

Chapter 1 : AN EVALUATION OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF BEING

(Young:) problem of the home and women's domesticity I cannot here explain them in depth, but in order to describe Young's call for an ambiguous but flexible notion of the home, I have to tackle both feminist political stances.

Nathaniel Hawthorne Although Nathaniel Hawthorne called himself "the obscurest man in American letters," his achievements in fiction, both as short-story writer and novelist, offer models fashioned too well for contemporary and later writers to ignore. Young Nathaniel was a descendant of Puritan settlers in Salem and the adjoining communities. His father, captain of a ship, died in in Surinam Dutch Guiana of yellow fever. Reclusive by nature, she remained a widow, living in Salem except for the years she removed her family to Raymond, Maine, where her brother built her a house and where Nathaniel "ran quite wild" as he skated, fished, and hunted. That injury helped to fashion his personality, since he became a reader, continuing to read assiduously, especially on rainy days in Raymond, such authors as John Bunyan and William Shakespeare and acquired, as he later lamented, his "cursed habits of solitude. As a means of entertaining himself, his absent mother, and his Manning kin, he launched a newspaper, *The Spectator* , imitating the famous journal of Richard Steele and Joseph Addison and serving as writer, editor, printer done by careful hand-lettering , and publisher. In it he shared short essays, included some family gossip, made his debut as a poet, and created a comic classified notice aimed at finding a husband for his Aunt Mary. This experience in the workaday world revealed something important to him, as he told his sister Ebe: So that he could be closer to his mother and sisters, Hawthorne chose the frontier college of Bowdoin, enrolling there in and making lifelong friends, among them Jonathan Cilley, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Franklin Pierce, and Horatio Bridge. Typical of students who seriously weigh professional opportunities, Hawthorne in a letter to his mother mused upon various paths open to him: The being a minister is of course out of the Question. I should not think that even you could desire me to choose so dull a way of life. Oh, no, mother, I was not born to vegetate forever in one place, and to live and die as calm and tranquil as--a puddle of water. As to lawyers, there are so many of them already that one half of them upon a moderate calculation are in a state of actual starvation. And it would weigh very heavily on my conscience if, in the course of my practice, I should chance to send any unlucky patient "ad inferum," which being interpreted is "to the realms below. What do you think of my becoming an author, and relying for support upon my pen? I think the illegibility of my handwriting is very author-like. How proud you would feel to see my works praised by the reviewers, as equal to proudest productions of the scribbling sons of John Bull. But authors are always poor devils, and therefore Satan may take them. That he was willing to join that brotherhood of poor devils appears in his first forays into fiction while he was in college. Although he says nothing about daring Satan to take him, he apparently began a series of stories that came to be titled "Seven Tales of My Native Land" and started writing a novel, *Fanshawe* , set in a place much like Bowdoin and the neighboring town of Brunswick. Activities other than serious study must have filled his days, since, at graduation, he stood eighteenth in a class of thirty-five. If he left Bowdoin without honors, he departed with the intention of becoming a poor devil committed to rivaling the proud scribblers of John Bull. Preceding his graduation, his mother and sisters had returned to Salem, where he now joined them in , spending the decade that followed in a "dismal and squalid chamber" in his pursuit of literary fame. Completing the romance begun at Bowdoin, he offered *Fanshawe* to publishers; finding no one interested, he printed it at his own expense. This abortive piece takes its title from a pale scholar, a student at Harley College, who becomes a champion of Ellen Langton, a newcomer living with the college president and his wife, the Melmouths. Into this pastoral setting comes a mysterious stranger, Butler, who abducts Ellen, hoping to acquire her fortune. Learning of her absence, Dr. Melmouth, *Fanshawe*, and Walcutt set out separately to find her. *Fanshawe* discovers Ellen and Butler, the latter slipping and falling to his death as he climbs a cliff to attack *Fanshawe*. *Fanshawe* descends the precipice, kisses Ellen, and revives her. Out of gratitude for his rescuing her, Ellen offers to marry him. He declines, returns to his books, and dies shortly thereafter. Ellen and Walcutt eventually marry. Patterned after the novels of Sir Walter Scott, *Fanshawe* presented a variety of characters, a plot centering on romantic love, and acts of villainy and heroism. Its liveliest characters are Mrs.

Melmoth and Hugh Crombie, landlord of a tavern near Harley College; its strangest characters are a sick woman and her sister--the former is the demented mother of Butler, as the reader learns later. This mixture of romance, mystery, and abduction was a false start. So unhappy was Hawthorne with himself as a would-be novelist that he tried to round up every copy of the book to destroy; so closemouthed was he about its appearance that not even his wife knew he had published the work. Yet, it foreshadowed what was to come: The distance between Fanshawe and Arthur Dimmesdale is great, but Hawthorne took the first steps toward the Puritan minister in describing Fanshawe. His failed novel behind him, Hawthorne now attempted to make his mark as a writer of tales and sketches capable of doing, in part, for New England something similar to what Sir Walter Scott had done for Scotland. He hit upon scheme after scheme to organize his pieces into works a publisher would accept, offering tales under the titles "Seven Tales of My Native Land," "Provincial Tales," and "The Story Teller. The quest of Young Goodman Brown, a bridegroom married only three months to a young woman named Faith, transforms him from a trusting man into a doubting, despairing, and gloomy husband, neighbor, and townsman. What he sees or believes he sees or perhaps only dreams about during his night in the forest wrenches him free of all his moorings. Evil must be your only happiness. Welcome, again, my children, to the communion of your race! There is no good on earth, and sin is but a name. For to thee is this world given. He now mistrusts everyone; turns from the embrace of his wife, though he fathers a large family; and goes to his grave without a "hopeful verse upon his tomb-stone. Here was an obsessive personality, a stone-hearted man who cut himself loose from the magnetic chain of humanity. Twice-Told Tales ; republished with additional materials in and Mosses from an Old Manse For the American Whig Review, Webber proclaimed, "Hawthorne is national--national in subject, in treatment and in manner. Had Melville and other critics been privy to the notebooks that Hawthorne began to keep in May , they would have seen instantly how closely Hawthorne was observing the ways and thoughts of his fellow citizens. He recorded scenes in vivid details and jotted down ideas for tales and sketches. Hawthorne spent roughly a decade writing, submitting, receiving rejection notices, and, in moments of frustration, burning manuscripts. Excepting evening strolls, occasional hiking tours, and walks along the seashore, he saw little of the world. A temporary break in his routine came in January , when he accepted appointment as editor of The American Magazine of Useful and Entertaining Knowledge, located in Boston. He and his sister Elizabeth wrote most of the copy. By June the publisher was bankrupt, and Hawthorne returned to Salem. Writing to Longfellow to account for the time since their last meeting, Hawthorne confided: I have made a captive of myself and put me in a dungeon; and now I cannot find the key to let myself out. But intercourse came on its own terms, more through his tales and sketches than through confessional autobiographical prefaces, a point he later insisted upon in his conclusion to the preface for Mosses from an Old Manse: Her efforts to draw the Hawthorne siblings within her social and intellectual circle ultimately brought her semi-invalid sister, Sophia Amelia Peabody, and Hawthorne together. None of these works did well in the marketplace, although a later omnibus edition published by Ticknor and Fields found a wider readership. This dusty, stifling work provided but meager means toward his goal. More promising, he concluded, was a housing arrangement possibly available with a group of social reformers now assembling at Brook Farm in nearby West Roxbury. He invested funds in the experiment in communal living and moved to Brook Farm. The few months he lived there April to November proved disappointing, since his creativity fell to nil as he tended hogs and mucked out stables, and because, given housing problems on the farm, he saw no opportunity to hasten his wedding date. He, therefore, asked Sophia to do a courageous thing: They took their wedding vows 9 July and, once settled into the house, considered themselves a new Adam and Eve in Eden. Here was a garden ready planted for them, thanks to Henry David Thoreau, and here were such companions as Emerson, Ellery Channing, Bronson Alcott, and Margaret Fuller to engage in conversations or go hiking or boating with. The Old Manse was their home for three and a half years. Hawthorne entered one of his most productive periods, writing twenty sketches and tales, and celebrated with Sophia the birth of a daughter, Una on 3 March Part of that fear is gender-based, since her sexuality is something potentially, or actually, frightening. Hawthorne once again suggests that pride, manipulation of what is natural and good for selfish purposes, and unwillingness to accept human traits as well as limitations create a moral wrong. Although Peter Hovenden and his son-in-law, Robert Danforth,

