

Chapter 1 : An Economic History of Patent Institutions

New Britain patents and patentees: with a list of New Britain patents prior to , arranged alphabetically as to patentees Item Preview.

World Economic History Congress. To add a paper, you need to upload at least an abstract of the paper as a PDF file. To replace paper, please delete the previous entry. The paper metadata will be public, but opening PDFs requires a user account and logging in. Panel Members If you are presenting in a panel , please remember to send your paper or abstract as a PDF file and details of your contribution to your panel organizers, so that they have time to add your paper to the website. Panel organizers are responsible for uploading the content and deciding on the order and program of their panels. Readers To read and download full papers, please either log in or sign up here. Once logged in, the paper abstract fields on panel pages show a PDF link in the upper right corner. A list of accepted panels is available here. The program also includes links to panel web pages. Email us to info wehc Proposal preview November 2nd, The new economic history of patents and innovation Over the last two decades, historical patent data have become a very versatile indicator in the toolkit of economic historians interested in reconstructing sources and drivers of technical progress cfr. In this respect, the main advantage of patents is to allow a systematic quantitative appraisal and testing of hypothesis concerning historical patterns of innovation, whereas previous research was, by and large, limited to impressionistic qualitative assessments. Starting from seminal contributions on United States and Britain, several historical patent studies are now available for a growing number of countries and time-periods comprising, for instance, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. In particular, this literature has shed light on important research issues such as the role of independent versus corporate innovation, the geographical clustering of inventive activities, the sources of breakthrough versus incremental innovations, the impact of different patent legislations on inventive activities, etc. Alongside, with this use of patent data, more recently, economic historians have also explored the construction of quantitative innovation indicators using a variety of sources such as exhibition catalogues, engineering records, biographical dictionaries, etc. This type of data have been a useful complement to patent data in charting the dynamics of technical change both at aggregate and sectoral level. The aim of this session is twofold: Organizer s Michelangelo Vasta University of Siena vasta unisi. In this respect, the main advantage of patents is to allow a systematic quantitative appraisal and testing of hypothesis concerning historical patterns of innovation. Alongside, with this use of patent data, more recently, economic historians have also explored the construction of quantitative innovation indicators using a variety of sources such as exhibition catalogues, engineering records and biographical dictionaries. The aim of this session is to take stock of the progress obtained by showcasing papers that will illustrate the potential but also the limitations of historical patent data and other innovation indicators in different historical contexts. Coal Mine Ventilation, John E. Murray, Javier Silvestre We document and analyze a new technology, mechanical mine ventilation, and its diffusion in two distinct streams from Europe to America. Mechanical ventilation significantly reduced fatal accident rates due to gas explosions in coal mines. In this paper we use systematic mine surveys collected several years apart to show 1 diffusion of an early Belgian ventilator the Guibal ventilator to the Ruhr and to eastern Pennsylvania, and 2 a later design from Britain The Capell ventilator to the Ruhr and to western Pennsylvania. We compare diffusion of the Guibal ventilator in eastern Pennsylvania to the Capell ventilator in western Pennsylvania in a rough difference-in-differences structure, by using as baselines the diffusion of Guibal fans in Belgium and of mechanical ventilation in general in Scotland. We show that the diffusion of technology can vary considerably across small differences in scale economies, law, geology and engineering. We document and analyze a new technology, mechanical mine ventilation, and its diffusion in two distinct streams from Europe to America. Innovation, Localized Knowledge Spillovers and the British Industrial Revolution, Ugo Gragnolati, Alessandro Nuvolari This paper estimates the determinants of the localization of innovative activities during the British industrial revolution. The main sources of the exercise are English patent data over the period The location of innovative activities is reconstructed using the stated residence of patentees. This paper estimates the determinants of the

