

Chapter 1 : International Religious Freedom Roundtable | Coalition | Washington DC

The report covers government policies violating religious belief and practices of groups, religious denominations and individuals, and U.S. policies to promote religious freedom around the world. The U.S. Department of State submits the reports in accordance with the International Religious Freedom Act of

November 17, From its earliest days, international law has been intertwined with religion. The 16th Century Spanish Catholic priests, Suarez and Vitoria, who are often viewed as among the founders of the modern discipline of international law, argued from religious sources that the Spanish crown was obliged to treat native Americans as real peoples under the moral influence of the law of nations. Another founder of international law, the Dutch Protestant jurist, Hugo Grotius, relied heavily on Old and New Testament citations to demonstrate a universal law of nations in his monumental 17th century text, *The Law of War and Peace*, usually seen as the first book on international law. Though Grotius depended on Christian texts for his proofs, he felt that much of the law of nations bound not only Christian states, but those of Islam and China, too. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 is usually considered to signal the beginning of the modern era of the international political system, a construct based on the concept of sovereign states, each legally entitled to govern its own territory and its own population free of external influence. It is said that half of Germany perished in these religious wars. Sovereignty meant that each state could choose its own religion without outside intervention, but the Treaty of Westphalia also included provisions calling for the protection of Catholics in Protestant states and vice versa. Since Westphalia, of course, religious controversies have not faded away. Moreover, the star of state sovereignty shines brighter than ever. Over the last four centuries religious persecutions have been all too frequently the stuff of current events. Some have estimated that almost a million persons died in the 20th Century alone as a result of "ethnic cleansings," much of it based on religious antagonisms. It is, it seems, one thing to recognize the right of states to order their own domestic affairs, religion included. It seems quite another to effectively secure the enforcement of any international legal guarantees, whether in treaty or custom, to protect religious diversity. Considering the relationship between international law and religion, two contributions stand out: Like Suarez, Vitoria, and Grotius before them, later important promoters of international law have been motivated at least in part by religious convictions. This has never been so true as it was for the American Protestant reformers of the 19th century. Men like David Low Dodge in New York and Noah Worcester in Massachusetts, dissatisfied with the waste of men and material in the War of 1812 and inspired by the earlier pacific success of the Jay Treaty arbitrations between the United States and the United Kingdom, founded state peace societies in to promote international arbitration as a substitute for war. They were followed by William Ladd of Maine, who not only founded the first nation-wide peace society in 1815, but in 1817 published an influential book, *Essay on a Congress of Nations*, detailing a project for an international court and parliament. Rather Wilson drew his proposals from a deep well of Protestant reform proposals, from which he, the son and grandson of Presbyterian ministers, had often drunk. It was this popular sentiment inspired by religious fervor, not elite opinion crafted by studied argument by professional international lawyers, that carried the cause of international law in 19th and early 20th century America. The second principal contribution is that made by international law to religion in the form of universalistic norms protecting religious diversity. Although some such rules are to be found in early modern treaties such as Westphalia ending the Thirty Years War in 1648 and Vienna ending the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, it was Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant after the First World War that truly inaugurated the modern period of international guarantees, often violated, of religious freedom. Following the ethnic and religious massacres of the Second World War, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was careful to guarantee freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Among other things, it included the freedom to change religion, the most controversial religious freedom. Although formally the Declaration is a non-binding U. N. General Assembly resolution, it has, in the eyes of many international lawyers, passed into the realm of customary international law. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966, a multilateral treaty binding on more than 110 states parties to it, also protects religious freedoms, but significantly does not explicitly guarantee the right to change

religion. Nevertheless, it is thought by many to be the most important international statement protecting religious diversity. It fleshes out the religious freedoms mentioned in the Universal Declaration and the Covenant. Despite the rights to religious freedoms proclaimed in these important international instruments, it is generally agreed that no area of human rights is so distant from a meaningful international consensus as the right to religious diversity. Moreover, there is virtually no effective universal supervision of international rights to religious diversity. There is, however, a regional exception in European human rights law. Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms guarantees the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Article 9 has been applied, albeit less often and less forcefully than some other parts of the European Convention, by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Janis is William F. He is the editor, with Carolyn Evans, of *Religion and International Law*, a collection of essays published by Kluwer in , and the author of *An Introduction to International Law*, the 4th edition to be published by Aspen in

Chapter 2 : International relations - Wikipedia

In Middle Eastern religion: Types of religious organization and authority is a theoretical progress to international religion. This scheme of the relations between God and mankind, from the personal to the universal level, mirrors the historical record of religion.

Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Questions center on the role of religion in peace and conflict, the compatibility of religious law and norms with different systems of government, and the influence of religious actors on a wide range of issues. In addition, scholars must situate the practices, principles, and identities of religious individuals and communities within broader historical and geographical contexts in order to understand the critical factors informing their ethical frameworks. There are several approaches that are attentive to interpretation, practice, and ethics, including neo-Weberianism, positive ethics, securitization theory, and a relational dialogical approach. These approaches provide alternatives to essentialized notions of religion and shed light on why and how religious actors choose some possible courses of action over others. However, due to the prevalence of the secularization thesis and related Enlightenment assumptions, scholars in political science, and international relations in particular, largely ignored religion in contemporary political matters. The break-up of the Soviet Union led international relations scholars to turn away from the ideological contestations between capitalism and communism and look to the role of other salient factors in international relations, including that of religion. However, the growing interest in the subject of religion and international relations is often connected to assumptions that link the religious with the magical, emotive, or barbaric—leading to specific assumptions about the propensity of religious ideologies to contribute to conflict. Such assumptions view religion as anachronistic and antimodern at best, and dangerous at worst. Despite the trend of treating religion as inherently problematic, in recent years a number of scholars, members of civil society, and government agencies and actors have argued that religion can contribute to peace processes and broader projects of good in the world. Such approaches, though engaging with religious doctrine and religious actors in a seemingly opposing manner, often continue to treat religion as a monolithic, stable, and easily identifiable category of analysis that incorporates a wide and complex array of religious actors, institutions, beliefs, doctrines, and practices within specific and strict boundaries. Many scholars who subscribe to these perspectives also assert that a complete separation of the religious from the secular is extremely difficult if not impossible, necessitating an investigation into how the religious and the secular are mutually constituted. Given the renewed interest in the role of religion in international relations, and the problems associated with treating religion as a clearly defined variable that is informed by Enlightenment assumptions, how should scholars of religion and international relations proceed? Essentialist approaches to the study of religion and politics often view religion through the lens of doctrine—“ascribing causal force to particular dogmas and norms. In this article we argue that scholarship on religion and politics benefits by moving beyond approaches that treat religion, and given religious traditions, as discrete and reified categories of analysis. Valuable challenges to the idea that religion is a primal and anachronistic identity are both quantitative and qualitative. Ager and Ager, conversely, use qualitative methods to describe how refugees and other vulnerable populations of one religion e. While this scholarship opened important debates, it risks being unable to account for the tensions within religious traditions, the hybridity of both religious and secular beliefs and practices, and the ethical interpretations that evolve and sometimes change radically with given historical circumstances. As a result, scholars should approach the study of religion with reflexivity and an attention to ethics. First, scholars must be attentive to their own ontologies of religion—i. Second, scholars should examine how religious actors navigate complex ethical schemes that are influenced by historical, political, economic, geographical, and other factors, in order to understand how and why they choose particular courses of action over others. Several approaches are attentive to ethics and interpretation, including neo-Weberianism, positive ethics, a relational dialogical approach, and securitization theory. These approaches place the primary focus on process and practice, rather than on overly selective assumptions about doctrines, sacred texts, and rituals. This article first summarizes some of the primary ways that scholars

