

The expression "Arab Cold War" was coined by American political scientist and Middle East scholar Malcolm H. Kerr, in his book of that title, and subsequent editions. [2] Contents.

The Arab Cold War Revisited: He wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance and insights offered by Dr. Lina Khatib, of Stanford University, and Dr. MargaretAnne Khoury, Elysaar Khoury and Deborah Ferro offered editorial suggestions and proofed the first draft of this paper. Starting in , a series of uprisings triggered domestic changes in several countries in the Arab world that affected regional and international politics. The Arab Uprising³ has resulted in the break-up of this triangle of power, or at least in its transition into a different mold. The key difference between the two triangles is that, post-Arab Spring, Islamist parties are evolving as mainstream political forces within the transitioning republics, as opposed to forces competing with entrenched regimes in those republics. In the twenty-first century, however, it is the Shia militias that are shaking things up the most, particularly in the Levant and the Gulf region. The new model proposed in this paper necessitates revisiting intraregional dynamics in the Arab world as well as its international alliances, as the three power blocs compete for influence. This paper investigates the impact of this new dynamic on patron-client relationships in the region. Some of them are likely to continue such as that between the United States and conservative monarchies , while new patron-client relationships are emerging such as Turkey and the transitioning republics and Iran and non-state Shia organizations and groups. In this new era, regional superpowers will assume new importance, with Turkey, Iran and Israel as competitive power brokers and with Russia and China as spoilers in any attempt at international conflict resolution. Contradictions are already apparent at both the internal and international levels: Like all models, this one will have exceptions, and the main players will send contradictory messages and espouse conflicting narratives. The group of monarchies, largely uncomfortable with the idea of democratic transition, will tout stability and economic development instead of revolution, but will nonetheless seek to influence, control and otherwise intervene in the affairs of the emerging regimes. Qatar, thus far rather adept at navigating the waters of the Arab Uprising, may have a better chance than other Gulf Cooperation Council GCC members in leading efforts to support some regional players, mediating between regimes and opposition forces where possible, all while trying to stave off the winds of change that may blow toward the Gulf itself. Motivated largely by self-preservation, the monarchs will be far more adventurous and interventionist than in recent decades, harkening back to the days of the Arab cold war. The "transitioning" republics will have new Islamist majorities that will mandate at least the appearance of a different approach to regional and international politics. These new leaders will, however, still have some old problems, namely the struggle for resources and the need to provide goods and services for their constituents. The need for foreign assistance, most likely to come from the Gulf monarchies, will temper their foreign policies and force them to collaborate with their regional and international patrons. Finally, non-state actors, primarily Hezbollah and other Shia groups, will likely experience the most difficulty in adjusting to the changing region and in narrowing the gap between their narrative and their behavior. The persistence of revolutionary rhetoric and behavior will be increasingly difficult to justify and defend, given the shifting balance of power against them and the inconsistent behavior of their patron, Iran, as it offers rhetorical support to some rebellious Muslim populations while actively supporting the suppression of others. The populist Islamist rhetoric of Iran and Hezbollah has already been stripped of any regional credibility, thanks to their blatant support for the Assad regime in Syria. Hamas, previously in the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah orbit, has already taken steps to navigate a more independent path that is likely to bring it closer to both the monarchs and regional MB leaders. The politics of accommodation, internally in the transitioning countries, and regionally among the various competing players, will make for a very unstable system. The Arab cold war of the fifties and sixties revolved around the regional axes of monarchies vs. Regional alliances largely mirrored the international Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, a rivalry that included proxy wars but also set certain limits to regional instability. Today the monarchies are still intact and allied with one another, though somewhat shaken by events and taking slightly nuanced approaches to them, both internally

