

Chapter 1 : Kant, Immanuel: Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

*Metaphysics and Common Sense (Macmillan Student Editions) [A. J. Ayer] on racedaydvl.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.*

The term common sense designates 1 a special faculty, the *sensus communis* of the Aristotelean and Scholastic philosophy ; 2 the sum of original principles found in all normal minds; 3 the ability to judge and reason in accordance with those principles *recta ratio*, good sense. The philosophy of common sense sometimes called Scottish philosophy from the nationality of its exponents though not all Scottish philosophers were adherents of the Common Sense School , represents one phase of the reaction against the idealism of Berkeley and Hume which in Germany was represented by Kant. The doctrine of ideas , which Locke had adopted from Descartes , had been made use of by Berkeley as the foundation of his theory of pure idealism , which resolved the external world into ideas , without external reality, but directly impressed on the mind by Divine power. Hume, on the other hand, had contended that there was no ground for assuming the existence of any mental substance as the subjective recipient of impressions and ideas , all that we know of mind being a succession of states produced by experience. Thus, between the two, both subject and object disappeared, and philosophy ended in mere scepticism. He argued that if it cannot be proved that there is any real external world or continuously existing mind, the true conclusion is not that these have no existence or are unknowable, but that our consciousness of them is an ultimate fact, which neither needs nor is capable of proof , but is itself the ground of all proof. Sir James Mackintosh adopted the principles of common sense, but accepted the utilitarian criterion of morality, held by the school of Hartly, and applied the analytic method to the moral faculty which Reid had taken to be "an original power in man". Sir William Hamilton illustrated the principle of common sense with wider learning and greater philosophical acumen than any of his predecessors. He was much influenced by Kant , and he introduced into his system distinctions which the Common Sense School had not recognized. While professing himself a natural realist, he held a somewhat extreme doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. His comments on Reid indicate many ambiguities and inaccuracies on the part of that author. The common sense philosophy, adopting the Baconian method of "interrogation", or analysis, rejects, as contrary to the universal convictions of mankind , the notion of ideas as a *tertium quid* intervening between the object perceived and the perceiving subject. All knowledge comes by way of sensation; and the reality of the external object is implied in sensation, together with the metaphysical principle of the existence of bodily and mental substance, of causality , and of design and intelligence in causation. What sensation is in itself it is impossible to say; it is an ultimate fact, and cannot be described or defined. But sensations are clearly not images or ideas of the objects which cause them; there is no resemblance between the pain of a wound and the point of a sword. Reid and his successors insist on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, the former extension, figure, hardness, etc. Hamilton, however, subdivides secondary qualities into secondary and secundo-primary, a distinction now generally considered to be ill-founded. The mental powers are divided into intellectual and active, a distinction corresponding to the peripatetic classification of cognitive and appetitive. All cognition has thus an intellectual element, and takes place by way of suggestion, or association a theory in which Reid was anticipated by Hutcheson. In cognition the mind is partly active and partly passive; the notion that it is a mere receptacle for ideas is rejected. Consciousness is regarded by Reid as a separate faculty, somewhat resembling the scholastic *sensus communis*; Brown and Hamilton dissent from this view, holding "consciousness" to be merely a general expression for the fundamental condition of all mental activity. The idea of causality , which implies the universal necessity of causation , cannot be educed from experience, since necessity as opposed to mere invariableness cannot be known by experience; it is therefore an original principle in the mind. In like manner, the will is known immediately as free; its freedom is not susceptible of proof but is intuitively recognized; and it is from the consciousness of will-power in ourselves that we derive our notion of causation. The belief in the uniformity of nature, on which all scientific discovery is based, is held by Reid to be an original principle in the mind. Conscience, or the moral sense, is taken to be an original faculty by the Common Sense School in general,

with the exception of Mackintosh, who derives the so-called faculty in great measure from the influence of social experience upon the will. The psychological analysis of this school is valuable; but its main principle has been considerably weakened by contact with Kantian criticism and the evolutionist doctrine, and with Hamilton lost much of its polemical effectiveness. It may be safely said that the materialistic tendency of French speculation was checked by the influences derived from the philosophy of common sense. Idem, *Metaphysical Synopsis* London, Idem, *System of Moral Phil.* Reid, *Works*, with preface, notes, and dissertation by Hamilton Edinburgh, ; new ed. Buffier, *Premieres Verites* tr. London, , "with a detection of the plagiarism, concealment, and ingratitude of Drs. Reid, Beattie, and Oswald". Jouffroy, *Oeuvres completes de Reid* Paris, Oswald, *Appeal to Common Sense* Edinburgh, Beattie, *Essay on Truth* Aberdeen, Idem, *Elements of Moral Science* Priestly, *Examination of Reid*, etc. Stewart, *Complete Works* Cambridge, Mass. Hamilton and completed by Veitch Edinburgh, Idem, *Lectures on the Phil.* Mansel and Veitch London, Edinburgh, and Boston, Idem, *Essays in Edinburgh Review* McCosh, *Scottish Philosophy* London, James, *Pragmatism* London and New York, , lect v. About this page APA citation. *Philosophy of Common Sense*. In *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. Robert Appleton Company, This article was transcribed for New Advent by Gary Mros. Farley, Archbishop of New York. The editor of New Advent is Kevin Knight. My email address is webmaster at newadvent. Dedicated to the Immaculate Heart of Mary.

Metaphysics and Common Sense has 5 ratings and 0 reviews. These fifteen essays are captivating works by one of the most celebrated philosophers of the tw.

Aristotelian[edit] The origin of the term is in the works of Aristotle. For example, sight can see colour. But Aristotle was explaining how the animal mind, not just the human mind, links and categorizes different tastes, colours, feelings, smells and sounds in order to perceive real things in terms of the "common sensibles" or "common perceptibles". As examples of perceiving by accident Aristotle mentions using the specific sense perception vision on its own to see that something is sweet, or to recognize a friend by their distinctive color. Lee , p. So the normal five individual senses do sense the common perceptibles according to Aristotle and Plato , but it is not something they necessarily interpret correctly on their own. Aristotle proposes that the reason for having several senses is in fact that it increases the chances that we can distinguish and recognize things correctly, and not just occasionally or by accident. And it receives physical picture imprints from the imaginative faculty, which are then memories that can be recollected. Aristotle, trying to give a more general account of the souls of all animals, not just humans, moved the act of perception out of the rational thinking soul into this *sensus communis*, which is something like a sense, and something like thinking, but not rational. The passage is difficult to interpret and there is little consensus about many of the details. For example, in some passages in his works, Aristotle seems to use the term to refer to the individual sense perceptions simply being common to all people, or common to various types of animals. There is also difficulty with trying to determine whether the common sense is truly separable from the individual sense perceptions and from imagination, in anything other than a conceptual way as a capability. They may even be the same. Under the influence of the great Persian philosophers Al-Farabi and Avicenna , several inner senses came to be listed. The great anatomist Andreas Vesalius however found no connections between the anterior ventricle and the sensory nerves, leading to speculation about other parts of the brain into the s. However, in earlier Latin during the Roman empire the term had taken a distinct ethical detour, developing new shades of meaning. This refers to shared notions, or common conceptions, that are either in-born or imprinted by the senses on to the soul. Unfortunately few true Stoic texts survive, and our understanding of their technical terminology is limited. Lewis , p. He uses the word on its own in a list of things he learned from his adopted father. The sense of the community is in this case one translation of "*communis sensus*" in the Latin of Cicero. Schaeffer , p. Peters Agnew argues, in agreement with Shaftesbury in the 18th century, that the concept developed from the Stoic concept of ethical virtue, influenced by Aristotle, but emphasizing the role of both the individual perception, and shared communal understanding. But in any case a complex of ideas attached itself to the term, to be almost forgotten in the Middle Ages, and eventually returning into ethical discussion in 18th-century Europe, after Descartes. As with other meanings of common sense, for the Romans of the classical era "it designates a sensibility shared by all, from which one may deduce a number of fundamental judgments, that need not, or cannot, be questioned by rational reflection". This was a term that could be used by Romans to imply not only human nature , but also humane conduct, good breeding, refined manners, and so on. Quintilian says it is better to send a boy to school than to have a private tutor for him at home; for if he is kept away from the herd congressus how will he ever learn that *sensus* which we call *communis*? On the lowest level it means tact. In other words, these Romans allowed that people could have animal-like shared understandings of reality, not just in terms of memories of sense perceptions, but in terms of the way they would tend to explain things, and in the language they use. Sensations from the senses travel to *sensus communis*, seated in the pineal gland inside the brain, and from there to the immaterial spirit. One of the last notable philosophers to accept something like the Aristotelian "common sense" was Descartes in the 17th century, but he also undermined it. He described this inner faculty when writing in Latin in his *Meditations on first philosophy*. Unlike Aristotle, who had placed it in the heart, by the time of Descartes this faculty was thought to be in the brain, and he located it in the pineal gland. To get a more distinct understanding of things, it is more important to be methodical and mathematical. The French philosopher did not fully reject the idea of the inner senses, which

