

**Chapter 1 : Russia Influence Operations Taking Aim at US Military**

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Tajikistan Military Guide Operational Group of Russian Forces in Tajikistan Subsequent to the declarations of independence, Tajikistan was the first Central Asian state to openly call for the maintenance of Russian troops on its territory. The country hosted the 1st Division, called Gachinskaya, which was founded in and set up in Dushanbe, then Stalinabad, at the end of World War II. It formed one of the contingents of Soviet troops sent to Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. When the Soviet Union dissolved at the end of 1991, the main military force in Tajikistan was the 1st Motorized Rifle Division, whose position and resources the Russian Federation inherited. The Russian military is present in Tajikistan at the request of the Tajikistani Government to support the current regime. Russian border forces also dominate the multi-national CIS forces guarding the Tajikistani-Afghan border. The Russian military presence in Tajikistan predated the civil war, and the 1st Motorized Rifle Division had been deployed in Tajikistan since the Soviet period. Although nominally neutral in the civil war that broke out in Tajikistan in the fall of 1992, the 1st Division, together with substantial forces from neighboring Uzbekistan, played a significant role in the recapture of the capital city, Dushanbe, by former communist forces. The resulting civil war claimed between 100,000 and 200,000 lives. As the civil war continued in more remote regions of Tajikistan during the next three years, the 1st Division remained the dominant military force, joining with Russian border troops and a multinational group of "peace-keeping" troops dominated by Russian and Uzbekistani forces and including troops from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to patrol the porous border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. In the absence of a strong policy guidance from Moscow, the 1st Division turned into an independent political force. Although the local Russian military in Tajikistan was ordered to stay neutral in the evolving conflict; informally it took side and transferred weapons to the Popular Front. The pro-Communist Popular Front was struggling against the Coalition government formed in May 1997, which included representatives from the Democratic and Muslim Opposition. Without the help of the 1st Division, Emomali Rakhmonov would never have come to power. Russia reinforced the 1st Motorized Rifle Division as fighting in the Tajik conflict worsened and the division became more involved. Therefore, the Rakhmonov regime came to rely upon two foreign armed forces: Tajikistan lacked resources to maintain forces along its 2,000-kilometer border. The 1st MRD was not part of the originally-designated force and was tasked to guard key installations and military facilities, but was drawn into the CCPFT once the magnitude of the mission and the lack of resources became apparent. The participation of regional powers in peacekeeping was extremely sensitive in Central Asia, where frontiers are often artificial, ethnic groups are divided and deep-rooted rivalries have recently re-emerged. Peacekeeping operations by Central Asian states in neighboring states, in which they might have an ethnic minority or territorial claims, could put further strain on the fragile inter-ethnic relations in the region. Thus, many Tajiks, who, as the only non-Turkic peoples in Central Asia, have a historical fear of being subjugated by the Turkic majority, view with suspicion the deployment of Uzbek or Kyrgyz peacekeeping troops in Tajikistan, particularly in the south. In 1997 and 1998, Russian and Central Asian authorities requested that the CIS troops be recognized as peacekeeping troops under United Nations UN jurisdiction, which elicited numerous debates as the 1st Division fought against the Tajik Islamic-democratic opposition alongside the Communists of Khudj and and Kuliab, and could not therefore be considered as a neutral force. Those interests were defined as preventing radical Islamic politicization and the shipment of narcotics, both designated as serious menaces to Russia itself. Meanwhile, Tajikistan formed a small army of its own, of which about three-quarters of the officer corps were Russians in mid Tajikistan, having no air force, relied exclusively on Russian air power. Border troops received artillery and armor support from the 1st Division, whose strength was estimated in 1997 as at least 12,000 troops. As refugees returned and the disparate political factions attempted to rebuild or really start to construct in the first place a unified Tajik state, the position of the CCPFT and GRBTT must necessarily change. However, given the significant number of locally-recruited personnel, it may not be a matter of Russian forces returning home, but ethnic Tajiks