engage with issues of religion and international relations. Next, it highlights how Enlightenment assumptions inform modern-day conceptualizations of religion and secularism and shows the ways that such approaches can promote problematic assumptions and lead to a monolithic view of religion, linking it with either conflict or peace. Then it outlines alternative approaches to the study of religious actors that focus on the ethical frameworks on which such actors rely, situating those ethics within broader contextual— including political and economic— factors. Finally, the article concludes by suggesting several paths forward for analyzing religions and secularisms of various kinds and by detailing conceptual and substantive issues that continue to be debated through studies employing different types of methods and approaches.

The Reemergence of Religion in the Study of International Relations

Though religion was never entirely absent from the study of international relations, a renewed and strengthened focus on religious actors, movements, and traditions emerged following the end of the Cold War. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, scholars stopped looking at capitalist and Marxist ideological differences to explain political and social tensions and turned their focus to religious, ethnic, and cultural differences. Conflicts that broke out in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya, and elsewhere were seen almost exclusively as conflicts between different and incommensurable religious identities, even where peoples of different religions had intermarried and lived together peacefully for years. During this period, both religion and ethnicity e. Yet, some scholars, including Peter Berger , began to put the onus of problematic characterizations of religion on the assumptions underlying academic scholarship itself. As a result, the academic focus on the role of religion in international relations grew and intensified, while, at the same time, policymakers and practitioners also began to pay serious attention to the influence of religion in global affairs. The reemergence of the study of religion in international relations prompted a wide range of discussions, questions, and debates about the role of religion in politics and approaches for studying religion. However, such scholarship often relies on assumptions that portray religion as a social element that inherently leads to tensions or outright conflict, or that religion is somehow irrational and thus inappropriate for the public sphere. Scholars like Samuel Huntington , provide the most glaring example of linking religion to conflict. In particular, Huntington , p. Others, specifically in a special issue on religion published in Millennium Chan et. Skepticism about religion also pervaded scholarship on global studies outside of the political science discipline of international relations. Though the essentialization of religion is disputed in international relations, assumptions about the inherent dangers or benefits of religion persist. Such assumptions continue to gain traction in academia and elsewhere due to a particular Enlightenment narrative that not only feeds common perceptions about religion, but also other related values and principles e. Before alternative approaches to the study of religion can be addressed, the problematic aspects of this Enlightenment narrative should be explored.

The Enlightenment Narrative and Assumptions about Religion

The idea that religion is inherently inappropriate for the public sphere or that religion inevitably leads to tensions and violence is a byproduct of Enlightenment assumptions, which derive from a particular narrative of European secularization that allegedly provides the best model for state development, and relations among states, in the rest of the world. The European secularization narrative is loosely formulated as follows. The international elites all based in Europe began to formulate and adhere to what Scott Thomas , p. As a result of these treaties, Western European governments severely limited the traditional authoritative role of the papacy Nexon, , p. In the 17th and 18th centuries, as a result of the Westphalian presumption, European scholars began to introduce and focus on the use of rationality, reason, and scientific knowledge to counter past processes of knowledge production linked with the monarchy and the Church. Intellectual elites increasingly criticized religion and its role in public life. Enlightenment thinkers viewed religion as primitive and antithetical to modern scientific methods and rationality Casanova, , pp. According to the narrative of European secularization, secularist ideals grew immensely in this period, pushing religion further into the private sphere; and, from this point forward, religion was no longer an influential factor in international politics. Daniel Philpott and Casanova tell us that Westphalia did not usher in a new era in which states separated matters of religion and politics, as often assumed, though they differ on whether religion ceased to be *casus belli*. Philpott , p. As a result of these domestic issues as well as the push to colonize Latin America, much of Asia, and, later, Africa, religious influences continued to have important

