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Chapter 1 : Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius - Read How You Want

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Those who desire to win the favor of princes generally endeavor to do so by offering them those things which they themselves prize most, or such as they observe the prince to delight in most. Thence it is that princes have very often presented to them horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments worthy of their greatness. Wishing now myself to offer to your Magnificence some proof of my devotion, I have found nothing amongst all I possess that I hold more dear or esteem more highly than the knowledge of the actions of great men, which I have acquired by long experience of modern affairs, and a continued study of ancient history. These I have meditated upon for a long time, and examined with great care and diligence; and having now written them out in a small volume, I send this to your Magnificence. And although I judge this work unworthy of you, yet I trust that your kindness of heart may induce you to accept it, considering that I cannot offer you anything better than the means of understanding in the briefest time all that which I have learnt by so many years of study, and with so much trouble and danger to myself. I have not set off this little work with pompous phrases, nor filled it with high-sounding and magnificent words, nor with any other allurements or extrinsic embellishments with which many are wont to write and adorn their works; for I wished Edition: And I hope it may not be accounted presumption if a man of lowly and humble station ventures to discuss and direct the conduct of princes; for as those who wish to delineate countries place themselves low in the plain to observe the form and character of mountains and high places, and for the purpose of studying the nature of the low country place themselves high upon an eminence, so one must be a prince to know well the character of the people, and to understand well the nature of a prince one must be of the people. May your Magnificence then accept this little gift in the same spirit in which I send it; and if you will read and consider it well, you will recognize in it my desire that you may attain that greatness which fortune and your great qualities promise. And if your Magnificence will turn your eyes from the summit of your greatness towards those low places, you will know how undeservedly I have to bear the great and continued malice of fortune. All states and governments that have had, and have at present, dominion over men, have been and are either republics or principalities. The principalities are either hereditary or they are new. Hereditary principalities are those where the government has been for a long time in the family of the prince. New principalities are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they are like appurtenances annexed to the hereditary state of the prince who acquires them, as the kingdom of Naples is to that of Spain. I will not discuss here the subject of republics, having treated of them at length elsewhere, but will confine myself only to principalities; and following the above indicated order of distinctions, I will proceed to discuss how states of this kind should be governed and maintained. I say, then, that hereditary Edition: For it is enough merely that the prince do not transcend the order of things established by his predecessors, and then to accommodate himself to events as they occur. So that if such a prince has but ordinary sagacity, he will always maintain himself in his state, unless some extraordinary and superior force should deprive him of it. And even in such a case he will recover it, whenever the occupant meets with any reverses. For the natural prince has less cause and less necessity for irritating his subjects, whence it is reasonable that he should be more beloved. And unless extraordinary vices should cause him to be hated, he will naturally have the affection of his people. For in the antiquity and continuity of dominion the memory of innovations, and their causes, are effaced; for each change and alteration always prepares the way and facilitates the next. But it is in a new principality that difficulties present themselves. In the first place, if it be not entirely new, but composed of different parts, which when taken all together may as it were be called mixed, its mutations arise in the beginning from a natural difficulty, which is inherent in all new principalities, because men change their rulers gladly, in the belief that they will better themselves by the change. It is this belief that makes them take up arms against the reigning prince; but