he appropriated from the Scholastics. But he distanced himself from the Aristotelian conception of a common sense faculty, abandoning it entirely by the time of his *Passions of the Soul*. According to Hobbes [He accepted mental representations but [But Descartes used two different terms in his work, not only the Latin term "sensus communis", but also the French term *bon sens*, with which he opens his *Discourse on Method*. And this second concept survived better. This work was written in French, and does not directly discuss the Aristotelian technical theory of perception. *Bon sens* is the equivalent of modern English "common sense" or "good sense". As the Aristotelian meaning of the Latin term began to be forgotten after Descartes, his discussion of *bon sens* gave a new way of defining *sensus communis* in various European languages including Latin, even though Descartes himself did not translate *bon sens* as *sensus communis*, but treated them as two separate things. Gilson noted that Descartes actually gave *bon sens* two related meanings, first the basic and widely shared ability to judge true and false, which he also calls *raison lit*. The Latin term Descartes uses, *bona mens lit*. Descartes was being original. It was promoted further by people such as Hobbes, Spinoza, and others and continues to have important impacts on everyday life. In France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Italy, it was in its initial florescence associated with the administration of Catholic empires of the competing Bourbon, and Habsburg dynasties, both seeking to centralize their power in a modern way, responding to Machiavellianism and Protestantism as part of the so-called counter reformation. The Enlightenment after Descartes[edit] Epistemology: On the one hand, the approach of Descartes is and was seen as radically sceptical in some ways. On the other hand, like the Scholastics before him, while being cautious of common sense, Descartes was instead seen to rely too much on undemonstrable metaphysical assumptions in order to justify his method, especially in its separation of mind and body with the *sensus communis* linking them. The alternative to induction, deductive reasoning, demanded a mathematical approach, starting from simple and certain assumptions. This in turn required Descartes and later rationalists such as Kant to assume the existence of innate or " a priori " knowledge in the human mind—a controversial proposal. In contrast to the rationalists, the " empiricists " took their orientation from Francis Bacon, whose arguments for methodical science were earlier than those of Descartes, and less directed towards mathematics and certainty. Bacon is known for his doctrine of the " idols of the mind ", presented in his *Novum Organum*, and in his *Essays* described normal human thinking as biased towards believing in lies. So while agreeing upon the need to help common sense with a methodical approach, he also insisted that starting from common sense, including especially common sense perceptions, was acceptable and correct. He influenced Locke and Pierre Bayle, in their critique of metaphysics, and in Voltaire "introduced him as the "father" of the scientific method " to a French audience, an understanding that was widespread by While Descartes had distanced himself from it, John Locke abandoned it more openly, while still maintaining the idea of "common sensibles" that are perceived. But then George Berkeley abandoned both. In his synthesis, which he saw as the first Baconian analysis of man something the lesser known Vico had claimed earlier, common sense is entirely built up from shared experience and shared innate emotions, and therefore it is indeed imperfect as a basis for any attempt to know the truth or to make the best decision. But he defended the possibility of science without absolute certainty, and consistently described common sense as giving a valid answer to the challenge of extreme skepticism. Concerning such sceptics, he wrote: But would these prejudiced reasoners reflect a moment, there are many obvious instances and arguments, sufficient to undeceive them, and make them enlarge their maxims and principles. Do they not see the vast variety of inclinations and pursuits among our species; where each man seems fully satisfied with his own course of life, and would esteem it the greatest unhappiness to be confined to that of his neighbour? Do they not feel in themselves, that what pleases at one time, displeases at another, by the change of inclination; and that it is not in their power, by their utmost efforts, to recall that taste or appetite, which formerly bestowed charms on what now appears indifferent or disagreeable? Once Thomas Hobbes and Spinoza had applied Cartesian approaches to political philosophy, concerns about the inhumanity of the deductive approach of Descartes increased. With this in mind, Shaftesbury and, much less known at the time, Giambattista Vico, both presented new arguments for the importance of the Roman understanding of common sense, in what is now often referred to, after Hans-Georg Gadamer, as a humanist interpretation of the term. One ethical concern was the deliberately simplified

method that treated human communities as made up of selfish independent individuals methodological individualism , ignoring the sense of community that the Romans understood as part of common sense. Another connected epistemological concern was that by considering common good sense as inherently inferior to Cartesian conclusions developed from simple assumptions, an important type of wisdom was being arrogantly ignored. An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour was a highly erudite and influential defense of the use of irony and humour in serious discussions, at least among men of "Good Breeding". He drew upon authors such as Seneca , Juvenal , Horace and Marcus Aurelius , for whom, he saw, common sense was not just a reference to widely held vulgar opinions, but something cultivated among educated people living in better communities. One aspect of this, later taken up by authors such as Kant, was good taste. Another very important aspect of common sense particularly interesting to later British political philosophers such as Francis Hutcheson was what came to be called moral sentiment, which is different from a tribal or factional sentiment, but a more general fellow feeling that is very important for larger communities: Now there are none so far from being Partners in this Sense, or sharers in this common Affection, as they who scarcely know an Equall, nor consider themselves as subject to any law of Fellowship or Community. And thus Morality and good Government go together. Indeed, this approach was never fully rejected, at least in economics. By the late enlightenment period in the 18th century, the communal sense or empathy pointed to by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had become the "moral sense" or " moral sentiment " referred to by Hume and Adam Smith , the latter writing in plural of the "moral sentiments" with the key one being sympathy , which was not so much a public spirit as such, but a kind of extension of self-interest. Jeremy Bentham gives a summary of the plethora of terms used in British philosophy by the nineteenth century to describe common sense in discussions about ethics: Another man comes and alters the phrase: This understanding of a moral sense or public spirit remains a subject for discussion, although the term "common sense" is no longer commonly used for the sentiment itself. For example, French *bon sens* and German *Gemeinsinn* are used for this feeling of human solidarity, while *bon sens* good sense and *gesunder Verstand* healthy understanding are the terms for everyday "common sense". According to Gadamer, at least in French and British philosophy a moral element in appeals to common sense or *bon sens* , such as found in Reid, remains normal to this day. Friedrich Christoph Oetinger , who appealed to Shaftesbury and other Enlightenment figures in his critique of the Cartesian rationalism of Leibniz and Wolff , who were the most important German philosophers before Kant. A defender of classical education in rhetoric, who analysed evidence of ancient wisdom in common sense. Vico, who taught classical rhetoric in Naples where Shaftesbury died under a Cartesian-influenced Spanish government, was not widely read until the 20th century, but his writings on common sense have been an important influence upon Hans-Georg Gadamer , Benedetto Croce and Antonio Gramsci. It presents common sense as something adolescents need to be trained in if they are not to "break into odd and arrogant behaviour when adulthood is reached", whereas teaching Cartesian method on its own harms common sense and stunts intellectual development. Rhetoric and elocution are not just for legal debate, but also educate young people to use their sense perceptions and their perceptions more broadly, building a fund of remembered images in their imagination, and then using ingenuity in creating linking metaphors, in order to make enthymemes. Enthymemes are reasonings about uncertain truths and probabilities as opposed to the Cartesian method, which was skeptical of all that could not be dealt with as syllogisms , including raw perceptions of physical bodies. Hence common sense is not just a "guiding standard of eloquence " but also "the standard of practical judgment ". Vico proposed his own anti-Cartesian methodology for a new Baconian science, inspired, he said, by Plato , Tacitus , [71] Francis Bacon and Grotius. In this he went further than his predecessors concerning the ancient certainties available within vulgar common sense. What is required, according to his new science, is to find the common sense shared by different people and nations. He made this a basis for a new and better-founded approach to discuss Natural Law , improving upon Grotius, John Selden , and Pufendorf who he felt had failed to convince, because they could claim no authority from nature. Unlike Grotius, Vico went beyond looking for one single set of similarities amongst nations but also established rules about how natural law properly changes as peoples change, and has to be judged relative to this state of development. He thus developed a detailed view of an evolving wisdom of peoples. Ancient forgotten wisdoms, he claimed, could

be re-discovered by analysis of languages and myths formed under the influence of them. If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them — these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd. He believed that the term common sense as he used it did encompass both the social common sense described by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and the perceptive powers described by Aristotelians. Reid was criticised, partly for his critique of Hume, by Kant and J.

Chapter 3 : CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Philosophy of Common Sense

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Nature and scope of metaphysics
Origin of the term
Etymologically the term metaphysics is unenlightening. Aristotle had distinguished two tasks for the philosopher: Modern readers of Aristotle are inclined to take both the *Physica* and the *Metaphysica* as philosophical treatises; the distinction their titles suggest between an empirical and a conceptual inquiry has little foundation. Aristotle was not indifferent to factual material either in natural or in metaphysical philosophy, but equally he was not concerned in either case to frame theories for empirical testing. It is also evident that the connection marked in the original titles is a genuine one: Plato, following the early Greek philosopher Parmenides, who is known as the father of metaphysics, had sought to distinguish opinion, or belief, from knowledge and to assign distinct objects to each. Opinion, for Plato, was a form of apprehension that was shifting and unclear, similar to seeing things in a dream or only through their shadows; its objects were correspondingly unstable. Knowledge, by contrast, was wholly lucid; it carried its own guarantee against error, and the objects with which it was concerned were eternally what they were, and so were exempt from change and the deceptive power to appear to be what they were not. Plato called the objects of opinion phenomena, or appearances; he referred to the objects of knowledge as noumena objects of the intelligence or quite simply as realities. The education of the Platonic philosopher consisted precisely in effecting this transition: Philosophy for Plato was thus a call to recognize the existence and overwhelming importance of a set of higher realities that ordinary men—even those, like the Sophists of the time, who professed to be enlightened—entirely ignored. That there were such realities, or at least that there was a serious case for thinking that there were, was a fundamental tenet in the discipline that later became known as metaphysics. Conversely, much of the subsequent controversy about the very possibility of metaphysics has turned on the acceptability of this tenet and on whether, if it is rejected, some alternative foundation can be discovered on which the metaphysician can stand.

