

DOWNLOAD PDF BUILDING FLEXIBILITY INTO THE ACCESSIONS PROCESS

Chapter 1 : Chapter 5: WTO Accession

adding flexibility to the production process can be a major competitive advantage. building flexibility into a production process is usually inexpensive, but.

Since the inception of the WTO on January 1, 1995, only four countries have completed the entire accession process: Bulgaria, Ecuador, Mongolia and Panama. Currently, thirty-four governments hold observer status in the WTO, thirty-one of which are actively seeking accession. Most of the applicant governments are developing or transitioning economies, for whom WTO membership will accelerate development and bind economic reform into an international legal framework. The following sections will enumerate the mechanics of accession, the changes in content between accession to the GATT and accession to the WTO, and the costs and benefits experienced by the applicants. In addition to their schedule of commitments undertaken at the time of accession, governments agree to submit to a monitoring process, the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), which ensures compliance with WTO rules, enhances transparency, and builds confidence that applicants will be held accountable for the commitments they take on. A discussion of this monitoring process will be followed by a case study of the accessions of China and Taiwan. Generally, aspiring members will first become observers, a status intended to allow governments to become familiar with WTO requirements and the accession process. Observers are not required to make any changes or commitments and are allowed to attend meetings and review WTO documents. As they develop a familiarity with WTO requirements, they may start unilaterally changing their foreign trade regime in anticipation of the accession process. Governments then request to accede to the WTO by submitting a communication to the director-general, which is then circulated among all members. Upon approval of the request at the next General Council meeting, a Working Party will be established to review the application. Any and all WTO members may form the Working Party, although usually only those governments particularly interested in the accession of a given government will participate. Thus begins the "information gathering" stage of the accession process. The applicant provides a memorandum on its foreign trade regime describing all aspects of its trade policy that has a bearing on WTO Agreements. The memorandum on the foreign trade regime is distributed among Working Party members, who in turn submit written questions and comments for response by the applicant. Based on this initial round, the Working Party will meet to further delve into the details of laws, regulations, sectoral policies, taxation systems, privatization plans, subsidy policies, information on regional trading agreements, tariff and non-tariff barriers and anything else that might affect international trade. With some overlap into the "information-gathering stage," the "negotiating" phase begins whereby the applicant engages in parallel multilateral and bilateral talks with members of the Working Party. For example, the U.S. Based on these and other consultations, the U.S. During this phase, either the applicant could submit an initial offer or Working Party members could submit requests as a basis for further negotiations, which continue until the Working Party agrees that all necessary changes have been made to bring the applicant's foreign trade regime into compliance with the WTO. The bilateral tariff, non-tariff, and market access commitments, once agreed to by the Working Party, are combined to form the draft protocol. The bilateral commitments made will automatically apply equally to all WTO members in accordance with the non-discrimination principle. The Protocol enters into force thirty days after ratification of the applicant government. Article XII governing accession does not set a fixed time frame or deadline for completion of the accession process. The detailed review of the applicant's trade regime and the negotiations are time consuming and technically complex. The applicants themselves are largely responsible for the progress of their accession. Given the difficult nature of the accession process, the WTO Secretariat and individual member states offer technical assistance to applicants. The observer status is designed for the purpose of familiarizing an applicant with the meetings of other working parties, WTO councils and committees. In addition, the Secretariat will provide assistance in the technical preparation of any documentation requested of the applicant. The United States also frequently provides similar assistance in

