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Chapter 1 : Epistemic Competence and the Call to Naturalize Epistemology - Oxford Scholarship

Justificatory cognitive processes must be tractable. That one ought to produce and sustain beliefs in certain ways entails that one can. Fitting epistemic standards for human epistemic agents must be sensitive to which potential belief-forming processes humans are capable of employing, at least with training.

The Epistemic Turn in Deliberative Democracy. Image by Thierry Ehrman, via Flickr As interest in deliberative democracy continues to grow, the term is becoming more umbrella-like encompassing different strands, orientations, and methodological proclivities. This strand has been influenced by John Rawls and begins from the fact of pluralism. This in turn has led some to embrace a Rawlsian epistemological position of agnosticism with respect to the truth-value of moral and political claims. Epistemic abstinence then characterizes this strand of deliberative democracy. The Heft of Deliberation In this alternative origin story, deliberative democracy grows as a response to and criticism of two interconnected strands of democratic theory that had come to dominate certainly the empirical study of democracy but also many basic theories of democracy. The first strand sees democracy as about the fair competition between fixed interests. Here voting is the central mechanism through which competing interests are mediated in a fair way that recognizes the equality of all citizens. Deliberative democrats found this picture deeply inadequate on the twin grounds that it rested on an impoverished and indeed implausible view of legitimacy and two it presupposed a black box of fixed interests. Deliberative democracy shifts the focus from preference aggregation to the processes of opinion formation that precedes the vote. Aggregation often in the form of voting and sometimes governed by majority rule does not necessarily disappear. But the question that motivated many deliberative democrats was how deliberation could carry the burden of democratic legitimacy in a way that aggregation could not. Theorists drew primarily from two sources. First from his work on the public sphere which suggested that the essential relationship between the public and the state should be understood in terms of rational justification and discursive accountability. And second his work in communicative action and discourse ethics that offered a procedural ideal for the conditions of justification. Landemore suggests that until recently this endorsement of deliberative democracy did not rely on an epistemic claim about outcomes but rather on a procedural claim about equality, respect and freedom of participants. This argument according to Landemore has dominated deliberative democracy I agree and it has no epistemic dimension I disagree. Here I come to the second strand in democratic theory and research against which deliberative democracy grew. Deliberative democracy has for the most part been a champion of the epistemic competency of citizens if given the chance to deliberate with each other under positive conditions. Even deliberative democrats who focus on middle democracy rather than mass democracy claim the deliberation is valued because it enhances epistemic competency of the participants. This epistemic competency is often discussed under the ubiquitous phrase *i. Before I elaborate the epistemic import of reason-giving I want to take a small detour into epistemic democracy and what it has come to mean in contemporary debates. What Is Epistemic Democracy? Epistemic democracy is the view that democracy is to be valued not simply for normative reasons but also or sometimes exclusively because it arrives at or can arrive at the right answers. Some but not all theories of epistemic democracy are also theories of deliberative democracy because they identify deliberation as the mechanism through which right outcomes are produced Estlund ; Landemore ; Mizak Are all theories of deliberative democracy also theories of epistemic democracy? I want to say that almost all theories of deliberative democracy recognize and value an epistemic function of deliberation but not all of them have focused on developing a clear procedurally-independent standard of correct outcome. If, as Landemore appears to imply, such a procedurally-independent standard is the defining feature of an epistemic theory of democracy then perhaps it is true that David Estlund has really inaugurated a new era of deliberative theory. But if, as I would like to argue, deliberative democracy has always had a robust procedurally-dependent epistemological view of deliberation then deliberative democracy has always been a form of epistemic democracy or if one insists that*

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that term must be reserved for theories that have procedurally-independent standards of right outcomes, then I would say that deliberative democracy has always valued democracy on epistemic as well as normative grounds. The sine qua non of deliberation is reason-giving. Now Landemore suggest that in early deliberative democracy reason-giving was tied to treating co-citizens with respect. We each deserve justification for coercion or claims we make on each other. But there was always more to reason-giving than equal respect. Certainly its agonist and postmodern critics have always thought of deliberative democracy as containing over blown claims to rationality and reason. But what is the epistemic status of the ubiquitous reason-giving? Landemore suggests that there are two minimum requirements in order to be able to talk about epistemic democracy. The first is to accept that political and normative questions are open to rational adjudication. She does not insist on a very high bar here. The second is to accept that democratic procedures are a good way to generate that adjudication. But, as I argue below, these dimensions can be present without a procedurally-independent standard of correct outcome. How do we know if the answers are better or worse? For public disputes that are predominantly normative, the Habermasian answer is to look to see to what extent the conditions of justification have been met in democratic procedures. When reading Habermas as containing strong epistemic claims as Landemore does it is sometimes common to mistake analogy with identity. But this is not entirely correct. In respect to truth Habermas makes a distinction between what the truth is say correspondence and how we arrive at the truth discourse. No such distinction is possible with regard to normative questions. Decisions facing a democratic polity will contain both elements. The more a policy dispute centers on facts or established knowledge, the more it is truth apt. But here too Rawls is not agnostic nor does he advocate abstinence. Rawls suggests that public reason rely on established truth of science and common sense for example Here Rawls insists that, on the one hand, participants in debate exercise self-restraint and refrain from claiming truth or objective status for their normative positions and, on the other hand, no strong truth claim should be made regarding the outcomes of public justification. Habermas makes neither of these claims. Citizens can bring up any and all claims certainly in the broad public sphere. But the epistemic claim tied to normative rightness is a procedural not a procedurally-independent claim. Now Landemore might say that any claim that outcomes are better is a procedurally-independent standard even if the assessment is exclusively tied to whether the procedures are good. Outcomes are not procedures; to value outcomes is to value something more than mere procedure. But if this is what she means then she is operating with a very narrow view of procedural theory in which democracy is valued for entirely outcome-independent reasons. On this reading of proceduralism then democracy might very well fair poorly on all epistemic measures but that is not why one endorses democracy; one endorses it because it treats people equally not because it arrives at better outcomes. It is this idea of independent standard that Habermas has explicitly questioned in his procedural theory of democracy and which as a result was never been a focus of the epistemic claims inherent in deliberative democracy from the beginning. Rational outcomes are the outcomes that would be justified in a discourse of all those affected. But no thought experiment can produce this outcome independently. So we are thrown back on trying to approximate the procedural conditions of justification: But there is a second and I think more interesting reason why procedures and not outcomes are the focus of epistemic assessment. Habermas is fully committed to the idea that democracy if properly structured results in better, more epistemically sound, and more rational outcomes than other regime types. Whereas Rawls thought we should exercise self-restraint for the sake of getting along under conditions of pluralism, Habermas sees unrestrained pluralism under democratic rules as the condition for epistemic advancement. The wild and anarchic nature of the informal public sphere allows for new claims to emerge, hidden injustices to be unmasked, received truth to be questioned, and new forms of political participation to be tested. This lack of Rawlsian restraint plays an important discursive and epistemic function by holding out the possibility of learning, revision, correction, and change through criticism of and opposition to stands taken and claims made especially by those who rule. A Tradition of Reason Few deliberative democrats have adopted the full Habermasian discourse theoretic edifice of his political theory. Not just better in the sense that

