? Is complete skepticism the most philosophically defensible position? In Meno the young challenger taunts Socrates, who claims to be searching for the truth. Such an inquiry is impossible since if one does not know what the truth is, there is no starting point and if one does know, there is no need for the search in the first place. As the boy answers each yes or no, Socrates leads him to a version of the Pythagorean Theorem. The knower possesses rather than learns the truth. Thus understood, knowledge of what is abidingly true cannot arise from sensory commerce with the world of changing things; it can arise only from an essentially intuitive and rational awareness that is possessed by the soul itself. To learn what it is that makes the person good it becomes useful to ask what constitutes the good state. By constructing the perfect state, the philosopher must comprehend the attributes that define the perfected human being. In Book 3 of The Republic citizens are categorized as being made of gold, silver, brass, or iron, the point being that they are framed so differently by the gods that of necessity some rule and others serve. This illustrates the strong hereditarian element in Platonic psychology but tends to mask the comparably great emphasis placed on early education and lifelong discipline; education is to be very carefully orchestrated. He explicitly endorses a multistage theory of cognitive development. In Laws, for example, the Athenian stranger asserts that virtue and vice are known to the young only as pleasure and pain and that, since children instinctively love what is pleasurable and hate what is painful, the principal task of the educator is to make sure that true virtue becomes the object of love. Moreover, there are critical periods of development when the lessons of virtue are most effectively conveyed by music, since virtue fundamentally is a harmonious relationship between body and mind. This aim is furthered by close contact between parent and infant. The same theme is sounded in The Republic, in which the young are depicted as being out of harmony: Reason and passion have yet to establish the unique accord that constitutes virtue. Music and dance and other gymnastics must be employed because the very young mind is not yet able to assimilate rational principles directly. Thus, early education uses metaphor, not literal lesson. If harmony is the goal, the sources of dissonance must be removed. In any case, eugenic breeding can reduce such mistakes to a minimum. Rather, it distinguishes three different types of pleasurable and painful experience. Some feelings are entirely bodily: Both body and soul participate in other feelings, such as a painful hunger relieved by anticipation of food. Some feelings, such as longing and love, only arise within the soul. Where body and soul are jointly engaged, the emotions are rich in cognitive content, but there can be feelings of the body without such content. In The Republic Socrates likens the soul to the state. As the state contains three classes merchants, auxiliaries, and counselors, the soul is occupied by three principles: The virtuous person is one who has harmonized these three principles such that reason controls appetite, and passion, as an auxiliary to reason, strengthens resolve. The view of reason and appetite as opposing forces is as old as the Homeric epics and as current as psychoanalytic theory. Where the balance is incomplete, where the three composites are in discord, the soul is sick and dying. While men and states are born with the capacity for such harmony, the capacity is actualized only under the leadership and guidance of the philosophically enlightened. Without this guidance the pleasures and pains of the flesh, which are the only sources of control for the child, continue to dominate the life of the adult. On this account, both madness and ignorance are diseases calling for a form of therapy. The mad and the unjust both have ruling appetites to which reason becomes subservient. Psychology Research and Reference.

**Chapter 3 : Platonic solid - Wikipedia**

*Platonic love is a special emotional and spiritual relationship between two people and is different than romantic love, but can be even more powerful and long-lasting. Psychology Today Find a.*

It is plain that humans can know and understand things; indeed, Aristotle supposes that it is our very nature to desire knowledge and understanding *Metaphysics* i 1, a21; *De Anima* ii 3, b18; iii 3, a6â€”8. In this way, just as the having of sensory faculties is essential to being an animal, so the having of a mind is essential to being a human. Human minds do more than understand, however. It is equally essential to the human being to plan and deliberate, to ponder alternatives and strategize, and generally to chart courses of action. In all these ways, investigating this capacity of soul thus has a special significance for Aristotle: His primary investigation of mind occurs in two chapters of *De Anima*, both of which are richly suggestive, but neither of which admits of easy or uncontroversial exposition. In *De Anima* iii 4 and 5, Aristotle approaches the nature of thinking by once again deploying a hylomorphic analysis, given in terms of form reception. Just as perception involves the reception of a sensible form by a suitably qualified sensory faculty, so thinking involves the reception of an intelligible form by a suitably qualified intellectual faculty *De Anima* iii 4, a13â€” This hylomorphic analysis of thinking is evidently a simple extension of the general model of hylomorphic change exploited by Aristotle in a host of similar contexts. That is, at least in schematic outline, Aristotle will offer the following approach. For any given thinker S and an arbitrary object of thought O: S thinks O if and only if: Unsurprisingly, the same questions which arose in the case of perception also arise here. The suggestion is, then, that when S comes to think of a stone, as opposed to merely perceiving some particular stone, S has a faculty which is such that it can become one in form with that stone. Aristotle sometimes infers from this sort of consideration that thought is of universals, whereas perception is of particulars *De Anima* ii 5, b23, *Posterior Analytics* i 31, 87b37â€”88a7 , though he elsewhere will allow that we also have knowledge of individuals *De Anima* ii 5, a29; *Metaphysics* xiii 10, a These passages are not contradictory, since Aristotle may simply be emphasizing that thought tends to proceed at a higher level of generality than perception, because of its trading in comparatively abstract structural features of its objects. A person can think of what it is to be a stone, but cannot, in any direct and literal sense of the term, perceive this. To take an initially favorable case, when thinking that tree frogs are oviparous, S will be in a psychic state whose internal structural states are, among other things, one in form with tree frogs. There must be a determinate and expressible structural isomorphism, even though one could not say that the blueprint realizes the form of the house. Houses are, after all, necessarily three-dimensional. On the contrary, the mind cannot realize a broad range of forms: As such, it would not be possible for the mind to realize the form of a house in the way bricks and mortar instantiate such a form: Consequently, when claiming that minds become isomorphic with their objects, Aristotle must understand the way in which minds become enformed as somehow attenuated or non-literal. Perhaps, though, this should be plain enough. If a mind thinks something by being made like it, then the way it is likened to what it thinks must be somehow representational. This approach to the nature of thinking has some promising features. At the same time, one of its virtues may appear also as a vice. Only surfaces can be affected so as to be changed in color. So, hylomorphic change requires at least the following two components: His reasons for maintaining this thesis are complex, but derive ultimately from the forms of plasticity Aristotle believes the mind must manifest if it is to be capable of thinking all things *De Anima* iii 4, a Now, if the mind is indeed nothing in actuality before thinking, it is hard to understand how the hylomorphic analysis of change and affection could be brought to bear in this arena. If some dough is made cookie-shaped, it is actually dough before being so enformed; even the sense organs, when made like their objects, are actually existing organs before being affected by the objects of perception. So, given a conception of mind as not existing in actuality before thinking, it is hard to appreciate how thinking lends itself to an analysis in terms of any recognizable hylomorphic approach to change. A builder is as such already able to build. When he begins building he becomes fully and actually a builder for the duration of his working. In this way, he loses nothing, but instead realizes an already established potential. This would involve its being nothing determinate in itself; and far

from being anomalous for Aristotle, the mind would be in the cognitive realm precisely what the most basic stuff, if there is a most basic stuff, would be in the material realm. Both would manifest unconstrained plasticity; and so each would be characterized essentially in terms of their range of potentialities. For the suggestion that thinking is to be understood at least partially in terms of isomorphisms between our representational capacities and the objects of our cognition has had, for good reason, a durable appeal. To the degree that hylomorphism is generally defensible, then, its application in this domain provides a theoretically rich framework for investigating the nature of thought.