out of their practical hardheadedness, would like to declare Owen Warland guilty of a moral wrong for not better serving his community and himself by using his considerable talents in clockmaking and repair more responsibly, they finally differ from him most sharply because he has the ambition to spiritualize matter. Their philosophic disagreement runs as a thread through "The Artist of the Beautiful," affording Hawthorne the chance to air aesthetic notions, some arguably cherished by him, some disdained. From what can be gathered from other tales where imagination clashes with practicality, as in "The Snow-Image," Hawthorne cherished these words spoken by the narrator of this tale: Ideas which grow up within the imagination, and appear so lovely to it, and of a value beyond whatever men call valuable, are exposed to be shattered and annihilated by contact with the Practical. It is requisite for the ideal artist to possess a force of character that seems hardly compatible with its delicacy; he must keep faith in himself, while the incredulous world assails him with utter disbelief. In creating the butterfly, a symbol not only of the imagination but of the soul as well, Owen was left with more than a tiny pile of rubbish, for his "spirit possessed itself in the enjoyment of the Reality" of his accomplishment. Owen himself seems too petulant and trifling to stand as a model of the true artist, his overindulgence in food and drink counting against him morally. The story both undercuts and supports Owen as an idealistic artist, a fact that contributes teasing levels of ambiguity to the piece. For that reason, it bears an unmistakable Hawthornean imprint, since he was a master of ambiguity. Ambiguities do not disappear from "The Celestial Rail-Road," but they figure far less prominently than does irony. Excellent though they were, these and other pieces written during the Old Manse period failed to earn sufficient income for the Hawthornes to pay their bills. His family shared living quarters with his mother and sister before he was able to rent a house and provide a separate apartment for them. Work at the Custom House occupied his mornings, but he did find time to assemble twenty-one uncollected stories and present them as Mosses from an Old Manse together with one of his most significant familiar essays, "The Old Manse," which provides an idyllic glance at his Edenic life in the famous old parsonage. Life in Salem proved anything but pleasant. A dying seaport, Salem hosted a customhouse filled with appointees with little or nothing to do. They idled their time away, as Hawthorne humorously revealed in an essay on the customhouse published as an introduction to *The Scarlet Letter*. But boredom is a minor thing compared to the loss of a job. The election of Zachary Taylor meant that the Whigs could replace Democratic appointees if they so chose. Downcast as he was over the loss of his position and his income, Hawthorne had a heavier blow to endure, the death of his mother on 31 July, "the darkest hour I ever lived. The intensity and force of the prose in his notebook was a prelude to the work that Hawthorne began soon thereafter, *The Scarlet Letter*. Living on funds that Sophia had stashed away, Hawthorne returned to the Puritan past that had so absorbed him in the earliest stages of his writing career in such tales as "Endicott and the Red Cross," where he noted the penalty invoked for adultery the wearing of the letter "A", "The Gray Champion," "The May-Pole of Merry Mount," "The Gentle Boy," and "Young Goodman Brown. In their treatment of her, the church leaders of Salem, where the action is set, and their followers mete out punishment with mean-spirited, intolerant rigor but are flexible enough, eventually, to see worth in her as seamstress, nurse, and conscientious mother. Hawthorne thus sets in motion forces that play themselves out with staggering impact, the earliest example of its power coming when Hawthorne read the just completed romance to his wife.

Chapter 2 : Hong Kong housing | South China Morning Post

Essay about Heideggers Being Heidegger believes that's the role and ultimate goal of philosophy is to achieve an understanding and awareness of one's being. Heidegger rejects the modern idea of progress which plans a projected future of society.

Its environment is suitable for the work of building and it is also where humans dwell. Building and dwelling are fundamental to human experience. It is near the river, a natural entity, that humans can become homely in this world. Building alongside a river is good because it is cultivable land and it is where livestock can be raised. Life can flourish around a river; it is the perfect locale for a home. Heidegger roots his philosophy not only primordially in natural spaces where Dasein dwells, spaces which cover the lands around us, but also in language where Dasein can express himself. Who is the builder of this home? Is the subject who is at home a gender neutral subject? Home and domesticity have been highly scrutinized by feminist theorists. They have been in charge of domestic work within the boundaries of a home. Accordingly, throughout the last century domestic life has been exposed as an important oppressive tool alongside family and marriage. My aim is to determine what a home is in Heidegger and who occupies it. The project is two-fold. Second, I want to further ask who builds the home and connect it to gender. Is dwelling gendered in any way? Are men and women builders alike? Variations on a Theme to specify if home is a gendered concept. If rivers are important to human destiny, we must ask ourselves about how we talk about them. A river gives humanity a "locale" to build itself upon. Here the river itself is tied to language: It is a reworking of concepts that have been previously fixed by a broader understanding. This broader understanding covers up and hides multiple meanings. Heideggerian recollection is a dynamic mode of historical analysis that does not take for granted general interpretations of history. Insofar as historical facts are always interpreted by human beings in particular contexts, the danger is that through the appropriation of their meanings other meanings are concealed in the process. In order to accomplish a genuine recollection, we ought to uncover various meanings concealed in history by dominant interpretations of certain concepts. Language has to be reworked and reappropriated constantly in order to achieve this goal. He talks about genuine inner recollection against non-genuine recollection. But what exactly is the former? In contrast, a non-genuine recollection is stuck in the past if it only concentrates on what is long gone. One can fall in the trap of recollecting past meanings without trying to go beyond them and create them anew. In this respect, recollection ought to be dynamic: The dynamism of the genuine recollection is best expressed in these lines: And inner recollection would be altogether the most profound intimation when that which is to come, that which intimation is otherwise concerned, comes out of what has been. Intimating, and especially those who are full of intimation, extend and proceed simultaneously into what is coming and what has been. What is more, it is a constant temporal movement. As Heidegger succinctly puts it: Heidegger sees rivers as this vanishing and intimating entity that has a close bond to recollection. The flow of a river signifies movement that happens continuously in time. Here we can see that a natural entity, just like the river, is a house for human beings, as much as language is the house of being. Rivers are locale for humanity. Indeed, Heidegger states that the river offers humanity a place to dwell. But what is a dwelling place? In *The Ister*, Heidegger defines dwelling as such: Such things indeed belong to dwelling, yet they do not fulfill or ground its essence. Dwelling takes on an abode and is an abiding in such an abode, specifically that of human beings upon this earth. The abode is a *whiling*. It needs a while. In such a while, human beings find rest. Dwelling is a place where we inhabit our essence as historical beings. Dwelling is where one can sojourn, live, and come to rest. The river is the location where human beings can build, have life and maintain themselves in their essence. If dwelling takes a while to happen, it must be something difficult to achieve: A locale has a position in space and when we journey there is a succession of steps we take to encounter what is foreign. This succession is temporal and so is journey. One need to lose oneself into foreign grounds, then return home to fully seize his homeliness and thus dwell properly. It means to dwell. The river thus brings human beings into their own and maintains them in what is their own. Whatever is their own is that to which human beings belong and must belong if they are to fulfill