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the outcomes are more legitimate but also better because outcomes are more in line with reason. Here we see the Kantian idea that reason arrives at the right answers through criticism, argument and persuasion. This view is echoed in Mill as well as Dewey and has been, I would argue, a central aspirational ideal of deliberative democracy from its inception. But it is an ideal that resides in the process of reason-giving and in maintaining the procedural conditions conducive to that reason-giving. Thus the evaluation of the epistemic value of the outcome will be invested in how well the procedures approximate good procedures. I have tried to make two arguments. The first is that because reason-giving has been at the center of deliberative democracy from the start and because many theorists of deliberative democracy have been influenced by Habermas in thinking about how reason-giving works, there has always been an epistemic dimension to deliberative democracy. The second argument I have made is that criterion of procedurally-independent standard of correct outcome is not the best way to conceptualize that epistemic dimension of much of deliberative democracy because so much of that dimension is invested in good procedures. The Journal of Political Philosophy: Princeton University Press, Elstub, Stephen and McLaverty. Edinburgh University Press, Between Facts and Norms. The impact of normative theory on empirical research. Critique of Pure Reason. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Cambridge University Press, Politics, Collective Intelligence and the Rule of the Many. Columbia University Press, But I would not call Jeremy Waldron, a second example appealed to by Landemore, a deliberative democrat at all precisely because he objects to some epistemic assumptions of most deliberative democracy theory and also because he has more faith in majority voting than deliberation. Bohman ; Chambers ; Elstub and McLaverty On the contrary, religious claims are excluded because Habermas wants to make a strong epistemic claim about the discursive process and such a claims would be undermined, he thinks, if religious claims were allowed to enter the debate Habermas

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Chapter 2 : Naturalism in Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

"The epistemological spectrum" comprises inquiry ranging from a priori reflection on concepts such as epistemic justification and knowledge to richly empirical work within cognitive science. The conceptual truths regarding justification (for one example) serve to orient a fitting naturalized epistemology, while empirical information is.

Before considering that work, some background will help to give a sense of the general character of the traditional approach to epistemological theorizing, the various themes running through NE, and the pre-Quinean history of NE. His specific recommendation, arrived at through careful reflection on his own ideas, was a particularly strong foundationalism designed to rule out the possibility of error: Taking our cue from Crumley By this, it is usually meant at least that epistemological facts—whether a belief is justified or rational, e. Many proponents of TE regard epistemology as being normative in respect of being prescriptive as well—i. Obviously, there are natural connections among them. However, the theories falling within TE are, once again, a varied lot; and those sympathetic to TE at times pull these features apart, emphasizing commitment to them to varying degrees and in various ways. Some key forms and themes And so too for those who favor NE: Naturalists join in rejecting one or more of the above features of traditional non-naturalistic epistemology. But different theories and theorists within NE reject—to varying extents, in different ways, and for different reasons—different combinations of these features, and so differ in how much distance is put between their specific view and traditional epistemologies. Thus, for example, Alvin Goldman The major forms of such appropriate relations are commonly thought to be reduction and supervenience. As Goldman notes In terms of a - d above, meta-epistemic NE would constitute a denial of the autonomy of epistemology b , at least as regards its fundamental ontology. If the relevant evaluative property cannot be appropriately related to natural ones, on this view, it is rejected as unreal—yielding eliminativism or error theory—which would constitute a rejection of c. Some object-level thesis in the vein recommended by meta-epistemic NE—that is, an account of some epistemic phenomenon in terms of certain natural non-normative properties or relations. Examples here would include accounts of knowledge or justification in terms of causation Goldman , reliability Armstrong , Goldman , Papineau , Kornblith , natural functions Graham , Millikan , information theory Dretske , or some kind of nomic or counterfactual dependence Nozick Further, some critics have contended that externalism is, as such, ill-equipped to provide useful guidance to epistemic agents, at least of the first-personal reason-guiding variety. In this way, it has been thought, substantive naturalistic views might run afoul of c , understood as a claim about a specific type of normative guidance or improvement see, e. For some, this is the primary motive for adopting a naturalistic approach: The main reason that I believe that epistemology would have much to learn from psychology if psychologists knew more about belief formation is that I believe that in epistemology as in ethics ought implies can. Epistemic agents cannot and ought not be faulted on the grounds that they did not follow epistemic strategies which are not cognitively possible for them. In his own work, Goldman ; ; Having reviewed some general features of TE, and some of the major forms and themes of NE, we will next consider some important and influential recent versions of NE, using the above features and categories to clarify and facilitate discussion. This survey will center on recent epistemological developments. However, it bears emphasizing once again that NE per se is not itself a recent phenomenon: A brief note on the pre-Quinean history While Cartesian epistemology offers an especially vivid instance of all of the features of TE discussed above, some of those same tendencies and concerns are, of course, present in varying degrees in the work of other figures in the epistemological canon. The assumption that epistemology trades in normative matters, and not just description c , and an abiding concern with skepticism d , for example, can be seen in much epistemology from Descartes through to the present. Only then, he thought, would we be in a position to get our epistemic position into proper perspective. But Locke, for example, is more consistently optimistic. But it also illustrates the above-mentioned shift, characteristic of NE, away from perfectly general questions about the nature and