In both perception and thinking, animal souls are in some ways active and in some ways passive. Although both mind and the sensory faculty receive their correlative forms when perceiving or thinking, neither is wholly passive in its defining activity. Perception involves discrimination, while thinking involves selective attending and abstraction, both activities, in the sense that each requires more than mere passive receptivity. Still, the sorts of activity required for cognition and perception do not explain in any obvious way another central fact about human beings and other animals: Even in his first characterizations of soul in *De Anima*, Aristotle is alive to the widely held conviction that the soul is implicated in motion *De Anima* 2, b11; i 5 b19. Of course, this is a natural connection for him to make, given that every animate being, that is, every being with a soul, has within it a principle of motion and rest. So, it seems deeply characteristic of living systems that they are able to move themselves in ways likely to result in their survival and flourishing. Animals move themselves, however, in a distinctive way: Why did ostrich run from the tiger? Because, one says easily, it desired to survive and so engaged in avoidance behavior. Why did the human being drive to the opera and sit quietly in her seat? Because, it seems, she desired to hear the music and to observe the spectacle. In these, as in countless other cases, the explanation of animal action, human and non-human alike, easily and unreflectively appeals to desire. This is why Aristotle does not end his *De Anima* with a discussion of mind. Instead, after discussing mind, he notes that all animals are capable of locomotion, only to deny that any one of the faculties of the soul so far considered viz. Although he had initially identified only these three faculties of soul *De Anima* ii 2, b12, Aristotle now notes that something must explain the fact that animals engage in goal-directed behavior in order to achieve their conscious and unconscious goals. The wanted explanation cannot, he urges, be found somehow in the nutritive faculty, since plants, as living beings, have that power of soul, but do not move themselves around in pursuit of their goals; nor is it due to perception, since even some animals have this faculty without ever moving themselves at all, in any way Aristotle evidently has in mind sponges, oysters, and certain testacea, *Historia Animalium* i 1, b6; viii 1 b12; *Partibus Animalium* iv 5, b34, c8; nor again can it be a product of mind, since insofar as it is contemplative, mind does not focus upon objects likely to issue in directives for action, and insofar as it does commend action, mind is not of itself sufficient to engender motion, but instead relies upon appetite *De Anima* iii 9, b14. Indeed, using the same form of reasoning, that a faculty cannot account for purposive action if its activity is insufficient to initiate motion, Aristotle initially concludes that even desire itself *orexis* cannot be responsible for action. After all, continent people, unlike those who are completely and virtuously moderate, have depraved desires but do not, precisely because they are continent, ever act upon them *De Anima* iii 9 a6; cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* i 13, b So their desires are insufficient for action. Consequently, he concludes, desire alone, considered as a single faculty, cannot explain purposive action, at least not completely. Ultimately, though, Aristotle does come to the conclusion that there is a faculty of desire *orektikon* whose occupation it is to initiate animal motion. Perhaps his initial reservations pertained only to one species of desire considered in isolation. In any case, he says plainly: He understands this conclusion, however, in tandem with another which also serves as a qualification of his earlier finding that mind cannot be the source of motion. He holds, in fact, that it is reasonable to posit two faculties implicated in animal movement: Rather, practical reason, broadly construed to incorporate the kind of image-processing present in non-human animals, is a source of movement when it focuses upon an object of desire as something desirable. So, practical reason and desire act corporately as the sources of purposive motion in all animals, both human and non-human *De Anima* iii 10, a9, even though, ultimately, it is desire whose objects prick practical intellect and set it in motion *De Anima* iii 10, a17. For this reason, Aristotle concludes, there is a faculty of desire whose activities and objects are primarily, if not autonomously or discretely,

responsible for initiating end-directed motion in animals. What animals seek in action is some object of desire which is or seems to them to be good. Aristotle displays some hesitation in his discussion of desire and its relation to practical reason in the aetiology of animal action. Some have consequently concluded that his treatment can be regarded as at best inchoate or, worse, as positively befuddled. There seem to be no grounds for any such harsh assessment, however. Equally likely is that Aristotle is simply sensitive to the complexities involved in any approach to the intertwining issues in the philosophy of action. Unlike some later Humeans, he evidently appreciates that the data and phenomena in this domain are unstable, wobbling and retreating at the approach of taxonomizing theory. The antecedents of action, he rightly concludes, involve some sort of faculty of desire; but he is reluctant to conclude that desire is the sole or sufficient faculty implicated in the explanation of purposive behavior. In some way, he concludes, practical reason and imagination have indispensable roles to play as well. All translations of passages in Aristotle in the above entry are by the author. D., Aristotle, *De anima*, edited, with introduction and commentary, Oxford: *Anthologies and Monographs* Barnes, L. *Psychology and Aesthetics*, London: *From Alcmaeon to Aristotle*, Oxford: *Interpretations of De Anima*, Ithaca: Bretano, Franz, , *The Psychology of Aristotle*, ed. University of California Press. Everson, Stephan, , *Aristotle on Perception*, Oxford: Gallop, David, , *Aristotle on Sleep and Dreams*, text and translation with introduction, notes and glossary, Peterborough, Ontario: Gill, Mary Louise and James G. *From Aristotle to Newton*, Princeton: Hartman, Edwin, , *Substance, Body and Soul*: Lear, Jonathon, , *Aristotle: The Desire to Understand*, Cambridge: Modrak, Deborah, , *Aristotle: The Power of Perception*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Sorabji, Richard, , *Aristotle on Memory*, Providence: *Articles and Book Chapters* Ackrill, J. Oxford University Press, €”

Chapter 4 : Plato's Ethics: An Overview (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*Plato (Greek: Πλάτων, "broad") (c. 428 - c. 348 BC), was a Classical Greek philosopher, mathematician, writer of philosophical dialogues, and founder of the Platonic Academy in Athens, the first institution of higher learning in the western world.*

Several of the philosophers we have already discussed considered it the pinnacle of their careers to come and teach in this great city. It began as a collection of villages in some of the poorest agricultural land in Greece. Only carefully tended grapes and olives provided early Athens with a livelihood, that and trade. The distance between the haves -- the ruling aristocratic trading families -- and the have nots -- peasants working the land -- and the accompanying feudal oppression, grew so great that it looked like the city and its surrounding area would collapse under the weight. In bc, the leaders of the middle class recruited a merchant named Solon to accept leadership of the city and restore some peace and prosperity. He began by canceling all debts and freeing all who had been enslaved on account of debt. Then he proceeded to draft a constitution in which the population was divided into four classes based entirely on economic worth, with the highest retaining the greatest power, but the lowest being exempt from taxes. Slavery would not be outlawed until 1808, when Mexico would become the very first sovereign nation to permanently ban slavery. It would take the US until the 13th and the 19th amendment. Unfortunately, at about the same time the democratic experiment began, the great Persian Empire to the east decided to expand into, first, Ionia, and then Greece proper. But in 490 bc, Greeks defeated Persian troops at Marathon, north of Athens. A messenger named Pheidippides ran the 26 miles -- In 480, the Persian emperor Xerxes sent an army of over two million men, assisted by a fleet of ships, to attack Greece again. The army ravaged the north of Greece and prepared to attack Athens. They found the city deserted. The Persian navy, however, found the Greek fleet waiting for it in the Bay of Salamis. The Greeks won the day against enormous odds. By 479, the Persians were forced back into Asia Minor. If this seems like just a little piece of history, consider: This victory allowed the Greek adventure to continue to produce the kind of thinking that would set the tone for the next two millennia in Europe and the Mediterranean. During the time period we are looking at in this chapter, Athens had as many as 400,000 people, making it one of the largest cities in the world. About half were free, one third were slaves, and one sixth were foreigners metics. The free adult males who could vote numbered about 50,000. He married, but had a tendency to fall in love with handsome young men, in particular a young soldier named Alcibiades. He was, by all accounts, short and stout, not given to good grooming, and a lover of wine and conversation. He was irritated by the Sophists and their tendency to teach logic as a means of achieving self-centered ends, and even more their promotion of the idea that all things are relative. It was the truth that he loved, desired, and believed in. Philosophy, the love of wisdom, was for Socrates itself a sacred path, a holy quest -- not a game to be taken lightly. He believed -- or at least said he did in the dialog Meno -- in the reincarnation of an eternal soul which contained all knowledge. We unfortunately lose touch with that knowledge at every birth, and so we need to be reminded of what we already know rather than learning something new. He said that he did not teach, but rather served, like his mother, as a midwife to truth that is already in us! Making use of questions and answers to remind his students of knowledge is called maieutics midwifery, dialectics, or the Socratic method. One example of his effect on philosophy is found in the dialog Euthyphro. He suggests that what is to be considered a good act is not good because gods say it is, but is good because it is useful to us in our efforts to be better and happier people. This means that ethics is no longer a matter of surveying the gods or scripture for what is good or bad, but rather thinking about life. He even placed individual conscience above the law -- quite a dangerous position to take! Socrates himself never wrote any of his ideas down, but rather engaged his students -- wealthy young men of Athens -- in endless conversations. In exchange for his teaching, they in turn made sure that he was taken care of. Plato reconstructed these discussions in a great set of writings known as the Dialogs. It is difficult to distinguish what is Socrates and what is Plato in these dialogs, so we will simply discuss them together. In 348, he was ordered to drink a brew of poison hemlock, which he did in the company of his students. Pay it and do not neglect it. From a wealthy and powerful family, his actual name was Aristocles -- Plato was a nickname,