localization of innovative activities during the British industrial revolution. Lessons from the Industrial Revolution Leonard Dudley, Christopher Rauh What are the policy implications of the sudden arrival of Big Data “ information available in large quantities at high frequency? Are such innovations a standard by-product of economic growth or is a major reorientation of economic policy necessary? This paper examines the impact of language standardization in the West. A simple variant of the gravity model suggests that urban regions which innovate will be able to attract the resources required to produce additional innovations and create downstream industries. However, empirical tests with innovations and Western cities between and indicate that once one accounts for language standardization, institutional change has little further power to explain innovation or growth. What are the policy implications of the sudden arrival of Big Data “ information available in large quantities at high frequency? Patents and Prizes as Incentives for Innovation in the Industrial Revolution, Zorina Khan Debates have long centered around the relative merits of prizes and other incentives for technological innovation. The paper analyzes the experience of the Royal Society of Arts, which offered inducement prizes for innovation. The Society initially was averse to patents and prohibited the award of prizes for patented inventions. The empirical results indicate the presence of adverse selection. Inventors of items that were valuable in the marketplace typically chose to obtain patents and to bypass the prize system. The findings suggest some skepticism is warranted about claims regarding the role that elites and nonmarket-oriented institutions played in generating technological innovation and long-term economic development. Debates have long centered around the relative merits of prizes and other incentives for technological innovation. The Responsiveness of Inventing: I exploit a large reduction in the patent fee in the United Kingdom in to distinguish between its effect on increased efforts to invent, and a decrease in patent quality due to a lower quality threshold. For this analysis I create a detailed new dataset of 54, British inventors with renewal information for each patent, which serves as the main quality measure. In the longer run high-quality patenting increases by over percent, and the share of new patents due to greater effort accounts for three quarters of the pre-reform share of high-quality patents. To test for the presence of credit constraints I generate two wealth proxies from inventor names and addresses, and find a larger innovation response for inventors with lower wealth. These results indicate efficiency gains from decreasing the cost of inventing and in addition, from relaxing credit constraints. Do financial incentives induce inventors to innovate more? Dependent Invention and Dependent Inventors: Andersson, Fredrik Tell This paper examines to what extent invention and inventors were independent in Sweden By using biographical dictionaries together with a new dataset on the universe of Swedish patents it employs a prosopographical methodology to study the inventive careers of the most productive patentees in Sweden and to pinpoint their actual workplaces at the time of their patent applications. This paper examines to what extent invention and inventors were independent in Sweden Based on a new data set that covers all 1, patents granted in Wuerttemberg between and , we concentrate our research on the period of early German industrialization in which private inventors had still dominated the patent statistics. A special feature of the Wuerttemberg patent law was that the patent authority could freely choose annual patent fees that ranged between five and twenty guilders and the duration of patent protection that could last up to ten years. We show that foreigners paid much higher patent fees even after controlling for the realized life span of their patent measure for quality. Citizens of Zollverein states were discriminated too. The empirical analysis of historical patenting activities in Germany usually starts with the introduction of the Imperial Patent Law. In order to analyze the consequences of this patent regime change, we use a new patent data set, which is based on hand-collected archival data and spans the period to Our empirical analysis shows that, after , the number of patents per capita decreased significantly in territories where the former legislation had been more patent-friendly than in Prussia. We rule out alternative explanations such as migration, other institutional factors than patent law, or differences in local economic growth trends. Finally, in the second step of our analysis, we discuss whether the change in patent law affected innovation, which we measure with data on inventions exhibited at world fairs. This paper analyzes the consequences of radical patent regime change by exploiting a natural experiment: The value of patents in Italy, Laura Magazzini, Alessandro Nuvolari, Michelangelo Vasta This paper uses renewal data to estimate the value of Italian patents during the so-called Liberal Age controlling for inventor and patent characteristics. We