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possibility of knowledge to understanding human knowledge, given the facts of our powers and situation: All that we know of the body, is owing to anatomical dissection and observation, and it must be by an anatomy of the mind that we can discover its powers and principles¹. And Rysiew argues that Reid does not neatly separate psychological facts from epistemic norms. In none of this was the goal to be faithful to actual psychology. Epistemology does not regard the processes of thinking in their actual occurrence; this task is entirely left to psychology. What epistemology intends is to construct thinking processes in a way in which they ought to occur if they are to be ranged in a consistent system; or to construct justifiable sets of operations which can be intercalated between the starting-point and the issue of thought-processes, replacing the real intermediate links. Epistemology thus considers a logical substitute rather than real processes. However, because of its undeniable historical importance, and because it will serve to introduce some of the principal objections to NE, it can hardly be ignored. Addressing the logical empiricist project of rational reconstruction, he says that [t]he Cartesian quest for certainty [is] the remote motivation of epistemology, both on its conceptual side and its doctrinal side. Why all this creative reconstruction, all this make-believe? The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology? Better to discover how science is in fact developed and learned than to fabricate a fictitious structure to a similar effect. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz. This human subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input² "certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance³" and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description of the three-dimensional external world and its history. The relation between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation that we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted epistemology: But a conspicuous difference between old epistemology and the epistemological enterprise in this new psychological setting is that we can now make free use of empirical psychology. But that does not affect the present discussion. In terms of the features of TE laid out above Section 1. Scepticism is an offshoot of science. In the sense that they seem to be material objects which they in fact are not. Illusions are illusions only relative to prior acceptance of genuine bodies with which to contrast them⁴. In thus deflating the skeptical problem, Quine turns his back on d , the final characteristic feature of TE. In terms of the forms of NE discussed above Section 1. As we will see, some of these are more easily met, at least prima facie, than others. Others still raise issues facing all versions of NE⁵ "they remain front and center in current discussions of NE and its prospects. On one version, this is because Quine equates TE with Cartesian epistemology; whereas, by the time of his writing, infallibilism had largely fallen out of fashion e. Instead, by TE had largely turned to the now-familiar analytic program of suggesting definitions, or criteria for the application, of epistemic terms and concepts, revising these in light of often-imaginary counter-examples, and so on Almeder A fair snapshot of the then-state of the art would be Knowing: Insofar as the challenge posed by skepticism is to establish the possibility of knowledge, making use of certain methods of belief-formation, common-sensical or otherwise, is hardly going to strike the skeptic as fair play: Granted, Quine claims that skeptical arguments inevitably trade on the fact of illusions, which would seem to make other appeals to common sense fair game. According to BonJour, however, [t]he fundamental skeptical move is to challenge the adequacy of our reasons for accepting our beliefs, and such a challenge can be mounted without any appeal to illusion. VI; compare Feldman Hence, that his endorsement of replacement naturalism has eliminativism as a consequence. The complaint here is not merely that normativity is a feature of TE Section 1. He is asking us to set aside the entire framework of justification-centered epistemology. Quine is asking us to put in its place a purely descriptive, causal-nomological science of human cognition. Sec 32; Siegel However, evidence as it relates to justification is what concerns the epistemologist. Justification is the central epistemic notion⁶ "it makes up the difference between mere true belief and knowledge modulo Gettier , and is the locus of specifically epistemic normativity. For epistemology to go out of the business of justification is for it to go out of business. But it seems that nothing in epistemology as Quine conceives of it affords us the resources for evaluating such

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arguments: So long as the naturalists mean to be showing their audience in spoken word and in print that their doctrines are correct, this question will be an urgent one. But how are we supposed to go about trying to answer it? It is hard to see what we can do except evaluate these arguments by the light of the very sorts of epistemic intuitions which the naturalists are so eager to disparage. Addressing the fourth and fifth will carry us beyond Quine and into the heart of current disagreements with, and within, NE. Rather, they have sought to find an alternative to what was seen as a stagnating or otherwise unsatisfactory traditional approach. The trouble with many philosophical treatments of knowledge is that they are inspired by Cartesian-like conceptions of justification or vindication. There is a consequent tendency to overintellectualize or overrationalize the notion of knowledge. A fundamental facet of animate life, both human and infra-human, is telling things apart, distinguishing predator from prey, for example, or a protective habitat from a threatening one. The concept of knowledge has its roots in this kind of cognitive activity. The result is that the theorist is left having to reject some very clear cases of knowledge—“in children, non-human animals, and unreflective adults”—as not genuine knowledge at all. Dretske This recalls, of course, meta-epistemic NE Section 1. The short answer is this: That [a given belief] is a justified belief cannot be a brute fundamental fact unrelated to the kind of belief it is. There must be a reason for it, and this reason must be grounded in the factual descriptive properties of that particular belief. Something like this, I think, is what we believe. Section 4; Maffie a: For virtually everyone on both sides of that debate can be seen as agreeing that epistemic properties supervene. The notable exception here is Lehrer. For example, Chisholm, who is hardly thought to be an advocate of NE, is explicit in holding that epistemic facts supervene on non-epistemic ones. And Feldman argues that evidentialism—which is usually regarded as an instance of TE, not NE—“respects supervenience as well. So we do not yet have a plausible candidate, in the vicinity of meta-epistemic NE, of something on which proponents of TE and NE might clearly divide. Suppose, for example, that the following sufficient condition of justified belief is offered: This is not the kind of principle I seek; for, even if it is correct, it leaves unexplained why a person who senses redly and believes that he does, believes this justifiably. Further, Feldman continues, something similar is true of traditionalists more generally: In addition to facts about particular people being justified in believing particular propositions, [traditionalists] are committed to the existence of epistemic facts about what beliefs are supported by a particular body of evidence. It remains unclear whether these are natural facts.

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Chapter 3 : Neta on Naturalized Epistemology | Certain Doubts

David Henderson and Terence Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology, which they see as a mixed discipline, having both a priori and empirical elements.