referring to his broad physique. His friends raised money to ransom him from slavery, but when he was released without it, they bought him a small property called Academus to start a school -- the Academy, founded in 387 BC. It was free, depending entirely on donations. True to his ideals, Plato also permitted women to attend! The Academy would become the center of Greek learning for almost a millennium. Plato can be understood as idealistic and rationalistic, much like Pythagorus but much less mystical. He divides reality into two: On the one hand we have ontos, idea or ideal. This is ultimate reality, permanent, eternal, spiritual. Phenomena are appearances -- things as they seem to us -- and are associated with matter, time, and space. Phenomena are illusions which decay and die. Ideals are unchanging, perfect. Phenomena are definitely inferior to Ideals! The idea of a triangle -- the defining mathematics of it, the form or essence of it -- is eternal. Any individual triangle, the triangles of the day-to-day experiential world, are never quite perfect: They may be a little crooked, or the lines a little thick, or the angles not quite right They only approximate that perfect triangle, the ideal triangle. If it seems strange to talk about ideas or ideals as somehow more real than the world of our experiences, consider science. If you believe that there is order in the universe, that nature has laws, you believe in ideas! Ideas are available to us through thought, while phenomena are available to us through our senses. So, naturally, thought is a vastly superior means to get to the truth. This is what makes Plato a rationalist, as opposed to an empiricist, in epistemology. Senses can only give you information about the ever-changing and imperfect world of phenomena, and so can only provide you with implications about ultimate reality, not reality itself. Reason goes straight to the idea. According to Plato, the phenomenal world strives to become ideal, perfect, complete. Ideals are, in that sense, a motivating force. In fact, he identifies the ideal with God and perfect goodness. If the world is not perfect, it is not because of God or the ideals, but because the raw materials were not perfect. I think you can see why the early Christian church made Plato an honorary Christian, even though he died three and a half centuries before Christ! Plato applies the same dichotomy to human beings: The soul includes reason, of course, as well as self-awareness and moral sense. Plato says the soul will always choose to do good, if it recognizes what is good. This is a similar conception of good and bad as the Buddhists have: Rather than bad being sin, it is considered a matter of ignorance. So, someone who does something bad requires education, not punishment. The soul is drawn to the good, the ideal, and so is drawn to God. We gradually move closer and closer to God through reincarnation as well as in our individual lives. Our ethical goal in life is resemblance to God, to come closer to the pure world of ideas and ideal, to liberate ourselves from matter, time, and space, and to become more real in this deeper sense. Our goal is, in other words, self-realization. Plato talks about three levels of pleasure. First is sensual or physical pleasure, of which sex is a great example. But the highest level is ideal pleasure, the pleasures of the mind. Here the example would be Platonic love, intellectual love for another person unsullied by physical involvement. Paralleling these three levels of pleasure are three souls. We have one soul called appetite, which is mortal and comes from the gut. The second soul is called spirit or courage. It is also mortal, and lives in the heart. The third soul is reason. It is immortal and resides in the brain. The three are strung together by the cerebrospinal canal. Plato is fond of analogies. Appetite, he says, is like a wild horse, very powerful, but likes to go its own way. Spirit is like a thoroughbred, refined, well trained, directed power. And reason is the charioteer, goal-directed, steering both horses according to his will. In *The Republic*, he designs through Socrates a society in order to discover the meaning of justice. The peasants are the foundation of the society. They till the soil and produce goods, i.

**Chapter 5 : Aristotle's Psychology - History of Psychology**

*Aristotle's Psychology and the Influence of Plato. To give Aristotle ( BC - BC) complete credit for being the first thinker to develop a theory of proto-psychology is unfair to some of the other philosophers from Greece and beyond.*

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Phaedrus c. In Henri Estienne whose Latinized name was Stephanus published an edition of the dialogues in which each page of the text is separated into five sections labeled a, b, c, d, and e. The standard style of citation for Platonic texts includes the name of the text, followed by Stephanus page and section numbers e. Scholars sometimes also add numbers after the Stephanus section letters, which refer to line numbers within the Stephanus sections in the standard Greek edition of the dialogues, the Oxford Classical texts. Other Works Attributed to Plato a. Spuria Several other works, including thirteen letters and eighteen epigrams, have been attributed to Plato. These other works are generally called the spuria and the dubia. The spuria were collected among the works of Plato but suspected as frauds even in antiquity. The dubia are those presumed authentic in later antiquity, but which have more recently been doubted. Ten of the spuria are mentioned by Diogenes Laertius at 3. Five of these are no longer extant: Five others do exist: Works whose authenticity was also doubted in antiquity include the Second Alcibiades or Alcibiades II , Epinomis, Hipparchus, and Rival Lovers also known as either Rivals or Lovers , and these are sometimes defended as authentic today. If any are of these are authentic, the Epinomis would be in the late group, and the others would go with the early or early transitional groups. Epigrams Seventeen or eighteen epigrams poems appropriate to funerary monuments or other dedications are also attributed to Plato by various ancient authors. Most of these are almost certainly not by Plato, but some few may be authentic. None appear to provide anything of great philosophical interest. Dubia The dubia present special risks to scholars: The dubia include the First Alcibiades or Alcibiades I , Minos, and Theages, all of which, if authentic, would probably go with the early or early transitional groups, the Cleitophon, which might be early, early transitional, or middle, and the letters, of which the Seventh seems the best candidate for authenticity. Some scholars have also suggested the possibility that the Third may also be genuine. If any are authentic, the letters would appear to be works of the late period, with the possible exception of the Thirteenth Letter, which could be from the middle period. Nearly all of the dialogues now accepted as genuine have been challenged as inauthentic by some scholar or another. In the 19th Century in particular, scholars often considered arguments for and against the authenticity of dialogues whose authenticity is now only rarely doubted. Of those we listed as authentic, above in the early group , only the Hippias Major continues occasionally to be listed as inauthentic. The strongest evidence against the authenticity of the Hippias Major is the fact that it is never mentioned in any of the ancient sources. However, relative to how much was actually written in antiquity, so little now remains that our lack of ancient references to this dialogue does not seem to be an adequate reason to doubt its authenticity. In style and content, it seems to most contemporary scholars to fit well with the other Platonic dialogues. The Early Dialogues a. Historical Accuracy Although no one thinks that Plato simply recorded the actual words or speeches of Socrates verbatim, the argument has been made that there is nothing in the speeches Socrates makes in the Apology that he could have not uttered at the historical trial. But as we have said, most scholars treat these as representing more or less accurately the philosophy and behavior of the historical Socrates—even if they do not provide literal historical records of actual Socratic conversations. Some of the early dialogues include anachronisms that prove their historical inaccuracy. Contemporary scholars generally endorse one of the following four views about the dialogues and their representation of Socrates: One recent version of this view has been argued by Charles H. Most later, but still ancient, interpretations of Plato were essentially Unitarian in their approach. Aristotle, however, was a notable exception. The Literary Atomist View: Those who endorse this view reject completely any relevance or validity of sorting or grouping the dialogues into groups, on the ground that any such sorting is of no value to the proper interpretation of any given dialogue. In this view, too, there is no reason to make any distinction between "Socratic philosophy" and "Platonic philosophy. Developmentalists may generally identify the earlier positions or works as "Socratic" and the later ones "Platonic," but may be agnostic about the relationship of the "Socratic" views and works to

the actual historical Socrates. Later on, however perhaps because of the development of the genre of "Socratic writings," within which other authors were making no attempt at historical fidelity, Plato began more freely to put his own views into the mouth of the character, "Socrates," in his works. Now, some scholars who are skeptical about the entire program of dating the dialogues into chronological groups, and who are thus strictly speaking not historicists see, for example, Cooper, xii-xvii nonetheless accept the view that the "early" works are "Socratic" in tone and content. With few exceptions, however, scholars agreed that if we are unable to distinguish any group of dialogues as early or "Socratic," or even if we can distinguish a separate set of "Socratic" works but cannot identify a coherent philosophy within those works, it makes little sense to talk about "the philosophy of historical Socrates" at all. There is just too little and too little that is at all interesting to be found that could reliably be attributed to Socrates from any other ancient authors. Socrates is represented as extremely agile in question-and-answer, which has come to be known as "the Socratic method of teaching," or "the elenchus" or elenchos, from the Greek term for refutation, with Socrates nearly always playing the role as questioner, for he claimed to have no wisdom of his own to share with others. As a result of his attempt to discern the true meaning of this oracle, Socrates gained a divinely ordained mission in Athens to expose the false conceit of wisdom. Platonic dialogues continue to be included among the required readings in introductory and advanced philosophy classes, not only for their ready accessibility, but also because they raise many of the most basic problems of philosophy. Unlike most other philosophical works, moreover, Plato frames the discussions he represents in dramatic settings that make the content of these discussions especially compelling.