and externally. The ascendance of the MB or MB-type parties presents a common thread and presages a potential return to an alliance among at least some of the republics, but this time with a different political agenda. The Islamist elites will be challenged at home by forces to both the right and left of center. In the absence of a clear superpower fault line and the emergence of a strong regional rivalry among Turkey, Iran and Israel, the international linkages promise to be complicated. The Arab Uprising may indeed have opened the way to democratic development in the region, but the road is strewn with landmines and may, at least in the near term, seem quite impassable. The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt were certainly not welcome news. Saudi Arabia immediately took in the fleeing president of Tunisia, Ben Ali, along with any resources he had presumably acquired while president. The Saudis openly accused the United States of having abandoned an important long-time ally. In the Saudi view, it had treated Mubarak shabbily, and it was reported that King Abdullah had upbraided President Obama about it. The family was asking, is this any way to treat a U. Said one Egyptian expatriate, Police here and in Dubai have dispersed even small gatherings of Egyptians who waved flags and sang the national anthem. Kuwait warned that any protesters would be immediately deported along with their families. The minister of foreign affairs of the United Arab Emirates UAE , Abdallah Bin Zayed al-Nahayan, expressed his revulsion at what he saw as chaotic challenges to law and order and the rise of the MB on the coattails of these "unwarranted" uprisings. Libya and Syria presented easier choices for the GCC. With no love lost for Muammar Qadhafi, who had been accused by the Saudis of having tried to assassinate King Abdullah and was derided by Qatar and other GCC members as a dangerous buffoon, Qatar actively participated in enforcing the NATO no-fly zone over Libya, contributing jet fighters, fuel and other material support. Both Qatar and Saudi Arabia joined in funding the rebel groups fighting Qadhafi. Here, as in post-uprising Egypt, hints of nuanced differences emerged between the GCC allies. They combined this with an unabashed attempt to empower the political opposition and the armed insurgency against him. This effort is obviously not so much about democracy as about the regional balance of power, both sectarian and national. This left little room for Saudi Arabia, at least, to do anything but support fellow Sunnis. With Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah firmly committed to the support of the Assad regime, and Lebanon split along the now traditional March March 8 fault line over the Syrian crisis, the regional implications were clear enough for the two GCC leaders to put their money where their interests lay. Yemen, despite some mixed feelings regarding its uprising, at least regarding Saudi Arabia, presented what has thus far been a case of successful leadership through diplomacy for the GCC. The Saudi monarchy, in the midst of a transition from one elder brother to another, along with the passing of Crown Prince Sultan, left the Yemen portfolio somewhat in a vacuum and Saudi policy on uncertain footing. Between that and the role of Qatar, what might otherwise have been a hanging on to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh the devil they know , ended up instead with a diplomatic triumph for the GCC aided in no insignificant manner by the efforts of the UN special envoy, Jamal Benomar in getting a transition agreement signed that averted civil war. The exit of Saleh and the installation of a new interim president and cabinet have, at least for now, spared the country a very destructive conflict and paved the way for a two-year transition plan that all sides seem to be doing their best to implement. Yemen, for the time being, seems to be moving in the direction of a more or less orderly transition, with a national dialogue underway and a new constitution in the offing. Saudi Arabia, which took Saleh in after an attack on the presidential palace in Sanaa in June left him critically wounded, resisted the urge to support his return to power. In fact the Saudis weighed in on the side of gently easing him and his family out, despite the apparent lack of a credible alternative. For the Saudis, President Hadi, and indeed the GCC plan itself, are part of a diplomatic gamble and a bold move to use diplomacy and international aid to resolve this particular uprising without resort to force or, at least for the time being, political subterfuge. They are, rather, indicative of their dilemma: Faced with turmoil and possibly prolonged chaos in some cases, Iran inevitably emerges as a likely victor if it intervenes and Saudi Arabia does not. The Saudi and Iranian approaches to the Arab Uprisings cannot broadly be labeled revolutionary or counterrevolutionary; instead, realpolitik considerations carry the day. Thus, both states buttress friendly regimes that face protest movements, but they also find themselves in the uncomfortable position of fanning opposition when it threatens their adversaries. In Bahrain, Iran is on the side of political change as a path to Shiite empowerment and a blow to its Saudi rival, while in Syria, Tehran