implications for international affairs. Scott Thomas takes a slightly different view than either Philpott or Casanova in his assessment of the development of the European state system, arguing that modern scholars erroneously applied a contemporary notion of religion, which tends to focus on individual beliefs and doctrines, to societies that had not yet adopted this concept. Thomas, p. According to Casanova, p. The narrative of European secularization, along with the emergence of seemingly secular peace in post-World War II Western Europe, contributed to the formation of the secularization thesis and its introduction into the discipline of international relations as well as the broader international elite community. For several decades, the secularization thesis seemed to be validated by the fact that the more progressive nation-states primarily within Western Europe appeared to be in various stages of shedding explicit religious influences in public life. Beyond Europe, leaders of important states that had become independent in the early or mid-19th century, including Egypt and India, forged nonconfessional governmental systems that intentionally diminished the power of religious actors and practices. Observing these events, although remaining rooted in a strong Europeanist mindset, early secularization theorists of the 18th and 19th centuries articulated and repeated the refrain that secularization was a necessary prerequisite for modernization. The Iranian and Polish revolutions in the late 19th and late 20th centuries, respectively, provided convincing initial counterevidence to this theory. These ideas further challenged both secularization assumptions and Huntingtonian fears. The constructivist international relations emphasis on identity as constitutive of material factors also enabled the turn to religion. As Mavelli and Petito, p. For instance, assumptions about religious exclusivism are. Thus, while many scholars are approaching the role of religion in international relations through the lens of history and context, the perspectives that portray religion as inherently problematic and potentially dangerous continue to persist. Though the dominant assumptions about religion continue to rely on Enlightenment presuppositions, we should also note that the essentializing of religion runs both ways, as some scholars and policymakers portray religion as something that is inherently good or beneficial for certain sectors of international relations. Scholars like Gerard Powers and practitioners like Katherine Marshall have been at the forefront of calling for the increasing participation of faith-based actors in peace building. They argue that faith-based actors are uniquely placed to engage in the peace-building process due to a the connections they developed from their long-standing presence in local communities, b their ability to engender the trust and participation of local actors, and c their incorporation of spiritual as well as material forms of assistance, which many recipient populations welcome. Atalia Omer, p. The next section discusses in more detail the problems with essentialization and reification of religion, followed by new approaches articulated by scholars to cope with the conceptual, methodological, normative, and pragmatic difficulties that reification produces. While theologians engage in the hermeneutic analysis of sacred texts, frequently debating among themselves which is the most accurate representation or interpretation of a given religious tradition. The distinction between disciplines should not be considered absolute, but it is important to highlight when dissecting problematic oversimplifications of religion that tend to resurface in some social science research. Assigning a fixed and essential ontology to religion results in several analytical and normative problems in political science. First, essentializing religion often leads the scholar to miss the range of roles a particular act, idea, or actor might play in international relations. For instance, scholars might treat religious identity as the most important form of identity over other ethnic, racial, gender, national, or other identities. Such privileging of religious identity in scholarship, as well as in legal and political institutional contexts can actually lead to more entrenched divisions among certain communities. Second, essentializing religion can privilege certain kinds of being over others. Thus, those studies that define religion as belief are leaving out other important aspects of religious adherence. Essentializing religion also often contributes to a secularist bias, wherein scholars are effectively blinded to the ways that secular phenomena can have similar problematic effects as religious phenomena. Similarly, Mona Kanwal Sheikh, p. Timothy Fitzgerald, pp. In order to avoid oversimplification and dehistoricization, scholars should reexamine the ontology of religion in international relations and approach the study of religious actors and action through the lens of reflexivity and ethics, as well as through new developments in securitization approaches. Alternative Approaches to the Study of Religion in International Relations Focusing on religious ethics-in-action moves analyses beyond Enlightenment and other essentializing assumptions about the inherent nature of religion to

better understandings of why religious global actors choose specific courses of action over others. To do this, scholars should both reexamine their own conceptions about what counts as religious and situate specific principles, practices, and identities within broader contexts, in order to understand how religious actors navigate ethical choices. Several approaches, including the securitization approach and the neo-Weberian approach, among others, can provide paths forward for accomplishing these goals. Scholars must first reexamine and reevaluate their ontologies of religion i. As Max Weber , p. Thus, when examining so-called religious actors or phenomena, scholars must be reflexiveâ€”actively engaging with their own assumptions about what it means for someone or something to be religious. Scholars need to assess what is gained or lost by identifying certain organizational characteristics e. What is at stake in such categorizations? Such a reflexive and socially constructed ontology of religion pushes the scholar to rethink how she can best understand why an Islamic humanitarian organization or a Christian social movement might or might not proselytize, include prayer in its activities, employ the discourse of development specialists, or participate in an advocacy campaign or protest Schwarz, In order to understand why so-called religious actors might engage in certain activities including activities of peace or violence , some scholars Toft et al. However, as Sheikh , p. Second, in order to deal with the interpretation problem, scholars need to contextualize the practice, principles, and identities of religious actors within broader histories and geographies in order to understand how such actors navigate ethical choices. While the securitization approach helps explain problematic foreign and domestic policy implications resulting from the essentialization of religion, scholars must go further in contextualizing the tensions among religious actors and within religious traditions. One important step is to look beyond religious doctrine to the way in which religious actors interpret that doctrine through practice. An ethics-based approach to the study of religion treats religion not as static doctrine, but as practice. The neo-Weberian approach focuses on moral reasoning and how notions of the common good are shaped by actors and their experiences Lynch, , p.

Chapter 3 : International religion | racedaydvl.com

The International Religious Freedom Act of (Public Law , as amended by Public Law , Public Law , Public Law , Public Law , and Public Law) was passed to promote religious freedom as a foreign policy of the United States, to promote greater religious freedom in countries which engage in or tolerate violations of religious freedom, and.

