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Chapter 1 : India and emerging Asia / editor, R. R. Sharma | National Library of Australia

Despite domestic political changes, the alliance with the US continues to be the cornerstone of Japan's security policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Although Japan has taken some significant steps in the direction of normal statehood, the domestic constituency in favour of full strategic autonomy is.

Several countries which had been constrained by the pressures of the Cold War for years started making appropriate policy changes to be in tune with the changing economic and security situation in the region. India, a leader of the nonaligned movement with close economic and security ties with the former Soviet Union, had to find new space for itself in the unfolding economic and strategic landscape of Asia. The earlier emphasis on the role of the state as the driving force of economic growth was replaced by a new policy of encouraging the private sector. Foreign direct investment, discouraged earlier, became a catalyst for economic transformation. Second, the end of the Cold War had freed India from its ideological constraints, enabling it to adopt a multi-dimensional foreign policy that encompassed the forging of a closer economic and strategic partnership with the United States. Their relations steadily warmed up and culminated in the signing of a historic civilian nuclear agreement in 2006. It is true that in the initial years after freedom, Indian leaders had a vision of future cooperation with Southeast Asian countries and the convening of the Asian Relations Conference was clear evidence of that vision. But after the Afro-Asian conference held in Bandung in 1955, the momentum in their interactions slowed down and what followed was a period of lull and stagnation. In the post-Cold War period, there was a strong rationale for India to cultivate closer relations with the countries of the region for mutual benefit. The Gulf War of 1990, which severely hit the Indian economy and the fall of the Soviet Union on which the Indian economy depended so much, made India seek alternative regions with great potential. Unfortunately, its own immediate neighbourhood, South Asia did not offer much by way of trade or investment. Political conflicts, lack of trust and economic backwardness compelled India to look to Southeast and East Asia for new paths to traverse. By the nineties, China was already busy implementing its modernization programme. Japan as the second biggest economy of the world had forged strong trade, investment and other economic links with ASEAN countries. ASEAN having established itself as a political and economic bloc, had emerged as a manufacturing hub for Japan and other advanced countries. India has forged many useful and robust partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region ever since it started pursuing its Look East Policy in 1991. When the Look East policy was adopted, the main driving motive was economic, but over the years it has tended to acquire significant strategic dimensions too. In the case of the ASEAN, India joined it in 1995 as a sectoral partner and went on to become a full-fledged partner in 2007. In the case of Japan in particular, there is a vast network of institutional mechanisms that bind the two in such forums like annual summit, strategic dialogue, defence dialogue and numerous forums on counterterrorism, energy cooperation, UN reforms, and maritime security. Step by step, Indo-Japanese partnership has broadened its interests. In the initial years, it was narrowly focused only on economic matters like trade, investment and development assistance. But since 2006 the year when they launched the global partnership, it has significantly expanded to include a vast spectrum of interests such as counter terrorism, maritime security, energy cooperation, UN reforms, climate change and cyber and space security. There is also a Japan-India-US trilateral dialogue at the level of joint secretaries and is likely to be raised to ministerial level. It is difficult to cite any other bilateral partnership in Asia with such vast institutional mechanisms. Similarly, both India and South Korea have forged several bilateral mechanisms to strengthen their partnership. A joint commission for bilateral cooperation at the level of foreign ministers has been actively meeting since 1998. So far eight meetings have been held to discuss both regional and bilateral issues. In addition, a Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue at secretary level is meeting regularly. Besides these forums, regular exchange of visits at the highest levels have taken place. The defence ministers and the national security advisers of both countries have been meeting to carry forward their strategic cooperation. As noted earlier, the Look East policy was initially governed by economic considerations. There