stands firmly against change. New Republics and Turkey In every transitioning country where a dictator has fallen and elections have taken place, an MB or an MB-type party has come to center stage. That said, none of these parties dominate their rivals to the point of being able to rule without them. In Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, moderate Islamist forces have won large numbers of seats in the new legislative assemblies, but they share legislative powers with other political parties to the right and left of their own. In Morocco, where the king chose to anticipate or preempt revolt, he initiated reform from above, giving up his prerogative to appoint any prime minister he chooses in favor of recognizing the result of elections and appointing the head of the party with the most seats in parliament. Here, too, the result has brought the head of the Islamist Party of Justice and Development PJD to the fore, albeit with limited powers; the king retains the ability to pull the strings on defense, security and intelligence matters. This division of power, albeit still skewed in favor of the monarch, demonstrates most visibly what the other "transitioning" states are going through: Given the internal balancing in which the new majority parties have to engage and the regional patrons they have to please, an Islamist or MB foreign policy is not likely to emerge any time soon. It would even be difficult to predict whether countries with Islamist majorities or pluralities will take an easily identifiable line in foreign affairs. Nevertheless, patterns may be emerging that reflect a difficult regional and international environment. Saudi Arabia, China and Iran the latter, a first for any Egyptian leader in over 30 years. Morsi seems to be signaling that a new generation of leaders has taken the helm and that Egypt wants to remain in the good graces of Saudi Arabia, but that it would not be joining any anti-Iran coalitions. While striving for balance and, therefore, distancing himself from the close alliance his predecessor had with Washington, Morsi clearly does not wish to antagonize the United States. Hence, he has declared that the peace treaty with Israel would hold, albeit while intending to put the special commercial relationship between Egypt and Israel under closer scrutiny. Genuine mediation of conflict is indeed an activity for which Egypt is well-equipped, and the Gaza experience may well be relevant to other conflicts in the region. Unlike Egypt, Tunisia and Libya have yet to take any strong initiatives in regional or international politics that might give a clear indication of which direction their foreign policies might take. This may be due to their preference at the moment to focus on internal affairs or their lack of desire to project a leadership profile in the region, given their lack of resources financial in the case of Tunisia, political in the case of Libya. A measured pro-Western approach, however, seems to be slowly taking shape. Libya has voiced support for the Syrian uprising and has allowed arms, paid for with Gulf money, to be shipped to the Syrian rebels. Libyan and Tunisian leaders alike took a brave stance in condemning the violence that erupted over the anti-Islam video, The Innocence of Muslims. Tunisian President Moncef Marzouqi dispatched his palace guard to protect the U. Marzouqi later wrote an op-ed, published in The New York Times on September 27, , in which he tried to reassure the West and ask for their continued patience with, and support for, the Arab Spring: While these fears are understandable, such alarmism is misplaced. The Arab revolutions have not turned anti-Western. Nor are they pro-Western. They are simply not about the West. They remain fundamentally about social justice and democracy "not about religion or establishing Sharia Law. This, again, is not something one would have expected from the pre-uprising regime in Tunisia. It is another sign of a new orientation, more in line with popular sentiment" though it does not yet rise to the level of an altogether new strategy. In Libya, the attack on the U. The Libyan government has shown a willingness to take counterterrorism action, albeit not very effectively thus far, against their radical Islamists, despite some internal blowback. Again, this attitude indicates at least a moderate shift in foreign policy that aspires to win friends rather than make enemies; it represents a pragmatic approach to regional and international affairs. Having spent two decades struggling against Israel and another trying to dominate Lebanese politics "as a major actor on the national and regional scenes and by virtue of its alliance with Iran and potential impact on U. Somewhat akin to LH, this Iraqi Shia force has transformed itself into a political party with a large national following, while retaining the ability to fight as a militia, should the need arise. They have, however, failed thus far to transform themselves into credible political entities and remain active militias with strong links to Muqtada al-Sadr inside Iraq and to Iran and LH outside it. But bringing the former militants into the fold incurs the cost of further alienating the Sunni minority and increases tensions among competing Shiite groups. The victorious Hezbollah is defending Arabs and Muslims

against the Israeli threats. Therefore, it is an honor for us to have relations with them. The first goal, having already been largely accomplished in the year , could have led to an agreement with Israel, signed or otherwise, certifying an end to hostilities and establishing an understanding that both sides would work towards the stability of the border region and the avoidance of any action that might provoke a return to armed conflict.

Chapter 2 : Arab Cold War - Wikipedia

The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 3rd Edition by Malcolm H. Kerr (Author).