Congress launched a debate on U. Foreign policy actors continue to debate how religious freedom “ and religion itself “ should be factored into U. Has the State Department interpreted the international religious freedom policy too narrowly over the past decade by focusing on individual cases of religious persecution? Does the country need new legislation to mandate a high-level understanding of religion among State Department officials? Does a robust international religious freedom policy truly advance U. Kennedy Library Foundation Thomas F. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you all for joining us today. The Center is a research organization and does not take positions on policy debates, including the present one. I am pleased to welcome you to a discussion of international religious freedom and U. Ten years ago this spring, the U. Congress began a lengthy debate on this topic, which culminated in the passage in of the International Religious Freedom Act. This legislation sets forth a mandate for the United States government to tackle the problem of religious persecution worldwide. This is no small task. That number may be small, but it includes such countries as China, for instance, on some of whose exports the U. Almost 10 years after the passage of the International Religious Freedom Act, we thought it would be worthwhile to step back and take stock of this effort. There are, of course, the large questions. Does an assertive policy on international religious freedom truly advance the U. If not the national interest more broadly, does singling out religious freedom as a special foreign policy priority serve the interests of promoting human rights around the world? Then there are the important questions of implementation. Have the president and the State Department properly interpreted and implemented the International Religious Freedom Act over the past decade? Could and should the policy be implemented any differently? To help us explore these and related questions, we are delighted to have with us three very distinguished experts. As a former Congressional fellow on the staff of Senator Richard Lugar , he was instrumental in crafting the International Religious Freedom Act 10 years ago. As the assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor under President Clinton, he helped raise the profile of human rights and U. He is the author of Freedom on Fire: He is the author of a forthcoming book from Oxford University Press on religious liberty and the American national interest. Faith and Freedom, Tom, is that the title? And when will it be out? Hopefully during the presidential campaign. We are delighted to have all of you with us today. This is meant to be a conversation. We were going to have a roundtable format, but even with our limited list of invitees, the response was so overwhelming had to go to theater style. Let me thank the Pew Forum for valuing this issue, as you have for a long time, and for putting on this event, which commemorates the 10th anniversary. It is an honor to appear on this panel with such distinguished colleagues. I worked with John Shattuck and his shop when I worked with Senator Lugar and appreciated very much their work across the whole human rights spectrum. Of course Tom Farr was the first office director of the Office [of International Religious Freedom,] which is when the lifting was the heaviest; a lot of what we have today is built upon the foundations which Tom laid for us. We have a number of people from the Commission on International Religious Freedom , including Mike Cromartie , who is a vice chair of commission. People like Mike Gerson , who has cheered me on in these efforts since we were both lowly staffers on the Hill. My position is that in Congress in its great wisdom passed a very well-conceived piece of legislation and that, secondly, the Office of International Religious Freedom at the State Department has done a faithful and dare I say commendable job of carrying out this mandate. However, there is still plenty of room for controversy, and I have the sneaking suspicion we may have a bit of that today. Hopefully this will set us up for a vigorous discussion. In , the opportunity presented itself to work on legislation. Frankly, the feeling on Capitol Hill was this issue had been neglected. First, a real champion on the issue of international religious freedom, Frank Wolf , came forward with a piece of legislation for the Wolf-Specter bill. This had not been written in his office, but it paved the way for consideration of legislation and was successful in the House. I sat down with

Wolf two or three times and mentioned a couple of things I felt would be detrimental to religious freedom in the legislation. He graciously removed those things. So I pulled together two other people to work with me on this. There was also an impressive balding redhead, Will Inboden who was hoping to be here as well. The three of us spent months sitting around a conference table poring over the question, how do we devise the best possible law and policy for the U. We consulted experts, and we spent months brainstorming. Mostly, though, we drew on our own experience. By that time I had been working for 11 years full-time on religious freedom issues. The other two, Laura and Will, had also worked for several years on these issues – both in Republican and Democratic offices and under Republican and Democratic administrations. We had approached persecution problems from many different angles and tried a lot of approaches. We had learned from Senator Lugar, in my case, or Senator Nunn or others we had worked for. We had seen how prisoners could be released or how an execution of a religious believer could be prevented, or how a major law could be stopped in a foreign country. We had seen what worked through U. Our goal was to develop an approach that would insure vigilant attention and use the vast array of tools in the U. We were honored to have Senator Nickles be our chief sponsor. In fact, I ran into him at a party this weekend; he was playing with his grandchildren and I with my children chuckles. His staffer, Steve Moffitt, joined the three of us and set apart the best part of a year of his life to plug away in writing and negotiating this. Then Senator Lieberman became our chief Democratic sponsor and was terrific to work with. We negotiated for many months – tough negotiations. I led in those along with Steve Moffitt, but what emerged was largely what we began with. Very little got changed in the process of negotiating with the State Department and the White House. I was pleased the Clinton administration came out in favor of the act – one day before its passage, but better late than never. The bill passed 98 to 0 in the Senate, and then passed by voice vote in the House of Representatives and is considered one of the most significant pieces of human rights legislation. Bob Seiple was the first ambassador-at-large, and he did a fabulous job laying the groundwork. The legislation sets up a position for an ambassador-at-large, which is a high-level diplomat to work these issues face-to-face with foreign officials, and a permanent office at the State Department. Our job is to identify, get to the bottom of and solve problems of religious freedom around the world. It sets up a commission, the U. Commission on International Religious Freedom, with nine commissioners who are chosen in a bi-partisan way; some are Democrats and some are Republicans. We do an annual report – [for, it was] pages, covering countries. If anyone can find two more countries, let us know. I want to get to before I leave. We also have an annual process to identify the worst violators, and these are called CPCs, countries of particular concern. Two years ago we added Vietnam, Saudi Arabia and Eritrea, and several months ago we removed Vietnam and added Uzbekistan. The IRF Act took things to another level. Action is required under the act against countries that violate religious freedom, even against countries that violate it in a fairly mild way. There are a number of optional actions that can be taken, and these are calibrated from mild to severe. We thought up as many innovative things as we could to advance religious freedom. The IRF Act takes a comprehensive approach, covering issues such as training assistance; program funding; asylum, refugee and visa policy; and international exchanges and broadcasting. I would say the IRF Act does one thing and does it well. Let me address the International Religious Freedom Act, one decade later. When Ambassador Seiple started, he had a vacuum cleaner and a contract secretary in his office. After 20 years of working on this, we now have a person office, and I like to brag we have almost more Ph. I like to say we can out-think, out-sue and out-pray any other office at the State Department. When we began this, religious freedom was in some ways the forgotten human right. Now we are engaging vigorously in countries around the world and increasingly in multilateral fora, such as the U. The IRF report has become the gold standard of religious freedom reporting. I have foreign ministers and others tell me how they read it and learn a lot about religion in their own country as a result. The CPC process has also been quite successful. For example, in the case of Vietnam, as many of you know, we negotiated an agreement under which Vietnam could come off [the list. When I began working with Vietnam, about 1, churches and places of worship had been recently shut down. They were basically trying to wipe out Protestant Christianity in two regions of the country. They had arrested dozens of religious leaders. They had a horrible practice of forced renunciations of faith, which they were carrying out all over the country, with tens of thousands being forced to renounce their

Christian faith.