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in this they deceive themselves, for they find afterwards from experience that they have only made their condition worse. This is the inevitable consequence of another natural and ordinary necessity, which ever obliges a new prince to vex his people with the maintenance of an armed force, and by an infinite number of other wrongs that follow in the train of Edition: Thus the new prince finds that he has for enemies all those whom he has injured by seizing that principality; and at the same time he cannot preserve as friends even those who have aided him in obtaining possession, because he cannot satisfy their expectations, nor can he employ strong measures against them, being under obligations to them. For however strong a new prince may be in troops, yet will he always have need of the good will of the inhabitants, if he wishes to enter into firm possession of the country. It was for these reasons that Louis XII. For the very people who had opened the gates to Louis XII. It is very true that, having recovered such revolted provinces, it is easier to keep them in subjection; for the prince will avail himself of the occasion of the rebellion to secure himself, with less consideration for the people, by punishing the guilty, watching the suspected, and strengthening himself at all the weak points of the province. Thus a mere demonstration on the frontier by Lodovico Sforza lost Milan to the French the first time; but to make them lose it a second time required the whole world to be against them, and that their armies should be dispersed and driven out of Italy; which resulted from the reasons which I have explained above. Nevertheless, France lost Milan both the first and the second time. The general causes of the first loss have been sufficiently explained; but it remains to be seen now what occasioned the loss of Milan to France the second time, and to point out the remedies which the king had at his command, and which might be employed by any other prince under similar circumstances to maintain himself in a conquered province, but which King Louis XII. I will say then, first, that the states which a prince acquires and annexes to his own dominions are either in the same country, speaking the same language, or they are not. When they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially if they have not been accustomed to govern themselves; for in that case it suffices Edition: There being no difference in their manners and customs, the inhabitants will submit quietly, as we have seen in the case of Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy, which provinces have remained so long united to France. For although there are some differences of language, yet their customs are similar, and therefore they were easily reconciled to each other. Hence, in order to retain a newly acquired state, regard must be had to two things: But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, customs, and laws, then come the difficulties, and then it requires great good-fortune and much sagacity to hold them; and one of the best and most efficient means is for the prince who has acquired them to go and reside there, which will make his possession more secure and durable. Such was the course adopted by the Turk in Greece, who even if he had respected all the institutions of that country, yet could not possibly have succeeded in holding it, if he had not gone to reside there. For being on the spot, you can quickly remedy disorders as you see them arise; but not being there, you do not hear of them until they have become so great that there is no longer any remedy for them. Besides this, the country will not be despoiled by your officials, and the subjects will be satisfied by the easy recourse to the prince who is near them, which contributes to win their affections, if they are well disposed, and to inspire them with fear, if otherwise. And other powers will hesitate to assail a state where the prince himself resides, as they would find it very difficult to dispossess him. The next best means for holding a newly acquired state is to establish colonies in one or two places that are as it were the keys to the country. Unless this is done, it will be necessary to keep a large force of men-at-arms and infantry there for its protection. Colonies are not very expensive to the prince; they can be established and maintained at little, if any, cost to him; and only those of the inhabitants will be injured by him whom he deprives of their homes and fields, for the purpose of Edition: And as those who are thus injured by him become dispersed and poor, they can never do him any harm, whilst all the other inhabitants remain on the one hand uninjured, and therefore easily kept quiet, and on the other hand they are afraid to stir, lest they should be despoiled as the others have been. I conclude then that such colonies are inexpensive, and are more faithful to the prince and less injurious to the inhabitants generally; whilst those who are injured by their establishment become poor and dispersed, and therefore unable to do any harm, as I have already said. And here we must observe that men must either be