whatever is destined to them, and whatever is fitting, as their specific way of being. Dwelling is the end of any kind of building, but when we build we are already dwelling: In his analysis of dwelling, the activities of construction and cultivation are seen as the real activities where human beings dwell, or at least the ones which exemplify the essence of dwelling the most². I shall address this claim in the second section of my paper. The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving. Hence, it is clear that natural spaces are where humans dwell, just as the river in *The Ister*. Building, or creating things, as well as cultivating, is a way of being in the world with our environment by preserving it. We preserve the world at the same time that we produce new meaningful things which are not damageable to the environment. It is a world-founding moment that divides itself into building in the world and preserving the world. We attain to dwelling by means of building and through this activity of construction we establish our world. But language is also a human-made construction and therefore it is another place wherein the human essence can unfold, thus intimately tying it together with dwelling as part of our essence. We create our environment by constructing and we actively create meanings, but as we will see later on, these are meaningful boundaries. In so doing, we assert our sense of identity and our history within a delimited sphere, whether it is a linguistic or a physical one: Dwelling, as preserving, keeps the fourfold in that with which mortals stay: Cultivating and construction are building in the narrower sense. Dwelling, insofar as it keeps or secures the fourfold in things, is, as this keeping, a building. The question guiding my analysis is whether building can be conceived as gender neutral. Then I will turn to Iris Marion Young and Luce Irigaray to investigate why they consider the Heideggerian dwelling as male-biased and how they flesh out a more inclusive understanding of dwelling. In her paper *Urban Flesh*, Gail Weiss considers how cities create and sustain meanings for human beings. Weiss focuses on the specific kind of differences urban environments impose upon embodied life. Weiss argues that the construction of cities regulates our spatial interactions in them. In other words, the manner in which we organize space determine how bodies circulate within it. In this context, Weiss discusses violence and vulnerability by bringing up the example of the attack on the World Trade Center in , which also can be used as an illustration of her more far reaching endeavour of understanding our relationship to space. Weiss is concerned about how inanimate things such as buildings can have an impact on our corporeal interactions with our environment: The material destruction of our world [â€] forces us to contend with the specific but usually invisible ways in which our surrounding environment actively shapes the intercorporeal interactions that help to construct our own sense of bodily agency. And as beings in and of the world, our sense of bodily agency provides the parameters that delimit the very nature of our emplacement within the world, that is, our ability to dwell within it. Our bodily agency is always determined by the spatial interactions we have in a world that we build. Being prevented to live or to dwell somewhere actually shapes our existence insofar as it excludes us from having certain interactions with others. Dwelling somewhere implicates having our roots and our sense of identity intimately related to a specific place. Spatiality qua environments and surroundings bestow upon human beings possible directions and this manner it actually shapes their identity and their agency. Thus relations between space, buildings and beings are closely intertwined. What is more, how we are positioned in those spaces also makes a difference: As such, Weiss simultaneously elaborates upon, extends and criticizes Heidegger by addressing the question of embodiment alongside with that of dwelling: This line of questioning is needed if we are to see which being is more likely to dwell or which is precluded from dwelling in cities. Weiss argues that we ought to ask which subject is the builder and what kind of bodies is more able to dwell in a specific environment. In order to find more theoretical resources to argue that Heidegger notion of dwelling is male-biased and exclusive of other work that human beings undertake, I will now move forward to Iris Marion Young. In *House and Home*: Perhaps even more significantly, men dominate the ranks of those who make buildings decisions â€” corporate boards of directors, architects, planners, engineers. Even in the most egalitarian households, the work of building and structural maintenance falls often most to men. Women were those maintaining and preserving the household and thus by definition also working in a dwelling place. Although they were not builders as such, they were for a long time those preserving the existence of homeplace. It is rather surprising that taking care of a human being, an act whereby we allow him or her to exist and develop his or her subjectivity, is somehow considered as less genuine work.

Chapter 3 : Nathaniel Hawthorne

Renting an apartment is only a transient solution to our housing problem. Pre Reading (pg.): What is an allegory? Purpose for Reading: To recognize Hawthorne's allegory pay attention to the way he describes characters and look for the instructive (didactic) purpose.