**Ethical Positions in the Early Dialogues** The philosophical positions most scholars agree can be found directly endorsed or at least suggested in the early or "Socratic" dialogues include the following moral or ethical views: A rejection of retaliation, or the return of harm for harm or evil for evil *Crito* 48b-c, 49c-d; *Republic* I. In some sense, all of the virtues are the same *Protagoras* bb, a-b; The view that the citizen who has agreed to live in a state must always obey the laws of that state, or else persuade the state to change its laws, or leave the state *Crito* 51b-c, 52a-d. **Psychological Positions in the Early Dialogues** Socrates also appears to argue for, or directly makes a number of related psychological views: All wrongdoing is done in ignorance, for everyone desires only what is good *Protagoras* a-c; *Gorgias* b; *Meno* 77eb; In some sense, everyone actually believes certain moral principles, even though some may think they do not have such beliefs, and may disavow them in argument *Gorgias* b, ea. **Religious Positions in the Early Dialogues** In these dialogues, we also find Socrates represented as holding certain religious beliefs, such as: The gods are completely wise and good *Apology* 28a; *Euthyphro* 6a, 15a; *Meno* 99bb; Ever since his childhood see *Apology* 31d Socrates has experienced a certain "divine something" *Apology* 31c-d; 40a; *Euthyphro* 3b; see also *Phaedrus* b, which consists in a "voice" *Apology* 31d; see also *Phaedrus* c, or "sign" *Apology* 40c, 41d; *Euthydemus* e; see also *Republic* VI. The same can be said of diviners and seers, although they do seem to have some kind of expertise—perhaps only some technique by which to put them in a state of appropriate receptivity to the divine *Apology* 22b-c; *Laches* ea; *Ion* da, d-e; *Meno* 99c; No one really knows what happens after death, but it is reasonable to think that death is not an evil; there may be an afterlife, in which the souls of the good are rewarded, and the souls of the wicked are punished *Apology* 40cc; *Crito* 54b-c; *Gorgias* aa. **Definitional knowledge of ethical terms is at least a necessary condition of reliable judging of specific instances of the values they name** *Euthyphro* 4e-5d, 6e; *Laches* eb; *Lysis* b; *Greater Hippias* d-e; *Meno* 71a-b, b; *Republic* I. Proper definitions must state what is common to all examples of the value *Euthyphro* 6d-e; *Meno* 72c-d; Those with expert knowledge or wisdom on a given subject do not err in their judgments on that subject *Euthyphro* 4e-5a; *Euthydemus* db, go about their business in their area of expertise in a rational and regular way *Gorgias* eb, and can teach and explain their subject *Gorgias* a, eb, a-b; *Laches* b, e, eb; *Protagoras* b-c.

**The Middle Dialogues** a. **Differences between the Early and Middle Dialogues** Scholarly attempts to provide relative chronological orderings of the early transitional and middle dialogues are problematical because all agree that the main dialogue of the middle period, the *Republic*, has several features that make dating it precisely especially difficult. As we have already said, many scholars count the first book of the *Republic* as among the early group of dialogues. But those who read the entire *Republic* will also see that the first book also provides a natural and effective introduction to the remaining books of the work. If this central work of

the period is difficult to place into a specific context, there can be no great assurance in positioning any other works relative to this one. Nonetheless, it does not take especially careful study of the transitional and middle period dialogues to notice clear differences in style and philosophical content from the early dialogues. The most obvious change is the way in which Plato seems to characterize Socrates: In the early dialogues, moreover, Socrates discusses mainly ethical subjects with his interlocutors— with some related religious, methodological, and epistemological views scattered within the primarily ethical discussions. The philosophical positions Socrates advances in these dialogues are vastly more systematical, including broad theoretical inquiries into the connections between language and reality in the *Cratylus*, knowledge and explanation in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, Books V-VII. This theory of Forms, introduced and explained in various contexts in each of the middle period dialogues, is perhaps the single best-known and most definitive aspect of what has come to be known as Platonism. So, for example, in the *Phaedo*, we are told that particular sensible equal things— for example, equal sticks or stones see *Phaedo* 74ad — “are equal because of their “participation” or “sharing” in the character of the Form of Equality, which is absolutely, changelessly, perfectly, and essentially equal. Plato sometimes characterizes this participation in the Form as a kind of imaging, or approximation of the Form. The same may be said of the many things that are greater or smaller and the Forms of Great and Small *Phaedo* 75c-d, or the many tall things and the Form of Tall *Phaedo* e, or the many beautiful things and the Form of Beauty *Phaedo* 75c-d, *Symposium* e, *Republic* V. When Plato writes about instances of Forms “approximating” Forms, it is easy to infer that, for Plato, Forms are exemplars. If so, Plato believes that The Form of Beauty is perfect beauty, the Form of Justice is perfect justice, and so forth. Conceiving of Forms in this way was important to Plato because it enabled the philosopher who grasps the entities to be best able to judge to what extent sensible instances of the Forms are good examples of the Forms they approximate. Scholars disagree about the scope of what is often called “the theory of Forms,” and question whether Plato began holding that there are only Forms for a small range of properties, such as tallness, equality, justice, beauty, and so on, and then widened the scope to include Forms corresponding to every term that can be applied to a multiplicity of instances. In the *Republic*, he writes as if there may be a great multiplicity of Forms— for example, in Book X of that work, we find him writing about the Form of Bed see *Republic* X. He may have come to believe that for any set of things that shares some property, there is a Form that gives unity to the set of things and univocity to the term by which we refer to members of that set of things. Knowledge involves the recognition of the Forms *Republic* V.

**Immortality and Reincarnation** In the early transitional dialogue, the *Meno*, Plato has Socrates introduce the Orphic and Pythagorean idea that souls are immortal and existed before our births. All knowledge, he explains, is actually recollected from this prior existence. It is an interest, however, that shows up plainly in the middle period dialogues, especially in the middle books of the *Republic*. Stylometry has tended to count the *Phaedo* among the early dialogues, whereas analysis of philosophical content has tended to place it at the beginning of the middle period. Similar accounts of the transmigration of souls may be found, with somewhat different details, in Book X of the *Republic* and in the *Phaedrus*, as well as in several dialogues of the late period, including the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*. No traces of the doctrine of recollection, or the theory of reincarnation or transmigration of souls, are to be found in the dialogues we listed above as those of the early period.

**Moral Psychology** The moral psychology of the middle period dialogues also seems to be quite different from what we find in the early period. Hence, all wrongdoing reflects some cognitive error. But in the middle period, Plato conceives of the soul as having at least three parts: One may suffer, in this account of psychology, from what is called *akrasia* or “moral weakness”— in which one finds oneself doing something that one actually believes is not the right thing to do see especially *Republic* IV. In the early period, Socrates denied that *akrasia* was possible: In the early period works, Socrates contends that the poets lack wisdom, but he also grants that they “say many fine things. Most of poetry and the other fine arts are to be censored out of existence in the “noble state” *kallipolis* Plato sketches in the *Republic*, as merely imitating appearances rather than realities, and as arousing excessive and unnatural emotions and appetites see esp. Also in that dialogue, we are told of the “ladder of love,” by which the lover can ascend to direct cognitive contact with usually compared to a kind of vision of Beauty Itself. In both of these dialogues, Plato clearly regards actual physical or sexual contact

between lovers as degraded and wasteful forms of erotic expression. For this reason, Plato thinks that most people sadly squander the real power of love by limiting themselves to the mere pleasures of physical beauty.