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addition to guidance in the process of economic and legislative reform. Other factors that may delay the accession process include a lack of resources on the part of the WTO and Working Party members and conflicts within the Working Party regarding required commitments of the applicant. The large number of applicants, many of whom are in the early stages of accession, may limit the attention members can devote on a particular accession. This highlights, again, the need for acceding governments to be forthright in the information gathering stages and how the pace of accession is largely in the hands of the applicant. Specifically, WTO members are concerned that tariffs and other regulations as applied to third parties outside the RTA are not on the whole higher or more restrictive. The EU would like Latvia to make the same commitments that all EU members have made - specifically, taking the necessary legal steps to maintain a quota reserving 51 percent of commercial airtime for European works. The fact that most applicants are either developing or transitioning economies brings certain concerns to the accession process. First on the list is whether or not to admit them as "developing countries" and whether or not to recognize them as "market" or "non-market" economies. Declared developing countries receive "special and differential treatment" within the WTO. For the most part, this status enables them to have a longer time-frame within which to implement certain commitments, although they may also commit to a lower level of obligations and obtain more favorable treatment for the least developed countries. WTO negotiators are trying not to repeat the failures of the GATT; designating "developing country" status provided little incentive for reciprocity on the part of the developing countries, and relegated them to second class status. Throughout the Uruguay Round, developing countries realized the benefits of being a first-class member. By engaging in reciprocal exchanges of concessions, they had a credible and significant role in addressing their concerns with the new issues of GATS, textiles and clothing, agriculture, and tropical products. Now, negotiators focus as much as possible on locking in more rational trade policies before granting accession. This is especially evident in the case of former communist countries: Once the West became certain that communism was defunct, the hurdles to accession became higher as the focus turned to commercially viable trade policies. As prices in non-market economies "reflect administrative priorities, not prices resulting from competition," so the logic goes that dumping calculations for non-market economies will be less accurate than for market economies. Investigations into anti-dumping are time consuming and costly to firms and are more prevalent when countries are labeled as "non-market. Realistically, these problems would not prevent accession, but they certainly contribute to the length of the accession process. The mechanics of the accession process is essentially the same as under GATT A series of negotiations determines the terms of membership. The inclusion of these additional issues and sectors into the world trading system means that, unlike GATT, applicants must "make legislative changes to meet WTO institutional and regulatory requirements in addition to the eliminating existing WTO-inconsistent measures. Moreover, the entry of China into the WTO directly affects accession of another applicant, Taiwan, which has entangled the accession process in the existing unresolved disputes between China and Taiwan. As the United States traditionally has an influential vote within the Working Party and within the General Council, it is fitting to examine negotiations between China and the U. China seems very reluctant to make acceptable concessions in the negotiation process, imposing barriers to U. On October 10, , the United States and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Market Access that commits China to dismantle most of these barriers and gradually open its markets to U. As a direct result, China has removed over 1, quotas and licenses on a wide range of key exports such as telecommunications digital switching equipment, computers, many agricultural products, and medical equipment. Also, administrative actions to enforce intellectual property rights have been weak; end-user piracy of computer software remains widespread. Trade with China under the rules of "the club," would create more jobs in both export and import industries, and help the United States achieve a more balanced trade relationship with China. Many legislators feel this process provides a key leverage against China to improve human rights and prevent arms trading. Congress is unlikely to revoke the amendment, although it could remove China from the list of nations requiring such conditional MFN extension. These provisions prohibit