When questions are raised about principles, the network of exchange that they have opened becomes confused, and the order that they have founded declines. A principle has its rise, its period of reign, and its ruin. Its death usually takes disproportionately more time than its reign. This gesture not only concerns the conditions of emergence for any self-interpretation of the being for whom being is an issue, but also intimates the irreducible thrown-ness and embeddedness of any philosophical inquiry. In other words, the pretension that thought can extricate itself from temporality, existential spatiality, etc. An honest phenomenology cannot take refuge in idealist or realist ontologies without forsaking the significance of phenomenology as a desire for the truth of things themselves. Dishonesty would entail a retreat from the phenomenon into a theory of consciousness and its objects, an escape that suppresses and conceals its own radical temporality. In this light, when *Sein und Zeit* appeared, a great astonishment arose in the reading public at the time. No one but his students had any scent or taste of the brew Heidegger had been cooking up for so long. Indeed, he had published nothing since his Habilitation work on Duns Scotus in *Out of this facticity* emerges, in a rough and ready way, *Sein und Zeit*, a torso inscribing its perhaps illusory hope of more time to eventually finish itself. An honest philosophy, as it is born out of facticity, will acknowledge the finitude and incompleteness of all works of thought. That which has changed for our era of readers of *Being and Time* is the availability of the lectures courses prior, simultaneous, and posterior to *Being and Time*. In this way, the horizons of astonishment in the face of *Being and Time* are slowly being transformed "but not eliminated" as these do not ultimately depend upon the gossip of the *Anyone Das Man*. At the same time, a differing understanding has also been facilitated by the growth of a quite considerable and increasingly diverse tradition of Heidegger scholarship. In this way, we will begin to disclose the passage of original, ecstatic temporality. This question provokes us to explore the greater questions of the meaning of the project, of which the published fragment of *Being and Time* was merely a step along the way. There have been intimations by those who have sought to put down their spectacles for awhile and become open to the phenomenon of finite existence. Indeed, reams have been written on *Being and Time* [v], but usually not in relation to any other contemporary texts or phenomena. In this way, he ends his otherwise great book before any consideration of *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Such reticence regarding important lecture courses and a third published work of the period gives the impression that these are dispensable, that they are merely commentaries on the main work or serve only to unpack what is already there in *Being and Time* or indeed they need not be read to understand being and time. The centrality that has been given to the latter text creates a circumstance in which *Being and Time* is re-mystified, de-contextualized, or, as Heidegger says in his early lectures, un-worlded. In other words, that which Kisiel has applauded as our ability to finally understand this work is tragically eliminated in a repetition of an artificial astonishment in the face of a magnum opus. It could be noted that in light of the irreducible facticity of honest philosophical inquiry that this, as Bataille writes in *Theory of Religion*, is quite appropriate "philosophy is a building site, always incomplete. The facticity of incompleteness is indicated by Heidegger as *Care*, as that which is incomplete in itself and as that which attains a makeshift unity in the resoluteness of a being toward death. It is in the singularization of the self, as Heidegger suggests in his lectures on Leibniz, that a world is projected as the a priori horizon of original, ecstatic temporality. It is on this basis that we can then turn *Kehre* toward a metontological topos of an-archic praxis in which *Dasein* is open to the truth of being. In this light, our point of departure will be the various texts which lie ready to hand, but as we seek an understanding of radical phenomenology, our beginning will be to enter into the question itself. Amid the event of anticipatory resoluteness, there is a radical singularization of the self, which discloses a sense of my own be-ing, and of my possibility which is its most pressing issue. It appears as a disturbance, a disruption of familiar expectancy, and incites a questioning which

tears us out of our absorption in the familiar, and beyond the merely unfamiliar, into the uncanny. Construction concerns the self-expression of existence, a forming of concepts, logos, amidst a pre-theoretical and pre-practical topos. A return to the phenomenon must be a counter-ruination, a cultivation of a fragile topos of meaning, self-expression, or as Dilthey sought, an independent ground for the cultivation of philosophy in all of its diversity. Life expresses itself, and reflects upon this articulation in its quest for an understanding within the horizons of temporal existence. Heidegger, for his part, seeks to place temporality transcendental imagination at the heart of a phenomenology of factual, lived existence, be-ing *Sherover* "indeed, into the heart of philosophy itself. This will be a provisional indication of the phenomenon of ecstatic temporality as the topos for a hermeneutics of existence. I will explore the topos as the be-ing of Dasein and of the concomitant peculiarity of indication and expression that is necessary in light of this radical singularity. Heidegger will seek to indicate a topos for an intimate self-interpretation of Dasein. The latter is exemplified by Husserl, in his lecture course, *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*. For Heidegger, finite existence is the place where the phenomenon of the questioner emerges and has its being. This expression is prospective as it indicates aspects of existence without however, as of yet, considering the event of expressive origination for this conceptuality. In this text, the existentials, or in the words of *History*, the characters of being-in-the-world, are explicitly disclosed as projections of ecstatic or original [xii] temporality, a possibility only hinted at in *Being and Time*. Indeed, at the climax of this lecture, in the last few utterances, Heidegger dramatically reveals the transcendental power of imagination to be reason itself "a pure, sensuous reason. In this light, I will propose, following *Schalow*, the resuscitation of a non-idealist interpretation of imagination in the context of a hermeneutics of existence. I will lay out an interpretation of the existential, indigenous expression in the published fragment of *Being and Time*, notably these existentials of Care, Anxiety, being-toward death, Guilt, and Resoluteness. In a discussion only hinted at in *Being and Time*, Heidegger engages in a destruktion of the doctrines of judgment and substance, in which he uncovers logos and being as distinct compartments of existence, where the former has no priority. I will begin with the prospective existential of Care, a place of thrown projection, fallenness, which is disclosed in the disposition of anxiety *Angst*, as indicated in Division One of *Being and Time*, but only fully analysed in Division Two. It is, as with Chapter 3, prospective in that Care, as being-in-the-world will be disclosed as an indication of existence that is limited in itself and can only acquire its meaning beyond itself in the ecstatic projections of temporality, the subject matter of the next chapter. I will close with the question of the temporality of anticipatory resoluteness and of the implications of such a radical temporality for thought and expression. Ultimately, one listens, one is silent "so as to allow for the self-expression of phenomenon that we ourselves are. One may wish to pass over this myth as a literary curiosity. Yet, this would be to miss the radical significance and potentialities of a radical phenomenology and turn from fundamental ontology to metontology. An interesting feature of this work is her attempt to create an interface with some important figures in Analytic philosophy, such as *Searle*. Perhaps for this reason, she abandons the ecstatic temporality of *Being and Time*, for considerations of time and death in social and cultural contexts. This debate seems to be in a perpetual state of post-ponement. I have taken this point in respect to the strategy of reading Heidegger backwards.

Chapter 4 : BryonySeries: Dr. Heidegger's Experiment by Nathaniel Hawthorne

Heidegger's Early Philosophy: The Phenomenology of Ecstatic Temporality () is published by Bloomsbury Publishing. When questions are raised about principles, the network of exchange that they have opened becomes confused, and the order that they have founded declines.

January 24, To read George Steiner is to bask in the presence of a great intellectual mind at work. Derrida merely muddies the water as Nietzsche would say , but Steiner puts you in touch with one of the most obscure, difficult, and significant philosophers of the 20th century. This is a short book, but it is slow reading. Indeed, the first half of the book is titled "Basic Terms," an understanding of which will enable the reader to follow what Heidegger is trying to say about existence, authentic being, etc.. To wit, Heidegger truly believes that we are spoken through language, so his philosophizing takes the form of etymologizing, going back to the origins of words, and recovering what can help us to think Being. According to Steiner, we never do get to defining Being, but the journey is rich and the effort is worthwhile. Heidegger wants to overcome Western Metaphysics, which has been determined by Plato who privileges the noumenal realm of ideas over the phenomenal world we live in and Aristotle who objectifies the natural, phenomenal world by subjecting it to study. Both strategies have left us without the ability to listen to or open ourselves up to Being, to standing in awe before its mystery. Because we are both beings-in-the-world and beings-in-time. Death, for Heidegger, "is not an event; it is a phenomenon to be understood existentially," a process, part of our becoming. There is something extremely liberating in this notion, and both Heidegger and Steiner are aware of it. Angst, or existential anxiety, is not something to be eliminated with facile religious beliefs, counseling, or psycho-pharmaceuticals; it is to be understood as the mark, the indication of a being striving to live authentically, embracing fate that which has been sent to a being-in-the-world. Because we are beings-in-the-world we must also be beings that care: How does one reconcile caring, commitment, and concentration camps? Steiner is neither persecutorial nor apologetic. And he is much more disturbed by what was not said than by what was. Steiner has a difficult time getting past this, but does not belabor the issue. But Steiner is unable to conclude that Heidegger was an anti-Semite; there does not seem to be enough convincing evidence for that. But still, why the silence? My field is Comparative Literature, not Philosophy, and I feel as though I learned a tremendous amount by reading this book. If you only read one introduction to Heidegger, this monograph should be it.