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has been a steady growth in the economic presence of India in the Indo-Pacific region though its full potential is yet to be harnessed. In a bid to boost their trade, both India and ASEAN have signed two trade agreements in goods and services which have created one of the biggest free trade areas with a market of 1. Both signed a comprehensive economic partnership agreement CEPA in and it is expected that the volume of their trade and investment will grow in the coming years. Japanese private investment in India has been growing rather gradually, but many vigorous steps have been taken to attract Japanese investment. India was the first country to receive Japanese ODA as early as and since then Japanese assistance has flowed into several critical areas of the Indian economy including power, environment, urban transportation, urban water supply, and sanitation, rural drinking water supply, tourism irrigation, agriculture shipping, railways and renewable energy. These projects which span six major Indian states are likely to transform vast areas into flourishing investment and manufacturing bases. A similar industrial corridor between Chennai and Bengaluru in South India is also being planned to encourage the manufacturing and investment prospects of the region. In recent years the number of Japanese companies operating in India has exceeded and is likely to grow further. The prime minister has assured Japanese investors that his government will remove all bureaucratic obstacles to Japanese investment by keeping a special Japan cell in his office for clearing investment proposals. The Republic of Korea has not lagged behind in its economic partnership with India. A comprehensive economic partnership agreement between the two was put into effect in and it contributed to the expansion of bilateral trade. South Korea has maintained a high investment profile in India and South Korean brands in electronics and automobiles have become household names in India. C onnectivity is the buzzword in the region. Both China and Japan have recently announced ambitious plans to invest massively in the improvement of infrastructure facilities particularly in the Mekong region. Though India has not made any such big announcements, it is very much involved in some important connectivity projects in the Mekong region. As a preliminary step, Japan is aiding India in modernizing and expanding the Chennai port and developing a new container port at Ennore close to Chennai. Chennai is a major hub of automotive and other industries and will be upgrading its infrastructure facilities in the coming years. A s mentioned earlier, though the Look East policy started with economic goals, it has over the years increasingly assumed strategic dimensions. It has articulated its views on issues such as safety of the sea lanes and freedom of nations to conduct commerce in the open seas without obstacles. India has also entered into long-term defence cooperation projects involving joint production and training. It is worth noting how India has deepened its cooperation, particularly with Japan, Vietnam and Singapore. As noted earlier, for a long time the India-Japan partnership was narrowly focused on economic engagements, but in recent years both countries have increasingly stressed their strategic ties. In they turned their global one into a strategic and global partnership. In , they followed it up with an agreement on security cooperation. Both countries are keen to coordinate efforts in addressing several regional and global issues like counterterrorism, safety of the sea lanes, cyber security, energy cooperation and so on. They conduct regular naval exercises and help other Asian navies in capacity building. More recently, both countries evinced a great deal of interest in defence production. They are also working hard to hammer out an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation and should it materialize it will go a long way in deepening their strategic partnership. Like Japan, South Korea is also interested in promoting its civil nuclear ties with India and it has already entered into an agreement. In particular, the China factor was very salient in the newly emerging strategic calculations of Vietnam and Singapore. Their interests converge on a range of bilateral and regional interests. They followed it up by signing a joint declaration on strategic partnership in which emphasized the following three areas: As China protested against the agreement, India withdrew from it, but after a year decided to continue the project. India clarified that it supported freedom of navigation in international waters including in the South China Sea and access to resources in accordance with accepted principles of international law. I n the last year since the new government was formed under Narendra Modi, both countries have taken several steps to strengthen their partnership. Both countries are keen to strengthen their partnership in the defence and economic spheres. They also conduct regular naval exercises and believe

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in the freedom of navigation for unimpeded commerce. Singapore and India have maintained strong cooperative relations in the defence field. They set up an annual defence dialogue between defence secretaries as early as 1991. The defence ties first started with cooperation between the two navies, but later expanded to include the air force and the army. Both countries share mutual concerns on the need to keep the Indian Ocean area free from the dominance of any single country. Australia is another country which shares many common strategic perspectives with India and yet the two countries had not fully tapped the potential for cooperation. The signing of a joint declaration for security cooperation in 2005 saw the commencement of their strategic partnership. Strangely no Indian prime minister had visited Australia for twenty eight years till this was broken by Narendra Modi in November 2015. It should not have been so. And this will change. Australia will not be at the periphery of our vision, but at the centre of our thought. They have also announced a new bilateral strategic framework which envisages annual meetings between leaders, defence ministers, and regular exchanges between armed and non-defence forces to address piracy, counterterrorism and cyber security. There are great opportunities for mutual cooperation especially in the maritime sphere. To be sure, in 2015, Australia took part in the multilateral naval exercise conducted in the Bay of Bengal. In 2016 it was announced that both countries would start their joint exercises in 2017. In addition, there are certain multilateral forums such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium where the potential for their cooperation looks strong. Indo-Pacific countries appreciate the categorical position taken by India on maritime issues and would welcome a larger Indian naval presence in the Indian Ocean. It is also strongly in favour of protecting the global commons and adopting a code of conduct in the South China Sea. This has resonated well on the Indo-Pacific countries. Finally, what is the position of the Look East policy regarding China? Both countries have also encouraged mutual exchanges of visits at the highest level. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that the unresolved border issue continues to cast a shadow on bilateral relations. But India has always believed in pursuing a policy of constructive engagement with China. It knows that in any scenario of future Asian security, China will figure prominently and therefore it is essential to encourage China to play its role as a responsible country in the region. India believes in constructing a transparent, inclusive and democratic regional order free from the hegemony of any single country. Keen to see that the new regional order in Asia is not China-centric, many Asian countries want India to play a more active role in the region by providing a degree of balance to the geostrategic situation in Asia.