But also, because of the contemporaneous attempts and failures to reduce mathematics to pure logic by those in or philosophically sympathetic to The Vienna Circle. He concludes that studies of scientific knowledge concerned with meaning or truth fail to achieve the Cartesian goal of certainty. The failures in the reduction of mathematics to pure logic imply that scientific knowledge can at best be defined with the aid of less certain set-theoretic notions. If no translation between scientific knowledge and the logical structures can be constructed that works both ways, then the properties of the purely logical and set-theoretic constructions do not usefully inform understanding of scientific knowledge. Quine rejects the analytic-synthetic thought and emphasizes the holistic nature of our beliefs. Since traditional philosophic analysis of knowledge fails, those wishing to study knowledge ought to employ natural scientific methods. Scientific study of knowledge differs from philosophic study by focusing on how humans acquire knowledge rather than speculative analysis of knowledge. This form of naturalism says that our psychological and biological limitations and abilities are relevant to the study of human knowledge. Empirical work is relevant to epistemology but only if epistemology is itself as broad as the study of human knowledge. Natural facts can be based on two main ideas. The first is that all natural facts include all facts that science would verify. The second is to provide a list of examples that consists of natural items. This will help in deducing what else can be included. That is, an empirical investigation into the criteria which are used to scientifically evaluate evidence must presuppose those very same criteria. One form of this investigation is reliabilism which requires that a belief be the product of some reliable method if it is to be considered knowledge. Since naturalized epistemology relies on empirical evidence, all epistemic facts which comprise this reliable method must be reducible to natural facts. If this is not true, i. In this vein, Roderick Chisholm argues that there are epistemic principles or facts which are necessary to knowledge acquisition, but may not be, themselves, natural facts. Ultimately, there is no "true" since any method for arriving at the truth was abandoned with the normative. All notions which would explain truth are only intelligible when the normative is presupposed. If naturalized epistemology does not provide the means for addressing these issues, it cannot succeed as a replacement to traditional epistemology. Jaegwon Kim, another critic of naturalized epistemology, further articulates the difficulty of removing the normative component. He notes that modern epistemology has been dominated by the concepts of justification and reliability. These concepts are meant to engender the question "What conditions must a belief meet if we are justified in accepting it as true? That is to say, what are the necessary criteria by which a particular belief can be declared as "true" or, should it fail to meet these criteria, can we rightly infer its falsity? This notion of truth rests solely on the conception and application of the criteria which are set forth in traditional and modern theories of epistemology. Kim adds to this claim by explaining how the idea of "justification" is the only notion among "belief" and "truth" which is the defining characteristic of an epistemological study. To remove this aspect is to alter the very meaning and goal of epistemology, whereby we are no longer discussing the study and acquisition of knowledge. Justification is what makes knowledge valuable and normative; without it what can rightly be said to be true or false? We are left with only descriptions of the processes by which we arrive at a belief. This account can never establish an affirmable statement which can lead us to truth, since all statements without the normative are purely descriptive which can never amount to knowledge. As a result of these objections and others like them, most, including Quine in his later writings, have agreed that naturalized epistemology as a replacement may be too strong of a view. One product of these objections is cooperative naturalism which holds that empirical results are essential and useful to epistemology. That is, while traditional epistemology cannot be eliminated, neither can it succeed in its investigation of knowledge without empirical results from the natural sciences. In any case, Quinean Replacement Naturalism finds relatively few

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Chapter 4 : Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Epistemic Competence and the Call to Naturalize Epistemology 7. An Expanded Conception of Epistemically Relevant Cognitive Processes: The Role of Morphological Content.

References and Further Reading 1. The word "knowledge" and its cognates are used in a variety of ways. One common use of the word "know" is as an expression of psychological conviction. This point is discussed at greater length in section 2b below. Even if we restrict ourselves to factive usages, there are still multiple senses of "knowledge," and so we need to distinguish between them. One kind of knowledge is procedural knowledge, sometimes called competence or "know-how;" for example, one can know how to ride a bicycle, or one can know how to drive from Washington, D. Another kind of knowledge is acquaintance knowledge or familiarity; for instance, one can know the department chairperson, or one can know Philadelphia. Epistemologists typically do not focus on procedural or acquaintance knowledge, however, instead preferring to focus on propositional knowledge. Propositional knowledge, then, can be called knowledge-that; statements of propositional knowledge or the lack thereof are properly expressed using "that"-clauses, such as "He knows that Houston is in Texas," or "She does not know that the square root of 81 is 9. Propositional knowledge, obviously, encompasses knowledge about a wide range of matters: Any truth might, in principle, be knowable, although there might be unknowable truths. One goal of epistemology is to determine the criteria for knowledge so that we can know what can or cannot be known, in other words, the study of epistemology fundamentally includes the study of meta-epistemology what we can know about knowledge itself. We can also distinguish between different types of propositional knowledge, based on the source of that knowledge. Non-empirical or a priori knowledge is possible independently of, or prior to, any experience, and requires only the use of reason; examples include knowledge of logical truths such as the law of non-contradiction, as well as knowledge of abstract claims such as ethical claims or claims about various conceptual matters. Empirical or a posteriori knowledge is possible only subsequent, or posterior, to certain sense experiences in addition to the use of reason ; examples include knowledge of the color or shape of a physical object or knowledge of geographical locations. Some philosophers, called rationalists, believe that all knowledge is ultimately grounded upon reason; others, called empiricists, believe that all knowledge is ultimately grounded upon experience. A thorough epistemology should, of course, address all kinds of knowledge, although there might be different standards for a priori and a posteriori knowledge. We can also distinguish between individual knowledge and collective knowledge. Social epistemology is the subfield of epistemology that addresses the way that groups, institutions, or other collective bodies might come to acquire knowledge. The Nature of Propositional Knowledge Having narrowed our focus to propositional knowledge, we must ask ourselves what, exactly, constitutes knowledge. What does it mean for someone to know something? What is the difference between someone who knows something and someone else who does not know it, or between something one knows and something one does not know? Since the scope of knowledge is so broad, we need a general characterization of knowledge, one which is applicable to any kind of proposition whatsoever. Epistemologists have usually undertaken this task by seeking a correct and complete analysis of the concept of knowledge, in other words a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions which determine whether someone knows something. Further, knowledge is a specific kind of mental state. While "that"-clauses can also be used to describe desires and intentions, these cannot constitute knowledge. Rather, knowledge is a kind of belief. If one has no beliefs about a particular matter, one cannot have knowledge about it. For instance, suppose that I desire that I be given a raise in salary, and that I intend to do whatever I can to earn one. Given that I do not believe that I will be given a raise, I cannot be said to know that I will. Only if I am inclined to believe something can I come to know it. Similarly, thoughts that an individual has never entertained are not among his beliefs, and thus cannot be included in his body of knowledge. Some beliefs, those which the individual is actively entertaining, are called occurrent beliefs. Truth Knowledge, then,