make use of a new dataset comprising all patents granted in Italy in five benchmark years. Overall, we find a highly skewed distribution of patent values. This paper uses renewal data to estimate the value of Italian patents during the so-called Liberal Age controlling for inventor and patent characteristics. There will be answers to questions such as which countries the patents came from, which industries were covered, what topics the patents were about, and how the pattern changed over times. The geographic origins of the patents are compared with a corresponding analysis of the number of Danish patents in the United States during the same period. The presentation will, through an analysis of patents registered in Denmark, tell about the dissemination of technical knowledge. Maloney This paper offers the first systematic historical evidence on the role of a central actor in modern growth theory- the engineer. It collects cross-country and state level data on the labor share of engineers for the Americas, and county level data on engineering and patenting for the U. These are robustly correlated with income today after controlling for literacy, other types of higher order human capital e. We further show engineering density supported technological adoption and structural transformation across intermediate time periods. Our estimates help explain why countries with similar levels of income in , but tenfold differences in engineers diverged in This paper offers the first systematic historical evidence on the role of a central actor in modern growth theory- the engineer. Our estimates help explain why countries with similar levels of income in , but tenfold differences in engineers diverged in their growth trajectories over the next century. The results are supported by historical case studies from the US and Latin America. Leave a Reply You must be logged in to post a comment.

Chapter 2 : Making smart decisions - Patent Lawyer Magazine

*New Britain Patents And Patentees: With A List Of New Britain Patents Prior To , Arranged Alphabetically As To Patentees [Shepard James , F. T. (Frederick T.) Stanley] on racedaydvl.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.*

Zorina Khan, Bowdoin College Introduction Such scholars as Max Weber and Douglass North have suggested that intellectual property systems had an important impact on the course of economic development. However, questions from other eras are still current today, ranging from whether patents and copyrights constitute optimal policies toward intellectual inventions and their philosophical rationale to the growing concerns of international political economy. Throughout their history, patent and copyright regimes have confronted and accommodated technological innovations that were no less significant and contentious for their time than those of the twenty-first century. An economist from the nineteenth century would have been equally familiar with considerations about whether uniformity in intellectual property rights across countries harmed or benefited global welfare and whether piracy might be to the advantage of developing countries. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in particular witnessed considerable variation in the intellectual property policies that individual countries implemented, and this allows economic historians to determine the consequences of different rules and standards. This article outlines crucial developments in the patent policies of Europe, the United States, and follower countries. The final section discusses the harmonization of international patent laws that occurred after the middle of the nineteenth century. Europe The British Patent System The grant of exclusive property rights vested in patents developed from medieval guild practices in Europe. Britain in particular is noted for the establishment of a patent system which has been in continuous operation for a longer period than any other in the world. English monarchs frequently used patents to reward favorites with privileges, such as monopolies over trade that increased the retail prices of commodities. It was not until the seventeenth century that patents were associated entirely with awards to inventors, when Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 21 Jac. The British patent system established significant barriers in the form of prohibitively high costs that limited access to property rights in invention to a privileged few. These constraints favored the elite class of those with wealth, political connections or exceptional technical qualifications, and consciously created disincentives for inventors from humble backgrounds. Patent fees provided an important source of revenues for the Crown and its employees, and created a class of administrators who had strong incentives to block proposed reforms. In addition to the monetary costs, complicated administrative procedures that inventors had to follow implied that transactions costs were also high. Patent applications for England alone had to pass through seven offices, from the Home Secretary to the Lord Chancellor, and twice required the signature of the Sovereign. If the patent were extended to Scotland and Ireland it was necessary to negotiate another five offices in each country. These features testify to the much higher monetary and transactions costs, in both absolute and relative terms, of obtaining property rights to inventions in England in comparison to the United States. Such costs essentially restricted the use of the patent system to inventions of high value and to applicants who already possessed or could raise sufficient capital to apply for the patent. The complicated system also inhibited the diffusion of information and made it difficult, if not impossible, for inventors outside of London to readily conduct patent searches. Patent specifications were open to public inspection on payment of a fee, but until they were not officially printed, published or indexed. Since the patent could be filed in any of three offices in Chancery, searches of the prior art involved much time and inconvenience. Potential patentees were well advised to obtain the help of a patent agent to aid in negotiating the numerous steps and offices that were required for pursuit of the application in London. In the second half of the eighteenth century, nation-wide lobbies of manufacturers and patentees expressed dissatisfaction with the operation of the British patent system. However, it was not until after the Crystal Palace Exhibition in that their concerns were finally addressed, in an effort to meet the burgeoning competition from the United States. In the efforts of numerous societies and of individual engineers, inventors and manufacturers over many decades were finally rewarded. Parliament approved the Patent Law Amendment Act, which authorized the first major adjustment of the system in two centuries. The new patent