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Chapter 2 : Ph.D Thesis | Welcome to Jawaharlal Nehru University

Japan south asia: security and economic perspectives, get this from a library! japan south asia: security and economic perspectives [k v kesavan; lalima varma;] papers presented at a seminar organized by the centre for east asian studies, school of.

I hope the students joining SIPEC are students who have great intellectual curiosity about the fluctuating world prospects. He is specializing in international political economy of the Asia-Pacific. He has published many books and articles on international political economy especially regional institution-building of the Asia-Pacific. He obtained his doctoral degree from Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan. What drives regional institution-building in the Asia Pacific? New Orders or New Problems? Beyond the Fukuda Doctrine? The Fukuda Doctrine and Beyond, London: East Asian Perspectives, London: CMP Publishing Ltd, ,pp. Japan Institute of International Affairs, March , pp. States, Regions, and the Global System: Nomos Publishing House, ,pp. Institution-Building in Northeast Asia," Manila: Regional Steps towards Global Governance, Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, , pp. Security, Development and Knowledge-based Society, Brussels: Peter Lang, , pp. Sisodia and Sreeradha eds. Magnum Books Pvt Ltd, , pp. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, , pp. Confronting the Issues, Kuala Lumpur: The Institute of Strategic and International Studies, , pp, Radtke and Marianne Wiesebron eds. A Japanese Perspective," K. University Press of America, , pp. Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, , pp.

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Chapter 3 : The imperial impetus behind Indo-Japanese relations | East Asia Forum

K V Kesavan. Japan's Expanding Security Perspectives in the Asia-Pacific. Anuradha M Chenoy. Is Human and Gender Security Relevant for Asia? Gulshan Sachdeva.

The imperial impetus behind Indo-Japanese relations 5 October Author: Since, both countries have been satisfied with the follow-up measures taken by the other, and there have been positive developments that could further transform the India-Japan partnership. The most important development is the announcement that Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko will make an official visit to India starting on 30 November. But Emperor Akihito is no stranger to India, having first visited in December soon after his marriage to Michiko and before he ascended the throne in 1989. Former Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, president Rajendra Prasad and vice president Radhakrishnan also paid separate goodwill visits to Japan between 1953 and 1957, which, in a way, helped Japan in its strenuous quest to establish its Asian identity. Both countries consider the imperial visit to be a landmark event capable of giving further impetus to the growing partnership. The fact that the Japanese imperial dignitaries now rarely make international trips due to their health further heightens the significance of their sojourn. Moreover, the coming visit is highly symbolic of potential future defence and civil nuclear cooperation. Defence cooperation is one particular area in which the two countries wish to develop new and mutually beneficial interactions. In their May joint statement, the two leaders expressed their satisfaction at expanding defence relations in areas such as joint naval exercises, and also expressed a desire to increase the frequency of their cooperation. They agreed to explore the prospect of Japan selling its indigenously-made US-2 amphibious aircraft to India. And they decided to create a joint working group to examine the modalities of cooperation on the issue. If the deal goes through successfully, it will be the first time Japan exports defence hardware to a major Asian country. A Japanese defence delegation visited India in the second week of July to see whether defence cooperation might also be taken to the next level through technology and equipment transfers between the two countries. Though Japan decided in 1991 to ban the export of military technologies to foreign countries, it modified its position in 1992 and has gradually relaxed its export policy. Many in India seem to prefer joint defence production with Japan instead of importing Japanese finished products, while Japan has been steadily removing many Indian companies from its export control list. The second India-Japan naval exercise, scheduled to be held before the end of the year, is expected to be much bigger than the first one held in June 1992. The first bilateral maritime affairs dialogue was held in New Delhi on 29 July 1992. As Tokyo attaches great importance to security cooperation with India it has decided to add two more attaches to its embassy in New Delhi. In addition, India and Japan have resumed civilian nuclear cooperation negotiations. Though they had already conducted three rounds of talks, the Fukushima tragedy became a formidable barrier to any further bilateral dialogue. Unfortunately, the two countries could not achieve a breakthrough and stood steadfastly by their well-stated positions on the issue. Right now, the atmosphere for further dialogue is not ideal, due to reports of massive leaks of radioactive water at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, vigorous anti-nuclear protests by several private groups and the decision to terminate operations at all 50 nuclear reactors across the country. But with Abe seriously committed to pursuing the civilian nuclear option, and with influential business interests supporting him, it is very likely an agreement will be reached. On 17 September, Prime Minister Abe assured Ashwani Kumar, the visiting special envoy of Manmohan Singh, that he would vigorously pursue negotiations for an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. Finally, considering the current steep depreciation of the Indian rupee, both countries decided to expand their prevailing currency swap arrangements. A joint press statement issued on 6 September pointed out that it was necessary to pursue reforms in the financial and investment sectors to strengthen bilateral financial cooperation between the two countries. Such currency swap arrangements have become quite common among many Asian countries and give the countries concerned a cushion to manage their current account deficits. While India may not actually use these dollars, the deal provides a psychological feeling of comfort for both