Characterizations of metaphysics
Before considering any such question, however, it is necessary to examine, without particular historical references, some ways in which actual metaphysicians have attempted to characterize their enterprise, noticing in each case the problems they have in drawing a clear line between their aims and those of the practitioners of the exact and empirical sciences. Four views will be briefly considered; they present metaphysics as:

Reflection on what is said under the different heads will quickly establish that they are not sharply separate from one another, and, indeed, individual metaphysical writers sometimes invoke more than one of these phrases when asked to say what metaphysics is—as, for example, the British Idealist F. Bradley does in the opening pages of his work *Appearance and Reality*

An inquiry into what exists
A common set of claims on behalf of metaphysics is that it is an inquiry into what exists; its business is to subject common opinion on this matter to critical scrutiny and in so doing to determine what is truly real. It can be asserted with some confidence that common opinion is certainly an unreliable guide about what exists, if indeed it can be induced to pronounce on this matter at all. Are dream objects real, in the way in which palpable realities such as chairs and trees are? Are numbers real, or should they be described as no more than abstractions? Is the height of a man a reality in the same sense in which he is a reality, or is it just an aspect of something more concrete, a mere quality that has derivative rather than substantial being and could not exist except as attributed to something else? It is easy enough to confuse the common man with questions like these and to show that any answers he gives to them tend to be ill thought-out. It is equally difficult, however, for the metaphysician to come up with more satisfactory answers of his own. Many metaphysicians have relied, in this connection, on the internally related notions of substance, quality, and relation; they have argued that only what is substantial truly exists, although every substance has qualities and stands in relation to other substances. Thus, this tree is tall and deciduous and is precisely 50 yards north of that fence. Difficulties begin, however, as soon as examples like these are taken seriously. Assume for the moment that an individual tree—what might be called a concrete existent—qualifies for the title of substance; it is just the sort of thing that has qualities and stands in

relations. Unless there were substances in this sense, no qualities could be real: The question can now be raised what the tree would be if it were deprived of all its qualities and stood in no relations. The notion of a substance in this type of metaphysics is that of a thing that exists by itself, apart from any attributes it may happen to possess; the difficulty with this notion is to know how to apply it. Any concrete thing one selects to exemplify the notion of substance turns out in practice to answer a certain description; this means in effect that it cannot be spoken of apart from its attributes. It thus emerges that substances are no more primary beings than are qualities and relations; without the former one could not have the latter, but equally without the latter one could not have the former. There are other difficulties about substance that cannot be explored here.”e. Enough has already been said, however, to indicate the problems involved in defining the tasks of metaphysics along these lines. There is, nevertheless, an alternative way of understanding the notion of substance: When the early Greek philosopher Thales inquired as to what is ultimately real and came up with the surprising news that all is water, he might be taken as advancing a scientific rather than a philosophical hypothesis. Although it is true that later writers, such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz , a German Rationalist philosopher and mathematician, were fully aware of the force of scientific claims in this area and, nevertheless, rejected them as metaphysically unacceptable, the fact remains that the nonphilosopher finds it difficult to understand the basis on which a Leibniz rests his case. When Leibniz said that it is monads i. Has he done any scientific work to justify him in setting scientific results aside with such confidence? And if he has not, why should he be taken seriously at all? The science of ultimate reality To answer these questions, another description of metaphysics has been proposed: The contrast between appearance and reality, however, is by no means peculiar to metaphysics. In everyday life people distinguish between the real size of the Sun and its apparent size, or again between the real colour of an object when seen in standard conditions and its apparent colour nonstandard conditions. A cloud appears to consist of some white, fleecy substance, although in reality it is a concentration of drops of water. In general, men are often though not invariably inclined to allow that the scientist knows the real constitution of things as opposed to the surface aspects with which ordinary men are familiar. It will not suffice to define metaphysics as knowledge of reality as opposed to appearance; scientists, too, claim to know reality as opposed to appearance, and there is a general tendency to concede their claim. It seems that there are at least three components in the metaphysical conception of reality. One characteristic, which has already been illustrated by Plato, is that reality is genuine as opposed to deceptive. The ultimate realities that the metaphysician seeks to know are precisely things as they are”simple and not variegated, exempt from change and therefore stable objects of knowledge. Ultimate reality, whatever else it is, is genuine as opposed to sham. Second, reality is original in contrast to derivative, self-dependent rather than dependent on the existence of something else. Likewise, the 17th-century Rationalists defined substance as that which can be explained through itself alone. Third, and perhaps most important, reality for the metaphysician is intelligible as opposed to opaque. Appearances are not only deceptive and derivative, they also make no sense when taken at their own level. To arrive at what is ultimately real is to produce an account of the facts that does them full justice. The assumption is, of course, that one cannot explain things satisfactorily if one remains within the world of common sense, or even if one advances from that world to embrace the concepts of science. One or the other of these levels of explanation may suffice to produce a sort of local sense that is enough for practical purposes or that forms an adequate basis on which to make predictions. Practical reliability of this kind, however, is very different from theoretical satisfaction; the task of the metaphysician is to challenge all assumptions and finally arrive at an account of the nature of things that is fully coherent and fully thought-out. It should be obvious that, to establish his right to pronounce on what is ultimately real in the sense analyzed, the metaphysician has a tremendous amount to do. He must begin by giving colour to his claim that everyday ways of thinking will not suffice for a full and coherent description of what falls within experience, thus arguing that appearances are unreal”although not therefore nonexistent”because they are unstable and unintelligible. This involves a challenge to the final acceptability of such well-worn ideas as time and space , thing and attribute, change and process”a challenge that metaphysicians have not hesitated to make, even though it has been treated with skepticism both by ordinary men and by some of their fellow philosophers e. Moore, a 20th-century British thinker who has greatly influenced modern Analytic philosophy.

Second, granted that there are contradictions or incoherences in the thought of common sense, the metaphysician must go on to maintain that they cannot be resolved by deserting common sense for science. He will not deny that the concepts of science are in many respects different from those of everyday thought; to take one aspect only, they are altogether more precise and sharply defined. They permit the scientist to introduce into his descriptions a theoretical content that is lacking at the everyday level and in so doing to unify and render intelligible aspects of the world that seem opaque when considered singly. The metaphysician will argue, however, that this desirable result is purchased at a certain price: The scientist, in this way of thinking, does not offer a truer description of the phenomena of which ordinary thought could make no sense but merely gives a connected description of a selected set of phenomena. The world of the scientist, restricted as it is to what can be dealt with in quantitative terms, is a poor thing in comparison with the rich if untidy world of everyday life. Alternatively, the metaphysician must try to show that scientific concepts are like the concepts of common sense in being ultimately incoherent. The premises or presuppositions that the scientist accepts contain unclarities that cannot be resolved, although they are not so serious as to prevent his achieving results that are practically dependable. Many ingenious arguments on these lines have been produced by philosophers, by no means all of whom could be said to be incapable of a true understanding of the theories they were criticizing. Leibniz, for example, was a physicist of distinction as well as a mathematician of genius; G. Hegel, a 19th-century German Idealist, had an unusual knowledge of contemporary scientific work; and Alfred North Whitehead, a pioneer of 20th-century metaphysics in the Anglo-Saxon world, was a professor of applied mathematics, and his system developed from physics and contained a wealth of biological ideas. The fact remains, nevertheless, that few if any practicing scientists have been seriously troubled by such arguments. Even if the metaphysician were thus able to make good the negative side of his case, he would still face the formidable difficulty of establishing that there is something answering to his conception of what is ultimately real and of identifying it. The notion of an original being, totally self-contained and totally self-intelligible, may not itself be coherent, as the 18th-century British philosopher David Hume and others have argued; alternatively, there may be special difficulties in saying to what it applies. The fact that different metaphysicians have given widely different accounts of what is ultimately real is certainly suspicious. Some have wanted to say that there is a plurality of ultimately real things, others that there is only one; some have argued that what is truly real must be utterly transcendent of the things of this world and occupy a supersensible realm accessible only to the pure intellect, while others have thought of ultimate reality as immanent in experience the Hegelian Absolute, for example, is not a special sort of existent, but the world as a whole understood in a certain way. That metaphysical inquiry should issue in definitive doctrine, as so many of those who engaged in it said that it would, is in these circumstances altogether too much to hope for. The science of the world as a whole Another way in which metaphysicians have sought to define their discipline is by saying that it has to do with the world as a whole. The implications of this phrase are not immediately obvious. Clearly, a contrast is intended in the first place with the various departmental sciences, each of which selects a portion or aspect of reality for study and confines itself to that. No geologist or mathematician would claim that his study is absolutely comprehensive; each would concede that there are many aspects of the world that he leaves out, even though he covers everything that is relevant to his special point of view. By contrast, it might be supposed that the metaphysician is merely to coordinate the results of the special sciences. There is clearly a need for the coordination of scientific results because scientific research has become increasingly specialized and departmentalized; individual scientific workers need to be made aware of what is going on in other fields, sometimes because these fields impinge on their own, sometimes because results obtained there have wider implications of which they need to take account. One can scarcely see metaphysicians, however, or indeed philosophers generally, performing this function of intellectual contact man in a satisfactory fashion. It might then be supposed that their concern with the world as a whole is to be interpreted as a summing up and synthesizing of the results of the particular sciences. Plato spoke of the philosopher as taking a synoptic view, and there is often talk about the need to see things in the round and avoid the narrowness of the average specialist, who, it is said, knows more and more about less and less. If, however, it is a question of looking at

scientific results from a wider point of view and so of producing what might be called a scientific picture of the world, the person best qualified for the job is not any philosopher but rather a scientist of large mind and wide interests. Only a scientist could hope to become such a superscientist. More hope for the metaphysician can be found, perhaps, along the following lines. People want to know not only what the scientist makes of the world but also what significance to assign to his account. People experience the world at different levels and in different capacities: Man is a many-sided being; he needs to understand the universe in the light of his different activities and experiences. There are philosophers who appear to find no problem here; they argue that there can be no possibility of, say, a moral or a religious vision of the world that rivals the scientific vision. In this view, morals and religion are matters of practice, not of theory; they do not rival science but only complement it. This neutralist attitude, however, finds little general favour; for most thinking people find it necessary to choose whether to go all the way with science, at the cost of abandoning religion and even morals, or to stick to a religious or moral world outlook even if it means treating scientific claims with some reserve. The practice of the moral life is often believed to proceed on assumptions that can hardly be accepted if science is taken to have the last word about what is true.