statutes incorporated features that drew on testimonials to the superior functioning of the American patent regime. Opponents were reluctant to vest examiners with the necessary discretionary power, and pragmatic observers pointed to the shortage of a cadre of officials with the required expertise. The law established a renewal system that required the payment of fees in installments if the patentee wished to maintain the patent for the full term. Provision was made for the printing and publication of the patent records. The reforms undoubtedly instituted improvements over the former opaque procedures, and the lower fees had an immediate impact. Nevertheless, the system retained many of the former features that had implied that patents were in effect viewed as privileges rather than merited rights, and only temporarily abated expressions of dissatisfaction. One source of dissatisfaction that endured until the end of the nineteenth century was the state of the common law regarding patents. At least partially in reaction to a history of abuse of patent privileges, patents were widely viewed as monopolies that restricted community rights, and thus to be carefully monitored and narrowly construed. After , the government could also appeal to a need for official secrecy to prohibit the publication of patent specifications in order to protect national security and welfare. Policies towards patent assignments and trade in intellectual property rights also constrained the market for inventions. Ever vigilant to protect an unsuspecting public from fraudulent financial schemes on the scale of the South Sea Bubble, ownership of patent rights was limited to five investors later extended to twelve. Nevertheless, the law did not offer any relief to the purchaser of an invalid or worthless patent, so potential purchasers were well advised to engage in extensive searches before entering into contracts. When coupled with the lack of assurance inherent in a registration system, the purchase of a patent right involved a substantive amount of risk and high transactions costs – all indicative of a speculative instrument. It is therefore not surprising that the market for assignments and licenses seems to have been quite limited, and even in the year after the reforms only assignments were recorded. In new legislation introduced procedures that were somewhat simpler, with fewer steps. For the first time, applications could be forwarded to the Patent Office through the post office. This statute introduced opposition proceedings, which enabled interested parties to contest the proposed patent within two months of the filing of the patent specifications. Indeed, it was not until that the British system included an examination for novelty, and even then the process was not regarded as stringent as in other countries. Many new provisions were designed to thwart foreign competition. Until patentees who manufactured abroad were required to also make the patented product in Britain. Between and chemical products were excluded from patent protection to counter the threat posed by the superior German chemical industry. Licenses of right enabled British manufacturers to compel foreign patentees to permit the use of their patents on pharmaceuticals and food products. In sum, changes in the British patent system were initially unforthcoming despite numerous calls for change. During this period inventors or introducers of inventions could benefit from titles, pensions that sometimes extended to spouses and offspring, loans some interest-free , lump-sum grants, bounties or subsidies for production, exemptions from taxes, or monopoly grants in the form of exclusive privileges. This complex network of state policies towards inventors and their inventions was revised but not revoked after the outbreak of the French Revolution. The modern French patent system was established according to the laws of amended in and Patentees filed through a simple registration system without any need to specify what was new about their claim, and could persist in obtaining the grant even if warned that the patent was likely to be legally invalid. On each patent document the following caveat was printed: Protection extended to all methods and manufactured articles, but excluded theoretical or scientific discoveries without practical application, financial methods, medicines, and items that could be covered by copyright. The statute stipulated patent fees that were costly, ranging from livres through livres, based on the declared term of the patent. In an obvious attempt to limit international diffusion of French discoveries, until patents were voided if the inventor attempted to obtain a patent overseas on the same invention. Patentees had to put the invention into practice within two years from the initial grant, or face a tribunal which had the power to repeal the patent, unless the patentee could point to unforeseen events which had prevented his complying with the provisions of the law. The rights of patentees were also restricted if the invention related to items that were controlled by the French government, such as printing presses and firearms. In return for the limited monopoly right, the patentee was expected to describe the invention in such terms that a workman