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requires belief. Of course, not all beliefs constitute knowledge. Belief is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge. We are all sometimes mistaken in what we believe; in other words, while some of our beliefs are true, others are false. As we try to acquire knowledge, then, we are trying to increase our stock of true beliefs while simultaneously minimizing our false beliefs. We sometimes, of course, form beliefs for other reasons – to create a positive attitude, to deceive ourselves, and so forth – but when we seek knowledge, we are trying to get things right. And, alas, we sometimes fail to achieve such a match; some of our beliefs do not describe the way things actually are. Note that we are assuming here that there is such a thing as objective truth, so that it is possible for beliefs to match or to fail to match with reality. That is, in order for someone to know something, there must be something one knows about. This assumption is not universally accepted – in particular, it is not shared by some proponents of relativism – but it will not be defended here. However, we can say that truth is a condition of knowledge; that is, if a belief is not true, it cannot constitute knowledge. Accordingly, if there is no such thing as truth, then there can be no knowledge. Even if there is such a thing as truth, if there is a domain in which there are no truths, then there can be no knowledge within that domain. For example, if beauty is in the eye of the beholder, then a belief that something is beautiful cannot be true or false, and thus cannot constitute knowledge. Justification Knowledge, then, requires factual belief. However, this does not suffice to capture the nature of knowledge. Just as knowledge requires successfully achieving the objective of true belief, it also requires success with regard to the formation of that belief. In other words, not all true beliefs constitute knowledge; only true beliefs arrived at in the right way constitute knowledge. What, then, is the right way of arriving at beliefs? In addition to truth, what other properties must a belief have in order to constitute knowledge? We might begin by noting that sound reasoning and solid evidence seem to be the way to acquire knowledge. By contrast, a lucky guess cannot constitute knowledge. Similarly, misinformation and faulty reasoning do not seem like a recipe for knowledge, even if they happen to lead to a true belief. A belief is said to be justified if it is obtained in the right way. The requirement that knowledge involve justification does not necessarily mean that knowledge requires absolute certainty, however. Between beliefs which were necessarily true and those which are true solely by luck lies a spectrum of beliefs with regard to which we had some defeasible reason to believe that they would be true. Even though there was some chance that my belief might have been false, there was a sufficient basis for that belief for it to constitute knowledge. This basis is referred to as the justification for that belief. We can then say that, to constitute knowledge, a belief must be both true and justified. Note that because of luck, a belief can be unjustified yet true; and because of human fallibility, a belief can be justified yet false. In other words, truth and justification are two independent conditions of beliefs. The fact that a belief is true does not tell us whether or not it is justified; that depends on how the belief was arrived at. So, two people might hold the same true belief, but for different reasons, so that one of them is justified and the other is unjustified. Of course, a justified belief will presumably be more likely to be true than to be false, and justified beliefs will presumably be more likely or more probable to be true than unjustified beliefs. As we will see in section 3 below, the exact nature of the relationship between truth and justification is contentious. The Gettier Problem For some time, the justified true belief JTB account was widely agreed to capture the nature of knowledge. However, in 1963, Edmund Gettier published a short but widely influential article which has shaped much subsequent work in epistemology. Gettier provided two examples in which someone had a true and justified belief, but in which we seem to want to deny that the individual has knowledge, because luck still seems to play a role in his belief having turned out to be true. Suppose that the clock on campus which keeps accurate time and is well maintained stopped working at 12:00. On my way to my noon class, exactly twelve hours later, I glance at the clock and form the belief that the time is 12:00. My belief is true, of course, since the time is indeed 12:00. And my belief is justified, as I have no reason to doubt that the clock is working, and I cannot be blamed for basing beliefs about the time on what the clock says. Nonetheless, it seems evident that I do not know that the time is 12:00. After all, if I had walked past the clock a bit earlier or a bit later, I would have ended up with a false belief rather than a true one. This example and others like it, while perhaps somewhat far-fetched, seem to show that it is possible for justified true belief

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to fail to constitute knowledge. To put it another way, the justification condition was meant to ensure that knowledge was based on solid evidence rather than on luck or misinformation, but Gettier-type examples seem to show that justified true belief can still involve luck and thus fall short of knowledge. This problem is referred to as "the Gettier problem. The No-False-Belief Condition We might think that there is a simple and straightforward solution to the Gettier problem. Note that my reasoning was tacitly based on my belief that the clock is working properly, and that this belief is false. This seems to explain what has gone wrong in this example. Accordingly, we might revise our analysis of knowledge by insisting that to constitute knowledge, a belief must be true and justified and must be formed without relying on any false beliefs. In other words, we might say, justification, truth, and belief are all necessary for knowledge, but they are not jointly sufficient for knowledge; there is a fourth condition "namely, that no false beliefs be essentially involved in the reasoning that led to the belief" which is also necessary. Unfortunately, this will not suffice; we can modify the example so that my belief is justified and true, and is not based on any false beliefs, but still falls short of knowledge. This belief, which is true, would suffice to justify my belief that the time is now The No-Defeaters Condition However, the no-false-belief condition does not seem to be completely misguided; perhaps we can add some other condition to justification and truth to yield a correct characterization of knowledge. After all, if I were asked, at the time that I looked at the clock, whether it is working properly, I would have said that it is. In other words, the proposition that the clock is working properly right now meets the following conditions: If we call propositions such as this "defeaters," then we can say that to constitute knowledge, a belief must be true and justified, and there must not be any defeaters to the justification of that belief. Many epistemologists believe this analysis to be correct. Causal Accounts of Knowledge Rather than modifying the JTB account of knowledge by adding a fourth condition, some epistemologists see the Gettier problem as reason to seek a substantially different alternative. We have noted that knowledge should not involve luck, and that Gettier-type examples are those in which luck plays some role in the formation of a justified true belief. In typical instances of knowledge, the factors responsible for the justification of a belief are also responsible for its truth. But one feature that all Gettier-type examples have in common is the lack of a clear connection between the truth and the justification of the belief in question. For example, my belief that the time is So, we might insist that to constitute knowledge, a belief must be both true and justified, and its truth and justification must be connected somehow. This notion of a connection between the truth and the justification of a belief turns out to be difficult to formulate precisely, but causal accounts of knowledge seek to capture the spirit of this proposal by more significantly altering the analysis of knowledge.

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Chapter 5 : The Epistemological Spectrum - oi

*Epistemic Competence** David K Henderson Draft of a paper published in *Philosophical Papers 23* (1): Some philosophers find the suggestion of a naturalized epistemology unsettling.