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flattered or crushed; for they will revenge themselves for slight wrongs, whilst for grave ones they cannot. The injury therefore that you do to a man should be such that you need not fear his revenge. But if instead of colonies an armed force be sent for the preservation of a newly acquired province, then it will involve much greater expenditures, so that the support of such a guard may consume the entire revenue of the province; so that this acquisition may prove an actual loss, and will moreover give greater offence, because the whole population will feel aggrieved by having the armed force quartered upon them in turn. Every one that is made to suffer from this inconvenience will become an enemy; and these are enemies that can injure the prince, for although beaten yet they remain in their homes. In every point of view, then, such a military guard is disadvantageous, just as colonies are most useful. A prince, moreover, who wishes to keep possession of a country that is separate and unlike his own, must make himself the chief and protector of the smaller neighboring powers. He must endeavor to weaken the most powerful of them, and must take care that by no chance a stranger enter that province who is equally powerful with himself; for strangers are never called in except by those whom an undue ambition or fear have rendered malcontents. The way in which these things happen is generally thus: So that, as regards these petty lords, the new prince need not be at any trouble to win them over to himself, as they will all most readily become incorporated with the state which he has there acquired. He has merely to see to it that they do not assume too much authority, or acquire too much power; for he will then be able by their favor, and by his own strength, very easily to humble those who are really powerful; so that he will in all respects remain the sole arbiter of that province. And he who does not manage this part well will quickly lose what he has acquired; and whilst he holds it, he will experience infinite difficulties and vexations. The Romans observed these points most carefully in the provinces which they conquered; they established colonies there, and sustained the feebler chiefs without increasing their power, whilst they humbled the stronger, and permitted no powerful stranger to acquire any influence or credit there. I will confine myself for an example merely to the provinces of Greece. Thus in all these cases the Romans did what all wise princes ought to do; namely, not only to look to all present troubles, but also to those of the future, against which they provided with the utmost prudence. For it is by foreseeing difficulties from afar that they are easily provided against; but awaiting their near approach, remedies are no longer in time, for the malady has become incurable. It happens in such cases, as the doctors say of consumption, that in the early stages it is easy to cure, but difficult to recognize; whilst in the course of time, the disease not having been recognized and cured in the beginning, it becomes easy to know, but difficult to cure. And thus it is in the affairs of state; for when the evils that arise in it are seen far ahead, which it is given only to a wise prince to Edition: The Romans therefore, on seeing troubles far ahead, always strove to avert them in time, and never permitted their growth merely for the sake of avoiding a war, well knowing that the war would not be prevented, and that to defer it would only be an advantage to others; and for these reasons they resolved upon attacking Philip and Antiochus in Greece, so as to prevent these from making war upon them in Italy. But let us return to France, and examine whether she has done any one of the things that we have spoken of. And we shall see how he did the very opposite of what he should have done, for the purpose of holding a state so unlike his own. I will not blame the king for the part he took; for, wishing to gain a foothold in Italy, and having no allies there, but rather finding the gates everywhere closed against him in consequence of the conduct of King Charles VIII. Genoa yielded; the Florentines became his friends; the Marquis of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivogli, the lady of Furlì, the lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, and Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisanese, and the Siennese, all came to meet him with offers of friendship. The Venetians might then have recognized the folly of Edition: Let us see now how easily the king might have maintained his influence in Italy if he had observed the rules above given. Had he secured and protected all these friends of his, who were numerous but feeble, some fearing the Church, and some the Venetians, and therefore all forced to adhere to him, he might easily have secured himself against the remaining stronger powers of Italy. Nor did he perceive that in doing this he weakened himself, by alienating his friends and those who had thrown themselves into his arms; and that he had made the Church great by adding so much temporal