skilled in the arts could replicate the invention and this information was expected to be made public. However, no provision was made for the publication or diffusion of these descriptions. At least until the law of April 7, specifications were only available in manuscript form in the office in which they had originally been lodged, and printed information was limited to brief titles in patent indexes. The attempt to obtain information on the prior art was also inhibited by restrictions placed on access: The state remained involved in the discretionary promotion of invention and innovation through policies beyond the granting of patents. In the first place, the patent statutes did not limit their offer of potential appropriation of returns only to property rights vested in patents. The inventor of a discovery of proven utility could choose between a patent or making a gift of the invention to the nation in exchange for an award from funds that were set aside for the encouragement of industry. Third, the award of assistance and pensions to inventors and their families continued well into the nineteenth century. Fourth, at times the Society purchased patent rights and turned the invention over into the public domain. The basic principles of the modern French patent system were evident in the early French statutes and were retained in later revisions. In fees remained high, although somewhat lower in real terms, at one hundred francs per year. Working requirements were still in place, and patentees were not allowed to satisfy the requirement by importing the article even if the patentee had manufactured it in another European country. However, the requirement was waived if the patentee could persuade the tribunal that the patent was not worked because of unavoidable circumstances. Similar problems were evident in the market for patent rights. Contracts for patent assignments were filed in the office of the Prefect for the district, but since there was no central source of information it was difficult to trace the records for specific inventions. The annual fees for the entire term of the patent had to be paid in advance if the patent was assigned to a second party. Like patents themselves, assignments and licenses were issued with a caveat emptor clause. This was partially due to the nature of patent property under a registration system, and partially to the uncertainties of legal jurisprudence in this area. For both buyer and seller, the uncertainties associated with the exchange likely reduced the net expected value of trade. The Spanish experience during the nineteenth century is instructive since this country experienced lower rates and levels of economic development than the early industrializers. Like its European neighbors, early Spanish rules and institutions were vested in privileges which had lasting effects that could be detected even in the later period. The per capita rate of patenting in Spain was lower than other major European countries, and foreigners filed the majority of patented inventions. Between and , roughly one half of all grants were to citizens of other countries, notably France and to a lesser extent Britain. Thus, the transfer of foreign technology was a major concern in the political economy of Spain. This dependence on foreign technologies was reflected in the structure of the Spanish patent system, which permitted patents of introduction as well as patents for invention. Patents of introduction were granted to entrepreneurs who wished to produce foreign technologies that were new to Spain, with no requirement of claims to being the true inventor. Thus, the sole objective of these instruments was to enhance innovation and production in Spain. Since the owners of introduction patents could not prevent third parties from importing similar machines from abroad, they also had an incentive to maintain reasonable pricing structures. Introduction patents had a term of only five years, with a cost of reales, whereas the fees of patents for invention varied from reales for five years, reales for ten years, and reales for a term of fifteen years. Patentees were required to work the patent within one year, and about a quarter of patents granted between and were actually implemented. Since patents of introduction had a brief term, they encouraged the production of items with high expected profits and a quick payback period, after which monopoly rights expired, and the country could benefit from its diffusion. The German Empire was founded in , and in the first six years each state adopted its own policies. Alsace-Lorraine favored a French-style system, whereas others such as Hamburg and Bremen did not offer patent protection. However, after strong lobbying by supporters of both sides of the debate regarding the merits of patent regimes, Germany passed a unified national Patent Act of . The statute created a centralized administration for the grant of a federal patent for original inventions. Applications were examined by examiners in the Patent Office who were expert in their field. During the eight weeks before the grant, patent applications were open to the public and an opposition could be filed denying the validity of the patent. German patent fees were deliberately high to eliminate protection for trivial inventions, with a renewal

system that required payment of 30 marks for the first year, 50 marks for the second year, marks for the third, and 50 marks annually after the third year. In the patent term was extended from fifteen years to eighteen years.