May 14, Stephen Hetherington ed. *Epistemological Essays*, Elsevier, , pp. In his introductory essay, "The Art of Precise Epistemology," the editor claims that the articles are concerned with the relation between philosophical reflection about knowledge and scientific practice -- with the set of issues that arises from the impetus to "naturalize" epistemology. The book is even divided into two sections, "Epistemology as Scientific? The editor does point out another unifying property of the papers with which it is easier to agree: In any case, some of the papers are very interesting indeed, even if they resist integration around a unifying theme. In the rest of this review I will present in some detail the arguments of three of the papers, together with some concerns that can be raised about them. Before doing that, I will briefly summarize the rest of the papers. In "A Problem About Epistemic Dependence," Tim Oakley argues that the notion of epistemic dependence is very hard to characterize, and that this difficulty raises doubts about the use of the regress argument in epistemology. In "Accounting for Commitments: A Priori Knowledge, Ontology, and Logical Entailments," Michaelis Michael deals with the question of what it is for someone to be committed to a certain proposition. In "Epistemic Bootstrapping," Peter Forrest aims to defend the claim that the property of being warranted if true is a positive epistemic status that beliefs might have, a status which, when noticed, might increase the justification of that belief. In "Skepticism, Self-Knowledge and Responsibility," David Macarthur examines the interplay of two stances that we can take towards our own beliefs, the "deliberative" stance and the "naturalistic" stance, and how they relate to skepticism. In "Knowledge by Intention? In "Knowledge that Works: A Tale of Two Conceptual Models," Stephen Hetherington argues that a thoroughgoing fallibilism makes some concerns of contemporary epistemologists seem less pressing. I now turn to a barely more detailed examination of the three other papers in the collection. In "Lotteries and the Close Shave Principle," John Collins argues that the impact of the lottery problem has been severely overestimated in the recent literature. Collins starts by describing what he calls the "lottery observation: The lottery observation threatens to become a serious problem if it generalizes beyond official lotteries. Jonathan Vogel has argued that the lottery observation does generalize: Here is an example from Vogel that Collins considers: Suppose that several hours ago Smith left his car parked on a side street in a major metropolitan area. Since Smith clearly remembers where he parked the car, we may be inclined to say he knows where his car is. But does he know that his car has not been stolen in the last couple of hours and driven away from where he parked it? Many people would say that he does not. For the same reason, Vogel argues, that many people agree with the lottery observation: In effect, when you park your car in an area with an appreciable rate of auto theft, you enter a lottery in which cars are picked, essentially at random, to be stolen and driven away. Having your car stolen is the unfortunate counterpart to winning the lottery. According to Collins, the reason for thinking that the lottery observation is true is that it is entailed by the following principle, which Collins thinks is true: The Close Shave Principle: If S knows that p, then there is no possibility that is very close to actuality at which p is false and to which S assigns non-zero probability. Therefore, applying the Close Shave principle to an official lottery case gives the result that we cannot know of any ticket that it will lose based solely on the fact that it is a ticket in a fair lottery. Collins admits that it is possible to adorn Car Theft so that, for instance, the thieves really do hold a lottery to determine which car to steal. First, it seems to me that the Close Shave Principle fails to fully explain the lottery observation. Second, there are reasons to think that the Close Shave Principle is false. First, then, in the paper discussed by Collins, Vogel himself suggested and Hawthorne later agreed that our tendency to agree with the lottery observation is not restricted to cases where every ticket has the same chance of winning: For suppose that I have ticket number 13 in a lottery that works this way: If 13 comes up, however, then a second lottery is held. Whichever number comes up in this second lottery is the

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winner. Now, in this case, I do assign a non-zero probability to the possibility of ticket 13 winning, but the possibility where 13 wins is not very close to actuality. Suppose that Hawthorne and Vogel are right that even in that case we will not say that we know that ticket 13 will lose. If so, then the Close Shave Principle fails to explain the lottery observation. Second, it seems to me that there are reasons to think that the Close Shave Principle is false. The Close Shave Principle is closely related to the safety principle for knowledge advanced in different versions by Sosa and Williamson. There are now in the literature a number of counterexamples to such safety principles. The book contains three papers on the Gettier problem. This is, in one respect, a very healthy development. The three papers in this collection are a symptom of the fact that interest in the Gettier problem is picking up again, and that is to be applauded. Heathcote himself notes that it is vulnerable to the fake barns case: You believe of each of them that they are real barns. As it happens, one of the things that you see is a real barn. Many philosophers think that you do not know that there is a real barn in the field. However, your belief satisfies all of the K-conditions. Heathcote claims that this style of counterexample will yield to taking seriously the fallibility of knowledge. I fail to see how that could help, though. Fred died of a heart attack, and then his head was cut off. Moments later, you see Fred with his head cut off, and come to believe, and obviously know, that Fred is dead. But there are some other concerns that cannot be so easily solved. Gallois argues that knowledge cannot be identified with the right to believe, because "if individuals exercise their right to believe only in Gettier-free situations, they will, very often, fail to form completely justified beliefs," and this is "not a good consequence from an epistemic point of view" Similar things could be said, however, about being sure. If individuals exercise their right to be sure only in Gettier-free situations then they will, very often, fail to be sure when they are completely justified in being sure. Contemporary perspectives on skepticism, Kluwer. If one can have the right to be sure that P without being sure that P, what is to prevent having the right to be sure that P without even believing that P? Perhaps something does, but if so, that needs to be shown.

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Chapter 6 : The Epistemological Spectrum : David K. Henderson :

An overview --Grades of a priori justification --Neoclassical reliabilism --Transglobal reliabilism --Defending transglobal reliabilism --Epistemic competence and the call to naturalize epistemology --An expanded conception of epistemically relevant cognitive processes: the role of morphological content --Iceberg epistemology: vindicating and.

Same or less Benefit 3 Adopt less reliable, but cheaper strategy. The first is always worth adopting. The second, where more expensive strategies are adopted, is worth it if opportunity costs are not too high. The third is worth it for fairly insignificant matters. The fourth way is to reallocate resources among existing strategies, especially towards more significant issues. Reasoning strategies can be characterized by four elements: Rules are robustly reliable if they make consistent, accurate predictions over a wide range. Being consistent involves being reliable on all natural subsets of a range, not just a few. Valuing robustness is important because low-reliability rules will be filtered out quicker and robust rules are easier to implement since their wide scope means you need fewer of them and safer for general use. The Cost and Benefits of Excellent Judgment Since we are limited creatures, any practical epistemology must consider resource allocation. Cost-benefit analysis has been criticized for attempting to compare the incomparable. However, even a flawed cost-benefit analysis forces us to slow down and reflect on what we really value. For tractability, the authors propose to measure epistemic benefits in terms of reliability. Cognitive resources may not be easily transferred across tasks, so cost accounting must acknowledge how scarce time, memory, and attention are as well as how they interact. Time is one easily measurable proxy for overall costs. When thinking about the ways people reason badly, it may be easier to cultivate new habits rather revise how we reason. Better to stick with simple, automatic actions if possible, rather than rely on discipline. Epistemic Significance If all you want are true beliefs, life is easy. Spend all your time sitting outside counting blimps, and you will be perfectly accurate almost all the time. Excellent reasoners must reason well about significant matters, not just arbitrary ones. Significance in general will be difficult to judge, since significance varies depending on the particular situation. Perhaps we can pick out features significant matters tend to share. For instance, not all reasoning about causality is significant, but most significant matters involve causal reasoning, so this is a skill worth improving. Epistemology must acknowledge other normative domains, and the authors assume there are objective reasons for action, i. At a minimum, individuals have moral and prudential reasons for action. Not all reasons are tied to consequences; some reasons might be tied to duties. Knowing certain basic truths might be intrinsically valuable, so there could be purely epistemic reasons. Some problems might be negatively significant, where one has reasons not to spend time reasoning about it. Since our reasons are ultimately tied to human well-being, so is epistemic significance. One problem with this account is that people may not know the relevant reasons. Any theory incorporating significance must deal with people lacking a good sense of it, so this is a fact of life. Part of the problem of allocating resources involves spending time determining significance to guide further allocation. The Troubles with Standard Analytic Epistemology Modern versions of Standard Analytic Epistemology include foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and contextualism. However, SAE has a descriptive theory at its core and is less likely to overcome the is-ought gap, so Strategic Reliabilism is superior to any existing theory of SAE. If we were magically granted the best SAE theory, it would essentially be a descriptive theory of these opinions. After all, epistemic judgments vary considerably across and between cultures, so it is slightly odd to focus on the intuitions of high-SES Westerners. If SAE works from a descriptive core, how are normative consequences extracted? Many criticisms of naturalism by SAE proponents apply to their own theories. In the end, everyone has to bridge the is-ought gap. Philosophers are essentially experts in their own opinions, while Ameliorative Psychologists have documented success at helping people and institutions reason better. By the Aristotelian Principle, this success is what gives Strategic Reliabilism a chance at normativity. Strategic Reliabilism is not a theory of justification, but if it were cast in that light, it would be more worthy of belief than any available theory. If it