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to its spiritual power, which gave it already so much authority. Having committed this first error, he was obliged to follow it up; so that, for the purpose of putting an end to the ambition of Pope Alexander VI. Not content with having made the Church great, and with having alienated his own friends, King Louis, in his eagerness to possess the kingdom of Naples, shared it with the king of Spain; so that where he had been the sole arbiter of Italy, he established an associate and rival, to whom the ambitious and the malcontents might have a ready recourse. And whilst he could have left a king in Naples who would have been his tributary, he dispossessed him, for the sake of replacing him by another who was powerful enough in turn to drive him out. The desire of conquest is certainly most natural and common amongst men, and whenever they yield to it and are successful, they are praised; but when they lack the means, and yet attempt it anyhow, then they commit an error that merits blame. If, then, the king of France was powerful enough by himself successfully to attack the kingdom of Naples, then he was right to do so; but if he was not, then he should not have divided it with the king of Spain. And if the partition of Lombardy with the Venetians was excusable because it enabled him to gain a foothold in Italy, that of Naples with the Spaniard deserves censure, as it cannot be excused on the ground of necessity. These errors, however, would not have injured him during his lifetime, had he not committed a sixth one in attempting to deprive the Venetians of their possessions. For if Louis had not increased the power of the Church, nor established the Spaniards in Italy, it would have been quite reasonable, and even advisable, for him to have weakened the Venetians; but having done both those things, he ought never to have consented to their ruin; for so long as the Venetians were powerful, they would always have kept others from any attempt upon Lombardy. They would on the one hand never have permitted this unless it should have led to their becoming masters of it, and on the other hand no one would have taken it from France for the sake of giving it to the Venetians; nor would any one have had the courage to attack the French and the Venetians combined. King Louis then lost Lombardy by not having conformed to any one of the conditions that have been observed by others, who, having conquered provinces, wanted to keep them. Nor is this at all to be wondered at, for it is quite reasonable and common. On that occasion the Cardinal said to me, that the Italians did not understand Edition: To which I replied that the French did not understand statesmanship; for if they had understood it, they would never have allowed the Church to attain such greatness and power. For experience proves that the greatness of the Church and that of Spain in Italy were brought about by France, and that her own ruin resulted therefrom. From this we draw the general rule, which never or rarely fails, that the prince who causes another to become powerful thereby works his own ruin; for he has contributed to the power of the other either by his own ability or force, and both the one and the other will be mistrusted by him whom he has thus made powerful. If we reflect upon the difficulties of preserving a newly acquired state, it seems marvellous that, after the rapid conquest of all Asia by Alexander the Great, and his subsequent death, which one would suppose most naturally to have provoked the whole country to revolt, yet his successors maintained their possession of it, and experienced no other difficulties in holding it than such as arose amongst themselves from their own ambition. I meet this observation by saying that all principalities of which we have any accounts have been governed in one of two ways; viz. Such nobles have estates and subjects of their own, who recognize them as their liege lords, and have a natural affection for them. In those states that are governed by an absolute prince and slaves, the prince has far more power and authority; for in Edition: Turkey and France furnish us examples of these two different systems of government at the present time. The whole country of the Turk is governed by one master; all the rest are his slaves; and having divided the country into Sanjacs, or districts, he appoints governors for each of these, whom he changes and replaces at his pleasure. But the king of France is placed in the midst of a large number of ancient nobles, who are recognized and acknowledged by their subjects as their lords, and are held in great affection by them. They have their rank and prerogatives, of which the king cannot deprive them without danger to himself. In observing now these two principalities, we perceive the difficulty of conquering the empire of the Turk, but once conquered it will be very easily held. The reasons that make the conquest of the Turkish empire so difficult are, that the conqueror cannot be called into the country by any of the great nobles of the state; nor can he hope that his

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attempt could be facilitated by a revolt of those who surround the sovereign; which arises from the above given reasons.