Late Transitional and Late Dialogues a. Philosophical Methodology One of the novelties of the dialogues after those of the middle period is the introduction of a new philosophical method. This method was introduced probably either late in the middle period or in the transition to the late period, but was increasingly important in the late period. In the early period dialogues, as we have said, the mode of philosophizing was refutative question-and-answer called elenchos or the "Socratic method". Although the middle period dialogues continue to show Socrates asking questions, the questioning in these dialogues becomes much more overtly leading and didactic. The highest method of philosophizing discussed in the middle period dialogues, called "dialectic," is never very well explained at best, it is just barely sketched in the divided line image at the end of Book VI of the Republic.

**Chapter 6 : 5 Reasons Why Plato and Aristotle Still Matter Today**

*Aristotle ( BC) was born in Macedon, in what is now northern Greece, but spent most of his adult life in Athens. His life in Athens divides into two periods, first as a member of Plato's Academy ( ) and later as director of his own school, the Lyceum ( ). The intervening.*

Few other questions have provoked debates as intense, family dinners as awkward, literature as lurid , or movies as memorable. Still, the question remains unanswered. Daily experience suggests that non-romantic friendships between males and females are not only possible, but common—men and women live, work, and play side-by-side, and generally seem to be able to avoid spontaneously sleeping together. In order to investigate the viability of truly platonic opposite-sex friendships—a topic that has been explored more on the silver screen than in the science lab—researchers brought 88 pairs of undergraduate opposite-sex friends into a science lab. Privacy was paramount—for example, imagine the fallout if two friends learned that one—and only one—had unspoken romantic feelings for the other throughout their relationship. In order to ensure honest responses, the researchers not only followed standard protocols regarding anonymity and confidentiality, but also required both friends to agree—verbally, and in front of each other—to refrain from discussing the study, even after they had left the testing facility. These friendship pairs were then separated, and each member of each pair was asked a series of questions related to his or her romantic feelings or lack thereof toward the friend with whom they were taking the study. The results suggest large gender differences in how men and women experience opposite-sex friendships. Men were much more attracted to their female friends than vice versa. Men were also more likely than women to think that their opposite-sex friends were attracted to them—a clearly misguided belief. Women, too, were blind to the mindset of their opposite-sex friends; because females generally were not attracted to their male friends, they assumed that this lack of attraction was mutual. As a result, men consistently overestimated the level of attraction felt by their female friends and women consistently underestimated the level of attraction felt by their male friends. Men were also more willing to act on this mistakenly perceived mutual attraction. However, men and women differed in the extent to which they saw attached friends as potential romantic partners. Men seem to see myriad opportunities for romance in their supposedly platonic opposite-sex friendships. The women in these friendships, however, seem to have a completely different orientation—one that is actually platonic. To the outside observer, it seems clear that these vastly different views about the potential for romance in opposite-sex friendships could cause serious complications—and people within opposite-sex relationships agree. In a follow-up study, adults many of whom were married were asked to list the positive and negative aspects of being friends with a specific member of the opposite sex. Variables related to romantic attraction e. However, the differences between men and women appeared here as well. Males were significantly more likely than females to list romantic attraction as a benefit of opposite-sex friendships, and this discrepancy increased as men aged—males on the younger end of the spectrum were four times more likely than females to report romantic attraction as a benefit of opposite-sex friendships, whereas those on the older end of the spectrum were ten times more likely to do the same. Although women seem to be genuine in their belief that opposite-sex friendships are platonic, men seem unable to turn off their desire for something more. And even though both genders agree overall that attraction between platonic friends is more negative than positive, males are less likely than females to hold this view. Are you a scientist who specializes in neuroscience, cognitive science, or psychology? And have you read a recent peer-reviewed paper that you would like to write about? He can be reached at [garethideas AT gmail](mailto:garethideas AT gmail). Ward is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University. His doctoral research is focused on the relationships between technology, cognition, social relationships, and self-esteem, and he worked briefly as a scientific consultant for a dating website.

**Chapter 7 : Platonism - Wikipedia**

*Plato is one of the world's best known and most widely read and studied philosophers. He was the student of Socrates and the teacher of Aristotle, and he wrote in the middle of the fourth century B.C.E. in ancient Greece. Though influenced primarily by Socrates, to the extent that Socrates is.*

In particular, Plato rejects the modern account of rationality as the maximization of subjectively evaluated self-interest because, had he adopted such an account, his theory of justice would be subject to criticisms which he holds are fatal to the contractarian theory of justice. While formulating a theory to remain within ethical constraints sometimes violates the canons of scientific theorizing, Plato avoids this mistake. The first serious account of justice Plato considers in the Republic is the contractarian account. Hence it is rational to be moral. It is rational to be moral. The contractarian account is also unacceptable because it has no force in the case of the Lydia Shepherd. But to show this Plato must establish each of the following: That is, he must show us that the just person is also the rational person, one who bases her actions on reason. Show how his account of the relationship between justice and rational self-interest illuminates our pre-critical concept of justice in an attractive way. That is, he must show that his account provides us with a truly valuable conception of justice. In Book IV of the Republic, Plato provides us with an account of human psychology compatible with the idea that we might be motivated by the goal of acting in our actual, rather than our apparent, self-interest; he outlines a picture of human nature which allows for the possibility that moral motives could be our motives. The psychological theory assumed by Glaucon in stating the contractarian account of justice was best stated and most ably defended by Hume. The passionate part provides us with goals, things we want for their own sake. The rational element serves to determine the best, or most efficient, means of attaining that which the passionate element has informed us we want. For Hume, reason does not play a direct role in providing us with motives; it does not determine what we want, only how to get that which we want. As Hume put it, reason "is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions". To see that this is so I will first sketch what the Platonic project would look like had Plato adopted a Humean psychology. Had Plato accepted the Humean psychology, his account of the relationship between morality and rationality would have been much like the following. Human beings come to have certain wants, and reason tells them how to satisfy them. Yet working at satisfying the desires one happens to have will not necessarily maximize satisfaction, because our true natures are such that each of us has a basic and powerful passion for fulfillment. This desire, the desire for fulfillment, is one of which most people are unaware. Satisfying the wants we happen to have is not, as a matter of contingent psychological fact, a good, or efficient, means of satisfying the fundamental desire for fulfillment, which we all possess. It is the task of philosophy particularly of the revisionist Platonism being outlined here to bring to light the fundamental desire for fulfillment. Once we become conscious of this desire, we can turn our reason to the task of figuring out how best to satisfy it. That is, once we see that our real self-interest lies in satisfying this desire we will see that the best, and as it turns out, only, way to satisfy this desire is to act justly. Plato would then tell us in what acting justly consisted. Thus, he would have provided us with a reason, that of satisfying our most fundamental desire, for acting justly. According to the revisionist Platonic account, it is rational to be or become moral. It is rational to act justly because acting justly is the best available means of maximizing desire satisfaction. However, this account of the relationship between rationality and morality is unacceptable to Plato. Presumably, Plato thought of an account like this and rejected it for some reason. This question is particularly pressing since the account just given is, compared with the account Plato actually gives us, such a simple and tidy account. I suggest the reason Plato rejected the revisionist Platonic account outlined above is the same as the reason he rejected the entire contractarian account of justice: Rather, they are acting justly because doing so is a means of attaining that which they really want, viz. It is, of course, true that what they really want happens to require the same behavior that justice requires. However, Plato must reject this story because the revisionist Platonic actors are not motivated to act justly for its own sake. Rather, they are using justice as a means to some other end; they are not treating it as an end in itself. The fact that the revisionist Platonic account given above is unsatisfactory reveals the