Chapter 4 : OHCHR | International standards - Framework for communications

Click the Step 1 or Step 2 tabs above to modify them or click the "Create My Report" button below to proceed. Global Overview includes an overarching summary and key information from the year's report. Hover over Countries/Regions for a list of countries and other areas. Click a region to narrow the.

Feminism international relations Feminist IR considers the ways that international politics affects and is affected by both men and women and also at how the core concepts that are employed within the discipline of IR e. Feminist IR has not only concerned itself with the traditional focus of IR on states, wars, diplomacy and security, but feminist IR scholars have also emphasized the importance of looking at how gender shapes the current global political economy. From its inception, feminist IR has also theorized extensively about men and, in particular, masculinities. Many IR feminists argue that the discipline is inherently masculine in nature. For example, in her article "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals" *Signs*, Carol Cohn claimed that a highly masculinized culture within the defence establishment contributed to the divorcing of war from human emotion. Feminist IR emerged largely from the late s onwards. The end of the Cold War and the re-evaluation of traditional IR theory during the s opened up a space for gendering International Relations. However, the growing influence of feminist and women-centric approaches within the international policy communities for example at the World Bank and the United Nations is more reflective of the liberal feminist emphasis on equality of opportunity for women. It makes the assumption that the economy trumps other concerns; allowing for the elevation of class as the focus of study. Marxists view the international system as an integrated capitalist system in pursuit of capital accumulation. Thus, colonialism brought in sources for raw materials and captive markets for exports, while decolonialization brought new opportunities in the form of dependence. A prominent derivative of Marxian thought is critical international relations theory which is the application of "critical theory" to international relations. Their emphasis on the "critical" component of theory was derived significantly from their attempt to overcome the limits of positivism. Modern-day proponents such as Andrew Linklater, Robert W. Cox and Ken Booth focus on the need for human emancipation from the nation-state. Hence, it is "critical" of mainstream IR theories that tend to be both positivist and state-centric. Further linked in with Marxist theories is dependency theory and the core-periphery model, which argue that developed countries, in their pursuit of power, appropriate developing states through international banking, security and trade agreements and unions on a formal level, and do so through the interaction of political and financial advisors, missionaries, relief aid workers, and MNCs on the informal level, in order to integrate them into the capitalist system, strategically appropriating undervalued natural resources and labor hours and fostering economic and political dependence. Marxist theories receive little attention in the United States. It is more common in parts of Europe and is one of the more important theoretic contributions of Latin American academia to the study of global networks. Examples of interest groups include political lobbyists, the military, and the corporate sector. Group theory argues that although these interest groups are constitutive of the state, they are also causal forces in the exercise of state power. Strategic perspective[edit] Strategic perspective is a theoretical[citation needed] approach that views individuals as choosing their actions by taking into account the anticipated actions and responses of others with the intention of maximizing their own welfare. Inherent bad faith model[edit] Further information: They are dismissed as propaganda ploys or signs of weakness. Post-structuralism explores the deconstruction of concepts traditionally not problematic in IR such as "power" and "agency" and examines how the construction of these concepts shapes international relations. The examination of "narratives" plays an important part in poststructuralist analysis; for example, feminist poststructuralist work has examined the role that "women" play in global society and how they are constructed in war as "innocent" and "civilians". See also feminism in international relations. Post-structuralism has garnered both significant praise and criticism, with its critics arguing that post-structuralist research often fails to address the real-world problems that international relations studies is supposed to contribute to solving. Levels of analysis[edit] Systemic level concepts[edit] International relations are often viewed in terms of levels of analysis. The systemic level concepts are those

broad concepts that define and shape an international milieu, characterized by anarchy. Focusing on the systemic level of international relations is often, but not always, the preferred method for neo-realists and other structuralist IR analysts. Westphalian sovereignty Preceding the concepts of interdependence and dependence, international relations relies on the idea of sovereignty. While throughout world history there have been instances of groups lacking or losing sovereignty, such as African nations prior to Decolonization or the occupation of Iraq during the Iraq War , there is still a need for sovereignty in terms of assessing international relations. Power international relations The concept of Power in international relations can be described as the degree of resources, capabilities, and influence in international affairs. It is often divided up into the concepts of hard power and soft power , hard power relating primarily to coercive power, such as the use of force, and soft power commonly covering economics , diplomacy and cultural influence. However, there is no clear dividing line between the two forms of power. Core or vital interests constitute the things which a country is willing to defend or expand with conflict such as territory, ideology religious, political, economic , or its citizens. Peripheral or non-vital are interests which a state is willing to compromise. For example, in the German annexation of the Sudetenland in a part of Czechoslovakia under the Munich Agreement , Czechoslovakia was willing to relinquish territory which was considered ethnically German in order to preserve its own integrity and sovereignty. Rather, it is the presence of non-state actors, who autonomously act to implement unpredictable behaviour to the international system. Whether it is transnational corporations , liberation movements , non-governmental agencies , or international organizations , these entities have the potential to significantly influence the outcome of any international transaction. Additionally, this also includes the individual person as while the individual is what constitutes the states collective entity, the individual does have the potential to also create unpredicted behaviours. Al-Qaeda , as an example of a non-state actor, has significantly influenced the way states and non-state actors conduct international affairs. During the Cold War , the alignment of several nations to one side or another based on ideological differences or national interests has become an endemic feature of international relations. Unlike prior, shorter-term blocs, the Western and Soviet blocs sought to spread their national ideological differences to other nations. Truman under the Truman Doctrine believed it was necessary to spread democracy whereas the Warsaw Pact under Soviet policy sought to spread communism. After the Cold War, and the dissolution of the ideologically homogeneous Eastern bloc still gave rise to others such as the South-South Cooperation movement. Polarity international relations Polarity in international relations refers to the arrangement of power within the international system. The concept arose from bipolarity during the Cold War , with the international system dominated by the conflict between two superpowers , and has been applied retrospectively by theorists. However, the term bipolar was notably used by Stalin who said he saw the international system as a bipolar one with two opposing powerbases and ideologies. Consequently, the international system prior to can be described as multipolar, with power being shared among Great powers. Empires of the world in The collapse of the Soviet Union in had led to unipolarity, with the United States as a sole superpower, although many refuse to acknowledge the fact. Several theories of international relations draw upon the idea of polarity. The balance of power was a concept prevalent in Europe prior to the First World War , the thought being that by balancing power blocs it would create stability and prevent war. Here, the concepts of balancing rising in power to counter another and bandwagoning siding with another are developed. Hegemony is the preponderance of power at one pole in the international system, and the theory argues this is a stable configuration because of mutual gains by both the dominant power and others in the international system. This is contrary to many neorealist arguments, particularly made by Kenneth Waltz , stating that the end of the Cold War and the state of unipolarity is an unstable configuration that will inevitably change. It suggests that while hegemony can control the occurrence of wars, it also results in the creation of one. Its main proponent, A. Organski , argued this based on the occurrence of previous wars during British, Portuguese, and Dutch hegemony. Interdependence[edit] Many advocate that the current international system is characterized by growing interdependence; the mutual responsibility and dependency on others. Advocates of this point to growing globalization , particularly with international economic interaction. The role of international institutions, and widespread acceptance of a number of operating