His son Steve would later play for the NBA champion Chicago Bulls and then become coach of the Golden State Warriors and lead them to a championship in and break the record for most wins in a regular season in He returned to the U. Embassy Beirut was bombed in and the Marine Corps barracks were attacked just a few months later. Sadly, Kerr would also become a victim to the violence: On January 18, , he was shot and killed by two gunmen outside his office. Rugh was in Beirut doing Arabic language study; he later served as Ambassador to Yemen from All were interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, beginning in March , January , and January , respectively. You can read about other Moments on the Middle East. Relations with the United States were excellent. That was what we believed at the time. But as far as we knew, Lebanon was a successful experiment in pluralism. I remember very distinguished scholars such as Malcolm Kerr writing that Lebanon was a model for harmony among different social groups and we believed that. It was a society that was very friendly to the United States. The crisis with the American intervention, direct military intervention, seemed to have been a successful use of American military power to help stabilize the situation. Later it became faction-ridden and had a lot of political difficulties. The American official presence was considered benign and benevolent by most people. Of course, in those years there was a wave of Arab nationalism led primarily by Nasser, in Egypt, and to some extent people in Lebanon were reflecting that and feeling that. One of the most interesting American families we met during our stay in Algiers was the Malcolm Kerr family. He and his wife I think were on a Fulbright scholarship traveling through North Africa when they stayed with us. Malcolm Kerr eventually became President of the American University of Beirut; he was a very astute student of the Arab world and one of the best friends the Arab world could ever had had We knew him when he was just a little kid, running around that big house we had in Algiers. The Kerr family in the mids at their home in Pacific Palisades, Calif. I will now embark on an interesting story. The intelligence community in Washington, through Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, and their good infiltration into Lebanon immediately following the Kuwait embassy bombing, noted the first rising of Shia radicalism because the Shias had been fairly lethargic up to the point. Under the aegis of the Iranian ambassador in Damascus, a hardliner named Hashi Mupoor, the southern Lebanese Shia were being organized away from the Islamic Jihad group to form a new, pure Shia group which is known as Hezbollah. We know how that has developed. They picked up that the Kuwait embassy bombing was step one. Step two was to be the assassination of a major American figure in the Gulf, an ambassador. Not only that, they were going to get a French ambassador, too. France for obvious reasons of its own interest was very happy that the Iraq tilt was being worked out. Plus, they had a lot of interest in Iraq and still do. They knew the weapons that they had, the serial numbers, the silencers. The whole smear came through the intelligence community. My kids are visiting from college. The American security moves in. The halftrack [a civilian or military vehicle with regular wheels at the front for steering and continuous tracks at the back to propel the vehicle and carry most of the load] gets parked in the driveway. A platoon of UAE infantry digs in around the residence. My ability to move about the country becomes very, very inhibited. The Foreign Minister is terribly worried. The Kuwaiti ambassador picks this up because it was our embassy in his country. He is terribly worried. So, everybody is sweating. We get the kids out as quickly as we can. Helen and I have to go out to be trained on how to use an Uzi and a . We have that in our room and we have U. They made him wear a bulletproof vest everywhere and he looked ridiculous. This is a bittersweet story. We were now into January All this tension was still there. About the 10th of January, the signal came through and they left. The local government knew the group was there. The bullet markings jived with this group. We became a hardened target. Now, it gets really bittersweet. Malcolm Kerr I had known since he was 13 years old. He was a class behind me at Deerfield Academy and was a class behind me at Princeton University. Coming to grips with this took me quite some time. I have only recently begun to speak about this situation. Through roommates and things I have just tried to figure out when, if ever, I should talk to his wife and son about this particular incident. Maybe somebody has told them. As an extra added postscript,

the son involved is a young man named Steve Kerr. Steve was substitute point guard for the Chicago Bulls-Michael Jordan dynasty. You may have seen him on television.

Chapter 3 : Arab Cold War | Military Wiki | FANDOM powered by Wikia

Malcolm Hooper Kerr (October 8, - January 18,) was a university professor specializing in the Middle East and the Arab world. An American citizen, he was born, raised, and died in Beirut, Lebanon.

After Israel began a ground invasion of the Gaza Strip in January, Mideast analysts writing in Forbes and the Indianapolis Star separately invoked the late political scientist Malcolm Kerr to set the fresh calamities in context. The famous Bruin peacemaker would not relish his continuing relevance. Kerr himself was murdered in front of his office at the American University of Beirut AUB 25 years ago, apparently by a Hezbollah gunmen acting on Iranian orders. Kerr understood the dangers in Beirut in as well as anyone. It represented the very best of this country in a sea of misguided policy—a meeting of the best of East and West. I wanted to go back every bit as much as he did. That was why he went back. And that was precisely what the Iranians wanted to get rid of," says UCLA emeritus professor David Rapoport, an expert on political violence and a Kerr family friend. Four hundred people turned out for a UCLA memorial service more than two weeks after the assassination. University of Arizona freshman Steve Kerr, who would go on to win five NBA championships with the Chicago Bulls and San Antonio Spurs, scored his highest point total of that season at a game dedicated to his father two days after the killing. Historian Nikki Keddie took a salary cut and managed to have it diverted to pay three Malcolm Kerr Memorial postdoctoral fellows for a year apiece at UCLA; and the Middle East Studies Association renamed its dissertation awards for Kerr, a founding member and one-time president. They wrote, "Being a highly visible authority on the Middle East in the s and s was not an enviable task: Preferring dialogue to intellectual cold wars, Kerr worked with people with a range of views; one of his first doctoral students at UCLA was Itamar Rabinovich, later an Israeli negotiator and ambassador to the United States. The decision was hard for some at UCLA to assimilate. An American Family Odyssey , which weaves together Lebanese and Southern Californian strands of a shared life story, partly in order to explain it to her grandchildren. But another set of questions and decisions would occupy the Kerr family for much of the second decade after , as information finally emerged about the identity of the assassins. Investigations by academics and by the journalist and former hostage Terry Anderson yielded results, while information came slowly from the U. With its ties to the Middle East, the family aimed not for retribution, but to pressure the United States and Iran to talk. In a vote for diplomacy and legal process, the Kerrs after much deliberation used a Clinton-era antiterrorism law to sue Iran in U. At the same time, in the interest of reconciliation, they declined to pursue large punitive damages. I suspect very, very few families would go that way. Monday, March 30,