shifting to Tajik authority. On the other hand, Dushanbe needed to use its finite funds for rebuilding and it can finance reconstruction by cutting the defense rolls; therefore, an immediate Russian exodus did not result. After the peace accords of June , the presence of the CIS forces, whose first mission was to prevent the reprise of conflict between belligerents and to disarm the regional militias, was put into question. In , an agreement on the status of the Russian military presence in Tajikistan brought the withdrawal of the latter but maintained the troops of the 1st Division, whose mission was no longer the domestic political stabilization but solely the securitization of the external borders. Russia, which already had 25, armed troops in Tajikistan, tentatively agreed in April to the establishment of a military base which would help increase the stability in Tajikistan. The provided for the construction of more permanent headquarters for the 6th, troops of the 1st Motorized Rifle Division already deployed there. As of , President Emomali Rakhmon sought to affirm his authority over the whole of the territory and to normalize the country by presenting it as capable of taking control over its own borders. The polemics with Moscow over the financing of the Russian troops, equally shared between both parties, deteriorated from year to year, with each seeking to reduce its own costs. The Tajik army then sought to take gradual control over the borders first by adopting surveillance tasks over the kilometers km with China, then over the borders with Kyrgyzstan. According to various sources it appeared that as of Russian troops in Tajikistan numbered 22, to 25,, including those serving in the 1st Motorized Infantry Division with garrisons in Dushanbe, Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube, in a group of the Russian Federal Border Troops and in an anti-aircraft unit. In line with the Military Agreement, dozens of military advisors work at the Ministry of Defense of Tajikistan. In , the Russian soldiers started to hand over to the Tajiks the responsibility of guarding the 1, km of border with Afghanistan. The border zone of Pamir was the first to be retroceded, followed by sections under command of the Moscow and Piandj border battalions, considered particularly strategic in drug-trafficking related issues. This process ended in the fall of . At the occasion of this transfer, Russia left the Tajikborder guards with material worth the equivalent of 10 million dollars and transferred the Federal Security Service FSB Training Center at Dushanbe, which provided specialized training snipers, cynologists, explosives specialists, etc. The negotiations over the transformation of the 1st Division into a permanent Russian military base started in and closed in . Russia has also been allowed to occupy the Aini air base close to Dushanbe, which stations Russian helicopter squadrons. The Okno spatial surveillance center, located at an altitude of 2, meters, is close to the Chinese border near Nurek. Built at the end of the s, Okno, which only became totally operational in , hosts an optical and electronic monitoring station for the Russian space forces and can see as far as 40, km away, thanks to the exceptional visibility provided by local climatic conditions. The specialists who work there are all Russian citizens and generally hold their posts for about 10 years. Under the year lease signed in , Russia got exclusive use of three military bases and joint use of an air base in Tajikistan free of charge. As of it was reported that there were 5, Russian troops in country. In all, by there were more than 7, servicemen in three bases deployed in Dushanbe, Qurghon Teppa and Kulob. Russia offered Tajikistan to extend term of the agreement on the Russian military base for ten years. Russia won a year deal on a military base in Tajikistan, but the price includes risk of placing Russian servicemen under fire if violence flares up in volatile Central Asia. Moscow and Dushanbe clinched an agreement on 05 October on the Russian military base in Tajikistan, which will remain in the country until at least , a Russian presidential aide said. The agreement, which followed months of haggling, is a success for Russian diplomacy, Russian and Western analysts said. On October 8, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon noted that documents on military cooperation between Tajikistan and Russia signed in Dushanbe laid a solid legal foundation for creation of modern armed forces in Tajikistan. We had no army, no defense ministry. We asked another state for more than officers and from among them I chose Colonel Shishlyannikov and appointed him defense minister. We started from scratch. The Tajik-Russian agreement on the staying period and the status of the Russian military base in Tajikistan will be ratified by the parliaments of Tajikistan and Russia after the Agreements signing on the duty-free supplies of petroleum products and the labor migration, - reported the Foreign Minister of Tajikistan, Hamrokhon Zarifi, to the journalists after the negotiations of the President and the Foreign Minister of Tajikistan with the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation 17 January in Dushanbe. According to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, the Tajik-Russian

agreement on duty-free delivery of oil products from Russia to Tajikistan and the agreement on migration are supported to be signed during the first quarter of President Vladimir Putin has instructed the Russian military to assess the risks of the withdrawal of US and international coalition troops from Afghanistan and help Tajikistan face potential threats after the pullout, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said 01 August According to the Military Balance Report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Tajik armed forces personnel totaled 16, as of , and include land-based and mobile units, an air force and an anti-aircraft force that mostly use outdated Soviet-era military equipment. At the same time, Tajikistan largely relies on the presence of a Russian base on its territory. A total of 7, Russian troops are stationed at three military facilities, collectively known as the st military base: Moscow and Dushanbe agreed in October that the base would remain in Tajikistan until at least A brigade normally consists of 3, to 5, military personnel.