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the extension of permanent MFN status to the acceding country. This would probably trigger a serious political crisis and undermine the value of WTO membership to China. The leaders are very worried that the rapid opening of Chinese society and the liberalization of the economy will result in massive dislocations of revenues and resources, unemployment resulting from foreign competition, and social instability. As Greg Mastel has pointed out, China is not a rule-based country, but rather a "man-ruled" country. As mentioned above, China is a state-planned economy, and its accession may set up a model for other countries that formerly operated command economies. The agreements include immediate market access for some agricultural products, the lifting of a ban on imports of U. The Monopoly Board, which administers the sales of alcohol and tobacco products, will eliminate internal taxes that discriminate against imported products and replace them with a value-added tax system. Enjoying the benefits from a free market economy must be balanced with abiding by its rights and obligations. The need to integrate such a country into the world trading system presents the WTO with one of its most challenging tasks. The TPRM, although still developing as an institution, serves as a mechanism for "achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members," 33 and also plays an important role as a confidence-builder in the expansion of the WTO. The next sixteen largest trading states are reviewed once every four years, and the remaining members are reviewed once every six years. Least-developed countries may be granted a longer period between reviews. Each report is intended to provide a detailed synopsis of the trade policies and practices, policy-making institutions, and macroeconomic situation of the member under review. The process of data collection and preparation for a review takes approximately ten months. The current staff of the TPRD consists of a director, sixteen economists, and eleven support staff. The TPRB meeting for a given country is a chance for members of the TPRB as well as any designated discussants usually two, selected in agreement with the member under review 39 to air any questions or concerns regarding the findings of the report. Questions for the member under review must be submitted in writing a week before the scheduled meeting. Discussants are required to submit an outline of relevant points at least one week prior to the meeting. The TPRB also agreed in to conduct "grouped" reviews of nations involved in regional customs unions or other obvious geographical or political linkages in an effort to stave off overloading of the TPRB. Although the primary goal of the TPRM is to provide transparency in domestic trade policies, there has been some debate about the ability of the TPRM to act in an enforcement capacity regarding unfair trade practices. The TPRM has repeatedly shied away from such a role. While the TPRM fulfills a public good in providing an institutionalized format for transparency in commerce, it has been limited by its charter and repeated statements to an observational and non-judgmental ideal. Although data from TPRM reports may serve as the starting point for a dispute resolution through the DSB, the evidentiary link between the TPRM and the dispute settlement mechanism has not fully developed yet. The current Country Report draft outline allows a member to selectively target specific issues for consideration. The depth and breadth of the Secretariat reports vary as well, from being hailed as "the best available description so far" 47 of a given economy to being "a little dry and seemingly descriptive. By training review teams in standard procedures, like the IMF or the WTO does now, as well as imposing standards in terms of data and analysis on the country being reviewed, we can help alleviate the burden on the TPRM. This has acted to reinforce the concept of equity in the process, but has also allowed Members to prepare to present their national trade policies in the best possible light. Further systematization of the institution of the TPRM will increase confidence in and compliance with the spirit of the exercise. The TPRM, although still limited in its ability to enforce free trade measures, could provide an important "safety valve" for the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. By instituting a middle level of arbitration or consultation between the impartial review and the dispute settlement process, the TPRM could serve to alleviate the caseload of the DSB. Giving the TPRB the power to order a deadline for arbitration or consultation on unfair trade practices uncovered in the review process would serve to eliminate some DSB cases before they got off the ground without seriously undermining the binding authority of the DSB. The mandatory nature of the WTO gives current members the assurance that accession-seeking

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countries like China, Taiwan, or the Russian Federation will have their trade policies brought under the same scope of evaluation they have come to accept. This is especially important in relation to transition economies and states with traditionally closed trade policies. A state seeking accession is explicitly stating its willingness to open its trade policy, the first step towards freer trade. It puts on the table a plan to bring their policies into line with the WTO guidelines. Membership in the WTO commits a country to a regime of monitoring and compliance that applies to everyone equally. The repetitive nature of the reviews allows for a comparison over time of changes in trade policy. The TPRM, although both innovative and experimental, has so far fulfilled its purpose.

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Chapter 2 : Functional / Operational | WBDG Whole Building Design Guide

Accession definition is - the act or process by which someone rises to a position of honor or power. How to use accession in a sentence. the act or process by which someone rises to a position of honor or power; an act of coming near or to something: approach, admittance.