Chapter 4 : Malcolm H. Kerr | LibraryThing

Malcolm H. Kerr is the author of The Arab Cold War (avg rating, 39 ratings, 7 reviews, published), Islamic Reform (avg rating, 3 ratings.

Once again, regional politics shows many signs of an Arab cold war and, once again, that broader conflict is manifesting itself in a struggle for Syria. The republics saw themselves as the future of Arab politics, with the aim of changing not only the type of regime in Arab states, but also the map of the region through repeated unification efforts. This pan-Arab project led to extensive intervention in the affairs of various states, by both sides, as the republics and monarchies waged proxy wars in civil conflicts in Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan and elsewhere. Many of the same elements -- power struggles, ideological and identity conflicts, and proxy wars -- are present today. The main difference is that the version of the Arab cold war does not array revolutionary republics on one side. Over time, the radical republics of the s and s became deep-seated authoritarian states, neither revolutionary nor particularly republican. As the monarchical regimes increasingly cooperate in self-defense, the question is: Until the uprisings, the answer seemed to be the non-Arab threat of Iran. Many Arab regimes were concerned not only with Iranian power, but also with Iranian influence and interference in Arab politics. Arab conflicts from Iraq to Lebanon were viewed increasingly in both power politics and sectarian terms: The first signs of the new Arab cold war predate the Arab uprisings of , and became especially clear during the war between Israel and Hizballah. Yet the conflict signaled another key shift that was perhaps a harbinger of events in Arab governments aside from Syria may not have supported Hizballah, but many Arab publics did. Arab street demonstrations made the link to the earlier Arab cold war period, with placards comparing Nasser in to Hizballah leader Hasan Nasrallah in Nasser was a head of state, with a secular, avowedly socialist approach to pan-Arabism. Nasrallah is head of a mass movement with an Islamist approach to Arabism and Arab identity. A societal Political Arabism rising from an Arab-Islamic public rather than a state-led Pan-Arabism constitutes a dominant frame of reference in Middle East regional politics today. Societal actors, not upstart republics, now represent the challenge to the regional status quo. The rivalry is also no longer primarily an inter-state competition, but a cold war between Arab regimes and societal actors led by Islamists with considerable popular support and subscribing to a popularly driven Islamic Political Arabism. Gregory Gause has argued that this interpretive lapse caused most scholars of the Middle East to miss the hints of the Arab uprisings. Unlike the Arabism of the earlier Arab cold war, the modern version does not emphasize redrawing borders and revamping governments through unification schemes. Rather, the new struggle more often involves conflicts within domestic politics, sometimes with a dimension of external intercession. Hence, there are multiple levels of meaning in inter-Arab struggles: Conservative monarchies rediscover the importance of Arab unity as a language of mutual protection from regime change; Arab Islamist movements challenge regimes and connect with peers across borders; and pro- and anti-democratization forces work not only within states, but also across states, in their attempts at collaboration. And like the earlier cold war, the contemporary one features competing approaches to intervention in the affairs of other Arab states. But the current version, while displaying sectarian and power dimensions, also includes new dynamics emerging from the Arab uprisings themselves. These dynamics have led to a reassertion of foreign policy activism on the part of conservative monarchies, to the point that one of the most active forces in regional politics today, somewhat amazingly, is the Gulf Cooperation Council GCC. The GCC is no military juggernaut, but has risen to prominence because the uprisings came at a time when the three traditional and often rival power centers -- Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus -- had all receded from the regional balance of power. Each state was overwhelmed with domestic concerns: Egypt with its own revolution, Iraq with the effects of US invasion and occupation, and Syria with its own uprising. Domestic unrest and insecurity had forced the regimes in Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus to cede the stage to Riyadh and, more surprisingly, to Doha. These changes in regional dynamics have had important effects for uprisings in Yemen, Libya, Bahrain and now Syria. And this time, there is no countervailing force to check the conservative monarchies unless it comes from the people under their rule. The Saudis and other GCC regimes were so alarmed at regional