Chapter 5 : Affordable Housing

This paper also discusses Heidegger's ideas about death. Human resources spend their lives as a type of housing to avoid mortality. the problem of human.

July 26, DOI: In this paper, we argue that the Anthropocene is relevant for philosophy of technology because it makes us sensitive to the ontological dimension of contemporary technology. In consequence, technology in the Anthropocene cannot be limited to the ontic domain of artefacts, but must be acknowledged to concern the whole of Being. This also indicates how the Anthropocene has a technical origin in an ontological sense, which is taken to imply that the issue of human responsibility must be primarily understood in terms of responsibility. Box, GL Nijmegen, the Netherlands; j. Research in Philosophy and Technology 1. The Anthropocene Is at Hand Although the concept of the Anthropocene was first developed in the scientific fields of geology and Earth-system science, it was never a purely disinterested, descriptive account, but included an explicit prescriptive dimension. Descriptively, the Anthropocene indicates the geological epoch in which the activity of industrialized humanity becomes the dominant factor in shaping the Earth and its life-supporting systems Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill Prescriptively, the Anthropocene takes account of how humanity faces the perilous situation in which the ecological aftermath of Earth-shaping threatens the very existence of our species cf. Issues like global warming, deforestation, pollution, reduction of biodiversity etc. We call this the ecological demand of the Anthropocene, since it concerns the oikos of the anthropic geoforce which will become uninhabitable unless we manage it differently. In his review of the concept of the Anthropocene in geology and Earth-system science, Jeremy Baskin recognizes the pairing of descriptive and prescriptive dimensions, 22 and shows how responses to the ecological demand follow a paradigm of management: In almost all of the major accounts of the concept it is assumed that [the Anthropocene] requires a trinity of techniques: For instance, the concept of the Anthropocene has been criticized for its hidden normative agenda. Accordingly, the name capitalocene is deemed more appropriate Moore; cf. Latour, 7; cf. Such a critique is unquestionably oriented towards management insofar as it calls for a reconfiguration of this force field in dealing with the ecological demand. As a final example, various ethicists have developed ways to deal with the ecological demand of the Anthropocene in a normative way, for example by arguing for a less anthropocentric and more ecological way of dealing with other species, by laying bare the normative dimension of carbon footprints Shue, or by making a case for demographic management Collings, etc. Such contributions are oriented towards management insofar as they sketch out new ways of managing our existence on the planet, including its normative dimension. The coupling of descriptive and prescriptive dimensions in both the natural scientific account of the Anthropocene geology, Earth-system science as well as in the humanities social science, political science, economy, ethics brings to light the following philosophically relevant characteristic of the Anthropocene: Research in Philosophy and Technology in order to safeguard our habitat. This managerial orientation envelops the whole planet and the identities of all its inhabitants, whereby these identities appear in a remarkable way due to the pre-eminent Anthropocenic phenomenon of global warming. It is thereby inescapably bound up with global warming, both as its source and potential remedy, thus revealing the human identity as anthropic geoforce and planetary manager. These shifts in identity bring the managerial dimension of the Anthropocene under consideration in a way that is not primarily situated on the level of things whether subjective or objective, human or non-human, but first concerns the way in which things appear to us, whilst we are included in this mode of appearance. The Anthropocene is therefore not merely a description of a planetary condition, nor a prescription on how to deal with the implications of the ecological demand, but has ontological status insofar as it concerns a mode of appearance according to which the world appears as managerial resource for human beings as planetary managers. We can therefore say that the Anthropocene is at hand: The answer takes the form of a triptych. First, there is little doubt that the Anthropocene is a consequence of the technological exploitation of earthly materials and processes: Secondly, the Anthropocene can be said to be an epistemological consequence of technology insofar as it only appears to us through the computational management of large amounts of collected

scientific data. Global warming cannot be directly seen, but can be inferred and computed cf. Morton , 3, 73, Put in terms of philosophy of technology, our knowledge of the Anthropocene is technically mediated inasmuch as epistemological access is solely possible via technologies satellites, laboratory equipment, carbon-measurements, etc. Further, the concretisation of Enframing gives rise to a re-examination of the origin of the Anthropocene, which is usually understood in terms of particular industrial technologies, but is ontologically situated in our interpretation. Understanding the origin in this way will subsequently be shown to necessitate a reinterpretation of human responsibility for and in the Anthropocene. Philosophical inquiry is inclusive, meaning that it is not principally about a domain of beings that stand over against me as isolated objects which is the case in scientific inquiry; cf. Heidegger b, 83 , but concerns the mode of appearance according to which I discover such beings. Research in Philosophy and Technology This mode is not itself a being, i. Zwieter, Blok, and Lemmens Whereas this rendition remains rather abstract, the Anthropocene offers a concrete indication of the inclusivity in the whole of Being. Rather, reversely, our rationality, objective science, and technological activity appear as expressions of the anthropic geoforce, which is to say inclusive to the Earth. The Earth is thereby not primarily understood as the objective totality of Earthly things, but as an indication of the whole, i. Further, and more specifically, in its managerial orientation, the Anthropocene offers a concrete experience of what Heidegger calls the essence of technology. Heidegger asks about the essence, i. Given the ontological direction of questioning, Enframing is not theoretically investigated as an objective domain, but comes under consideration as a whole, i. Again, whereas this remains abstract, the Anthropocene offers a concrete experience of Enframing. In consequence to this orientation, the notion of Enframing has regularly been criticized for its totalitarian and bloated character, and has conversely been interpreted as a regional ontology. For Feenberg, this account is far too abstract and totalizing, since it fails to discriminate between technologies associated with electricity, atom bombs, and agriculture , He therefore explores alternative, more democratic or democratizing technologies that exceed the totalizing region of Enframing: Secondly, in postphenomenology, Peter-Paul Verbeek has argued that whereas Enframing may be a condition of possibility for modern technologies, it does not follow that all dimensions of such technologies can be reduced to this condition , Verbeek and Ihde thus take issue with the totalitarian aspect of Enframing, and in arguing that it depicts a region of beings at most, they emphasise a less reductionist and more expansive perspective on the rich intricacy of various human-technology relations cf. However, the very concreteness of inescapable managerialism in the Anthropocene indicates that Enframing can no longer be reduced to a limited region, but must be acknowledged to encompass the whole Earth. In philosophy of technology, the critiques concerning the totalitarianism of Enframing have given rise to an alternative, less reductionist method of questioning technology, which empirically analyzes specific technological artefacts and their implications. This would take the Earth as the meta-region housing all the technological regions in question, viz. However, such an orientation overlooks the third aspect of the triptych, i. Accordingly, if the Anthropocene offers a concrete experience of the mode of appearance according to which we appear as managers of the planetary oikos which jointly appears as managerial resource , this additionally makes clear how Enframing cannot be understood as categorical concept under which the totality of technological things is inappropriately subsumed, but concerns the whole of Being qua mode of appearance cf. The implication for philosophy of technology is that rejecting Enframing as a bloated category and conversely turning to specific technological things concurrently turns a blind eye to the ontological dimension, which in the Anthropocene is not only experienced concretely, but is philosophically relevant and urgent. In Earth-system science and geology, the origin of the Anthropocene is situated in the industrial revolution, where humanity taps into a vast well of fossil fuels on an unprecedented scale, and accordingly becomes the dominant Earth-shaper Crutzen ; cf. This origin is thereby interpreted on the ontic level, i. The encounter between beings engendering the Anthropocene the anthropic geoforce, fossil fuels, etc. Understanding origin in this way sheds light on the question of human responsibility. This immediacy is evident in the Anthropocenic sciences, where the fact of the anthropos as dominant Earth-shaper immediately translates into the task of taking responsibility for the planet according to a managerial paradigm: When seen in light of the above asserted ontological origin of the Anthropocene, however, the issue of responsibility must be primarily understood in