Chapter 4 : Metaphysics - Wikipedia

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If one were to look at a tree one day, and the tree later lost a leaf, it would seem that one could still be looking at that same tree. Two rival theories to account for the relationship between change and identity are perdurantism, which treats the tree as a series of tree-stages, and endurantism, which maintains that the organism—the same tree—is present at every stage in its history. Space and time[edit] See also: Philosophy of space and time Objects appear to us in space and time, while abstract entities such as classes, properties, and relations do not. What then is meant by space and time such that it can serve this function as a ground for objects? Are space and time entities themselves, of some form, or must they exist prior to other entities? How exactly can they be defined? For example, if time is defined as a "rate of change" then must there always be something changing in order for time to exist? Causality Classical philosophy recognized a number of causes, including teleological future causes. In special relativity and quantum field theory the notions of space, time and causality become tangled together, with temporal orders of causations becoming dependent on who is observing them. The laws of physics are symmetrical in time, so could equally well be used to describe time as running backwards. Why then do we perceive it as flowing in one direction, the arrow of time, and as containing causation flowing in the same direction? Causality is linked by most philosophers to the concept of counterfactuals. To say that A caused B means that if A had not happened then B would not have happened. Causality is usually required as a foundation for philosophy of science, if science aims to understand causes and effects and make predictions about them. Necessity and possibility[edit] See also: Modal logic and Modal realism Metaphysicians investigate questions about the ways the world could have been. David Lewis, in *On the Plurality of Worlds*, endorsed a view called Concrete Modal realism, according to which facts about how things could have been are made true by other concrete worlds, just as in ours, in which things are different. Other philosophers, such as Gottfried Leibniz, have dealt with the idea of possible worlds as well. The idea of necessity is that any necessary fact is true across all possible worlds. A possible fact is true in some possible world, even if not in the actual world. For example, it is possible that cats could have had two tails, or that any particular apple could have not existed. By contrast, certain propositions seem necessarily true, such as analytic propositions, e. A less controversial view might be that self-identity is necessary, as it seems fundamentally incoherent to claim that for any x, it is not identical to itself; this is known as the law of identity, a putative "first principle". Aristotle describes the principle of non-contradiction, "It is impossible that the same quality should both belong and not belong to the same thing This is the most certain of all principles Wherefore they who demonstrate refer to this as an ultimate opinion. For it is by nature the source of all the other axioms. Cosmology and cosmogony[edit] See also: Cosmology metaphysics Metaphysical cosmology is the branch of metaphysics that deals with the world as the totality of all phenomena in space and time. Historically, it formed a major part of the subject alongside Ontology, though its role is more peripheral in contemporary philosophy. It has had a broad scope, and in many cases was founded in religion. The ancient Greeks drew no distinction between this use and their model for the cosmos. However, in modern times it addresses questions about the Universe which are beyond the scope of the physical sciences. It is distinguished from religious cosmology in that it approaches these questions using philosophical methods e. Cosmogony deals specifically with the origin of the universe. Modern metaphysical cosmology and cosmogony try to address questions such as: What is the origin of the Universe? What is its first cause? Is its existence necessary? Does the cosmos have a purpose? Philosophy of mind Different approaches toward resolving the mind–body problem Accounting for the existence of mind in a world otherwise composed of matter is a metaphysical problem which is so large and important as to have become a specialized subject of study in its own right, philosophy of mind. Substance dualism is a classical theory in which mind and body are essentially different, with the mind having some of the attributes traditionally assigned to the soul, and which creates an immediate conceptual puzzle about how the two interact. Idealism postulates that material objects do not exist unless perceived and only as perceptions. Panpsychism and

panexperientialism , are property dualist theories in which everything has or is a mind rather than everything exists in a mind. For the last century, the dominant theories have been science-inspired including materialistic monism , Type identity theory , token identity theory , functionalism , reductive physicalism , nonreductive physicalism , eliminative materialism , anomalous monism , property dualism , epiphenomenalism and emergence. Determinism and free will[edit] See also: Determinism and Free will Determinism is the philosophical proposition that every event, including human cognition, decision and action, is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences. It holds that nothing happens that has not already been determined. The principal consequence of the deterministic claim is that it poses a challenge to the existence of free will. The problem of free will is the problem of whether rational agents exercise control over their own actions and decisions. Addressing this problem requires understanding the relation between freedom and causation, and determining whether the laws of nature are causally deterministic. Some philosophers, known as Incompatibilists , view determinism and free will as mutually exclusive. If they believe in determinism, they will therefore believe free will to be an illusion, a position known as Hard Determinism. Proponents range from Baruch Spinoza to Ted Honderich. Others, labeled Compatibilists or "Soft Determinists" , believe that the two ideas can be reconciled coherently. Adherents of this view include Thomas Hobbes and many modern philosophers such as John Martin Fischer. Incompatibilists who accept free will but reject determinism are called Libertarians , a term not to be confused with the political sense. Robert Kane and Alvin Plantinga are modern defenders of this theory. Natural and social kinds[edit] The earliest type of classification of social construction traces back to Plato in his dialogue Phaedrus where he claims that the biological classification system seems to "carve nature at the joints". In his essay The Analytical Language of John Wilkins , Borges makes us imagine a certain encyclopedia where the animals are divided into a those that belong to the emperor; b embalmed ones; c those that are trained; According to Quine this notion is closely related to the notion of similarity. Philosophy of mathematics There are different ways to set up the notion of number in metaphysics theories. Platonist theories postulate number as a fundamental category itself. Others consider it to be a property of an entity called a "group" comprising other entities; or to be a relation held between several groups of entities, such as "the number four is the set of all sets of four things". Many of the debates around universals are applied to the study of number, and are of particular importance due to its status as a foundation for the philosophy of mathematics and for mathematics itself. Applied metaphysics[edit] Although metaphysics as a philosophical enterprise is highly hypothetical, it also has practical application in most other branches of philosophy, science, and now also information technology. Such areas generally assume some basic ontology such as a system of objects, properties, classes, and spacetime as well as other metaphysical stances on topics such as causality and agency, then build their own particular theories upon these. In science for example, some theories are based on the ontological assumption of objects with properties such as electrons having charge while others may reject objects completely such as quantum field theories, where spread-out "electronness" becomes a property of spacetime rather than an object. For example, they may postulate the existence of basic entities such as value, beauty, and God respectively. Then they use these postulates to make their own arguments about consequences resulting from them. When philosophers in these subjects make their foundations they are doing applied metaphysics, and may draw upon its core topics and methods to guide them, including ontology and other core and peripheral topics. As in Science, the foundations chosen will in turn depend on the underlying ontology used, so philosophers in these subjects may have to dig right down to the ontological layer of metaphysics to find what is possible for their theories. For example, a contradiction obtained in a theory of God or Beauty might be due to an assumption that it is an object rather than some other kind of ontological entity. Relationship of metaphysics and science[edit] Prior to the modern history of science , scientific questions were addressed as a part of natural philosophy. Originally, the term "science" Latin scientia simply meant "knowledge". The scientific method , however, transformed natural philosophy into an empirical activity deriving from experiment , unlike the rest of philosophy. By the end of the 18th century, it had begun to be called "science" to distinguish it from philosophy. Thereafter, metaphysics denoted philosophical enquiry of a non-empirical character into the nature of existence. For example, any theory of fundamental physics is based on some set of axioms , which

may postulate the existence of entities such as atoms, particles, forces, charges, mass, or fields. Stating such postulates is considered to be the "end" of a science theory. Metaphysics takes these postulates and explores what they mean as human concepts. For example, do all theories of physics require the existence of space and time, [11] objects, and properties? Or can they be expressed using only objects, or only properties? Do the objects have to retain their identity over time or do they change? Is the distinction between objects and properties fundamental to the physical world or to our perception of it? Much recent work has been devoted to analyzing the role of metaphysics in scientific theorizing. Since [14] [15] "he showed the ways in which some untestable and hence, according to Popperian ideas, non-empirical propositions can nevertheless be influential in the development of properly testable and hence scientific theories. These profound results in applied elementary logic David Hull has argued that changes in the ontological status of the species concept have been central in the development of biological thought from Aristotle through Cuvier , Lamarck , and Darwin. Whitehead is famous for creating a process philosophy metaphysics inspired by electromagnetism and special relativity. In the eighteenth century, David Hume took an extreme position, arguing that all genuine knowledge involves either mathematics or matters of fact and that metaphysics, which goes beyond these, is worthless. He concludes his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding with the statement: If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? Commit it then to the flames: Although he followed Hume in rejecting much of previous metaphysics, he argued that there was still room for some synthetic a priori knowledge, concerned with matters of fact yet obtainable independent of experience. These included fundamental structures of space, time, and causality. He also argued for the freedom of the will and the existence of "things in themselves", the ultimate but unknowable objects of experience.

Chapter 5 : Common sense - Wikipedia

Caption: Metaphysics and Common Sense It can make you more empathetic. A study in the Netherlands found that people who read books with this genre, and emotionally picked up by it, felt an impulse of empathy.

Bishop Berkeley said in his Philosophical Commentaries no. It is also part of common sense to learn fast not to touch hot stoves, and the like. I break my nose against a postâ€¦ I step into a dirty kennel; and after twenty such wise rational actions, I am taken up and clapped into a madhouse. The Birth Common sense had two parents, appropriately enough, one Greek, one Roman. In a different vein, the Roman Stoic philosopher Cicero construed *sensus communis* as the shared, often unspoken values and beliefs of a community. This was the root of common law, on which British and then American law was based. By the s there was a publication titled *Common Sense*. The tug of war between ordinary wisdom and that of the learned was a persistent and prominent theme. But common sense was here to stay as a foundation of social and moral order. And it would soon become a school of philosophy. *Common Sense Comes of Age* The big surprise is where this occurred. At the turn of the eighteenth century Scotland was a remote backwater. But the Union with England Act of â€” the Act recently reaffirmed in the Scottish referendum of September â€” made it possible for Scotland to join the civilized world. Within thirty years Glasgow was a bustling commercial city; within fifty years Edinburgh surpassed Leiden as the premier medical school in the West. Our tale, though, takes place not in Edinburgh or Glasgow, but in the even more remote town of Aberdeen. More specifically, it takes place in the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, launched in by Thomas Reid. This was the heyday of the learned society, and that in Aberdeen, nicknamed the *Wise Club*, was among the best. Several papers presented there became books that made their authors well known, and their discussions covered almost everything under the sun. Here is a smattering: Most Scots opposed slavery. In our age of narrow specialization, the question naturally arises whether these wide-ranging discussions could have been anything more than sophomoric bull sessions. But the *Wise Club* meant business. A penalty of half a crown was imposed for failing to deliver a paper without a good excuse. Members began preparing three years ahead of time for the Transit of Venus, due in June The far more prestigious Royal Society of London did not begin its preparations until a year before the transit, and then only when prodded to action by the French astronomer Delisle. So the *Wise Club* lived up to its name. Hume gave subtle and powerful reasons to be skeptical about the foundations of morality, about the existence of God, even about the everyday connection of cause and effect. It can have no other tendency than to show the acuteness of the sophistâ€¦making mankind Yahoos. If you write no moreâ€¦ I am afraid we shall be at a loss for subjects. It appeared in , and the same year Reid was appointed to the chair of moral philosophy at Glasgow, replacing Adam Smith, who soon began work on *Wealth of Nations*. Today Hume is on every top-ten list of the most important philosophers in history, whereas Reid might not make the top fifty. Hume knew as much, of course, and said so. But Hume adds something that Reid seems to have missed: Witherspoon was soon the most important educator in colonial America. Even without Witherspoon common sense would have found a ready welcome in the new world, particularly in Philadelphia, where Benjamin Franklin personified this quality. Moreover, Franklin had broad and deep Scottish connections. His *Proposal for the Education of Youth* drew on the writings of two Aberdeen professors; and when he launched the College of Philadelphia later the University of Pennsylvania , he picked William Smith of Aberdeen to run it. Among the many letters of introduction Franklin wrote for people going abroad, or those coming to America, was one for Thomas Paine, who arrived in Philadelphia from England in , at age 37 a bankrupt corset-maker with two failed marriages. He died in obscurity, having accomplished one big thing: The signing of the US Constitution 5. Originally the opening phrase read: He spiked Scottish common sense with French *bon sens*, a term coming into vogue with radical Continental thinkers, to form the linguistic yeast that fomented revolution in America. Even *bon sens* was too tame to be the motto of the French Revolution. But the American Revolution was a lot more successful than the French one â€” precisely because it followed Reid rather than Robespierre. In this he was astonishingly effective. But Franklin, with his canny, down-home style, was no less so. It was lost on Reid, but evidently not on Franklin, that Humean skepticism contains an essential