trends that they reached out to decidedly non-Gulf kingdoms, in Morocco and Jordan, inviting them to join the council. Morocco showed limited interest in joining the faraway alliance, while Jordan scrambled to revive an application that had been on the table for 20 years. The GCC remains, in any case, an alliance of conservative Arab and Sunni hereditary monarchies, this time not against radical Arab republics or even Iranian revolutionaries, but against the restive peoples within their own borders. While not inviting Yemen to join, the GCC did attempt to dampen the fires there by brokering deals to trade partial regime change for an end to unrest. Still, despite Saudi efforts to use the GCC as its main tool in a regional counter-revolution, other GCC states often break with Riyadh and maintain defiantly independent foreign policies. Despite the bilateral Saudi-Iranian cold war, for instance, Oman and Qatar have each maintained cordial relations with Tehran. The tiny but immensely wealthy peninsular monarchy has steadily enhanced its regional and even global role, from hosting rounds of World Trade Organization negotiations in to landing the World Cup scheduled for Qatar is also home to the influential Al Jazeera satellite news channel, which has provided exhaustive coverage of most of the Arab uprisings. The Gulf emirate has also positioned itself as broker of peace in conflicts between factions in Lebanon, Palestine and even Afghanistan, with the Taliban opening an office in Doha. When the Libyan uprising began, Qatar led the call for international intervention. When the wave of revolt reached Bahrain, Saudi Arabia led the counter-revolution and the GCC intervened militarily to support the Bahraini monarchy against pro-democracy and pro-reform demonstrators. While the Libyan revolution led to civil war and outside intervention, including an extended NATO campaign of air strikes against the Qaddafi regime, the Syrian uprising threatens to take an even more dangerous path, both for the Syrian people and the region as a whole. The Syrian crisis began as part of the Arab uprisings, with civilian activists marching for greater freedom and openness in Syria. These movements, too, began peacefully but were met with force. Eventually, calls for reform became calls for regime change. Indeed, the idea of Arab League monitors in Syria had a similar genesis, and the GCC states were accordingly the first to withdraw their monitors in early February followed closely by GCC aspirant Jordan when they deemed the mission a failure. The Syrian imbroglio bears all the hallmarks of the new Arab cold war, including domestic struggle between a regime and opposition each with outside patrons, attempts to fan the flames of sectarianism, and dueling narratives regarding who is really attacking whom. Like the earlier Arab cold war, the conflict is awash in propaganda and disinformation. Even honest media attempts to understand the Syrian revolution too often distill the conflict to a ruthless regime versus the Syrian National Council a collection of opposition groups in exile and the Free Syria Army a relatively small set of army deserters who have now started an armed campaign against the regime. What is missing, more often than not, is the overwhelming majority of Syrians working at the grassroots against the regime and linked to neither the Council nor the Army. Meanwhile, the GCC states leading calls for international pressure to oust Asad are hardly themselves bulwarks of democracy. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and their allies appear to be hoping that a successor regime in Damascus would be predominantly Sunni, indebted to the GCC states and no longer an ally of Iran or Hizballah. Their motivations, in short, seem more in line with those of the new Arab cold war than with the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people. With Iran and Hizballah backing the Asad regime, and the GCC states and Turkey actively opposing it, the Syrian conflict is already becoming a regional conflict. As the United States, Britain and France call for action through the UN Security Council, blocked only by rival imperial powers Russia and China, the Syrian crisis has assumed international dimensions as well. Still, despite the usual level of disarray and rivalry associated with inter-Arab relations, the Arab League -- led by Qatar and the GCC states -- did manage to create a semblance of unity as it attempted to craft a way out of the Syria crisis. While not calling for military intervention, the Arab League proposal called for Asad to cede power to his vice president, paving the way for a negotiated end to the fighting and the creation of a Syrian unity government. The Russian and Chinese veto of the Arab League proposal in the Security Council, however, ensures that the Syrian conflict will become more violent and more internationalized, as the Asad regime attempts to crush the rebellion once and for all, Syrian resistance groups turn increasingly to armed struggle, and Arab states and others intervene in other ways -- supplying arms, materiel and financial support to their chosen side. The battle lines outside Syria are already drawn, with the US, Britain and France in conflict with Russia and China, while regional non-Arab powers