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Outline[edit] Discourses on Livy comprises a dedication letter and three books with numbered chapters. The first two books but not the third are introduced by unnumbered prefaces. Rucellai had died in , but this did not lead Machiavelli to find a new dedicatee, as he had with the Prince. Machiavelli justifies dedicating the Discourses to his two friends because they deserve to be princes, even if they lack principalities, and he criticizes the custom which he had adopted in the Prince of dedicating works to men who are princes but do not deserve to be. He says that he will restrict himself in Book I to those things that occurred inside the city and by public counsel I 1. He notes that he brings new modes and orders, a dangerous task given the envy of men, but one motivated by the desire to work for the common benefit of everyone. He also notes that while his work may not be perfect, it deserves to be heard, because it will aid others after him in fulfilling his vision. He complains that the Italian Renaissance has stimulated a desire to imitate the ancients in art, law, and medicine, but that no one thinks of imitating ancient kingdoms or republics. He traces this to an improper reading of history that suggests that imitation of ancient political virtue is impossible. He declares his intention to overcome this view of the ancient world by examining Livy and modern politics. Book one begins by explaining how a city is formed, which is done by either natives to the area or foreigners, citing specific examples such as Athens and Venice. Machiavelli then explains this idea and states that this greatly changes the way a city is viewed, in particular for Rome. Each, however, is remarkably similar to a malevolent twin, called tyranny, oligarchy, and anarchy, and they quickly deteriorate into the bad systems. Machiavelli then delves into more historical events. Once the Tarquins left Rome there seemed to be peace and alliance between the patricians and the plebs, but this in fact was untrue. This disunity resulted in Rome evolving into a Republic. Moving on, he says that a republic has the opportunity to emerge as an empire, like Rome, or just maintain what it is. Also, allowing people to accuse citizens of sins is necessary in creating a republic, but calumnies, whispered allegations that cannot be proven or disproven in a court, are harmful because they cause mistrust and help create factionalism. Machiavelli ranks then which rulers are most praiseworthy, the first of which being leaders who lead due to religion, then those who lead because they created a republic or kingdom. Religion in Rome was cited as a primary cause for joy in the city as it is truly an important element. He also states that Livy gives many examples of when religion was utilized to restructure the city. The Samnites were defeated by the Romans several times and in order to change this they decided find a new approach to their religion. Discussing then freedom, Machiavelli explains that freedom becomes an issue once a type of government shifts. He explains that the Romans were not corrupt when they regained their freedom and could thus keep it. Questioning what mode a free state can be maintained in a corrupt city, he states that Rome had orders, which kept the citizens checked. He then goes into a discussion of the rulers of Rome and how a strong or weak Prince can maintain or destroy a kingdom. He continues, to say that after a weak prince a kingdom could not remain strong with another weak prince. Luckily, the first three kings each had a certain strength, which aided the city. Romulus was fierce, Numa was religious, and Tullus was dedicated to war. The book then slightly shifts focus to discussing the reformation of a state. Machiavelli explains that if one wants to change a state they must keep some elements of the previous state. Also, he says that a Prince or republic should not deny citizens necessities. He then conveys that having a dictatorial authority was beneficial for the City of Rome because a republic cannot always make the quick decisions demanded by a crisis, and in these cases one person can do a better job than the rest. Rome benefited because the office of Dictator was written into the constitution so it could be exercised legitimately and then retired during the emergency. Continuing with this, weak republics are not truly able to make important decisions and that any change will come from necessity. The themes of pride and corruption appear many times throughout The Discourses and Machiavelli

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believes that it is very easy for a person to be corrupted. It is also good for a soldier to have the desire to fight for personal pride and glory. Towards the end of Book One, Machiavelli adds that great accidents that occur in a city usually come with some kind of sign. This sign could be divine or seen through a revelation. Also, Machiavelli explains that Livy stated that people are strong together, but weak when alone giving the example of the Roman plebs. Livy additionally feels that the multitude is wiser than the one prince. Thus, Book One examines a variety of issues that occur when creating a state, and looks at it with specific examples from Rome and other parts of Italy. There were many opinions equally distributed to both sides, and there is not final consensus on which had more of a cause, virtue or fortune. Chapter two discusses what people the Romans had to combat, and that they obstinately defended their freedom. He believes that we have lost our love of freedom, and we need to get it back. Chapter three talks about how Rome had its rise to power through their ruining of surrounding cities, making Rome the primary power of the region. Chapter four lists the three modes of expanding that republics have taken. Also, Machiavelli gives the reasoning