common sense component. As Harvard undergraduates, Emerson and Thoreau were schooled in this philosophy, and Emerson explicitly praised Reid and his disciple Dugald Stewart in an undergraduate prize essay. Stewart was the last of the major Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, and became even better known. Why did it rise so high? And why did it then fall so low? It rose because there was a lot to like about this philosophy. In James McCosh, a Scot who became president of Princeton University in , exactly years after Witherspoon, wrote a history of the Scottish philosophy, lest it vanish without a trace “like Brigadoon” which despite McCosh, is pretty much what transpired. But Pragmatism is a complex philosophy, and its common sense element is less than obvious. Next, common-sensism became identified with Cambridge philosopher G. Even in Scotland we find this same amnesia. Today common sense in America is more a political slogan than a philosophical principle, so it harks back more to Paine than to Reid. She writes regularly for Philosophy Now and serves on its U.

Chapter 6 : Common-sense metaphysics : Wikis (The Full Wiki)

Metaphysics and common sense (Book) Author: Ayer, A. J.

Across Europe and North America, and even in Australasia, for most of the 19th century Scottish philosophy was held in very high regard. It was only with the turn of the 20th century that its star fell, and did so surprisingly rapidly. To understand this decline in reputation, it is necessary to see 19th century Scottish philosophy against the background of the century that preceded it. According to George Davie there is an opposition between two contrasting positions that in their tension provided Scottish philosophy with its central problem: On the side of the first is Hume, whose skeptical conclusions arise from the Berkeleian presupposition asserted in the very first sentence of his *Treatise of Human Nature* All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call impressions and ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind. It is genius, and not the want of it, that adulterates philosophy, and fills it with error and false theory. A creative imagination disdains the mean offices of digging for a foundation, of removing rubbish, and carrying materials: And if common sense, or the principles of education, happen not to be stubborn, it is odds but we end in absolute skepticism. The antidote to such skepticism is common sense, but not of the robust sort displayed by Dr. Johnson when he purported to refute Berkeley by kicking a stone. There is, then, this deep division within the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, yet it occurs within a context of striking unanimity also. This is a tension, however, within only one part of 18th century Scottish philosophy, namely the philosophy of sensation and perception, and not perhaps the most influential part. The Scottish Enlightenment is in many ways more marked by the type of thinking about social and political topics that we find in Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, as well as Hume, who in this respect take their cue from Hutcheson. In the 19th century, this strand of Enlightenment thinking ceased to be an important part of the philosophical agenda. It is also a story of remarkable institutional continuity. Brown was a student of Dugald Stewart , who in turn was a student and friend of Reid and himself held the Chair of Moral Philosophy at both Glasgow and Edinburgh. This continuity was sustained throughout most of the succeeding century as the students of Scottish professors themselves became Scottish professors, often moving between the four ancient universities. Yet in retrospect he made no notably innovative contribution to the central debate in Scottish philosophy. It was Brown who took Scottish philosophy into a new phase. Brown was a poet and physician as well as a philosopher, and a rather more independent thinker than Stewart, so much so, in fact, that Stewart regarded him as something of a traitor to the philosophy of Reid. His premature death in meant that he published relatively little philosophy during his life time, though his *Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect* revealed his sympathy for Hume. At the time of his death he left behind voluminous lectures that were posthumously published. In them he was critical of Reid, though on certain issues he may be said to have sided with Reid against Hume. In his most frequently quoted remark, however, which does not come from the lectures, he famously sought to diminish the distance between the two. Reid bawled out that we must believe in an outward world; but added, in a whisper, we can give no reason for our belief. Hume cries out that we can give no reason for such a notion; and whispers, I own we cannot get rid of it. Despite this popularity, after or so, they fell into total neglect. Consequently the greatest contribution that his lectures made to philosophical debate was second hand -- namely the re-interpretation and defence of Reid that they induced on the part of the most prominent philosopher of the period -- Sir William Hamilton. Though neither published anything of significance, they both transmitted to a new generation the philosophical legacy of Reid -- though not uncritically. Mylne in particular seems to have viewed Reid with detachment. From 1821 he worked at the Scottish Bar with limited success until being appointed Professor of Universal and Civil History at the University of Edinburgh, where he transferred to the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in , a post he held until his death in . At the height of his powers, Hamilton was regarded as a major intellectual figure of international importance. Further evidence of this towering stature lies in the fact that a volume on Hamilton was included in the series *Philosophical Classics*, edited by William Knight, Professor of Moral Philosophy at St Andrews.

Such an estimation must now strike us as strange, yet there is point in asking why his times regarded him in such a favorable light. The answer has several sources. Secondly, as Porter records by the early 19th century, a measure of intellectual exhaustion had set in in philosophical circles, and this provided a ready audience for his vigorous style of writing. Thirdly, there was his almost unique knowledge of German philosophy. Thanks to two trips he made to Germany during his years as a lawyer, Hamilton acquired an extensive knowledge of Kant and his immediate successors, little of which had been translated into English but which Hamilton was able to read in the original language. At the same time, he was not only thoroughly versed in the Scottish tradition of philosophy that he had acquired from Jardine and Mylne, but an enthusiastic exponent of Reid, whose collected works he edited and annotated extensively. He was thus perfectly placed to broaden the horizons of Scottish philosophy, to push it beyond the narrower confines of Common Sense by bringing to wider attention the importance of Kant, while doing so as one profoundly sympathetic to the native tradition. It is precisely for these reasons, in fact, that he is praised by John Veitch in the *Philosophical Classics* volume devoted to his philosophy. Rescue came from two sources. The question at issue can be expressed in a number of different ways. Kant held that we can only have knowledge of phenomena, never of noumena or things in themselves. Both positions have their difficulties. It is this contention that Hamilton aims to refute, but it is arguable that he misinterprets Brown. Reid holds, of course, that we do not reason from sensation to perception; the apprehending mind moves from one to the other by a natural, inbuilt instinct—“one of the principles of common sense. Hamilton too holds that there is no reasoning process here, but he also thinks that the continuing division that Reid is employing between sensation and perception is incompatible with the idea of immediate perception or direct realism. Hence his amendment, which so to speak ties the sensation and perception together. But how is this further contention to be sustained? Is it a conceptual truth of some kind, or an empirical observation about how the mind works? At any rate, if we do press the question of its defence, we quickly encounter a new version of the old division, namely whether the perception is to be identified as a manifestation of self-evident principles of common sense, or as a psychological association of ideas. This estimation did not persist for long. Two devastating attacks, from strikingly different philosophical perspectives, appeared in print within a decade. Being the *Philosophy of Perception an Analysis* published the first and ultimately only part of an equally strenuous attack from an Idealist point of view. It was Ferrier who strove most obviously, in the name of Scottish philosophy, to take a different tack from both Reid and Hamilton. Ferrier—“*Scottish Philosophy, the Old and the New* Ferrier writes with great force and feeling. It has been asserted, that my philosophy is of Germanic origin and complexion. A broader fabrication than that never dropped from human lips or dribbled from the point of a pen. My philosophy is Scottish to the very core; it is national in every fibre and articulation of its frame. Are we to judge the productions of Scotland by merely looking to what Scotland has hitherto produced? May a philosopher not be, heart and soul, a Scotsman—“may he not be a Scotsman in all his intellectual movements, even though he should have the misfortune to differ in certain respects, from Dr Reid and Sir William Hamilton Ferrier Indeed he is not afraid to repeat his objections in his defence of himself. These are undoubtedly truths, but I maintain that they are not truths in philosophy, any more than those just mentioned are truths in chemistry. Our old Scottish school, however, is of a different way of thinking. It represents these and similar facts as the first truths of philosophy, and to these it has recourse in handling the deeper questions of metaphysics. I have no objections to this, for those who like it—“only my system deals with first truths of a very different order; and it denies that the first truths of the old Scottish school are truths in philosophy at all. This is one very fundamental point of difference between the old and the new Scottish system of metaphysics *ibid*. And there are indeed several points of contact to be observed. The first is this. Ferrier shares with Hamilton a largely unspoken assumption that the question of mind and world lies at the heart of philosophy. This assumption signalled a move away from the much broader conception of moral philosophy as both psychological and social inquiry, which as we have already noted, is characteristic of Ferguson, Hume, Adam Smith, and even Reid in part. In these essays he took his stand on the contention that consciousness implies the impossibility of a naturalistic science of mind, and in a later essay robustly defends a version of Berkeleyan idealism. His language it is true, has sometimes the appearance of paradox; but there is nothing paradoxical in his thoughts, and time has proved