**Chapter 2 : Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan - Wikipedia**

*"Three quarters of Russia's territory lies in Asia, east of the Ural mountains. The country's principal threats now come from Asian countries on its southern borders. Drawing on a wide variety of Russian language sources, this book provides the first substantial study of Russian military posture in.*

History[ edit ] Armed Forces shoulder sleeve insignia On May 7, , the President of Kazakhstan took a number of actions regarding defence. Mukhtar Altynbayev served as the Minister of Defence twice, most recently from December to 10 January Kazakhstan acquired all the units of the 40th Army the former 32nd Army and part of the 17th Army Corps, including 6 land force divisions, storage bases, the 14th and 35th air-landing brigades, 2 rocket brigades, 2 artillery regiments and a large amount of equipment which had been withdrawn from over the Urals after the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The Armed Forces returned to a dual structure general-purpose forces and air defense forces. The Airmobile Forces were created, the transition to the new military-territorial structure, established military districts, harmonized structure and deployment of troops. On August 7, Lieutenant-General A. Ertaev became commander of the Eastern Military District. According to the decree, the head of the General Staff subordinates all kinds of aircraft and type of troops and military districts, while the Minister of Defence has a mostly administrative and political functions. On March 30, Major General M. Sihimov was appointed commander of the Western Military Region. On October 12, M. Elamanov became commander of the Airmobile Forces. On December 8, a new Defense Minister was appointed: Altynbayev, and on December 27, Major General K. Akhmadiev was appointed commander of the Air Defense Forces. Elamanov commander of the Southern Military District, Maj. Dzhulamanov commander of the Eastern Military District, Maj. Shatskov commander of the Central Military District and K. Altynbayev given the title of Army General. Kazakhstan had its first military parade in its history at Otar Military Base on May 7, , celebrating the Defender of the Fatherland Day as the national holiday for the first time ever. During the ceremony, the first woman was promoted to the rank of General. The 32nd Army had been redesignated initially the 1st Army Corps , then the 40th Army June It came under Kazakh control in May The 78th Tank Division had tanks, armoured fighting vehicles and artillery pieces. The th Guards Training Center , the former 80th Guards Motor Rifle training Division, had 6, soldier and officers and tanks and artillery pieces, so was a strengthened division. It was often called the Division of Guards by Kazakh sources. Today the Ground Forces include four regional commands: The main task is ensuring the integrity of state borders, territorial integrity, sovereignty and economic interests of Kazakhstan in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea. In , the commander of the district appointed general Alimzhan Kanagatovich Erniyazov. The District has separate motor rifle and artillery brigades. In , General Alikhan Brimzhanovich Dzharbulov was appointed commander of the district. The th Reserve Division was previously stationed in this command area. Near Karaganda was the th Base for Storage of Weapons and Equipment, the remnants of a motor rifle division. One of which was left near Karaganda, and another called 2nd Separate Motor Rifle Brigade and was relocated kilometers to the north of Astana, which by that time was the capital, and for that reason ought to have a decent court garrison. No units were stationed in Astana Tselinograd during the Soviet period.