principles in the international system, reinforces ideas that relations are characterized by interdependence. NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan

Dependency theory is a theory most commonly associated with Marxism , stating that a set of core states exploit a set of weaker periphery states for their prosperity. Various versions of the theory suggest that this is either an inevitability standard dependency theory , or use the theory to highlight the necessity for change Neo-Marxist. Systemic tools of international relations[edit] Diplomacy is the practice of communication and negotiation between representatives of states. To some extent, all other tools of international relations can be considered the failure of diplomacy. Keeping in mind, the use of other tools are part of the communication and negotiation inherent within diplomacy. Sanctions, force, and adjusting trade regulations, while not typically considered part of diplomacy, are actually valuable tools in the interest of leverage and placement in negotiations. Sanctions are usually a first resort after the failure of diplomacy, and are one of the main tools used to enforce treaties. They can take the form of diplomatic or economic sanctions and involve the cutting of ties and imposition of barriers to communication or trade. War , the use of force, is often thought of as the ultimate tool of international relations. A popular definition is that given by Clausewitz , with war being "the continuation of politics by other means". There is a growing study into "new wars" involving actors other than states. The study of war in international relations is covered by the disciplines of " war studies " and " strategic studies ". The mobilization of international shame can also be thought of as a tool of international relations.

Chapter 5 : International Blasphemy Day Marked as Persecution of Critics of Religion Continues Worldwide

WHAT'S NEW? Prevent Systematic Violence Against Religious and Ethnic Minorities On May 31, , Archbishop Timothy P. Broglio wrote to Representatives Trott and Schiff to commend them for introducing H. Res. in so doing seeking to prevent war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide against religious and ethnic groups in the Middle East by drawing upon relevant lessons from the past.

April 2, The Future of World Religions: Over the next four decades, Christians will remain the largest religious group, but Islam will grow faster than any other major religion. If current trends continue, by 2050 the number of Muslims will nearly equal the number of Christians around the world. The global Buddhist population will be about the same size it was in 2010, while the Hindu and Jewish populations will be larger than they are today. India will retain a Hindu majority but also will have the largest Muslim population of any country in the world, surpassing Indonesia. In the United States, Christians will decline from more than three-quarters of the population in 2010 to two-thirds in 2050, and Judaism will no longer be the largest non-Christian religion. Muslims will be more numerous in the U.S. Four out of every 10 Christians in the world will live in sub-Saharan Africa. These are among the global religious trends highlighted in new demographic projections by the Pew Research Center. Islam was second, with 1.5 billion adherents. If current demographic trends continue, however, Islam will nearly catch up by the middle of the 21st century. As a result, according to the Pew Research projections, by 2050 there will be near parity between Muslims and Christians. 2. The global Buddhist population is expected to be fairly stable because of low fertility rates and aging populations in countries such as China, Thailand and Japan. In 2010, censuses and surveys indicate, there were about 1.5 billion Buddhists. At the same time, however, the unaffiliated are expected to continue to increase as a share of the population in much of Europe and North America. As the example of the unaffiliated shows, there will be vivid geographic differences in patterns of religious growth in the coming decades. One of the main determinants of that future growth is where each group is geographically concentrated today. Religions with many adherents in developing countries where birth rates are high, and infant mortality rates generally have been falling are likely to grow quickly. Much of the worldwide growth of Islam and Christianity, for example, is expected to take place in sub-Saharan Africa. Globally, Muslims have the highest fertility rate, an average of 3.1 children per woman. Worldwide, Jewish fertility is 1.8. All the other groups have fertility levels too low to sustain their populations: Another important determinant of growth is the current age distribution of each religious group whether its adherents are predominantly young, with their prime childbearing years still ahead, or older and largely past their childbearing years. All the remaining groups have smaller-than-average youth populations, and many of them have disproportionately large numbers of adherents over the age of 40. In addition to fertility rates and age distributions, religious switching is likely to play a role in the growth of religious groups. But conversion patterns are complex and varied. In some countries, it is fairly common for adults to leave their childhood religion and switch to another faith. In others, changes in religious identity are rare, legally cumbersome or even illegal. The Pew Research Center projections attempt to incorporate patterns in religious switching in 70 countries where surveys provide information on the number of people who say they no longer belong to the religious group in which they were raised. In the projection model, all directions of switching are possible, and they may be partially offsetting. In the United States, for example, surveys find that some people who were raised with no religious affiliation have switched to become Christians, while some who grew up as Christians have switched to become unaffiliated. These types of patterns are projected to continue as future generations come of age. For more details on how and where switching was modeled, see the Methodology. For alternative growth scenarios involving either switching in additional countries or no switching at all, see Chapter 1. Over the coming decades, Christians are expected to experience the largest net losses from switching. Globally, about 40 million people are projected to switch into Christianity, while 100 million are projected to leave, with most joining the ranks of the religiously unaffiliated. All told, the unaffiliated are expected to add 97 million people and lose 36 million via switching, for a net gain of 61 million by 2050. Modest net gains through switching also are expected for Muslims 3 million, adherents of folk religions 3 million and members of other religions 2 million.