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India and Japanese investors.

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Chapter 4 : japan s role in asia | Download eBook pdf, epub, tuebl, mobi

Japan's expanding security perspectives in the Asia-pacific/K.V. Kesavan. Is human and gender security relevant for Asia?/Anuradha M. Chenoy. Japan, India.

Despite the economic prosperity of these countries, Northeast Asia is one region where the legacies of the cold war continue to exert great influence and pose serious challenges. The division of Korea, Taiwan and the uneasy relations between Japan and China, and Japan and South Korea all pose challenges that could erupt into a crisis situation at any moment. The peace and prosperity of the Asian continent would depend on how China, Japan and the two Koreas conduct their relations. It is hard to envisage lasting peace in Asia in an atmosphere of animosity between China and Japan or between Japan and South Korea. Realising this hiatus, China, Japan and South Korea set up a trilateral mechanism intended to deal specifically with issues falling within the Northeast Asian region. They continued this process until when they decided to meet separately independent of the ASEAN gathering. They held their summits regularly until when the meeting took place in Beijing. Subsequent summit meetings could not be held due to strained relations between Japan and the other two countries. The sixth trilateral summit meeting was resumed only this year. The trilateral summit that met in Seoul on 1 November is a landmark development as the Summit took place after a gap of three and a half years. The three leaders – Shinzo Abe, Li Keqiang and Park Geun – have issued a long joint statement which testifies to the importance that they have attached to trilateral cooperation for peace and stability of the region. In particular, they have identified nuclear safety, nuclear non-proliferation, cyber security, and disaster management as major areas for trilateral cooperation. The three countries evinced considerable interest in regional integration including the creation of a common market in the region as part of their Vision. Noting that the Trilateral Investment Agreement which came into effect in May has contributed to improving the investment climate in the region, they agreed to make further efforts to accelerate the negotiations for a mutually beneficial trilateral Free Trade Agreement FTA. They have also agreed to cooperate in several areas including energy security and climate change. The joint statement stresses that their trilateral cooperation will succeed only if it rests solidly on their respective bilateral ties. Realising this, the summit provided platforms for bilateral summit talks between Abe and Park and Abe and Li. This was indeed the first formal bilateral summit between Abe and Park and Abe and Li. Abe-Park talks Expectedly, the issue of comfort women figured prominently in the Abe-Park meeting. President Park had taken a tough position on this issue saying that unless it was settled amicably, there could be no talks between the two countries whereas Japan had always maintained that this issue had already been settled in itself at the time of the normalization of relations. But at the current talks, both leaders seem to have given some indications for reconciliation. Abe told his counterpart that they should not let their bilateral relations be held hostage to any one issue. Park on her part said that efforts should be made to settle the issue by the end of the year. It appears that the issue will not easily fade away and the Koreans will carefully scrutinise the steps that the Abe government will take in the coming weeks. There are indications that considering the fast dwindling number of afflicted women, the Japanese government may adopt a more flexible attitude, but may not be able to settle it before the end of the year since it would need time for Abe to mould a domestic consensus on the issue. They agreed to set up a maritime and air communication mechanism to prevent any collision in the East China Sea. Given the wide divergences in their security and economic approaches to the region, it will not be easy for them to reconcile all their competing interests. China expressed its displeasure at the support extended by Japan to the American dispatch of a destroyer within twelve nautical miles of the controversial Subi Reef a submerged feature until China dredged the surroundings in. Then please consider donating today to ensure that Eurasia Review can continue to be able to provide similar content. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms. Leave a Reply Your email address will not be

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Chapter 5 : Download [PDF] Perspectives On South Asian Security Free Online | New Books in Politics

India and emerging Asia. the Asian dimension / Ajay Patnaik --Japan's expanding security perspectives in the Asia-Pacific / K.V. Kesavan --Is human and gender.