Turkey and Iran similarly back opposite sides. Israelis are torn between which outcome is worse for them, while Arab neighbor Jordan is perhaps in the weakest and most dangerous position of all, wedged between Baathist Syria and the GCC, and deeply vulnerable to the instability engulfing its northern neighbor. As both Kerr and Seale demonstrated, Syria during those years was a key battleground in regional struggles between republicans and monarchists, among nationalists, communists and Baathists, and between global superpowers. Coup after coup toppled governments in Damascus as rival civilian political parties and military officers maneuvered against one another, aided and abetted by local and global cold war dynamics. A plunge into full-scale civil war would be all too reminiscent of Lebanon from to or Iraq after the US invasion. While much will depend on the efforts of Syrians themselves, today, as in the earlier cold war period, much will also depend on the cooperationâ€”or rivalryâ€”associated with external Arab, regional and global powers. Oxford University Press, University Press of Florida, , ch. While Gulf labor markets, oil, gas and aid were all clear incentives to join, the Jordanians also made the case that they had much to offer the GCC: Though Saudi Arabia had proposed the invitations to Jordan and Morocco, at press time the GCC remained divided -- with Qatar and Oman particularly lukewarm -- over the idea of adding members. The bureaucratic wheels for GCC expansion have begun to turn, but the outcome is uncertain. Interviews with Jordanian policymakers, Amman, December

Chapter 5 : Malcolm Kerr (academic) - Infogalactic: the planetary knowledge core

1 Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War (Oxford University Press,). 2 Nabeel Khoury, "The Pragmatic Trend in Inter-Arab Politics," Middle East Journal 36, no. 3 (): 3 The term Arab Uprising has been deliberately chosen in this paper to reflect a more sober assessment of regional events than the one implied in the terms Arab Spring.

Jun 1, at 6: Kerr speaking Steve Kerr has had a legendary career with the NBA, winning five championship titles as a player and two as the head coach of the Golden State Warriors. He is known for his measured, methodical coaching style, which he attributes to his late father, Dr. He had the sense that I needed to learn on my own, and anything he would say would mean more after I calmed down. He served as president of the AUB from to his untimely death in Kerr and his life: His parents, Stanley Kerr and Elsa Reckman, were also educators, with his father being the chairman of the Department of Biochemistry at the American University of Beirut and his mother being the Dean of Women. According to the AUB website , Kerr spent the next decade as a student and a traveler. He returned to Beirut to continue his studies, earning an MA in Arab studies in Both had a passion for Middle Eastern politics, and felt that they could make a positive difference. Some people just put their head in a hole. An American Family Odyssey , which recounted the tumultuous years that she and Kerr spent in Beirut, and the emotional toll that his death took on the rest of the family. She published another book in , Painting the Middle East , and remarried in to a man named Ken Adams. The couple currently lives in California. Kerr and Ann had four children together: Susan, John, Steve, and Andrew. She and her husband Hans van de Ven have three children, according to her website. Even his more historical work about the nineteenth century or about the early reformists in Egypt and the Muslim world, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida, raised many of the questions about the nature of Islamic reform and even relations of Islam and the West which still are relevant to the kind of discussions that intellectuals have today. The endowment is dedicated to promoting international understanding and peace through education, and will be given to young Middle Easterners who attend UCLA. According to the New York Times , he was stepping off the elevator towards his office when he was shot twice in the back of the head. Steve, a star college athlete at the time, was the only one of the children who did not attend. But the logistics were really tricky. And it was cathartic for me to just play. I had tears in my eyes. For one thing, it brought back memories of my dad. But, for another thing, it was just sad that people would do something like that. He credits him with helping shape the man, and the coach, that he is today. Looking back on it, I think my dad was a huge influence on me, on my coaching. I really realized from Pop and Phil [Jackson] that I could use my experience as a kid and growing up to my advantage as a coach, and connect with players and try to keep that healthy perspective.

Chapter 6 : Malcolm Kerr's Middle East

Malcolm H. Kerr's classic study The Arab Cold War appeared in print in a circuitous way, which can be traced using archival materials that have previously been inaccessible to scholars.