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recommends justified beliefs, no other theories are necessary. If it occasionally recommends unjustified beliefs, what would that mean? Would proponents of SAE have the holders of this belief adopt less reliable strategies or think about less significant problems? What would justification really buy us? Putting Epistemology into Practice: Normative Disputes in Psychology The Heuristics and Biases program revealed many systematic flaws in human reasoning. Unlike Ameliorative Psychology, philosophers have paid attention to the HB program. These reject-the-norm arguments can be made on empirical grounds, for instance claiming that subjects understand the problem differently than the experimenter intended. Reject-the-norm arguments can also be made on conceptual grounds. One such conceptual argument is given by Gerd Gigerenzer. Another argument comes from L. Cohen, who argues normal adults cannot be empirically shown to be irrational. Ordinary human reasoning sets its own standards, so any flaws must be performance errors, not flaws in reasoning competence. Then, nothing could be an error unless its author, under ideal conditions, would agree it was an error. Cohen is surely right that there is distinction between performance and competence, but language is the wrong comparison. This is supported by the considerable correlation between scores on typical reasoning tasks, which are also correlated with SAT scores, although somewhat curiously, not math education 3. Even though Cohen seems to be arguing for epistemic relativism, he must actually be arguing psychologists and others are wrong. From the perspective of Strategic Reliabilism, the quality of a reasoning strategy depends on its expected costs and benefits relative to its competitors. Positive Advice Practical advice can only be made so far as empirical data allows, but the Strategic Reliabilist theory that reasoning strategies are better to the extent they are cheaper, more robustly reliable, and address more significant issues can tell us what evidence is missing if we want to offer guidance. However, if probabilities are recast as natural frequencies, subjects perform much better. The start-up costs to reliably use the former are too high for many. Overconfidence is a pervasive feature of reasoning. Monetary incentives and simple declarations to reduce bias have no effect. In controlled environments, calibration exercises can eliminate overconfidence. For individuals, the most feasible method is to consider the opposite. Applying this to every facet of our lives might be too expensive, either because it requires too much discipline or makes us neurotic. Both are valid concerns from a Strategic Reliabilist view, but is likely to be worth employing for significant problems. Compelling narratives are often accepted as causal explanations. Though they can go awry, controlled experiments provide the best way of understanding causal relationships. Acknowledging that a control might be impossible would lead us to accept fewer causal claims. Narratives come too easily, especially for rare or unique events. It is not clear how well good reasoning can be taught, but there is hope. One group of researchers surprised themselves when they found formal discipline has an effect, though admitting we know very little about reasoning, how to teach it, or how much of an improvement is possible by instruction 4. Conclusion Psychology profitable divorced itself from philosophy in the mid-19th century. Philosophers have been particularly neglectful of developments in the other field, but both disciplines could benefit from increased interaction. The authors propose three projects that would aid the development of a strong, mature epistemology. The first is to acquire a wide-range of new heuristics people can feasibly employ. Second, to guide the first project, a stronger account of human well-being is needed to highlight significant areas. Third, social institutions should be developed keeping in mind that much of our reasoning is ecological. Philosophy might be about self-knowledge, but that knowledge is unlikely to come from introspection. Epistemologists might become theoreticians describing an applied science, but the overall discipline will be stronger for it. Psychological Science in the Public Interest 1: Journal of Experimental Psychology:

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Chapter 7 : Naturalized epistemology | Psychology Wiki | FANDOM powered by Wikia

The authors set out a broad new approach to epistemology, which they see as a mixed discipline, having both a priori and empirical elements. They defend the roles of a priori reflection and conceptual analysis in philosophy, but their revisionary account of these philosophical methods allows them a subtle but essential empirical dimension.