the adamantine solidity of his principles. The external world in itself, and the external world in relation to us, was a philosophic distinction which he [Berkeley] refused to recognize. In his creed, the substantive and phenomenal were one. And though he has been accused of sacrificing the substance to the shadow, and though he still continues to be charged, by every philosophical writer, with reducing all things to ideas in the mind, he was guilty of no such absurdity. There does not appear to be much justice in the ordinary allegation, that Berkeley discredited the testimony of the senses, and denied the existence of the material universe. He merely denied the distinction between things and their appearances, and maintained that the thing was the appearance and the appearance was the thing. It hardly needs to be said that this was a highly controversial position. This implication—that the methods of the sciences are inapplicable to philosophy—somewhat isolated Ferrier within Scottish philosophy. Though he was regarded with great acclaim in continental Europe, Scottish philosophers moved in different directions, some to an intensification of the experimental method, and some to Absolute Idealism. Of the first group, the most prominent and influential was Alexander Bain. A man of remarkable gifts, he was appointed to the Chair largely on the strength of distinguished philosophical work he had published while working as a journalist in London, where he made the acquaintance of John Stuart Mill with whom he formed a lasting friendship. *Dissertations on Leading Philosophical Questions*, is a collection of his essays published in retirement, though almost all had originally appeared in the journal *Mind*, a journal he was instrumental in founding. In several of these essays, Bain takes Reid and Hamilton as his starting point and, broadly, follows the same methods. But, his sympathy with Mill and anti-metaphysical inclinations led him to push them in a much more strongly empirical direction. We are, at the moment, in the midst of a conflict of views as to the priority of Metaphysics and Psychology. If indeed the two are closely identified as some suppose, there is no conflict; there is in fact, but one study. If, on the other hand, there are two subjects, each ought to be carried on apart for a certain length, before they can either confirm or weaken each other. I believe that in strictness, a disinterested Psychology should come first in order, and that, after going on a little way in amassing the facts, it should revise its fundamental assumptions. I do not see any mode of attaining a correct Metaphysics until Psychology has at least made some way upon a provisional Metaphysics. Bain The conclusion to be drawn is that Bain, like Ferrier, can be seen to stand in the tradition of Scottish philosophy in the sense that he adopted its methods. But in contrast to Ferrier, he did so in ways that further removed the question of sensation and perception from the realms of traditional metaphysics, and pressed the study of the mind in the direction of empirical psychology. Associationism is the application of empirical observation to the relation between ideas and experiences. What it seeks is observed regularities, in the hope of formulating psychological laws that will enable us to order the contents of mind. Two such principles—Contiguity and Similarity—were widely accepted, and identified by Bain as being employed by Reid and Hamilton. However, for present purposes his arguments are interesting chiefly not so much for their elaboration of associationism, but for the light they throw on the development of Scottish philosophy in the nineteenth century. One point in particular seems to me illuminating. In the dispute between Reid and Hume with respect to the operations of the mind one of the fundamental points of difference is this.

Chapter 7 : Metaphysics and Common Sense by A.J. Ayer -

Common sense (or, when used attributively as an adjective, commonsense, common-sense, or commonsensical), based on a strict construction of the term, consists of what people in common would agree on: that which they "sense" as their common natural understanding.

Plato said that philosophy was for the very few people who were able to do it. Rorty said philosophy is pretty remote from life. Is there a way of coordinating all of these thoughts? Do they all fit together? I think they can, in their way, fit together coherently, but there have been better and worse ways of construing them. Socrates came upon the Greek scene at a very important point in its cultural evolution. For some years, leisured aristocrats had begun popping up around the Aegean Sea and composing themselves in a manner that had previously been unheard of—our first intellectuals. The hold of democracy on Athens produced a shift in the educational institutions of Greece. The existence of a citizen class in Athens created a need for a means of educating them, one that surpassed the means that existed for the needs of fickle aristocracies. For the first time in history, an opportunity was created in which people could live on their wits. These were the Sophists, the first professional intellectuals, and, like most people I know, they soon began talking about themselves and what they do. The trouble for them was that nobody had really done what they did before. The Sophists had to attract customers, which meant not only displaying their wares in public, but arguing for why they knew what they were doing, over and against their competitors. What they did, in fact, was increase the ability of public speakers to convince their audience that they were right. In Athens, in contrast to today, every man was their own politician and lawyer. This meant that arguing your view say, of innocence became dramatically more important than in previous, aristocratic generations, where oratory was more for the battlefield the first great place you had to convince people of doing something, like bleeding. So the Sophists, our first rhetoricians, began to reflect on the process of argumentation, persuasion, how a person is convinced to do something. The Sophists, however, fell victim to the forces of rampant cultural evolution. Not only were they working without a net on the self-image and practice of intellectuals in general, but they were still working with the tools of their forebears. The Sophists saw quite clearly, and correctly, that the process of persuasion, and particularly argumentation, only works with an understanding of your audience—a persuader, if to prove effective, must work with the beliefs of his audience to have any chance of being understood, let alone be successful. This, however, produced some hasty formulations, a few of which equated the conventions *nomos* and opinions *doxa* of society with what is right and just. Socrates would have none of this. This would leave no place for change. In this light, Socrates appears as the crusading anti-professionalist, damning the know-it-alls for supposing they had the market cornered on the good and righteous. I think this is the good light that comes out of the Delphism Socrates cleaved to: The Socratic interaction between common sense and philosophy is that between the wisdom of the ages and the love of something better. But the rise of democracy spread out the things they did and the application of the commendation. Neither of them wanted money easy for Plato since he had money, they simply wanted something better for humanity. Plato saw democracy at work and saw the blind leading the blind. And so Plato institutionalized the life of the critic, created a home and a tradition of transmitting the skeptical attitude toward contemporary modes of life. Much like his Sophist counterparts, Plato meditated frequently on how we dig into ourselves and reality generally. Plato concluded that, whatever it was that Socrates did, it was hard and not, sadly, for everyone. Inquiry into ourselves is better done by ourselves. However, as much as looking askance at the world is a common ability for all, the tools are not. The Sophists were right in that. Exploding out from Plato, the paths weave about, branching off in a multitude of directions. Some succeed—these branches break off and fall from the tree of metaphysics and set up shop for themselves, become different disciplines. Some simply die, still-born in the breast of the never-heard-from-again thinker. But the tradition continues on. It is on the other side of this year process that we find Pirsig and Rorty, and it is only by understanding their reactions to this process that we can make sense of their opinions about philosophy. The philosophers one studies in Philosophy Departments, these footnotes, have been placed there because of the way contemporary philosophers tell the story of their own discipline. A

typical way of narrating it gives us license to break philosophy into three branches: Many of these philosophers studied other things, but the obsession Kant centered his narrative around, which preselected his choice of exemplars, was of how we are and how we know it. Metaphysics is a handy moniker for the professional philosophy that stems out of the Kantian historiographical tradition because the understanding it breeds is that the study of being will never be far from the study of knowing. When you assert the way something is, an interlocutor will always be interested in how you know that. Philosophers in this tradition have always gone back and forth as to which is primary, whether you can intelligibly answer the question of knowledge by itself before wielding it upon instances, or whether one must lock down a conception of the way the world is first before wondering about how you know it. One thing in this tradition is certain however—ethics and aesthetics are secondary studies. If one takes the activities of being and knowing as basic, one will naturally think that valuing is secondary because the explanation given is predicated on the earlier assumption of primacy. One way to understand what Pirsig did is to think of him as reversing the traditional order of things in professional philosophy and making axiology primary to metaphysics objects and epistemology subjects. Kant said that philosophy was queen of the sciences, ruling and judging all other human activities, institutionalizing the pretentiousness that Socrates accused the Sophists of. However, if we think of metaphysics as inquiry into how things work, we can see the sense of Newton having described himself as a natural philosopher. Inquiry into how things work began with the Pre-Socratics, who still get treated in history of science classes. The broad inquiry began breaking off into specialties as a new method or new way of looking at an old problem took off. On this view, metaphysics today in Philosophy Departments is the way it is because the natural and human sciences have set up shop on their own, taking with them part of what used to be in the philosophical purview. Standing at the gates looking in, Pirsig sees a lot of sterile, pointless debates about subjects so seemingly remote from life that it almost amounted to dereliction of duty. Rorty comes to very similar conclusions, but from the inside. Rorty did his time in grad school and spent 20 years burrowing to the center of these debates. There is a *prima facie* distance between Pirsig and Rorty on the utility of metaphysics, study of being and knowing, to people living their lives. In *ZMM*, Pirsig sees the dysfunctional attitude of his friends, the Sutherlands, towards technology as expressions of a deep-lying attitude that undergirds Western culture in its relation to life, one he traces to Ancient Greek philosophy. Plato makes the analogy to help show that justice is uniform across the two units and to establish the unity of the questions and answers for both city and soul. This causes him to point to conceptual distinctions, generated in the Platonic tradition, as the locus of our, of his, spiritual crisis. My concern right now is not whether Pirsig is right to do this. What does interest me currently is how Pirsig turns philosophy into a kind of therapy. In *Lila*, Pirsig draws this parallel further in his discussion of a philosophy of insanity in Chapter 1. Pirsig employs philosophy to help him reintegrate with Phaedrus in *ZMM* and so become a full human being again and, in *Lila*, to reorient our culture more generally. This is why Pirsig develops a systematic metaphysics of distinctions—its only purpose is to help the individual life. Our sickness stems from the conceptual apparatuses handed us by the past and so we must seek their solution there. Rorty treats professional philosophers the same way. As Rorty entered the professional ranks he shifted from an historically-oriented, Whiteheadian systematic metaphysician to a conceptual analyst. Freud and physical scientists, however, gave us a good, solid sense of what a reality behind an appearance actually looks like. Psychoanalysts started telling us that our problems getting an erection were because we wanted to do unhealthy things to our mothers and fathers. The reason why we believed them is because they were able to get results—they were able to tinker with the inputs to effect, in predictable and controllable ways, the outputs. However, he also continued a tradition of esotericism, out of which the notion of an expert flows. The esoteric is a class of mystery and secrets, and though we can clearly see its similarity to expertise, its separation through long affiliation is past due. There are many secrets, but the shift from esotericism to expertise is a shift in attitude, orientation, from viewing life and its variegated problems as ineffable mysteries to discussable difficulties. There is a sense in which the philosopher, like the psychologist, knows something a little more than the regular Joe or Jane on the street. When we are talking about ourselves, our beliefs, views, attitudes, desires, habits, hopes and dreams, we are, in a sense, an expert over this area against which no one else could come close. What you should rebel

against, like Socrates, however, is the notion that anyone knows some mystery about you, the reality behind your beliefs that swings free and independently of your view of your beliefs. Socrates marked the birth of a self-critical culture. He thought it was important for everyone to examine themselves in an effort to better their future selves over their past selves. If we define the Socratic spirit as the spirit of Philosophy and the Platonic as Metaphysics, we might say that Philosophy is an amateur genre, one everyone should take part in, while Metaphysics is a specialized genre, one which might help for those who want to take the time and energy to delve into, but for which “because of the very fact of its generality over the particular life” we might not, and simply ask for help from time to time from the experts, should we need it. If Common Sense is the continuing, evolving body of belief that is passed from generation to generation, then the Socratic spirit is the blood that keeps it moving. Pirsig may have been right, that a certain depth of attention, born of passing the buck on to specialists on too many scores, is lacking in our culture, and that the blood is beginning to stiffen and coagulate. What Pirsig was certainly right about, however, is that the Socratic spirit is not a flame lit in secret and watched over by robed priests called Professional Philosophers “it is the heritage of all reflective individuals. What Rorty was certainly right about, however, is that the Socratic spirit is not only unprofessionalizable, but to be all the more protected because of it “it pays to have leisured self-explorers teaching our children how to explore, if not exactly what to explore.