million. Jews are expected to experience a net loss of about 10 million people due to switching, while Buddhists are expected to lose nearly 3 million. International migration is another factor that will influence the projected size of religious groups in various regions and countries. Forecasting future migration patterns is difficult, because migration is often linked to government policies and international events that can change quickly. For this reason, many population projections do not include migration in their models. But working with researchers at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria, the Pew Research Center has developed an innovative way of using data on past migration patterns to estimate the religious composition of migrant flows in the decades ahead. For details on how the projections were made, see Chapter 1. The impact of migration can be seen in the examples shown in the graph at the right, which compares projection scenarios with and without migration in the regions where it will have the greatest impact. In Europe, for instance, the Muslim share of the population is expected to increase from 5%. In North America, the Hindu share of the population is expected to nearly double in the decades ahead, from 0.5%. Beyond the Year This report describes how the global religious landscape would change if current demographic trends continue. With each passing year, however, there is a chance that unforeseen events—war, famine, disease, technological innovation, political upheaval, etc. Owing to the difficulty of peering more than a few decades into the future, the projections stop at 2050. Readers may wonder, though, what would happen to the population trajectories highlighted in this report if they were projected into the second half of this century. And, if so, when? The answer depends on continuation of the trends described in Chapter 1. After that, the number of Muslims would exceed the number of Christians, but both religious groups would grow, roughly in tandem, as shown in the graph above. Due to the heavy concentration of Christians and Muslims in this high-fertility region, both groups would increase as a percentage of the global population. It bears repeating, however, that many factors could alter these trajectories. Or if disaffiliation were to become common in countries with large Muslim populations—as it is now in some countries with large Christian populations—that trend could slow or reverse the increase in Muslim numbers.

Regional and Country-Level Projections

In addition to making projections at the global level, this report projects religious change in countries and territories with at least 10 million people as of 2010, covering 195 countries and territories. Population estimates for an additional 36 countries and territories are included in regional and global totals throughout the report. Ongoing growth in both regions will fuel global increases in the Muslim population. One exception is Hindus, who are overwhelmingly concentrated in India, where the population is younger and fertility rates are higher than in China or Japan. As previously mentioned, Hindus are projected to roughly keep pace with global population growth. Europe is the only region where the total population is projected to decline. While Christians will remain the largest religious group in Europe, they are projected to drop from three-quarters of the population to less than two-thirds. Over the same period, the number of Hindus in Europe is expected to roughly double, from a little under 1 million. Buddhists appear headed for similarly rapid growth in Europe—a projected rise from 1 million. In the United States, for example, the share of the population that belongs to other religions is projected to more than double—albeit from a very small base—rising from 0.5%. And by the middle of the 21st century, the United States is likely to have more Muslims than 2. But Nigeria also will continue to have a very large Christian population. Indeed, Nigeria is projected to have the third-largest Christian population in the world by 2050, after the United States and Brazil. As of 2010, the largest religious group in France, New Zealand and the Netherlands is expected to be the unaffiliated. About These Projections

While many people have offered predictions about the future of religion, these are the first formal demographic projections using data on age, fertility, mortality, migration and religious switching for multiple religious groups around the world. The projections cover eight major groups: Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, adherents of folk religions, adherents of other religions and the unaffiliated (see Appendix C: Defining the Religious Groups). Because censuses and surveys in many countries do not provide information on religious subgroups—such as Sunni and Shia Muslims or Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox Christians—the projections are for each religious group as a whole. Data on subgroups of the unaffiliated are also unavailable in many countries. As a result, separate projections are not possible for atheists or agnostics. The projection model was developed in collaboration with researchers in the Age and Cohort Change Project at IIASA, who are world leaders in population projections methodology. The model uses an advanced version of

the cohort-component method typically employed by demographers to forecast population growth. It starts with a population of baseline age groups, or cohorts, divided by sex and religion. Each cohort is projected into the future by adding likely gains immigrants and people switching in and by subtracting likely losses deaths, emigrants and people switching out year by year. For more details, see the Methodology. An initial set of projections for one religious group, Muslims, was published in , although it did not attempt to take religious switching into account. Some social theorists have suggested that as countries develop economically, more of their inhabitants will move away from religious affiliation. While that has been the general experience in some parts of the world, notably Europe, it is not yet clear whether it is a universal pattern. Rather, the projections extend the recently observed patterns of religious switching in all countries for which sufficient data are available 70 countries in all. And the projections assume that people gradually are living longer in most countries. These and other key input data and assumptions are explained in detail in Chapter 1 and the Methodology Appendix A. Since religious change has never previously been projected on this scale, some cautionary words are in order. Population projections are estimates built on current population data and assumptions about demographic trends, such as declining birth rates and rising life expectancies in particular countries. The projections are what will occur if the current data are accurate and current trends continue. But many events – scientific discoveries, armed conflicts, social movements, political upheavals, natural disasters and changing economic conditions, to name just a few – can shift demographic trends in unforeseen ways. That is why the projections are limited to a year time frame, and subsequent chapters of this report try to give a sense of how much difference it could make if key assumptions were different. For more details on the possible impact of religious switching in China, see Chapter 1. Finally, readers should bear in mind that within every major religious group, there is a spectrum of belief and practice. The projections are based on the number of people who self-identify with each religious group, regardless of their level of observance. What it means to be Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish or a member of any other faith may vary from person to person, country to country, and decade to decade. Acknowledgements These population projections were produced by the Pew Research Center as part of the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures project, which analyzes religious change and its impact on societies around the world.

Chapter 6 : United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

The place to connect for coalitions of organizations who work on International Religious Freedom.