Reviewed by James R. Beebe, University at Buffalo In this excellent and thought-provoking book, Mikkel Gerken articulates and applies a methodological framework for thinking about the empirical study of folk epistemology. Gerken brings together i contemporary debates in epistemology about the nature of knowledge, skepticism, contextualism, knowledge-first epistemology, pragmatic encroachment, norms of action and assertion, and much else with ii empirical research on folk epistemology and iii broader psychological and linguistic investigations into the nature of human cognition in more sophisticated detail than any other work in print. The book will be of interest not only to epistemologists of all stripes and experimental philosophers who study folk epistemology but also to anyone interested in understanding what a philosophically astute, empirically informed engagement with the scientific study of mental state attributions can look like. We know from research in cognitive and social psychology, behavioral economics, decision theory, and other fields that heuristics, biases, and satisficing are common features of human cognition. Yet these ideas have not been fully developed and applied to the empirical study of folk epistemology until now. Many will question the particular theses Gerken defends about which epistemic assessments are biased due to this heuristic or that cognitive limitation, but his general methodological approach will be difficult to reject or ignore. Gerken uses his view of epistemic cognition as boundedly rational, heuristically driven cognition to explain a variety of empirical findings, such as our inclination to deny that someone knows that p in the face of a salient alternative, q, and why knowledge norms of action and assertion seem plausible. To explain the salient alternative effect, he p. For epistemic norms of action, Gerken argues that if a conversation is focused on the question of whether someone should act on a given belief, ascribing knowledge will often fulfill the directive function of recommending in favor of or against acting on the belief. However, Gerken cautions against hastily inferring from this that knowledge is the norm of action. And the fact that the concept of knowledge comes to mind quite readily and easily when making epistemic assessments of actions may only mean that more fine-grained and often more accurate assessments are simply more difficult to conceptualize or articulate. Thus, Gerken takes knowledge norms of action and assertion to represent useful, easy to apply rules of thumb rather than the sober truth of how we should think about epistemic norms. Philosophers working in areas such as philosophy of science, social and political philosophy, applied ethics, or philosophy of mind have long been accustomed to the need for empirical studies to inform their philosophical theorizing. In other domains where being empirically well informed has not been the traditional norm e. On the one hand, there is a dismissive approach that denies empirical studies any relevance for philosophical theorizing. These two approaches represent more than merely ideal types, since they can often be observed in their pure, unqualified forms. Folk epistemology without epistemology is biased" p. Gerken begins from the fact that epistemic assessments play important roles in our social lives. For example, he writes: The proposition is now given a special status. Moreover, we can give someone a stamp of social approval by ascribing knowledge to her. Gerken endorses an approach that places less emphasis on single case judgments, more emphasis on comparative judgments across cases, and allows folk epistemology and epistemological theory to be "mutually illuminating" p. When the folk judge that subjects in Gettier cases have knowledge e. Gerken agrees with the latter group to a certain extent, noting that in response to the discovery of the conjunction fallacy, "it would be misguided to suggest that Kahneman and Tversky should have called up the department of mathematics to announce that the conjunction rule had been empirically falsified" p. However, the most interesting case to consider is one where folk judgments align with the expert consensus in epistemology. In such a case, one does not expect to find either experimental philosophers or armchair epistemologists claiming that the agreed

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upon epistemic principle should be discarded. Yet, that is precisely what Gerken does from time to time. For example, even though empirical studies and philosophical reflection have shown that knowledge norms of action and assertion have a great deal of intuitive plausibility, Gerken claims their plausibility stems from the fact that they are "cognitively cheap and reasonably accurate folk epistemological heuristic[s]" p. Gerken is not always skeptical of cases where the folk and experts agree. But he does think that we should always consider what role cognitive and communicative heuristics might play in making certain kinds of epistemic assessments seem felicitous. Many philosophers bring in psychological explanations only to explain or explain away unexpected patterns of judgments or behavior -- often those that conflict with some preferred philosophical perspective. Gerken, however, thinks that psychological explanations should be concerned with all of epistemic assessments -- expected, unexpected, untutored, or trained. And yet he maintains: In fact, one of the key methodological theses that I will argue for is that empirical research on folk epistemology depends on epistemological theorizing. Without a considerable theoretical grasp of what knowledge is, we would be unable to properly assess empirical findings. So, while we should not uncritically rely on judgments about cases, we should -- indeed must -- critically rely on judgments about cases. Doing so requires plenty of empirically informed reflection, which is best conducted from the armchair. Thus, I do not use empirical results in an ideological attempt to naturalize epistemology beyond recognition. I expect his endeavor to explain a wide variety of intuitive epistemic assessments by appealing to cognitive and communicative heuristics to have a lasting discipline-shaping impact on the empirical study of folk epistemology. In addition to developing a broad methodological approach for thinking about the empirical study of folk epistemology, Gerken also defends a variety of specific theses in epistemology. The core of his epistemological view is a form of strict purist invariantism with regard to knowledge. Gerken contends that degree of warrant required for action and assertion vary with context but that the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions do not. This is not a package of epistemological views that initially strikes me as very plausible. However, I found the arguments that Gerken provides for each component of his view to be interesting and more persuasive than I would have liked them to be. I suspect that many other readers will have a similar experience. One area where I expect philosophers to press Gerken concerns the number of times he appeals to cognitive and communicative biases to explain findings that represent challenges for his strict purist invariantism. When individuals refrain from attributing knowledge after skeptical alternatives have been made salient, Gerken claims this represents a false negative that results from failing to distinguish between salience and epistemic relevance. When people refrain from attributing knowledge in high stakes situations, he claims this, too, is a false negative -- one that results in part from failing to realize that even though the warrant demand for knowledge frequently coincides with the warrant demand for action, it does not always do so. When we deny knowledge to those who are unable to articulate the epistemic grounds for their beliefs, Gerken maintains this will often be a mistake that arises from a failure to recognize that certain conversational settings bring with them justificatory demands that do not correspond to the justificatory demands on knowledge. When we observe that knowledge ascriptions are often used to provide assurance, identify reliable informants, stop inquiry, direct action, or honor or blame informants p. And as we have already seen, he contends that the fairly widespread preference for knowledge norms of action and assertion stems from satisficing and overgeneralizing from paradigmatic cases. Once some favored pragmatic factors are allowed in, Gerken argues it will be difficult to keep out a host of other pragmatic factors that epistemological impurists would not want to determine the truth values of knowledge ascriptions. Nevertheless, the fact remains that there are a number of moving parts in his perspective, and I expect the number of biases and cognitive limitations to which he appeals to be a source of criticism in the philosophical discussion of his book that ensues. Given their comparable explanatory merits, Gerken claims we should prefer his more traditional approach. However, in the history of science, when simpler, less traditional theories are pitted against more complex, more traditional ones, and both are taken to explain the relevant phenomena equally well, simplicity often seems to trump conservatism. Moreover, when he appeals to theoretical conservatism in this fashion as a reason to

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prefer his view, I believe that he sells himself too short. Gerken takes great care -- perhaps a bit too much care at times -- to explain how the various heuristics, biases, and pragmatic factors to which he appeals are grounded in an array of empirical research and are not simply post hoc rationalizations for his preferred perspective. And he supplements these appeals with insightful philosophical arguments against competing epistemological theories. Thus, I think it would be dialectically more effective if less modest if Gerken did not grant the explanatory comparability of his views with the opposing views. When I began reading this book, I was concerned about the fact that the empirical study of folk epistemology was still rather new and that there was not a great deal of data on each of the effects that Gerken wants to analyze. This carefully crafted book will raise the level of discussion and theorizing about folk epistemology going forward. It is a must read for anyone interested in thinking about folk epistemology. The Case for Contextualism.

Chapter 8 : Table of Contents: New waves in epistemology /

classic form advocated by Quine (), to naturalize epistemology is to reconstruct certain traditional epistemic concerns within the disciplinary confines of empirical psychology.