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This reputation owes less to the philosophical uses Reid makes of common sense than to fellow Scotsman James Beattie, who popularized common sense in his very widely read *An Essay on The Nature and Immutability of Truth In Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism*. Here it refers to a select set of intuitive judgments. Common sense first principles are identifiable because they typically possess a suite of additional traits, note, not necessary conditions as follows. Denial of a common sense principle is not only false but absurd EIP 6. Common sense principles are common sense because, but not only because, they are common to humanity. Though his commitment to common sense forms a key component in his philosophical method, a deeper methodological principle clearly underlies his appeal to common sense. Reid attempts to build his fallibilist, foundationalist account of empirical knowledge while working under an empiricist constraint that prohibits speculative use of a priori reason. Though this marks a point commonly neglected in the interpretation of Reid, one can often find, in his discussion of common sense, emphasis on empirical generalizations from observable data about what people believe and how they behave. Laying stress upon his claim about the universality of certain beliefs across our species has opened Reid up to tiresome criticism that began in his lifetime and continues to the present of the following sort: Reid corrects this misunderstanding by emphasizing the fact that his first principles are psychological generalizations about belief formation applicable to most of our species EIP 6. Reid often appeals to the structure of languages as evidence for generalizations about human cognition, belief, and descriptive metaphysics. Language, being something so widely shared, offers an abundance of data for observation. Reid finds many commonalities across languages. The connection between ordinary language and common sense that Reid espouses was of great influence on such later philosophers as G. Reid does not believe, however, that every feature of ordinary language is indicative of some important tenet of common sense EIP 1. All languages distinguish between qualities of things and the things themselves EIP 6. This suggests that certain universal features of the syntactic structure of languages inform us of a common sense cognitive commitment, even if it is implicit. Such common sense first principles are intended to be more than merely generalizations about how humans across cultures form beliefs. Reid intends these general principles to provide evidence for particular beliefs. Thus Principle 5 issues in the self-evident belief, for example, that I perceive a computer before me Van Cleve He is not, for instance, interested in providing a refutation of skepticism about the external world by appeal to first principles. Since the belief in the external world is a dictate of common sense, it is, Reid thinks, as justified as it needs to be when it is shown to be on the same footing as any alternative. Justification, therefore, does not necessarily require providing positive reasons in favor of common-sensical beliefs; common sense beliefs could be adequately justified simply by undermining the force of the reasons in favor of alternatives to common sense. Common sense constrains, rather than dictates, acceptable philosophical positions. For example, a number of comments Reid makes indicate that he appears to have a psychological conception of evidence whereby what is evident forces assent. Typically these stances are framed as various commitments to Newton and Newtonianism. Wanting both the world and knowledge of it in his philosophical system, Reid was at pains to articulate his account of both common sense and Newtonianism. First, Reid is committed to the positive role of mathematics in stating and testing theories. Second, Reid says that issues about causation are not issues physics should attempt to resolve. Not only this, efficient causes are only ever agents EAP 1. Causation and Free Will , below. Reid attributes this position to Newton. Reid mentions on many occasions, and with a certain pride, that Newtonian science does not permit knowledge of causes of phenomena, for example, the motion of the compass needle or the attraction of two bodies. More often, however, Reid urges readers to think of scientific explanation in terms of laws, as Newton had done. Laws are true general propositions used to explain appearances Thomas Reid on the Animate Creation , Physics does not aim to find efficient causes.

Third, related, when one event produces another event, e. One event may be constantly conjoined to another event, but it is a mistake to believe that this forms any necessity. Reid was active in his community, bringing his penchant for knowledge through experimentation to meetings in Aberdeenshire in which experimental techniques in farming were debated. Philosophy of Religion below. Despite the fact that with a few notable exceptions Reid scholars have neglected issues in his philosophy of science, a few key controversies have emerged and merit brief mention. Interpretations differed considerably, as did the translations and restatements of the rules themselves. Occurring in the introductory portion of his *Essays on Intellectual Powers*, he would go on to use and reuse it countless times in what followed. Ether appears to represent just the sort of posit originally by Descartes in *Principles of Philosophy* that Newtonians often enjoyed sweeping into the trash. Lacking any observational evidence for ether, Descartes posits ether as a medium through which forces can act on bodies that are not in direct contact. But does Reid reject ether theory on the grounds that it is unobservable and therefore does not belong in a Newtonian science, or does he reject ether theory because scientists as yet lack justificatory observations on its behalf? The first rule does not entail that unobservables like ether, subtile fluids, or forces do not or cannot have explanatory force, let alone that unobservables do not exist. Reid is explicit that questions about the existence of ether were open questions that were not settled by a priori EIP 2. First, the fact that Reid admits that these forces of attraction—unobservable, immaterial forces—may be physical implies that he is comfortable with a physical explanation of gravitation that does not entail the existence of God. Second, physical forces will not yield their secrets to an impoverished Cartesian science. This criticism is made on the grounds that Cartesians were attempting to understand gravitational attraction in terms of only extension, figure and motion—for Reid, a catastrophic mistake. Reid would face pointed criticism for multiplying faculties, but this consequence was more than outweighed by the explanatory utility of separating mental powers—their inputs, their operations, and their outputs—from one another. The most ubiquitous mental power is that of conception. Our suite of intellectual faculties supports a wide variety of mental events. Acts of conceiving are embedded in most of them. Whether judging that there is a tree before me, imagining there is a tree before me, or reasoning to a generalization that all trees have roots, these mental events employ the faculty of conception. Instead, simple apprehension—the basic form of conception—is bundled within typical acts of perception. The model of conception received from the Way of Ideas marks its first long step into two types of skepticism. Reid regards the Way of Ideas as founded on a flawed, anti-Newtonian methodology, is unscientific, and he argues that it has highly undesirable consequences. Reid distinguishes between several functions of conception. In order to believe, or remember or perceive, I must perform an act of simple apprehension in order to get something in mind. We explain Reidian conception by contrast with the Way of Ideas. First, Reid presupposes that the mind has an irreducible capacity for intentional conception in which our mental states are uniquely about specific objects. This faculty cannot be explained in terms of further non-intentional states. How intentional conception can be explained is mysterious—Reid is well aware of this. In a contrasting methodological move, Hume suggests that intentional content through ideas is built up from the operation of the laws of association—contiguity in time and space, resemblance and perceived causation—working upon impressions and images in the mind see *Treatise* 1. Conception takes as its intentional objects items with varied ontologies, including physical objects and propositions EIP 1. Note that, according to Reid, the Way of Ideas fails to adopt a proper faculty psychology since all mental powers—memory, perception, abstraction, etc. Considerable work in the secondary literature has been devoted to determine just what the content of conceptions are or can be. Hume uses these valences to determine which faculty is at work conceiving the idea. If I perceive an idea of a tree, my conception is lively and vivacious. If I remember the same idea of a tree, my conception is faint. Instead, Reid offers an account of a distinct faculty—conception—whose objects are embedded in other acts of the intellectual powers. Conceptions are ways of being aware of objects. To conceive of an object is to be aware of that object as the bearer of some particular property. Being tall and being female are different properties, and their difference signals something important about Reidian conception. Being tall is a relational property since height is a trait that is assessed relative to some further thing or standard. To foreshadow, this subtle feature of conception will become important for Reid in his discussion of vision, especially his discussion of

the relational property of visible figure. If I think about a tree, then I am defeasibly justified that I am thinking about a tree. Like the more familiar veil of perception created by the representational role of ideas see 3. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected. Hume describes his theory of thought as corpuscular because impressions are atomic and separable mental states without any determinate intentional link to anything else. Note that Hume appears to be led to this position by way of his attempt to repurpose Newtonian mechanics, as it applies to bodies, to formulate a science of the mind. Reid presents this argument about the intentionality of thought through an analogy about the meaning of language, specifically, about someone who is blind to the meaning of the language in a book. Suppose I see unfamiliar ink marks on paper. I neither know what they mean nor even that they are meaningful to anyone. The meanings of these words are not intrinsic to the representations of the words, whether those representations are on paper or are sound waves, just like the intentional content of ideas is not intrinsic to the ideas themselves. Suppose that ideas represent things like symbols; in this way, words and writing are known to express everything. Let the intellect, therefore, be instructed by ideas This view does not solve the problem; for who will interpret this book for us? If you show a book to a savage who has never heard of the use of letters, he will not know the letters are symbols, much less what they signify. If you address someone in a foreign language, perhaps your words are symbols as far as you are concerned, but they mean nothing to him. The resulting veil of conception implies that my impressions risk having no meaning for me. As a result, I do not know the contents of my own thoughts. Hume refrains from this claim in part because he sees no plausible metaphysics to support it. That is, if intentionality is endemic to thought, then the mind must not be what we think it is—“a part of nature whose ideas operate on impact principles familiar from Newtonian mechanics. Reid is aware of this problem and prepares to bite the bullet. In an effort to explicate this mysterious conceptual ability, Reid examines theories of thought of Aristotle and medieval philosophers.