Trade and commercial opportunities have also become more obvious over the years, both as India itself has developed and opened up its economy and as opportunities for trade growth elsewhere have diminished. But the more significant part of this transformation is the strategic dimension, which has evolved rapidly since the mid-1970s. Two such changes have been especially important. The first was the strategic approach adopted by the United States toward the region over the past decade, including its relations with India. For Japan, engaging India is part of a wider adjustment to these dependence on the United States for its security needs in order to concentrate systemic pressures. Because the US international order. Significant consideration War progressed ran counter to Japanese views. Where India came to see the is given to the nuclear crisis, which from the Japanese perspective was Soviet Union as a friendly power, Japan saw it as a threat. The chapter then examines buildup in East Asia, described as "extraordinary" by some Japanese analysts. But the trade relationship remained relatively small and grew only modestly during the 1970s and 1980s. David Brewster observes that Japan saw stage; when it sought cooperation, it did so chiefly with other nonaligned and its interests during this period as "ending at Burma"-it did not want to become developing countries. By contrast, Japan could not avoid superpower hood. Closer links were pursued with Northeast Asian states, through engagement-dominance, first under US occupation and later as a key US ally. Although ment with South Korea and China. Greater attention was also paid to Southeast India was quick to recognize Japan after the war, this ideological divide, as K. Asia, for instance through the provision of aid to Indonesia. Gradually Japan Kesavan points out, created a "psychological barrier between the two countries broadened its relations with the region by increasing its economic development that saw them taking diametrically opposite positions on a range of regional and aid activities and by linking up with the Association of Southeast Asian global issues. In Manila in challenges. Japan would henceforth remain peaceful, contribute Union and economic self-sufficiency. New Japanese investment in India-illustrated by the establishment of own strategic objectives very differently. Mutual trade was encouraged, but the total of visited Japan in 1970, 1980, and 1990. In 1990, international "aid great power. Yet foreign direct investment declined from the late 1970s and early 1980s and only started picking up again in the mid-1990s. Overall, Japanese firms appeared reluctant to enter the Indian market. That India did not rapidly liberalize its economy goes some way to explain this, but The end of the Cold War removed many obstacles to improved relations Japanese woes were also significant. With the collapse of government finances in 1991, India willingness to engage globally, including with India. By comparison, American ODA fell by approximately 35 set about establishing a more thorough framework for its aid program in the percent during the same period, while other key donors, France and Germany, form of an ODA charter. Released in 1992, it prioritized the environment, only increased their ODA by 17 percent and 19 percent, respectively. Greater democracy, the restriction of military expenditures, and market reform as con- ODA to India was, therefore, less the product of any "special relationship" siderations when determining ODA policy. Why then did Japan pursue such a forthright bur ultimately egy. However, it is also strengthen international peace and stability. In June 1998, ble by a strong domestic antipathy toward the tests, which then made it difficult Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa urged Indian prime minister P. Narasimha for the government to retreat from its hardline stance. As Limaye observes, with Rao to sign and ratify the NPT; in December, he asked the same of Pakistani citizens and the press arguing that the foreign ministry should take an even prime minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif. However, while Rao agreed to hold tougher position, there was soon a momentum pushing the government toward talks with Japan on nuclear disarmament, he rejected the request to sign the stricter disarmament and nonproliferation policies. In responding to the tests, Japan initially after the nuclear tests would be reviewed once India decided to sign the CTBT, focused its efforts on the United Nations Security Council UNSC , of