Excerpt from New Britain Patents and Patentees: With a List of New Britain Patents Prior to , Arranged Alphabetically as to Patentees Having devoted thirty-five years of my life to the study of patents, and, knowing that their true value to the public is generally unappreciated and sometimes wholly ignored, I have been led to make a special study of the history and value of New Britain.

Jochen Sties explores the options. There is no doubt patentees seeking patent protection in multiple EU countries will benefit significantly from a unified EU Patent, not only in terms of reduced portfolio costs as no validation will be required, but also in terms of being able to take advantage of simplified central enforcement against infringers. However, patentees who need to validate their patents in 25 EU countries are a minority. The majority only really have to validate their patents in a handful of countries. On average EP Patents are usually only validated in four countries so the question has to be whether those who only need to patent in a few countries really benefit from the EU Patent. The idea of significantly reducing the administrative efforts currently involved with EP Patents could at first glance appear attractive. However, in most cases using the EU Patent will not result in a significant reduction in administration because it will have to be used in parallel with the EP Patent as some popular countries will not be covered by the EU Patent. Member states like Italy and Spain have decided not to participate and all non-EU countries like Switzerland and Turkey are, by definition, not covered. Annuities pose another potential problem. The level of annuities for the EU Patent is expected to correspond to the cost of five to six national parts of an EP Patent. This effect is partly offset by the fact a single annuity is to be paid to the EPO as compared to, for example, paying four annuities in four different countries plus the costs annuity service providers demand. Nevertheless, the costs for an EU Patent will, in the long run, exceed the costs involved with maintaining an EP Patent in four countries. Prosecution costs are of no influence in this comparison as they are identical for both the EU and the EP Patent. This penalty is even more significant if all national parts of the EP Patent are not maintained up until the 20th year, which is currently a very popular maintenance strategy. Assuming that the patentee decides to drop Italy after 13 years, France after 15 and Great Britain after 18 years but maintains Germany up to the 20th year, the accumulated costs are: It could be argued the initial result is an EU Patent only makes sense for the minority of patentees, those who tend to validate their EP Patents in a multitude of countries. For the majority of patentees, including those who only validate in three or four countries, the EP Patent is the cheaper alternative. Are national patent applications an alternative? Based on the fact that patentees validate their EP Patents in fewer and fewer countries, it makes sense to analyze in which situations a bundle of national patent applications would make more sense than an application filed with the EPO. The following diagram compares the accumulated costs of filing and prosecuting four national patent applications DE, FR, GB, IT with the costs of prosecuting an application with the EPO then validating in these four countries and then again with choosing the EU Patent. The sample patent application here comprises 15 pages of specification, 3 pages of claims with 15 claims in total, all of which are presented in English. Further it was assumed that the request for substantive examination for the national German patent application was filed seven years after the filing date. Assuming that all of the national patents are being maintained up to the very end of their maximum lifetime, the costs are identical with the costs of an EU Patent. However, those costs exceed the costs for the EP Patent, mainly because of translation costs and the attorney fees associated with four separate applications. Comparing EU, EP and national patent costs Provided one does not require patent protection in a wide range of countries throughout Europe, filing national patent applications is clearly a more cost-effective alternative to using the new EU Patent. Looking purely at cost, you can quickly see that national patent applications barely constitute an alternative to an EP Patent. However, there are other factors that have to be taken into account when drafting a filing strategy for Europe: Are there any specific benefits offered by national patent applications in the various countries I need protection in that I can take advantage of? Will prosecution be easier than it would be if I was to go through the EPO? How can I make it harder for my competitors to design around my IP rights? In which countries do I really need protection? In which countries and with which court