tremendous difficulty of the task Plato has set for himself. He has to develop a theory which will motivate people to be moral, for any account of justice which conceives of this virtue as inert is useless. But he cannot motivate people to be moral just by appealing to any wants or desires they happen to have whether or not they are aware of these desires, even if the desire appealed to is, in its content, equivalent to the desire to be or to become a moral person. Plato appears to have snookered himself. It is for this reason that Plato has to develop an alternative account of human motivation; one which differs radically from the Humean account. While the contractarian divides the mind into two parts; the passions, which provide us with goals for action, and reason, which tells us how to attain those goals, Plato divides the mind into three parts; reason, spirit, and appetite. No part of the Platonic mind by itself provides us with nothing but ends for our action; no element of the Platonic mind is concerned with nothing but determining how best to obtain goals provided by some other part of the mind. Rather, each part of the Platonic mind provides both its own ends and the means of attaining them. Each part of the Platonic mind may have either the virtue or the vice which is appropriate to it. By denying that there is an element of the mind which, by itself, determines the content of our self-interest, Plato is able to have his cake and eat it too. Anyone who holds that one element of the mind both determines our self-interest and moves us to act is going to be prey to the charge that the just person is just simply because it is in her amoral interest to be just. This holds even if one adds further elements to the mind in addition to the Humean passions. He has the chance to show that it is rational to be moral without it being the case that moral persons do good for the wrong that is, solely self-interested reasons. To see how Plato accomplishes this feat we need to remind ourselves of his account of the just individual. What has the unjust individual got that one with a harmonious soul does not? Some elaboration will clarify this point. Suppose it is my goal to satisfy my desires. One way in which I can fail to achieve this goal is by having desires that are incompatible or inappropriate. For example, my desires may be logically incompatible, in that I may desire both  $p$  and  $\text{not-}p$ . Alternatively, my desires may be causally incompatible; I may want to have breakfast in Halifax and lunch in Athens. Desires may be incompatible or inappropriate in other ways. I may find that sets of my desires are mutually unbecoming, aesthetically incompatible, or personally intolerable. Plato recommends that we eliminate the psychic tension which is simply the state of having incompatible desires. That is to say, she lacks the psychic tension of having incompatible desires. This theory raises several points which deserve brief mention. First, it would be a mistake to suppose that Plato thought one could come to have a harmonious soul by the simple expedient of not having any desires at all. Indeed, this interpretation is so clearly absurd Plato does not even pause to consider it. Plato, as well as most of those who have been influenced by Freud, think it is the fact of conflict that is the evil. Yet it is not at all clear why this should be so. Third, it may be that some desires have a privileged position, such that if one satisfies them one will find that satisfying some others is either unnecessary or counter-productive. Plato holds that the desire for knowledge is of this type. As far as I can tell, he offers no argument for this claim, although, of course, the Platonic theory seems to require it. It does not follow from the fact that I want something that I want to want it, as any dieter can attest. Plato holds that our second-order desires generated by the element of reason in our souls are the ones to be preferred. But, although he gives us no argument for supposing that reason will provide us only with good, or proper second-order desires, perhaps a case may be made for thinking that reason will never provide me with a motive for seeking to develop a taste for torturing innocent barbarians. The most plausible position among these would appear to be that happiness is proportional to the total quantity of satisfaction, and not merely to the proportion of desires satisfied. This would include, as Plato surely wants to, the idea that it is not only existent desires that should count, but also desires one might come to have. This position and the complication posed by the inclusion of future desires are certainly problematic. Perhaps the best way to deal with them would be to point out that Socrates dissatisfied is happier than a pig satisfied. But Socrates satisfied would be even happier. We should all note that the reverse strategy is absurd. Imagine cultivating desires for both  $p$  and  $\text{not-}p$  on the grounds that, whatever happens, at least one of the desires will be satisfied. This seems about as sensible as the strategy of seeking to increase the number of true beliefs one has by believing or at least claiming to believe both  $p$  and  $\text{not-}p$ . This is because Plato favors reaching harmony by having the reasoning element dominate the other two elements. This seems to be much like our conception of integrity. We may say

that persons with integrity are those persons who do that which they have set for themselves to do. A person fails to have integrity when she succumbs to the seductive lure of lesser desires. The connection between this conception of integrity and the conception of harmony discussed previously is obvious. The person with integrity is the person who can either resolve conflicts within herself in a fairly efficient way or prevent such conflicts from ever arising. At this point, one of the problems mentioned earlier in this paper becomes evident. We demand that the good person not only have principles, but that she have a certain kind of principles. Nothing we have said so far precludes the idea of a principled Nazi. Her problem may not be any lack of integrity or harmony in her soul. Rather, the problem is that she has the wrong principles. This brings us to my last two points. What argument has Plato got for thinking that the person with a harmonious soul will have the sort of principles in terms of their content that Plato thinks that person will have? I find no argument on this point at least not in the Republic. Hence, it is rational to be a "just man". What does not follow is that the "just man" is a good man; that being a "just man" is a morally worthy goal though, of course, it does follow that being what Plato calls a "just man" is a prudentially worthy goal. Plato still has to show that what he calls a "just man" is in fact, a just person. The first argument, which appears in Book IV, for this inference is that it is obvious that the Platonic "just man" is a good person. Plato still needs the argument to convince those skeptics who refuse to grant that the "just man" is a good person and that consequently the Platonic conception of justice does connect justice with rationality in a manner superior to the connection offered by Glaucon in his defense of the contractarian position.

*What Way Did Philosophy Of Plato Influence Psychology Philosophy Essay. In the ideals and methods of today's psychological medicine, the general psyche of the human mind has been influenced by historical and cultural forces, and various perspectives through time.*

Aristotle gestures to the earth, representing his belief in knowledge through empirical observation and experience, while holding a copy of his *Nicomachean Ethics* in his hand. Plato holds his *Timaeus* and gestures to the heavens, representing his belief in *The Forms*. A boy in ancient Athens was socially located by his family identity, and Plato often refers to his characters in terms of their paternal and fraternal relationships. Socrates was not a family man, and saw himself as the son of his mother, who was apparently a midwife. A divine fatalist, Socrates mocks men who spent exorbitant fees on tutors and trainers for their sons, and repeatedly ventures the idea that good character is a gift from the gods. *Crito* reminds Socrates that orphans are at the mercy of chance, but Socrates is unconcerned. In the *Theaetetus*, he is found recruiting as a disciple a young man whose inheritance has been squandered. Socrates twice compares the relationship of the older man and his boy lover to the father-son relationship *Lysis* a, *Republic* 3. In several dialogues, Socrates floats the idea that Knowledge is a matter of recollection, and not of learning, observation, or study. Socrates is often found arguing that knowledge is not empirical, and that it comes from divine insight. He is quite consistent in believing in the immortality of the soul, and several dialogues end with long speeches imagining the afterlife. More than one dialogue contrasts knowledge and opinion, perception and reality, nature and custom, and body and soul. The only contrast to this is his *Parmenides*. Several dialogues tackle questions about art: Socrates says that poetry is inspired by the muses, and is not rational. In *Ion*, Socrates gives no hint of the disapproval of Homer that he expresses in the *Republic*. On politics and art, religion and science, justice and medicine, virtue and vice, crime and punishment, pleasure and pain, rhetoric and rhapsody, human nature and sexuality, love and wisdom, Socrates and his company of disputants had something to say. Platonic realism "Platonism" is a term coined by scholars to refer to the intellectual consequences of denying, as Socrates often does, the reality of the material world. While most people take the objects of their senses to be real if anything is, Socrates is contemptuous of people who think that something has to be graspable in the hands to be real. In the *Theaetetus*, he says such people are "eu a-mousoi", an expression that means literally, "happily without the muses" *Theaetetus* a. In other words, such people live without the divine inspiration that gives him, and people like him, access to higher insights about reality. Socrates says that he who sees with his eyes is blind, and this idea is most famously captured in his allegory of the cave, and more explicitly in his description of the divided line. The allegory of the cave begins *Republic* 7. There, Socrates tells Euthyphro that people can agree on matters of logic and science, and are divided on moral matters, which are not so easily verifiable. Socrates says in the *Republic* that people who take the sun-lit world of the senses to be good and real are living pitifully in a den of evil and ignorance. Socrates admits that few climb out of the den, or cave of ignorance, and those who do, not only have a terrible struggle to attain the heights, but when they go back down for a visit or to help other people up, they find themselves objects of scorn and ridicule. According to Socrates, physical objects and physical events are "shadows" of their ideal or perfect forms, and exist only to the extent that they instantiate the perfect versions of themselves. Just as shadows are temporary, inconsequential epiphenomena produced by physical objects, physical objects are themselves fleeting phenomena caused by more substantial causes, the ideals of which they are mere instances. For example, Socrates thinks that perfect justice exists although it is not clear where and his own trial would be a cheap copy of it. Socrates claims that the enlightened men of society must be forced from their divine contemplations and compelled to run the city according to their lofty insights. Thus is born the idea of the "philosopher-king", the wise person who accepts the power thrust upon him by the people who are wise enough to choose a good master. This is the main thesis of Socrates in the *Republic*, that the most wisdom the masses can muster is the wise choice of a ruler. The theory has been of incalculable influence in the history of Western philosophy and religion. Theory of Forms Main article: Plato spoke of forms in formulating his

solution to the problem of universals. The forms, according to Plato, are roughly speaking archetypes or abstract representations of the many types and properties that is, of universals of things we see all around us.