His undergraduate degree in came from Princeton University where he had studied with Professor Philip Hitti. An early onset of arthritis caused him to return to his family in Lebanon; he entered a masters program, completing it in at the American University of Beirut. Here he met his wife, Ann Zwicker Kerr, with whom he had four children. He commenced his doctorate work in Washington, D. Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism. Then at Oxford University he did post-doctorate work for a year with Prof. While at Oxford Professor Gustave von Grunebaum recruited Kerr for a teaching post at the University of California at Los Angeles ; his career matured over the course of twenty years teaching in Los Angeles, to In an academic grant, however, sent him to Cairo , where he worked on his most well-known book The Arab Cold War, published in The next year he published Islamic Reform, a reworking of his doctorate dissertation. Following the Arab-Israeli War , Prof. Kerr sensed a drastic change for the worse in the tone of Arab politics, which became harsh and bitter. Kerr served as president of the Middle East Studies Association in Subsequently, an award of the Middle East Studies Association was named in his honor. Later he served as Dean in the Division of Social Sciences from to His own scholarship was forthright and honest to the point of sometimes getting him into trouble. He spoke the truth as he saw it and was committed to the cause of Arab-Israeli peace and to building understanding between the Arab World and the West. He returned to Cairo in , where he edited the results of this joint Egyptian-American academic effort, the book Rich and Poor States in the Middle East. Although the civil war in Lebanon was still being fiercely battled on occasion, the recent exit of the Palestinian Liberation Organization from the country helped calm the growing Lebanese revolutionary sentiments against Israeli occupation of Arab lands. With the removal of the Palestinian Liberation Organization , the Lebanese civil struggle for domestic change had been a more focused effort, thus encouraging hope for resolution. Kerr biography" by Ann Z. Kerr Text and Beirut quotation. Yet some doubt remains as to the perpetrators. News of his sudden death, another tragic event in the Lebanese civil war, appeared world-wide in the media. Selected publications Malcolm H. Kerr, Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism Kerr, The Arab Cold War. Elsevier Malcolm H. Arabic and Islamic studies in honor of Malcolm H. Kerr Biography" [cached at Google]. Condolences and remembrance came from many respected sources.

Chapter 7 : Malcolm H. Kerr (Author of The Arab Cold War)

The Arab cold war, by Malcolm H. Kerr, , Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs [by] Oxford U.P. edition, in English - 2nd edition.

After the Marash Affair they moved to Beirut. An early onset of arthritis caused him to return to his family in Lebanon. Here he met his wife, Ann Zwicker Kerr, with whom he had four children. He commenced his doctorate work in Washington, D. The same year, he accepted a similar post, teaching at the University of California at Los Angeles. Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism. While he was at Oxford, Professor Gustave von Grunebaum recruited Kerr for a teaching post at the University of California at Los Angeles ; his career matured over the course of twenty years of teaching in Los Angeles, from to The next year he published Islamic Reform, a reworking of his doctorate dissertation. Following the Arab-Israeli War , Kerr sensed a drastic change for the worse in the tone of Arab politics, which became harsh and bitter. Kerr served as president of the Middle East Studies Association in Subsequently, an award of the Middle East Studies Association was named in his honor. He spoke the truth as he saw it and was committed to the cause of Arab-Israeli peace and to building understanding between the Arab World and the West. He returned to Cairo in , where he edited the results of this joint Egyptian-American academic effort, the book Rich and Poor States in the Middle East. Appointed president in March, effective July 1, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and occupation of Beirut made him work first from the New York office. He arrived at his College Hall office at the University in September Susan, John, Steve, and Andrew. Kerr, Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism â€” Kerr, The Arab Cold War. Elsevier Malcolm H. Arabic and Islamic studies in honor of Malcolm H. Kerr American University of Beirut

Chapter 8 : The Arab cold war, (edition) | Open Library

In his classic study, The Arab Cold War, Malcolm Kerr charted the machinations of inter-Arab politics during an era dominated by Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser. In another renowned work, The Struggle for Syria, Patrick Seale documented the links between Syria's tumultuous domestic politics.

Chapter 9 : Malcolm H. Kerr, Steve Kerrâ€™s Dad: 5 Fast Facts | racedaydvl.com

Malcolm H. Kerr, the president of the American University of Beirut who was assassinated yesterday, was an academic expert in the heritages, tensions and passions of the Arab world.