**Chapter 3 : Expert: U.S. Military 'Over a Decade' Behind China, Russia on Space Defense**

*While Russia has, in modern times, been preoccupied with threats from the West, three-quarters of her territory, and of her borders, lie in Asia. This fact justifies Russia's inclusion in the latest volume of the Armed Forces of Asia series, in which we have already reviewed the volume for China (RR /65).*

That program envisages abandoning the mass-mobilization principle in favor of forming mobile, permanent-readiness forces, capable of reacting to the order to deploy within "one hour. Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov has been castigated by some domestic opponents who argue that his reform will destroy the Russian Army. Yet, dramatically downsizing its oversized officer corps to maximize efficiency, switching from a division-based to a brigade-based table of organization, and reforming the General Staff Academy and the system of military education pale in comparison with the huge challenges involved in modernizing its aging equipment and weapons inventory. Many aspects of the reform agenda are so radical, far-reaching, and multifaceted that Western and Russian commentators have failed to identify the key elements. One widespread misconception is related to the affordability of the plan to downsize the officer corps by , by Since doing so will undoubtedly be very costly, especially in light of the current economic crisis, many dismissed this as another failed bid to reform the structures. In fact, Western interpretations of these reforms have consistently underestimated key aspects of the program, assessing it primarily in terms of Russian economic potential and stressing the officer downsizing. Many aspects of the present agenda, currently far advanced, are thus missed, ignored, or simply ridiculed as signs of impending failure. They include the speed of transferring to brigade structures; overhauling the system of military education; radically changing the General Staff Academy; introducing a civilian chaplaincy; rewriting the manuals on combat training; and focusing on noncommissioned-officer NCO training and testing the new structures. In its place, more than half the required brigades were already formed and exercises and training were geared to testing and developing these new structures. The Russian media coined the phrase "new look" to describe these monumental changes. However, there appears to be something more going on than simply concentrating on appearance; this is no public-relations campaign. The Russian military is changing fast; few are able to perceive the sheer breathtaking scale of these changes, and the familiar methods of assessing its conventional capabilities are passing into history. Analysts, commentators, and decision makers on all sides are unable to fit the "new look" Russian military into a familiar pattern. One thing is clear: By the end of this year, the Russian Army will be unrecognizable. While it is very likely that the structures that emerge will still compare unfavorably with Western militaries, they will nonetheless meet the needs of a modern and potentially resurgent Russia, enhancing its capability to project power within its "near abroad. Such a benevolent strategy would require both political will and intensive supporting programs agreed between Moscow and NATO. Both are unrealistic given the shift in the geopolitical landscape after the Georgia war and the ongoing opposition in Moscow towards any future eastward expansion of the alliance. Moreover, without these programs, the lives of allied personnel could be potentially jeopardized by any ill-conceived plan to create interoperability. Indeed, analyses of the Russian military in the wake of the Georgia conflict, which exposed many of its conventional failings, concentrated on its future military requirements in precisely this context. For instance, although one key feature of the large-scale military exercises Kavkaz in late June was to test the new brigade structures under an "antiterrorist" guise, those exercises appeared to rehearse an improved version of intervention in Georgia. Unrecognizable Much of the reform program also appears hurried, such as introducing widespread changes within the manning system before a revised military doctrine expected in late is published. On August 10, President Dmitry Medvedev sent a bill to the Duma that constitutes the legal basis for future intervention by the Russian military abroad in protection of its citizens or its national interests. Until the reforms are completed, it is difficult to extrapolate policy implications, but one thing is clear: The challenges are immense. For example, can the ailing defense industry, whose weaknesses have recently been highlighted by the test failures of the new Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM , meet the demands to modernize equipment and weapons? Those seemingly endless conventional requirements range from

modern communications equipment to new platforms for the air force and ships and submarines for the navy -- a huge undertaking given the present severe economic constraints and the shortage of skilled defense industry engineers. Russia may instead procure some Western weapons and equipment; it has recently concluded contracts with Israel for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and communications technology from the French defense company Thales. There are evidently other challenges, ranging from establishing a reformed system of military education, revising combat training, and decommissioning more than , officers by The modernization of the equipment inventory will almost certainly take longer than planned. However, one fundamental aspect that may take a generation to resolve relates to the future role of noncommissioned officers NCOs. In essence, the delegation of decision making and a culture of promoting individual initiative embodied in the NCO concept will take considerable time, energy, and commitment in the Russian context: It is a truism that generals invariably assume the next war will be a carbon copy of the last. Granted, this partly fed into the overall effort to embark on the sweeping reforms now under way. But historically the Russian military has proven adroit in rapidly assimilating the lessons of previous conflicts or learning during the course of a larger conflagration, such as the response to Barbarossa in The extent of the changes under way is unparalleled in the history of the Russian armed forces since the end of World War II, perhaps even earlier. Western militaries can only now begin to study and monitor these transformations, while those closer to Russia in Central Asia, for instance are already privately admitting new difficulties in conducting joint exercises or training. Meanwhile, the opportunities for the West to take advantage of this new reality may be limited to the commercial sphere, in the form of defense contracts. It is highly unlikely that the tumultuous structural shifts and modernization of the Russian military are in any sense aimed at complementing Western multilateral efforts: This is an exclusively Russian venture.