**Platonic epistemology** Many have interpreted Plato as stating that knowledge is justified true belief, an influential view which informed future developments in modern analytic epistemology. This interpretation is based on a reading of the *Theaetetus* wherein Plato argues that belief is to be distinguished from knowledge on account of justification. Many years later, Edmund Gettier famously demonstrated the problems of the justified true belief account of knowledge. Really, in the *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Republic*, and the *Parmenides* Plato himself associates knowledge with the apprehension of unchanging Forms and their relationships to one another which he calls "expertise" in *Dialectic*. More explicitly, Plato himself argues in the *Timaeus* that knowledge is always proportionate to the realm from which it is gained. In other words, if one derives their account of something experientially, because the world of sense is in flux, the views therein attained will be mere opinions. And opinions are characterized by a lack of necessity and stability. On the other hand, if one derives their account of something by way of the non-sensible forms, because these forms are unchanging, so too is the account derived from them. It is only in this sense that Plato uses the term "knowledge". The knowledge must be present, Socrates concludes, in an eternal, non-experiential form.

**POxy Parts Plato Republic.** There is some discrepancy between his early and later views. Some of the most famous doctrines are contained in the *Republic* during his middle period, as well as in the *Laws* and the *Statesman*. However, because Plato wrote dialogues, it is assumed that Socrates is often speaking for Plato. This assumption may not be true in all cases. The body parts symbolize the castes of society. Workers – the labourers, carpenters, plumbers, masons, merchants, farmers, ranchers, etc. These correspond to the "appetite" part of the soul. Protective Which represents the chest. Warriors or Guardians – those who are adventurous, strong and brave; in the armed forces. These correspond to the "spirit" part of the soul. Governing Which represents the head. Rulers or Philosopher Kings – those who are intelligent, rational, self-controlled, in love with wisdom, well suited to make decisions for the community. These correspond to the "reason" part of the soul and are very few. According to this model, the principles of Athenian democracy as it existed in his day are rejected as only a few are fit to rule. Instead of rhetoric and persuasion, Plato says reason and wisdom should govern. As Plato puts it: Sailing and health are not things that everyone is qualified to practice by nature. A large part of the *Republic* then addresses how the educational system should be set up to produce these philosopher kings. However, it must be taken into account that the ideal city outlined in the *Republic* is qualified by Socrates as the ideal luxurious city, examined to determine how it is that injustice and justice grow in a city *Republic* e. According to Socrates, the "true" and "healthy" city is instead the one first outlined in book II of the *Republic*, câ€™d, containing farmers, craftsmen, merchants, and wage-earners, but lacking the guardian class of philosopher-kings as well as delicacies such as "perfumed oils, incense, prostitutes, and pastries", in addition to paintings, gold, ivory, couches, a multitude of occupations such as poets and hunters, and war. Socrates is attempting to make an image of a rightly ordered human, and then later goes on to describe the different kinds of humans that can be observed, from tyrants to lovers of money in various kinds of cities. The ideal city is not promoted, but only used to magnify the different kinds of individual humans and the state of their soul. However, the philosopher king image was used by many after Plato to justify their personal political beliefs. The philosophic soul according to Socrates has reason, will, and desires united in virtuous harmony. A philosopher has the moderate love for wisdom and the courage to act according to wisdom. Wisdom is knowledge about the Good or the right relations between all that exists. Wherein it concerns states and rulers, Plato has made interesting arguments. For instance he asks which is better - a bad democracy or a country reigned by a tyrant. He argues that it is better to be ruled by a bad tyrant since then there is only one person committing bad deeds than be a bad democracy since here all the people are now responsible for such actions. According to Plato, a state which is made up of different kinds of souls, will overall decline from an aristocracy rule by the best to a timocracy rule by the honorable, then to an oligarchy rule by the few, then to a democracy rule by the people, and finally to tyranny rule by one person, rule by a tyrant [ How to reference and link to summary or text ]. Most of the books on Plato seem to diminish its importance. Nevertheless the first important witness who mentions its existence is Aristotle, who in his *Physics* b writes: The reason for not

revealing it to everyone is partially discussed in Phaedrus c where Plato criticizes the written transmission of knowledge as faulty, favoring instead the spoken logos: The content of this lecture has been transmitted by several witnesses, among others Aristoxenus who describes the event in the following words: But when the mathematical demonstrations came, including numbers, geometrical figures and astronomy, and finally the statement Good is One seemed to them, I imagine, utterly unexpected and strange; hence some belittled the matter, while others rejected it. In Metaphysics he writes: Plato] supposed that their elements are the elements of all things. Accordingly the material principle is the Great and Small [i. Further, he assigned to these two elements respectively the causation of good and of evil" a. The first scholar who recognized the importance of the unwritten doctrine of Plato was Heinrich Gomperz who described it in his speech during the 7th International Congress of Philosophy in This scheme is ascribed by Diogenes Laertius to an ancient scholar and court astrologer to Tiberius named Thrasyllus. In the list below, works by Plato are marked 1 if there is no consensus among scholars as to whether Plato is the author, and 2 if scholars generally agree that Plato is not the author of the work. Unmarked works are assumed to have been written by Plato.

*Platonic love in its modern popular sense is an affectionate relationship into which the sexual element does not enter, especially in cases where one might easily assume otherwise.*

Preliminaries If ethics is widely regarded as the most accessible branch of philosophy, it is so because many of its presuppositions are self-evident or trivial truths: At least for secularists, the attainment of these overall aims is thought to be a condition or prerequisite for a good life. What we regard as a life worth living depends on the notion we have of our own nature and of the conditions of its fulfillment. This, in turn, is determined, at least in part, by the values and standards of the society we live in. The attainment of these ends can also depend at least in part on external factors, such as health, material prosperity, social status, and even on good looks or sheer luck. Although these presuppositions may appear to be self-evident, most of the time, human beings are aware of them only implicitly, because many individuals simply lead their lives in accordance with pre-established standards and values that are, under normal circumstances, not objects of reflection. The historical Socrates was, of course, not the first to question the Greek way of life. Nevertheless, Plato continued to present his investigations as dialogues between Socrates and some partner or partners. And Plato preserved the dialogical form even in those of his late works where Socrates is replaced by a stand-in and where the didactic nature of the presentations is hard to reconcile with the pretense of live discussion. But these didactic discourses continue to combine questions of ethical, political, social, or psychological importance with metaphysical, methodological and epistemological considerations, and it can be just as hard to assess the extent to which Plato agrees with the pronouncements of his speakers, as it is when the speaker is Socrates. Furthermore, the fact that a certain problem or its solution is not mentioned in a dialogue does not mean that Plato was unaware of it. There is, therefore, no certainty concerning the question: It stands to reason, however, that he started with the short dialogues that question traditional virtues – courage, justice, moderation, piety. It also stands to reason that Plato gradually widened the scope of his investigations, by reflecting not only on the social and political conditions of morality, but also on the logical, epistemological, and metaphysical presuppositions of a successful moral theory. These theoretical reflections often take on a life of their own. The *Parmenides*, the *Theaetetus*, and the *Sophist* deal primarily or exclusively with epistemological and metaphysical problems of a quite general nature. Nevertheless, as witnessed by the *Philebus*, the *Statesman*, the *Timaeus*, and the *Laws*, Plato never lost interest in the question of what conditions are necessary for a good human life. Socrates explores the individual virtues through a discussion with persons who are either representatives of, or claim to be experts on, that virtue. Xenophon *Memorabilia* I, 10; In the *Laches*, he discusses courage with two renowned generals of the Peloponnesian war, Laches and Nicias. Similarly, in the *Charmides* Socrates addresses – somewhat ironically – the nature of moderation with the two of the Thirty Tyrants, namely the then very young Charmides, an alleged model of modesty, and his guardian and intellectual mentor, Critias. And in the *Gorgias* Socrates discusses the nature of rhetoric and its relation to virtue with the most prominent teacher of rhetoric among the sophists. Finally, in the *Meno* the question how virtue is acquired is raised by Meno, a disciple of Gorgias, and an ambitious seeker of power, wealth, and fame. Nor is such confidence unreasonable. These flaws vary greatly in kind and gravity: Socrates shows that enumerations of examples are not sufficient to capture the nature of the thing in question. Definitions that consist in the replacement of a given concept with a synonym are open to the same objections as the original definition. Definitions may be hopelessly vague or miss the mark entirely, which is to say that they may be either too wide, and include unwanted characteristics or subsets, or too narrow, and exclude essential characteristics. Moreover, definitions may be incomplete because the object in question does not constitute a unitary phenomenon. Given that the focus in the early dialogues is almost entirely on the exposure of flaws and inconsistencies, one cannot help wondering whether Plato himself knew the answers to his queries, and had some cards up his sleeve that he chose not to play for the time being. This would presuppose that Plato had not only a clear notion of the nature of the different virtues, but also a positive conception of the good life as such. Since Plato was neither a moral nihilist nor a sceptic, he cannot have regarded moral perplexity *aporia*