Chapter 9 : Scottish Philosophy in the 19th Century (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

If Common Sense is the continuing, evolving body of belief that is passed from generation to generation, then the Socratic spirit is the blood that keeps it moving. Pirsig may have been right, that a certain depth of attention, born of passing the buck on to specialists on too many scores, is lacking in our culture, and that the blood is.

Existence-Nonexistence Necessity-Contingency While Kant does not give a formal derivation of it, he believes that this is the complete and necessary list of the a priori contributions that the understanding brings to its judgments of the world. Every judgment that the understanding can make must fall under the table of categories. And subsuming spatiotemporal sensations under the formal structure of the categories makes judgments, and ultimately knowledge, of empirical objects possible. Since objects can only be experienced spatiotemporally, the only application of concepts that yields knowledge is to the empirical, spatiotemporal world. Beyond that realm, there can be no sensations of objects for the understanding to judge, rightly or wrongly. Since intuitions of the physical world are lacking when we speculate about what lies beyond, metaphysical knowledge, or knowledge of the world outside the physical, is impossible. Claiming to have knowledge from the application of concepts beyond the bounds of sensation results in the empty and illusory transcendent metaphysics of Rationalism that Kant reacts against. That is, Kant does not believe that material objects are unknowable or impossible. While Kant is a transcendental idealist--he believes the nature of objects as they are in themselves is unknowable to us--knowledge of appearances is nevertheless possible. As noted above, in *The Refutation of Material Idealism*, Kant argues that the ordinary self-consciousness that Berkeley and Descartes would grant implies "the existence of objects in space outside me. Another way to put the point is to say that the fact that the mind of the knower makes the a priori contribution does not mean that space and time or the categories are mere figments of the imagination. Kant is an empirical realist about the world we experience; we can know objects as they appear to us. All discursive, rational beings must conceive of the physical world as spatially and temporally unified, he argues. And the table of categories is derived from the most basic, universal forms of logical inference, Kant believes. Therefore, it must be shared by all rational beings. So those beings also share judgments of an intersubjective, unified, public realm of empirical objects. Hence, objective knowledge of the scientific or natural world is possible. Indeed, Kant believes that the examples of Newton and Galileo show it is actual. In conjunction with his analysis of the possibility of knowing empirical objects, Kant gives an analysis of the knowing subject that has sometimes been called his transcendental psychology. Kant draws several conclusions about what is necessarily true of any consciousness that employs the faculties of sensibility and understanding to produce empirical judgments. As we have seen, a mind that employs concepts must have a receptive faculty that provides the content of judgments. Space and time are the necessary forms of apprehension for the receptive faculty. The mind that has experience must also have a faculty of combination or synthesis, the imagination for Kant, that apprehends the data of sense, reproduces it for the understanding, and recognizes their features according to the conceptual framework provided by the categories. The mind must also have a faculty of understanding that provides empirical concepts and the categories for judgment. The various faculties that make judgment possible must be unified into one mind. And it must be identical over time if it is going to apply its concepts to objects over time. Judgments would not be possible, Kant maintains, if the mind that senses is not the same as the mind that possesses the forms of sensibility. And that mind must be the same as the mind that employs the table of categories, that contributes empirical concepts to judgment, and that synthesizes the whole into knowledge of a unified, empirical world. So the fact that we can empirically judge proves, contra Hume, that the mind cannot be a mere bundle of disparate introspected sensations. In his works on ethics Kant will also argue that this mind is the source of spontaneous, free, and moral action. Kant believes that all the threads of his transcendental philosophy come together in this "highest point" which he calls the transcendental unity of apperception. First, in his analysis of sensibility, he argues for the necessarily spatiotemporal character of sensation. Then Kant analyzes the understanding, the faculty that applies concepts to sensory experience. He concludes that the categories provide a necessary, foundational template for our concepts to map onto our

experience. In addition to providing these transcendental concepts, the understanding also is the source of ordinary empirical concepts that make judgments about objects possible. The understanding provides concepts as the rules for identifying the properties in our representations. The cognitive power of judgment does have a transcendental structure. Kant argues that there are a number of principles that must necessarily be true of experience in order for judgment to be possible. Within the *Analytic*, Kant first addresses the challenge of subsuming particular sensations under general categories in the *Schematism* section. Transcendental schemata, Kant argues, allow us to identify the homogeneous features picked out by concepts from the heterogeneous content of our sensations. Judgment is only possible if the mind can recognize the components in the diverse and disorganized data of sense that make those sensations an instance of a concept or concepts. A schema makes it possible, for instance, to subsume the concrete and particular sensations of an Airedale, a Chihuahua, and a Labrador all under the more abstract concept "dog. That is, the role of the mind in making nature is not limited to space, time, and the categories. In the *Analytic of Principles*, Kant argues that even the necessary conformity of objects to natural law arises from the mind. In the sections titled the *Axioms*, *Anticipations*, *Analogies*, and *Postulates*, he argues that there are a priori judgments that must necessarily govern all appearances of objects.

Axioms of Intuition All intuitions are extensive magnitudes.

Anticipations of Perception Analogies of Experience In all appearances the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, *i.* In all variations by appearances substance is permanent, and its quantum in nature is neither increased nor decreased. All changes occur according to the law of the connection of cause and effect. All substances, insofar as they can be perceived in space as simultaneous, are in thoroughgoing interaction.

Postulates of Empirical Thought What agrees in terms of intuition and concepts with the formal conditions of experience is possible. What coheres with the material conditions of experience with sensation is actual. That whose coherence with the actual is determined according to universal conditions of experience is necessary exists necessarily ⁶. The purpose of the *Analytic*, we are told, is "the rarely attempted dissection of the power of the understanding itself. Kant calls judgments that pretend to have knowledge beyond these boundaries and that even require us to tear down the limits that he has placed on knowledge, transcendent judgments. The *Transcendental Dialectic* section of the book is devoted to uncovering the illusion of knowledge created by transcendent judgments and explaining why the temptation to believe them persists. Kant argues that the proper functioning of the faculties of sensibility and the understanding combine to draw reason, or the cognitive power of inference, inexorably into mistakes. The faculty of reason naturally seeks the highest ground of unconditional unity. It seeks to unify and subsume all particular experiences under higher and higher principles of knowledge. But sensibility cannot by its nature provide the intuitions that would make knowledge of the highest principles and of things as they are in themselves possible. Nevertheless, reason, in its function as the faculty of inference, inevitably draws conclusions about what lies beyond the boundaries of sensibility. Corresponding to the three basic kinds of syllogism are three dialectic mistakes or illusions of transcendent knowledge that cannot be real. The *Dialectic* explains the illusions of reason in these sections. But since the illusions arise from the structure of our faculties, they will not cease to have their influence on our minds any more than we can prevent the moon from seeming larger when it is on the horizon than when it is overhead. In the *Paralogisms*, Kant argues that a failure to recognize the difference between appearances and things in themselves, particularly in the case of the introspected self, leads us into transcendent error. Kant argues against several conclusions encouraged by Descartes and the rational psychologists, who believed they could build human knowledge from the "I think" of the cogito argument. From the "I think" of self-awareness we can infer, they maintain, that the self or soul is 1 simple, 2 immaterial, 3 an identical substance and 4 that we perceive it directly, in contrast to external objects whose existence is merely possible. That is, the rational psychologists claimed to have knowledge of the self as transcendently real. Kant believes that it is impossible to demonstrate any of these four claims, and that the mistaken claims to knowledge stem from a failure to see the real nature of our apprehension of the "I. But to take the self as an object of knowledge here is to pretend to have knowledge of the self as it is in itself, not as it appears to us. Our representation of the "I" itself is empty. It is subject to the condition of inner sense, time, but not the condition of outer sense, space, so it cannot be a proper object of knowledge. It can be thought through concepts, but without the commensurate

spatial and temporal intuitions, it cannot be known. Each of the four paralogisms explains the categorical structure of reason that led the rational psychologists to mistake the self as it appears to us for the self as it is in itself. We have already mentioned the Antinomies, in which Kant analyzes the methodological problems of the Rationalist project. Kant sees the Antinomies as the unresolved dialogue between skepticism and dogmatism about knowledge of the world. Each antinomy has a thesis and an antithesis, both of which can be validly proven, and since each makes a claim that is beyond the grasp of spatiotemporal sensation, neither can be confirmed or denied by experience. The First Antinomy argues both that the world has a beginning in time and space, and no beginning in time and space. The Fourth Antinomy contains arguments both for and against the existence of a necessary being in the world. The seemingly irreconcilable claims of the Antinomies can only be resolved by seeing them as the product of the conflict of the faculties and by recognizing the proper sphere of our knowledge in each case. In the first Antinomy, the world as it appears to us is neither finite since we can always inquire about its beginning or end, nor is it infinite because finite beings like ourselves cannot cognize an infinite whole. As an empirical object, Kant argues, it is indefinitely constructable for our minds. As it is in itself, independent of the conditions of our thought, it should not be identified as finite or infinite since both are categorical conditions of our thought. He considers the two competing hypotheses of speculative metaphysics that there are different types of causality in the world: The conflict between these contrary claims can be resolved, Kant argues, by taking his critical turn and recognizing that it is impossible for any cause to be thought of as uncaused itself in the realm of space and time. But reason, in trying to understand the ground of all things, strives to unify its knowledge beyond the empirical realm. The empirical world, considered by itself, cannot provide us with ultimate reasons. So if we do not assume a first or free cause we cannot completely explain causal series in the world. So for the Third Antinomy, as for all of the Antinomies, the domain of the Thesis is the intellectual, rational, noumenal world. The domain of the Antithesis is the spatiotemporal world. The Ideas of Reason The faculty of reason has two employments. For the most part, we have engaged in an analysis of theoretical reason which has determined the limits and requirements of the employment of the faculty of reason to obtain knowledge. Theoretical reason, Kant says, makes it possible to cognize what is. But reason has its practical employment in determining what ought to be as well. Kant believes that, "Human reason is by its nature architectonic. That is, reason thinks of all cognitions as belonging to a unified and organized system. Reason is our faculty of making inferences and of identifying the grounds behind every truth. It allows us to move from the particular and contingent to the global and universal. I infer that "Caius is mortal" from the fact that "Caius is a man" and the universal claim, "All men are mortal."