terms of responsiveness. If the Anthropocene has ontological status qua concretization of Enframing, this mode of appearance cannot itself be anthropogenic, since it concerns the whole of Being and thus already includes us. Hence, taking responsibility for Earthly beings on the ontic level is already responsive to this call on the ontological level. What follows is that although humans are now responsible for managing the planet, they cannot be held responsible for bringing about the situation in which taking responsibility becomes imperative. What follows is that because human responsiveness to the ecological demand is situated at an ontological level, humans cannot be irreducibly listed as one geoforce amongst many cf. Anthropocene in Danger In this inal section, we ask whether the Anthropocene accords to what Heidegger calls the danger of Enframing, as well as its saving power. We will argue that the answer is radically ambiguous, meaning that the Anthropocene can be said to accord and discord with the danger of Enframing. We elaborate on this by showing how in the Anthropocene, the Earth comes under consideration as having ontic-ontological status. Rather than consisting in ontic dangers afiliated with technology, e. Hence, the danger concerns our self-evident understanding of ourselves as manager of the planetary standing-reserve, meaning the failure to recognize Enframing as a mode of appearance, which entails that we forget how our managerial encounter with the world is already responsive to the claiming call of Enframing. At irst glance, this perspective may seem nostalgic, since we can also regard the old windmill to challenge the wind to deliver energy, but simply to a different end, e. It is worth considering, however, that such a critique, albeit theoretically correct, begs the question of whether it does not itself accord with the danger of Enframing insofar as it indifferently and apriori encounters both windmill and turbine as standing-reserve energy resource. To address the former point irst, in what sense can the Anthropocene be said to demonstrate the danger of Enframing? In the Anthropocene, the exclusivity of the standing-reserve is cemented insofar as we now cannot encounter the Earth otherwise than as managerial resource cf. Be that as it may, while the Anthropocene is dangerously monolithic in how the Earth concretely appears as managerial resource standing-reserve for human beings as manager of these resources, it simultaneously“and likewise concrete-ly“conveys the epochal character of this situation. On the one hand, the Anthro- pocene by deinition is a geological epoch, implying that it has a geological origin and will have a geological termination. Our previously dis- cussed tree offers further clariication: This is to say that the identity of the tree has changed, and its current appearance as resource in light of global warming i. The implication for the question regarding the danger of Enframing is that the Anthropocene accords and discords with it. The Anthropocene accords with the danger insofar as it cements the exclusivity of encountering the Earth qua managerial resource standing-reserve for human existence qua manager of these resources. At the same time, the Anthropocene discords with the danger insofar as it offers the opportunity to concretely experience the epochality of the hegemony of Enframing. This then constitutes a countertendency to the danger of Enframing by explicitly manifesting how human existence as planetary manager is embedded in a responsiveness to a speciic call arising in the epoch of the Anthropocene cf. The danger of the Anthropocene is therefore radically ambiguous. How does Heidegger understand the saving power? Like the essence and danger of technology, the saving power is ontological. It therefore neither consists in renouncing technology cf. Rather, the saving power concerns the awareness of human existence as responsive to the call of being, meaning that Enframing is perceived as an epochal mode of appearance to which our managerial encounter with the world is already responsive. In recognizing this, we can become perceptive to how the mode of appearance of Enframing involves a withdrawal insofar as the possibility of a different mode of revealing remains hidden. We can experience this withdrawal, for instance, in our contemporary tendency towards indifferent responsiveness when we ind ourselves disposed to regard both the old windmill and modern turbine indifferently as energy resources cf. Baskin , 21; cf. The saving power then means that we become perceptive of this withdrawal, which entails resistance to being indifferently absorbed in managerially attending to the standing-reserve, thus gaining a glimpse at the possibility of a wholly different mode of revealing cf. Now, for Heidegger, the danger and saving power of Enframing solely involve the ontological level, meaning that the rise of a different mode of appearance is not dependent on human interactions with ontic things e. Research in Philosophy and Technology technologies , but depends on the call of being Heidegger , 52; cf. Since our interactions with things on the ontic level are already responsive to a call on the

ontological level cf. Secondly, releasement acknowledges the importance of technologies into our life, whilst simultaneously leaving them outside. In order to develop this point, we must first understand how responsiveness is always eco-logical: In this sense, the oikos is prerequisite for human responsiveness. This offers a first characterization of the Earth as ontic condition of possibility for the Anthropocene.

Chapter 6 : Heidegger's Early Philosophy – Introduction – James Luchte: Philosophy