as the ultimate end, nor regarded continued mutual examination, Socratico more, as a way of life for everyone. Perplexity, as is argued in the Meno, is just a wholesome intermediary stage on the way to knowledge Me. But if Plato assumes that the convictions that survive Socratic questioning will eventually coalesce into an account of the good life, then he keeps this expectation to himself. There is no guarantee that only false convictions are discarded in a Socratic investigation, while true ones are retained. For, promising suggestions are often as mercilessly discarded as their less promising brethren. It is therefore a matter of conjecture whether Plato himself held any positive views while he composed one aporetic dialogue after the other. He may have regarded his investigations as experimental stages, or have seen each dialogue as an element in a network of approaches that he hoped to eventually integrate. The evidence that Plato already wanted his readers to draw this very conclusion in his early dialogues is somewhat contradictory, however. Plato famously pleads for the unity of the virtues in the Protagoras, and seems intent to reduce them all to knowledge. This intellectualizing tendency, however, does not tell us what kind of master-science would fulfill all of the requirements for defining virtues, and what its content should be. Though Plato often compared the virtues with technical skills, such as those of a doctor or a pilot, he may have realized that virtues also involve emotional attitudes, desires, and preferences, but not yet have seen a clear way to coordinate or relate the rational and the affective elements that constitute the virtues. In the Laches, for instance, Socrates partners struggle when they try to define courage, invoking two different elements. His comrade Nicias, on the other hand, fails when he tries to identify courage exclusively as a certain type of knowledge eâ€™a. The investigation of moderation in the Charmides, likewise, points up that there are two disparate elements commonly associated with that virtue â€™ namely, a certain calmness of temper on the one hand Chrm. It is clear that a complex account would be needed to combine these two disparate factors. In his earlier dialogues, Plato may or may not already be envisaging the kind of solution that he is going to present in the Republic to the problem of the relationship between the various virtues, with wisdom, the only intellectual virtue, as their basis. Courage, moderation, and justice presuppose a certain steadfastness of character as well as a harmony of purpose among the disparate parts of the soul, but their goodness depends entirely on the intellectual part of the soul, just as the virtue of the citizens in the just state depends on the wisdom of the philosopher kings R. Nicias is forced to admit that such knowledge presupposes the knowledge of good and bad tout court La. But pointing out what is wrong and missing in particular arguments is a far cry from a philosophical conception of the good and the bad in human life. But the evidence that Plato already had a definitive conception of the good life in mind when he wrote his earlier dialogues remains, at most, indirect. First and foremost, definitions presuppose that there is a definable object; that is to say, that it must have a stable nature. Nothing can be defined whose nature changes all the time. In addition, the object in question must be a unitary phenomenon, even if its unity may be complex. If definitions are to provide the basis of knowledge, they require some kind of essentialism. This presupposition is indeed made explicit in the Euthyphro, where Plato employs for the first time the terminology that will be characteristic of his full-fledged theory of the Forms. Despite this pregnant terminology, few scholars nowadays hold that the Euthyphro already presupposes transcendent Forms in a realm of their ownâ€™ models that are incompletely represented by their imitations under material conditions. No more than piety or holiness in the abstract sense seems to be presupposed in the discussion of the Euthyphro. Given that they are the objects of definition and the models of their ordinary representatives, there is every reason not only to treat them as real, but also to assign to them a state of higher perfection. And once this step has been taken, it is only natural to make certain epistemological adjustments. For, access to paradigmatic entities is not to be expected through ordinary experience, but presupposes some special kind of intellectual insight. It seems, then, that once Plato had accepted invariant and unitary objects of thought as the objects of definition, he was predestined to follow the path that let him adopt a metaphysics and epistemology of transcendent Forms. It would have meant the renunciation of the claim to unassailable knowledge and truth in favor of belief, conjecture, and, horribile dictu, of human convention. It led him to search for models of morality beyond the limits of everyday experience. This, in turn, explains the development of his theory of recollection and the postulate of transcendent immaterial objects as the basis of reality and thought that he refers to in the Meno, and that he presents more fully in the Phaedo. We do not know when, precisely, Plato

adopted this mode of thought, but it stands to reason that his contact with the Pythagorean school on his first voyage to Southern Italy and Sicily around BC played a major role in this development. Mathematics as a model-science has several advantages. It deals with unchangeable entities that have unitary definitions. It also makes a plausible claim that the essence of these entities cannot be comprehended in isolation but only in a network of interconnections that have to be worked out at the same time as each particular entity is defined. For instance, to understand what it is to be a triangle, it is necessary "inter alia" to understand the nature of points, lines, planes and their interrelations. That Plato was aware of this fact is indicated by his somewhat prophetic statement in his introduction of the theory of recollection in the *Meno*, 81d: The slave finally manages, with some pushing and pulling by Socrates, and some illustrations drawn in the sand, to double the area of a given square. In the course of this interrogation, the disciple gradually discovers the relations between the different lines, triangles, and squares. That Plato regards these interconnections as crucial features of knowledge is confirmed later by the distinction that Socrates draws between knowledge and true belief 97b-98b. And that, *Meno* my friend, is recollection, as we previously agreed. After they are tied down, in the first place, they become knowledge, and then they remain in place. Not only that, the same is suggested by the list through which Socrates first introduces the Forms, 65d-e: And the Beautiful, and the Good? How does it work? The hypothesis he starts out with seems simpleminded indeed, because it consists of nothing more than the assumption that everything is what it is by participating in the corresponding Form. But it soon turns out that more is at stake than that simple postulate. First, the hypothesis of each respective Form is to be tested by looking at the compatibility of its consequences. Second, the hypothesis itself is to be secured by higher hypotheses, until some satisfactory starting point is attained. The distinctions that Socrates subsequently introduces in preparation of his last proof of the immortality of the soul seem, however, to provide some information about the procedure in question b. Socrates first introduces the distinction between essential and non-essential attributes. This distinction is then applied to the soul: The viability of this argument, stripped here to its bare bones, need not engage us. The procedure shows, at any rate, that Plato resorts to relations between Forms here. The essential tie between the soul and life is clearly not open to sense-perception; instead, understanding this tie takes a good deal of reflection on what it means to be, and to have a soul. To admirers of a two-world metaphysics, it may come as a disappointment that in Plato, recollection should consist in no more than the uncovering of such relationships. Plato does not employ his newly established metaphysical entities as the basis to work out a definitive conception of the human soul and the appropriate way of life in the *Phaedo*. Rather, he confines himself to warnings against the contamination of the soul by the senses and their pleasures, and quite generally against corruption by worldly values. He gives no advice concerning human conduct beyond the recommendation of a general abstemiousness from worldly temptations. But as long as this negative or other-worldly attitude towards the physical side of human nature prevails, no interest is to be expected on the part of Plato in nature as a whole "let alone in the principles of the cosmic order but cf. But it is not only Platonic asceticism that stands in the way of such a wider perspective. Socrates himself seems to have been quite indifferent to the study of nature. And in a dialogue as late as the *Phaedrus*, Socrates famously explains his preference for the city and his avoidance of nature d: If Plato later takes a much more positive attitude towards nature in general, this is a considerable change of focus. In the *Phaedo*, he quite deliberately confines his account of the nature of heaven and earth to the myth about the afterlife c.