and background information for why these three modes of expanding that the republic took were necessary. Chapter five talks about how memories can be lost due to issues such as language barriers, floods, or even plague. Chapter six talks about how the Romans went about making war. He claims that their goal for war was to be short and massive. Chapter seven talks about how much land the Romans gave per Colonist. He claims that this would be tough to determine because it depended on the places where they sent the colonists. Chapter 8 discusses the cause why peoples leave their ancestral places and inundate the country of others. He blames it either on famine or on war that has taken over their land and they must move on to something new. Chapter 9 he talks about what factors commonly cause wars. He says there are many different reasons for disputes. Chapter 10 talks about how the common opinion of money being the sinew of war is actually incorrect. Faith and benevolence of men is what makes war what it is. Chapter 11 talks about the idea that becoming friends with a Prince who has more reputation than force is not something that would go unnoticed. People were looking for good connections, and the prince who has a better reputation is better off than the one with better force. Chapter 12 talks about whether it is better to wait to be attacked if you feel it is coming, or if you should make the first move. Chapter 13 talks about how a person comes from base to great fortune more through fraud than through force. He thinks that fraud is just quicker and easier, so force is not needed. Chapter 14 talks about how men confuse themselves into believing that through humility, they will conquer pride. Claims that humility and pride are two separate things and do not go hand in hand. Chapter 15 claims that the resolutions of weak states will always be ambiguous, and that slow decisions, no matter who or what is making them, are always hurtful. Chapter 16 talks about how much the soldiers of his time did not conform to the ancient orders. Values and ideologies were being lost, and soldiers just were not the same as they used to be. Chapter 17 talks about how much artillery should be esteemed by armies in the present times, and whether the opinion universally held of it is true. Many different opinions are voiced in the chapter, and each has a valid argument to go along with it. Chapter 18 talks about how the Authority of the Romans and by the example of the ancient military infantry should be esteemed more than the horse. Claimed that the military esteemed the military on foot much more than military on horseback. Chapter 19 talks about how the acquisitions by Republics that are not well ordered and that do not proceed according to Roman virtue are for their ruin, not their exaltation. Chapter talks in detail about the different outlooks people have. Chapter 20 talks about and asks what danger the prince or republic runs that avails itself of Auxiliary or mercenary military. Says that having these services admits you are weak and is not something that is necessarily respectable. Chapter 21 says the first praetor the Romans sent anyplace was to Capua, four hundred years after they began making war. Claims that the Romans were changing things and were acting differently from past precedents. Chapter 22 talks about how false the opinions of men often are in judging great things. Says that the best men are treated poorly during the quiet times because of envy or from other ambitions. Chapter 23 talks about how much the Romans, in judging subjects for some accidents that necessitated such judgment, fled from the Middle Way. Chapter 24 claims that fortresses are generally much more harmful than useful. They did not build fortresses to protect them

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because they were of another virtue to that of building them. Chapter 25 says to assault a disunited city so as to seize it by means of its disunion is a contradictory policy. He is saying that taking advantage of someone while they are already down is something that should not be done. Chapter 26 claims vilification and abuse generate hatred against those who use them, without any utility to them. He is saying that the abuse that men do to women is something that brings hatred not only from the victim, but from everyone who hears about it as well. Chapter 27 says for prudent princes and republics, it should be enough to conquer, for most often when it is not enough, one loses. He is saying that people should be happy with what they get, because if they try to get more than they can handle, they end up losing it all. Chapter 28 says how dangerous it is for a Republic or a Prince not to avenge an injury done against the public or against a private person. Chapter 29 claims that fortune blinds the spirits of men when it does not wish them to oppose its plans. This means that fate will take its toll on what men do and do not do. Chapter 30 says that truly powerful Republics and Princes buy friendships not with money, but with virtue and reputation of strength. Chapter 31 talks about how dangerous it is to believe the banished. He is talking about how there should be no circumstances in which someone should believe another individual who has been kicked out of the country. Chapter 32 talks about how many modes the Romans seized towns. He talks about the different advantages to seizing towns in different ways, both weighing the pros and cons such as cost and efficiency. Chapter 33 talks about how the Romans gave free commissions to their captains of armies.

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"The Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius" is one of the masterpieces by Machiavelli. This work narrates the writer's comments as to how a democratic government should be established.

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