In addition to standardizing archival practice within the department, these manuals function as living documents that respond to changing trends and innovations in the profession. The UC Guidelines provide recommendations aimed at exposing all archival holdings and processing collections to an appropriate level in order to expedite user access and maximize institutional resources. The guidelines also emphasize tracking processing metrics for heuristic purposes and provide a template for local adaptation. The cornerstone of the guidelines is the concept of the "value score" – a number between 4 and 20 that corresponds with processing levels ranging from Minimal to Highly Intensive. The value score, derived from a set of four criteria including user interest, quality of documentation, institutional value, and object value, represents the processing priority of an archival collection and thus serves as a powerful decision-making tool for processors grappling with competing priorities. At the point of accession, new collections or additions are evaluated using the defined criteria, which were inserted directly into the accessioning manual with slight modifications to suit local needs. The value score and corresponding processing levels are recorded in the accession record, with the number given to each of the four criteria documented to give future processors insight into the rationale of the overall score. For legacy accessions acquired before implementation of the guidelines, the manual instructs processors to assign "retroactive" value scores, with procedures varying based on single or multiple accessions and whether a collection is processed or unprocessed. Assigning value scores is covered in Section 13 of the accessioning manual. Special Collections and Archives often receives accruals to existing collections, presenting processors with "multiple-accession" dilemmas. Familiar questions of how to process wholly unprocessed and semi-processed collections comprised of multiple accessions, as well as additions to previously processed collections, were made all the more complex when value scores were added to the workflow. Instructions were developed for the various scenarios, the common rule being to take the highest value score and apply it to the collection or additions to the collection as a whole. This accommodates both higher and lower levels of processing and provides processors with the flexibility needed to select the best solution for their particular collection. Working with multiple accessions is addressed in Section 5. Using the assigned value score, processors create a processing plan that applies the prescribed levels of control based on collection survey findings. The breakdown of tasks for Minimal to Highly Intensive processing results in a much more structured processing plan from the start, requiring the processor to think of each collection component as an aggregate of physical and intellectual tasks rather than a rough draft arrangement proposal with to-be-determined granularity. While flexibility is always critical, the value score demands more upfront detail, which in turn aids the processor in tracking processing metrics. A sample processing plan is provided in Appendix G. The processing plan also records the estimated number of processing hours as set by the UC Guidelines. Tracking is only being done for processing activities, not accessioning, surveying, or any other preliminary actions undertaken before the start of processing, including preparation of a processing plan. When doing minimal processing, processors track at the collection level; for low through highly intensive processing, tracking is at the component level. Thus, all work performed at a particular level throughout the project is represented with one entry in the worksheet and all hours associated with that level in one total value. The same is done when measuring pre-processing extent. Discussion of processing hours and metrics is covered in Section 4. Nonetheless, the benefits of upfront decision-making facilitated by the use of value scores are already evident. Assessing materials during accessioning answers many administrative questions at the beginning of the archival workflow, the most important being the priority collections should receive. It allows processors to build upon an existing processing strategy and eliminates the need to start from scratch,

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incentives that are critical when time and resources are limited.

Chapter 3 : Accession | Definition of Accession by Merriam-Webster

Century: Building the Upper Floors of the Trading System Through WTO Accessions draws on recent accession experiences to distil the impact of accessions on the constantly evolving architecture of the multilateral trad-

Chapter 4 : Interim guidance issued for transgender service members

d. adding flexibility to the production process can be a major competitive advantage. building flexibility into a production process is usually inexpensive, but difficult adding flexibility to the production process can be a major competitive advantage. building flexibility into a production process is usually inexpensive, but difficult.

Chapter 5 : Building flexibility into business planning â€“ Tom Spencer

Chapter 5 WTO Accession INTRODUCTION. One of the most important tasks the WTO faces in pursuit of a truly transparent, predictable and fair world trading system is the integration of non-members.

Chapter 6 : OMC | Librairie en ligne

Safeguarding both product and operators is paramount when designing systems for the processing of highly potent active pharmaceutical ingredients (HAPI), but ensuring that the systems are designed with maximum flexibility in mind is of growing importance too.

Chapter 7 : Accessing talent : the foundation of a U.S. Army Officer Corps strategy / - CORE

Flexibility can make the difference in today's competitive market, and a Delayed Coker has the in-built flexibility to process whatever crude oils the traders are likely to buy for the refinery.

Chapter 8 : WTO | WTO accessions

In these instances, it is critical that organizations have enough flexibility built into In the case of data preservation, those details; often take the form of unique circumstances where a standardized, linear preservation process must be altered to account for a particular.

Chapter 9 : Trade Multilateralism in the Twenty-First Century

Analyse the benefits and penalties of building flexibility into the manufacturing process. Assignment 4 A company specializing in the manufacture of hydraulic valves has analyzed its fixed and overhead costs relating to one of its valves which together amount to £, which the variable costs amount to £12 per valve manufactured.