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A being, we can say, using the participle is an individual that is, whereas being using the verbal noun is, as it were, what any individual being is engaged in. The totality of individual being makes up being. For Aristotle, it is the study of anything that is, whether material or immaterial. For Thomas Aquinas, it refers to all that is and their ultimate support ultimate principle. For some contemporary thinkers, being is abstract and refers to nothing concrete. It is therefore important to point out that the entire metaphysical journey is that of trying to understand being in this effort to explicate being, Heidegger the great German philosopher is not left out. The problem which Heidegger sets out to investigate is not the problem of man but the problem of Being. He feels passionately that it is necessary to restate this ancient problem which has been neglected. So it is fitting that we should raise a new question of the meaning being! Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of being and to do so correctly Heidegger: According to Ireogbu That in its historical journey, something has gone wrong with metaphysics. It has missed its way in terms of the primary object of its occupation: But metaphysics in the process forgot the most fundamental subject of its inquiry. Firstly, he started by posing the fundamental ontological questions. Why is there being rather than nothing? The first problem we shall encounter here is that of articulating the nature of something that is veiled or hidden. This according to Heidegger makes the forgetfulness of being a part of its reality. Metaphysically the concept of Being is prior to the concept of man. It becomes problematic to attempt to draw the concept of Being from that of man. In fact the concept of man is always dependent on a particular concept of Being. It is the horse that should draw the cart and not the other way round. Not only is Heidegger consciously silent on the God question, his preponderant use of pre-Socratic text is denounced by Levinas as anti-scripture. Further more, the question of Being has been very elusive and difficult to grasp. Much as the history of philosophy is riddled with bad answers that need questioning. Remains a question to be now and again restated in new vocabularies, given new circumstances. It is therefore our intention to re-examine and re-evaluate old questions within the context of contemporary experiences. The contemporary experience seems to be based on concrete issues and questions and not on abstract entities like Being and non-Being. Is one of the most important questions that face man in the contemporary era? A world where Being is neglected would not be a meaningful world. It is in fact impossible to neglect it as Being speaks for itself. Chapter One 1 deals with scientific methodology. First is the analytic method which will enable us reflect systematically, coherently, consistently, logically and otherwise. If Being is veiled it is only through analyses that its hideousness shall be unveiled. Secondly, we shall be employing the critical method. This second method shall enable us to examine the strength and weakness of Being as a concept. The next work to be reviewed here is titled: For him, existence within time refers to our fundamental way of Being which simultaneously spans and is constituted by the three dimensions of time-past, present and future. The third book under review is titled: The central theme of this companion is fundamental ontology. It is the preliminary analytic of the Dasein which is the sole focus where the Being-question is posed and tackled. The fourth book to be reviewed here is authored by Pantaleon Ireogbu titled Metaphysics: The author, insist here that Being is the fundamental bedrock of any metaphysics. For Ireogbu, Being is and non-beings is not. Being is englobing and encompassing. It signifies the totality of reality. He especially devoted chapter 17 of this work to explaining, analyzing and evaluating Heidegger ontological difference. The Problem Of Metaphysics, authored by Fredrick Sontag, published in Pennsylvania by Chandler Publishing Company in According to the author, philosophy, in so far as it is, is a search for first principles is the basic assumption implicit in any question in metaphysics. It teaches us a radical form of questioning. The search for and the questioning of first principles. The author insist here that metaphysics deals with problems which themselves involves even more fundamental problems, and the exasperation involves in this difficult enterprise comes from an impartial desire simply to settle a question without first reformulating and criticizing the question itself. One of these basic metaphysical problem is that

of the true meaning of Being. Chapter six 6 of this book centers on the problem of being as Heidegger encountered it when he contrasted being with non-being. How is it that a radical-phenomenology must become ontology? Northern Illinois University Press. Cambridge University Press Ltd. Iroegbu, Pantaleon, , Metaphysics: Salles, John, , Delimitations: Watts, Martin, , Heidegger: Hodder and Stoughton Press.

Chapter 7 : Building Dwelling Thinking Martin Heidegger Pdf To Excel - softzonerise

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In order to move from love to worldliness I will engage in the practice of rigorous storytelling. Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, Letters. Institutions, Organisations and Governance Being a housing association. Man and his Dwelling Place. Holzwege is Heidegger's first post-war book and contains some of the major expo. Download as PDF File. From Futurism to Constructivism 1. Mies as Paradigm Case 4. Heidegger and the Origin of the. Enjoy proficient essay writing and custom writing services provided by professional academic writers. Kids Vancouver is a resource on what to do with kids in the Vancouver area. This was a field in which modernist architects could and did excel. Glossary from German to English. Abstract Martin Heidegger and Vincent Scully. Modelos para la econom. Simultaneously, humans grow, excel, and flourish in the presence of these things. This is the first textbook for architectural drawing with the computer that is based on understanding how digital drawing fundamentally differs from drawing with lead pencils on drafting boards. Architectural Drawing Today demonstrates a cinematically- inspired, cybernetically imaged, architectural drawing system for thinking about architecture as embedded in relationships within the world at large. It opens up the possibility of inventing new ways of building as framing flowing matter in order to live a philosophy of? The authors, who have for fifteen years collaborated in teaching architectural students, link the architectural drawing text with research in the expanded field of architecture, which includes neurology, biology, ecology, physics, sustainability and philosophy. The book is written in an accessible and direct tone. Providing both an understanding of the visual perception behind drawing and practical exercises, it is set to become the key text book on the subject at both undergraduate and graduate level. It is highly illustrated with black and white diagrams and drawings. This daringly analytical book precisely and effectively delineates heretofore hidden systems of emergent relations between ideology, methodology, representation, and production.? With this engaging, mind- expanding, and original guide to contemporary modalities of visualizing and representing architecture, the authors usher the not- yet- initiated into the digital design age.? Cinematics extends the parameters of representation by drawing on aspects of media, film and video. This book is an addition to the lineage of expanding the pictorial field - the Nude Descending a Staircase meeting the battleship Potemkin. The digital drawing methodology produces an explosive shattering of architectural space and reflects the understanding of multiple vantage points and the simultaneity of events in the manner of postmodern literature and filmmakers such as Godard. View from the Union Building. Thinking outside the box is, as are most worthwhile pursuits, more easily said, than done. The Linnaeushof can therefore be seen as a combination between modernist thinking on rationalized dwelling and. Smith critically examines the moral thinking of his time. An essay on Martin Heidegger and. Hall and Ames write in Thinking Through Confucius. An interdisciplinary collection of essays in the history and philosophy of architecture. These drawings have the power to communicate as seductively as the moving image how architecture, space, inhabitation, perception and experience unfold over time. The book offers new ways to analyze space and more importantly new ways of generating it.? In a world of change, fluctuating points of view, duration and virtuality, it is vital for designers to reassess the representation of their work in new and non- orthogonal ways, This book addresses this most fundamental of design questions and explains various representational protocols for the designer at the cusp of the twenty- first century. A new generation of architects and designers has turned from the drafting table to computer drafting and design, seemingly seamlessly and without much turmoil. But, in reality, a whole new way of thinking about architecture has developed- -the computer is changing way designers see the physical world. Architectural Drawing Today discusses the theory and practice of design in the digital age. Professor of Architect, University of Florida? Five hundred years from now architects may look at Cinematics the way today? In fact, if architecture is still being built 5. Grath and Gardner propose, asking us to? In the process of laying out a concrete set of design strategies, this book makes original connections between theory and ecology, science and art, technology and touch.? This is a serious and timely