History[edit] This Act was a response to the growing concern about religious persecution throughout the world. There had been instances of toleration on the part of the governments when the religious rights of their citizens and others had been violated. The former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor , John Shattuck , cited specific countries that fail to recognize the fundamental right of religious freedom. There are suspect cases of minority oppression in Europe as well. It finds that over one-half of the population of the world lives under regimes that have strict policies against basic religious freedoms. Title VII of the Act has noted that some regimes engage in persecution that includes subjection of those people who engage in practice of religious faiths that are not state sponsored, to detention , torture , beatings, forced marriage , rape , imprisonment , enslavement , mass resettlement and death. If the definition of religious persecution were limited to only torture, imprisonment, or death, This Act was first introduced as S. It provided an alternative to H. During consideration of H. This forced several important changes to H. Brady to offer a floor amendment to H. Brady withdrew his amendment in committee, and added several provisions from S. Because this vote was one of the last substantive votes of the th Congress, the House agreed to take the Senate version in its entirety, as there was no time for a conference. The differences between H. This definition was so extreme as to exclude most countries in which gross violations of international religious freedom take place. IRFA, in contrast, used the internationally recognized definitions of "gross violations of human rights" in the requirement to take action in persecuting countries, on behalf of any religious believers. Further, IRFA put in place a comprehensive structure headed by a high-ranking diplomat who could negotiate with other governments on behalf of the President, rather than a mid-level White House official tasked with making findings, under FRPA. In addition to the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, and the Annual Report, the cornerstone of IRFA is the requirement that each year the President review and determine whether any country has met the threshold, based on international human rights law, of "Country of Particular Concern" or CPC, engaging in or tolerating "particularly severe violations of religious freedom. Based on similar successful provisions in trade law, IRFA included a ground-breaking provision that the goal of these negotiations was to secure a "Binding Agreement" to cease the violations. In such a case, sanctions would be withheld. Reversing the violations that had led to CPC designation, Vietnam issued a decree ordering the cessation of its practice of forced renunciations of faith, released all known religious prisoners, and allowed hundreds of churches it had shut down to re-open. The Act has seven titles, each containing numerous sections. Under Title I of the Act, a permanent infrastructure within the State Department is created for dealing with religious issues. The crux of the Act lies in Title IV. Title IV details the requirement that the President annually review and determine whether any country has met the CPC threshold, based in international human rights law, of "engaging in or tolerating particularly severe violations of religious freedom". Any designation then leads to a series of negotiations and consultations resulting in a number of possible actions available to the president, in consultation of the secretary of state, the ambassador at large, the National Security Council special advisor, and the commission, design a response to those countries. Under this section, the president must either enter into a binding agreement with the concerned country to end the religious persecution, or to choose from remedies outlined in Sec. This section offers the president fifteen options to exercise against countries engaging in religious persecution, ranging from private negotiations to sanctions, or a "commensurate action" not listed in IRFA but which would serve the purpose of advancing religious freedom. These include a private or a public demarche ; a private or public condemnation; the delay or cancellation of scientific or cultural exchanges; the denial, delay, or cancellation of working, official or state visits ; the withdrawing, limitation, or suspension of some forms of U. Title V of the act seeks to promote religious freedom abroad through the way of international media, exchanges and foreign service awards for working to promote human rights. Title VI requires appropriate training for asylum officers domestic , refugee officers abroad and judges. The final provision of the Act, Title VII contains miscellaneous provisions,

including , which urges transnational corporations to adopt codes of conduct sensitive to the right to freedom of religion. The Office Director and the staff monitor religious persecution and discrimination worldwide, and assist in recommending and implementing policies in respective regions or countries. In negotiations abroad dealing with religious freedom, the Ambassador outranks the country ambassador. The United States seeks to conform with international covenants that guarantee the inalienable right of religious freedom to every human being. The Act is committed to the promotion of freedom of religion and conscience throughout the world as a fundamental human right and a source of stability for all countries. It further seeks to assist newly formed democracies in implementing freedom of religion and conscience. Religious and human rights non-governmental organizations are sought to promote religious freedom. Its specific activities include: This report supplements the most recent Human Rights Reports. It includes individual country chapters on the status of religious freedom. States so designated are subject to further actions, including economic sanctions by the United States. Meetings are organized with foreign government officials at all levels, as well as religious and human rights groups in the United States and abroad, to address the problem of religious freedom. Providing testimony to the United States Congress, on issues of international religious freedom. Sponsorship of reconciliation programs in disputes that divide groups along lines of religious beliefs. The office seeks to support NGOs that are promoting reconciliation in such disputes. Outreach programs to American religious communities. The Commission may not implement sanctions on countries that violate religious freedom as it only has advisory and monitoring authority, including the authority to hold hearings. The Commission report also reviews and analyzes the work of Department of State. Under the Act, the special advisor is designated to serve as a resource for executive branch officials, compiling and analyzing information on the facts and circumstances of violations of religious freedom and formulating possible US reactions to religious persecution in the light of US national security interests. The position of the director shall be comparable to that of director within the executive office of the President. Several of the sponsors of the bill spoke of the United States as being born out of the need for religious freedom, and that this principle was codified in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Their contention made, to this is that the United States has the duty to uphold this fundamental right. The principles of international law were made inherent in the act so as to clarify its commitment to promote international religious freedom. This right explicitly includes the freedom to change religious faith or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance. All the members of the United Nations have adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the virtue of their UN membership and are pledged to uphold its provisions. The justification for this Act lies on the guarantee of freedom of religion found in the US Constitution and in principles of international law. Critics of this Act would probably contend that while the US Constitution does prohibit Federal and State governments from infringing on the religious liberties of people living within the US, it does not obligate or permit the US to use embargo or military intervention as means to uphold these rights abroad. The rejoinder would be that the US can prioritize those rights it holds most dear in its interaction with other states, and that IRFA is a means to help other nations secure freedoms to which they have already committed themselves, but may not in fact uphold. On February 10, , Rep. Grace Meng introduced the bill To amend the International Religious Freedom Act of to include the desecration of cemeteries among the many forms of violations of the right to religious freedom H. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act which amends the Act by specifically extending protection to non-theists as well as those who do not claim any particular religion.

Chapter 7 : Annual Report | United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

International relations (IR) or international affairs (IA) – commonly also referred to as international studies (IS), global studies (GS), or global affairs (GA) – is the study of interconnectedness of politics, economics and law on a global level.

Chapter 8 : Religion Under Attack More Than Ever as International Religious Freedom Act Turns 20 (Epo

World International Affairs Religion The annual International Blasphemy Day will be marked on Sunday as multiple countries continue to treat this as a criminal offense and dole out convictions.

Chapter 9 : The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, | Pew Research Center

USCIRF is an independent, bipartisan federal body that monitors violations of religious freedom abroad and makes recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State and Congress.