### Chapter 4 : Russia and China Will Hold War Games in Asia, Checking U.S. Military Power in Pacific

*Russia's largest frontier is with China. For decades it has deployed air and land forces in North Asia. For many years Vladivostok was the largest non-US naval base in the North East Asia Pacific.*

Service Branches[ edit ] Armed forces under the Ministry of Defence are divided into: These retain the legal status of "Armed Forces", while falling outside of the jurisdiction of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The new structure has been detached from the Ministry of Internal Affairs into a separate agency, directly subordinated to the President of Russia. Both organizations have significant wartime tasks in addition to their main peacetime activities and operate their own land, air and maritime units. The number of personnel is specified by decree of the President of Russia. On 1 January , a number of 2,, units, including military of 1,, units, was set. For the next year and a half various attempts to keep its unity and to transform it into the military of the Commonwealth of Independent States CIS failed. National Guard military units were to be deployed in 10 regions, including in Moscow three brigades , Leningrad two brigades , and a number of other important cities and regions. By the end of September in Moscow the National Guard was about 15, strong, mostly consisting of former Soviet Armed Forces servicemen. In the end, President Yeltsin tabled a decree "On the temporary position of the Russian Guard", but it was not put into practice. Finally, on 7 May , Yeltsin signed a decree establishing the armed forces and Yeltsin assumed the duties of the Supreme Commander. While in most places the withdrawal took place without any problems, the Russian Armed Forces remained in some disputed areas such as the Sevastopol naval base in the Crimea as well as in Abkhazia and in Transnistria. The Armed Forces have several bases in foreign countries, especially on territory of the former Soviet Republics. A new military doctrine , promulgated in November , implicitly acknowledged the contraction of the old Soviet military into a regional military power without global ambitions. In keeping with its emphasis on the threat of regional conflicts, the doctrine called for a smaller, lighter, and more mobile Russian military, with a higher degree of professionalism and with greater rapid-deployment capability. Such change proved extremely difficult to achieve. Under Pavel Grachev Defence Minister from to little military reform took place, though there was a plan to create more deployable mobile forces. Later Defence Minister Rodionov in office had good qualifications but did not manage to institute lasting change. Only under Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev in office did a certain amount of limited reform begin, though attention focused upon the Strategic Rocket Forces. Key elements of the reforms announced in October included reducing the armed forces to a strength of one million by planned end-date was ; [33] reducing the number of officers; centralising officer training from 65 military schools into 10 "systemic" military training centres; reducing the size of the central command; introducing more civilian logistics and auxiliary staff; elimination of cadre-strength formations ; reorganising the reserves; reorganising the army into a brigade system; and reorganising air forces into an air-base system instead of regiments.