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which and several rounds of mostly ineffective fence-mending diplomacy ensued. According to Michael Green, Mori recognized the role that India strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. The Japanese government announced that the various measures it had focus more closely on questions of maintaining security in South Asia. On the implemented following the nuclear tests would be discontinued, since India and 46 H. Cooperation would also include defense force exchanges and col- though neither had signed the CTBT. In October , the two bitterness in the relationship had been removed. In their joint statement, Prime Ministers Abe and again in earnest, despite the efforts made to patch up their differences in Singh emphasized the importance of negotiating a free-trade agreement known and Economically the relationship between India and Japan continued to as a comprehensive economic partnership agreement CEPA and directed offi- tell a story-dear in the s-of false starts and unfulfilled promise. From cials to "complete the negotiations as soon as possible. It picked up again in the next two years, market, but the two sides finally reached a compromise in late It was diplomatic and catalytic engagement, not economic exchange in August Noda pushed for greater cooperation on the rare-earth trade and now "elevate" their partnership to a "strategic and global partnership. It has been estimated engagement, stronger defence relations, [and] greater technological coopera- that by , over a thousand Japanese firms were operating in India. After the low of 48 H. This brought significant benefits to Japan, which enjoyed a trade surplus nuclear deal. Some across the country. Two important factors, which was not well received in the Asia-Pacific region, while the quadrilateral aspect of were not sufficiently influential or clearly directed in past iterations of engage- the initiative was viewed by China as a form of containmentY What has worked ment, have now grown and combined to propel Japan closer to India. These are is lower-level, military-to-military engagement, which can be seen to be catalyz- the practices and expectations of the United States in the region and the rise of ing deeper ties in the security realm. The low-key objective of closer security China. In , joint naval exercises and "strategic regional arrangements. Having resolved their early , the United States gradually extended the joint dialogue to include immediate differences over the tests, Japan and India have since sought to initiatives and agreements on trade, health policy, counterterrorism, and most negotiate an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, following in the footsteps controversially on civil nuclear cooperation. Prior to his visit to Japan in announced an agreement that would allow for cooperation on civil nuclear October , Prime Minister Singh stated that he was "confident that we will power. By , they had launched an even more comprehensive "strategic be able to conclude an agreement, which will be a win-win proposition for both dialogue. The Japanese mainstream, it should be said, has often been conciliatory Where there was once merely a US "hub and spokes" system, the US expecta- toward China-to the extent that conservatives have attacked its "kowitzion now appears to be for greater "intra-spoke" cooperation within a wider diplomacy. Japanese fears about China. This includes, in particular, the "industrialization of A "fear of China" has become a consistent feature of recent Japanese domes- China and India. They explain how, in a world characterized by 52 H. At and partners in the region concerning the concept of "intra-hub" cooperation. They also point to a continuation of a Japanese preference for catalytic over exchange engagement with India, attempting to shift the perceived interests of its elites to align them with those of Japan. Conclusion Although Japan and India lived in largely different strategic worlds during the Notes Cold War, their bilateral relationship has recently taken on greater economic 1. After this limited 2. Sumit Ganguly New Delhi: Oxford University Press, , 1. Kesavan, "India and Japan: Observer Research Foundation, subsequent attempts to engage more carefully with India. Although these events May , 3. The already substantial cultural differences were also important. See David were important, however, neither can be used to fully explain why it was only Brewster, India as an Asia Pacific Power London: Routledge, , The Resurgence ofjapanese Power and Purpose New and global partnership requires a closer examination of the changes that have York: PublicAffairs, , By contrast, from the middle of the last de-Myers, Defending an Economic Superpower: Wesrview, , For more on the trade agreements, seeP. Narasimha Murthy, "India and These two factors have in fact pushed strongly in the same direction in terms of Japan," International Studies 17, nos. See also Steven W. The Resources Policy 20, no. Forces behind Competing

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Chapter 6 : ScholarSpace at University of Hawaii at Manoa: Expanding Indo-Japanese partnership

On 22nd December , Observer Research Foundation (ORF), in association with the Embassy of Japan, arranged a lecture by Dr. Shin Kawashima. Dr. Kawashima, who is working as a Professor at the Tokyo University, spoke about China's foreign policy. The event was chaired by Dr. K.V. Kesavan, who is.

Chapter 7 : perspectives on south asian security | Download eBook pdf, epub, tuebl, mobi

Japan's security policy in the Asia-Pacific during the post-Cold War period K.V. Kesavan / Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, The Asia-Pacific region has now emerged as the main centre of dynamic economic and technological development in the world.

Chapter 8 : Japan And Indian Asia | Download eBook PDF/EPUB

K.V. Kesavan is Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, and Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center. He can be contacted via email at kvkesavan@racedaydvl.com

Chapter 9 : K.V. Kesavan, India's partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region

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