would I want to enforce my patents? In which countries do I usually drop my patent before 20 years are out? In fact, still no two countries have an identical system. Germany has a patent system with substantive examination and is a system consistently credited with delivering good quality patents. There are no formal traps: A divisional application can be filed any time as long as the parent application is in force and the regime as to what amendments are allowable within the original disclosure is more liberal than it would be through the EPO. The most significant advantage of the German patent system is it allows one to request substantive examination for anything up to seven years after the day it was filed. Unlike other patent systems under which the applicant has to define the scope of protection within a few years after filing and therefore often at a point in time where neither the owner nor his competitors have managed to take the products concerned to market, the deferred examination allows the patentee to draft their claims during examination when they know precisely what protection is necessary. Even though there is a quality search report, the applicant is not required to change his claims based on the prior art cited in that report. The validity of the patent is checked during infringement proceedings. This system allows for pretty broad patents to be obtained which maintains a certain level of uncertainty for potential infringers as they have to rely on their assessment as to whether or not the patent will be declared null and void during infringement proceedings. Italy also has a system without substantive examination. There are two features that make an Italian application an exotic yet interesting option in certain situations. Firstly, Italian patent applications are not available online. It is therefore hard for competitors to identify exactly where there may be a potential problem. Secondly, if the application is a first filing, a high quality search report prepared by the EPO is provided at a fraction of the cost of a search request prepared for an application filed with the EPO. Prosecution of national patent applications The prosecution of a patent application with the EPO is becoming a more and more formulaic process. Time windows for filing divisional applications are being created, punitive claims fees are being charged and the case law regarding what is considered to actually have been included in the original disclosure is becoming stricter and stricter. Finally, the number of clarity objections appears to increase from year to year. The same cannot be said of national patent applications. In the countries that do not rely upon substantive examination, such problems obviously cannot arise. In other countries, for example Germany or Great Britain, there are immediately recognizable approaches to issues such as unity of invention, original disclosure and the preconditions to a valid priority claim. Broad scope of protection Both the EP and the EU Patent will result in one patent offering identical protection in all of the countries in which they are recognized. Such unitary protection will make it easier for competitors to design around. Using a bundle of national patent applications allows patentees the luxury of obtaining greater protection. On the one hand, patentees can choose to have their patents granted with differing scope of protection. On the other, the patents could be granted with a rather broad scope of protection in countries without substantive examination. Used in combination these options make it harder for competitors to design around. Where and how long do I need protection? Other countries with a significant number of cases are France, Great Britain and the Netherlands. In the majority of European countries, no patent litigation cases are being filed at all. From an economic perspective, it can be assumed that the Many applicants have proven with their filing strategies that patent protection can be concentrated on a few countries. These considerations however do not apply if the patentee prefers to license their intellectual property rather than enforcing an injunction against infringers. If generating income by collecting royalties from infringers is the priority, then broader geographic protection is necessary as royalties can only be collected for sales in countries where patent protection exists. Finally, it has to be taken into account that patentees seldom maintain the national parts of their current EP patents over the entire 20 years. Some countries are more commercially interesting than others which results in patentees taking the decision to drop certain national parts at different times. Where would I enforce my patents? This is largely because German courts are known for fast, high quality decisions. It has to be said the courts in the other countries involved in a significant amount of litigation are also known for high quality decisions, but the costs associated with litigation are often high, which makes Germany a more attractive option for many patentees. The Unified Patent Court will offer a new option in the future. This will clearly be preferable to having to litigate in each country. He passed the German patent bar examination in and became a European Patent and Trademark

Attorney in The Masters thesis dealt with the protection of intellectual property as a fundamental right under the German constitution, the EU Community law and the European Human Rights Convention.

Chapter 4 : US Patent: , - Cutter Adjustment for Plane

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Chapter 5 : US Patent: , - Method of Marking Level Glasses or Analogous Articles

2. New Britain patents and patentees: with a list of New Britain patents prior to , arranged alphabetically as to patentees: 2.

Chapter 6 : Institute of Patentees and Inventors | Revolv

Prior to most of the New Britain inventors who secured patents gave their residence as Berlin and thus it is possible that some New Britain patentees may have been overlooked. The first person to receive a United States patent that I can identify as a resident of New Britain was Joseph Sage, April 14, , for an improvement in Clothes.

Chapter 7 : Alphabetical index of patentees of inventions. / (edition) | Open Library

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