book that proposes new methods of representation for designers working in the digital age. This book, with its stunning and sophisticated visual documentation, is destined to be an essential resource for the next generation of designers. Thinking Outside the Box: Although studying creativity is considered a legitimate scientific discipline nowadays, it is still a very young one. In the early 1900s, Guilford was one of the first academic researchers who dared to conduct a study of creativity. He challenged research subjects to connect all nine dots using just four straight lines without lifting their pencils from the page. Today many people are familiar with this puzzle and its solution. If you have tried solving this puzzle, you can confirm that your first attempts usually involve sketching lines inside the imaginary square. The correct solution, however, requires you to draw lines that extend beyond the area defined by the dots. The symmetry, the beautiful simplicity of the solution, and the fact that 80% of people fail to find it led Guilford and the readers of his books to leap to the sweeping conclusion that creativity requires you to go outside the box. The idea went viral via 1959. Overnight, it seemed that creativity gurus everywhere were teaching managers how to think outside the box. Management consultants in the 1960s. Because the solution is, in hindsight, deceptively simple, clients tended to admit they should have thought of it themselves. Or so their consultants would have them believe. There seemed to be no end to the insights that could be offered under the banner of thinking outside the box. Speakers, trainers, training program developers, organizational consultants, and university professors all had much to say about the vast benefits of outside-the-box thinking. It was an appealing and apparently convincing message. Indeed, the concept enjoyed such strong popularity and intuitive appeal that no one bothered to check the facts. No one, that is, before two different research teams—Clarke Burnham with Kenneth Davis, and Joseph Alba with Robert Weisberg—ran another experiment using the same puzzle but a different research procedure. Both teams followed the same protocol of dividing participants into two groups. The second group was told that the solution required the lines to be drawn outside the imaginary box bordering the dot array. Would you like to guess the percentage of the participants in the second group who solved the puzzle correctly? Most people assume that 60%. In fact, only a meager 20%. In other words, the difference could easily be due to what statisticians call sampling error. Solving this problem requires people to literally think outside the box. That is, direct and explicit instructions to think outside the box did not help. That this advice is useless when actually trying to solve a problem involving a real box should effectively have killed off the much widely disseminated—and therefore, much more dangerous—metaphor that out-of-the-box thinking spurs creativity. After all, with one simple yet brilliant experiment, researchers had proven that the conceptual link between thinking outside the box and creativity was a myth. But you will find numerous situations where a creative breakthrough is staring you in the face. They are much more common than you probably think.

Chapter 8 : racedaydvl.com: Customer reviews: Martin Heidegger

Singapore had a severe housing shortage decades ago. But it developed one of the world's best public housing programs, which has also allowed a huge number of its citizens to buy their own homes.

July 31, Daniel O. Critical Essays, Cambridge University Press, , pp. Reviewed by Theodore Kisiel, Northern Illinois University Editor Dan Dahlstrom is quick to place this entire collection of "critical essays" under the Dilthey-Heideggerian preconception of the pan-hermeneutic character of human life: *Das Leben selbst legt sich aus*: The need for more thoughtful interpretations of this tradition of interpretations readily develops into some of the larger tasks assumed in the Heideggerian opus, like the need to interpret the entire history of Western thinking from its Greek beginnings to the present in order to come to terms with the "hermeneutic situation" of the revolutionary age in which we now find ourselves. The essays are grouped into three divisions: Tom Sheehan takes a similar tack in his essay entitled "Facticity and Ereignis," except that his entire essay is placed under the hermeneutic-phenomenological reduction of being to meaning and its constituting source in the disclosure of meaning to human understanding. But what lets meaning come about at all? What is the constituting source of meaning as such? It is the ultimate factum — what Heidegger calls facticity" p. Hardly a brute fact, in view of its being charged with meaning, but it does constitute a limit to our understanding. The groundless facticity of the ever-latent Ereignis in its meaning-giving is thus the ultimate mystery of our be-ing. Each metaphysical epoch grasps reality at once ontologically what things are, viewed from the inside-out, fundamentally and theologically how things are, viewed from the outside-in, ultimately. But the attempt to extend this Nietzschean ontotheology of eternally recurring will-to-power to our present epoch of global technology is not completely satisfying, since it does not adequately account for this phenomenon issuing from the modern epoch in its entirety. Heidegger characterizes this constellation of intelligibility with the single hyphenated word *Ge-Stell*, which is best translated etymologically from its Greek and Latin roots as "syn-thetic com-posit[ion]ing," which presciently portends the internetted World Wide Web with its virtual infinity of websites, Global Positioning Systems, interlocking air traffic control grids, worldwide weather mapping, etc. In sizing up its ultimately strange situation of be-ing, *Dasein* finds itself taut between two nothings, the nothing of being thrown into the world willy-nilly and the nothing of being projected into a life that inevitably ends in death. In the end, I owe it first to myself to own up to this double nullity inherent in human be-ing by becoming fully responsive to and responsible for this life that is most my own, ready to live it in its angst-full tension taut between the double shortfall of my birth and my ownmost death. There are at least two reasons for this. First, in interpreting poets and other thinkers, Heidegger assumes that they partake at some level in the horizon of the originary hermeneutics of human life that is the starting point and goal of all of his interpretations. Dahlstrom contends that Heidegger would be dismissive of the charge of anachronism, of projecting his own experience of be-ing back into the beginning of Western thought, of antedating some current event, since this presupposes a linear and so derivative conception of time, of a denumerable past that has passed away and is now long gone. Heidegger explicitly contends that his is a plausible interpretation of Heraclitus and that this sense of be-ing at the beginning of the history of Western thought, far from being past and gone, is the inception of an event so originary in its temporality that it continues to be ours as an originary past that comes to meet us from the future and allows us to think our way into another beginning. f. Josh Michael Hayes examines how Heidegger existentializes the Aristotelian texts on the passions *pathei* of the soul in order to draw his own terms on how we find ourselves *sich befinden*, i. Song is not a way of controlling the world, of manipulating it with tools language. Instead, song is a way of receiving from the world — and letting things appear" What is lacking in Rilke is accordingly a sense of human finitude, a sense of not belonging perfectly in the world and of presabsence, which will be provided by Georg Trakl. This being underway is the only belonging we know" No thing may be where the word fails. Since they only appear in the medium of a language, things themselves are from the start relational and contextual. Moreover, all that appears in this medium does so meaningfully. The most curious feature of this review is that Ryle criticizes Heidegger especially on a point that he himself will make central in his classic

book, *The Concept of Mind*. This book, much like *Being and Time*, begins with a parodying attack on the Cartesian model of the mind as "an inner space housing ghostly thoughts" in order to give precedence to the tacit knowledge of know-how occurring in intelligent practical interactions independent of the more theoretical know-that knowledge. Such programs have proven to be limited and ultimately doomed to failure because human intelligence is in fact more a tacit and holistic know-how operating out of meaningful contexts and practical webs of purposes and interests that enable even a four-year-old to sort out the relevant factors necessary to interpret properly one or another problematic situation. But further comparisons only expose fundamental disagreements. The problem in the Heideggerian text is its inability to think through the ontological difference between be-ing and beings in a way that escapes equating be-ing with presence. Dastur makes the following points: Be-ing is never immediately present, never immediately appears but, as the most inapparent of phenomena, belongs to whatever does appear such as to constitute its meaning and ground SZ Be-ing is never purely and fully present because of its aletheic character of concealing that always happens with the clearing of beings. With concealment having the last word, the focus is now clearly on the difference, named by the later Heidegger as *Unter-schied* and *Enteignis* expropriation, where be-ing itself is thought to come from the difference. But Derrida still retains the edge in the dispelling of presence.

Chapter 9 : continental philosophy - What is Sorge (Care) in Heideggers thought? - Philosophy Stack Exchange

Subsidized Housing Rent is based on your income, Income limits apply. Affordable Housing Rent is based on a flat rent amount per bedroom size. Income limits apply for the household.