**Chapter 5 : Russian Air Force - Wikipedia**

*Armed Forces of Central Asia and the Regional Threat Situation* In the most recent issue of NVO, Aleksandr Khramchikhin has a very useful description of the forces located in Russia's Central Operational Strategic Command.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Chechens declared independence in November , under the leadership of a former Air Forces officer, General Dzhokar Dudayev. A Security Council meeting was held 29 November , where Yeltsin ordered the Chechens to disarm, or else Moscow would restore order. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev assured Yeltsin that he would "take Grozny with one airborne assault regiment in two hours. The 1st Motor Rifle Brigade was ordered to make a swift push for the centre of the city, but was then virtually destroyed in Chechen ambushes. After finally seizing Grozny amid fierce resistance, Russian troops moved on to other Chechen strongholds. When Chechen militants took hostages in the Budyonovsk hospital hostage crisis in Stavropol Kray in June , peace looked possible for a time, but the fighting continued. Following this incident, the separatists were referred to as insurgents or terrorists within Russia. Dzhokar Dudayev was assassinated in April , and that summer, a Chechen attack retook Grozny. Second Chechen War The Second Chechen War began in August after Chechen militias invaded neighboring Dagestan , followed quickly in early September by a series of four terrorist bombings across Russia. This prompted Russian military action against the alleged Chechen culprits. In the first Chechen war, the Russians primarily laid waste to an area with artillery and airstrikes before advancing the land forces. Improvements were made in the Ground Forces between and ; when the Second Chechen War started, instead of hastily assembled "composite regiments" dispatched with little or no training, whose members had never seen service together, formations were brought up to strength with replacements, put through preparatory training, and then dispatched. Combat performance improved accordingly, [21] and large-scale opposition was crippled. Most of the prominent past Chechen separatist leaders had died or been killed, including former president Aslan Maskhadov and leading warlord and terrorist attack mastermind Shamil Basayev. However, small-scale conflict continued to drag on; as of November , it had spread across other parts of the Russian Caucasus. General Colonel Gennady Troshev was dismissed in for refusing to move from command of the North Caucasus Military District to command of the less important Siberian Military District. A larger number of army divisions were given "constant readiness" status, which was supposed to bring them up to 80 percent manning and percent equipment holdings. Sergeyev announced in August that there would be six divisions and four brigades on hour alert by the end of that year. Three levels of forces were announced; constant readiness, low-level, and strategic reserves. Lack of fuel for training and a shortage of well-trained junior officers hampered combat effectiveness. Plans called for reducing mandatory service to 18 months in , and to one year by , but a mixed Ground Force, of both contract soldiers and conscripts, would remain. As of , the length of conscript service was 12 months. However, in , Alexander Goltz said that, given the insistence of the hierarchy on trying to force contract soldiers into the old conscript pattern, there is little hope of a fundamental strengthening of the Ground Forces. Top military personnel demonstrate neither the will nor the ability to effect fundamental changes. However, while the move to one year conscript service would disrupt dedovshchina , it is unlikely that bullying will disappear altogether without significant societal change. Russian military reform A major reorganisation of the force began in by the Minister for Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov , with the aim of converting all divisions into brigades, and cutting surplus officers and establishments. - only. It is intended to create 39 to 40 such brigades by 1 January , including 39 all-arms brigades, 21 artillery and MRL brigades, seven brigades of army air defence forces, 12 communication brigades, and two electronic warfare brigades. In addition, the 18th Machine Gun Artillery Division stationed in the Far East remained, and there will be an additional 17 separate regiments. In the course of the reorganization, the 4-chain command structure military district - field army - division - regiment that was used until then was replaced with a 3-chain structure: Brigades are supposed to be used as mobile permanent-readiness units capable of fighting independently with the support of highly mobile task forces or together with other brigades under joint command. Among them are the combined-arms brigade, missile brigades, assault brigades and electronic warfare brigades. This body

was disbanded in , but reformed by President Putin in by appointing Colonel General Nikolai Kormiltsev as the commander-in-chief of the ground forces and also as a deputy minister of defense. Their exact command status is now unknown. Branches of service[ edit ] The branches of service include motorized rifles, tanks, artillery and rocket forces , troop air defense , special corps reconnaissance, signals , radioelectronic warfare, engineering , nuclear, biological and chemical protection , logistical support , automobile, and the protection of the rear , military units, and logistical establishments. They are equipped with powerful armament for destruction of ground-based and aerial targets, missile complexes, tanks, artillery and mortars, anti-tank guided missiles, anti-aircraft missile systems and installations, and means of reconnaissance and control. It is estimated that there are currently 19 motor rifle divisions, and the Navy now has several motor rifle formations under its command in the Ground and Coastal Defence Forces of the Baltic Fleet , the Northeastern Group of Troops and Forces on the Kamchatka Peninsula and other areas of the extreme northeast. The Tank Troops are the main impact force of the Ground Forces and a powerful means of armed struggle, intended for the accomplishment of the most important combat tasks. As of , there were three tank divisions in the force: They consist of surface-to-air missiles , anti-aircraft artillery and radio-technical units and subdivisions. However, by , Army Aviation will have been transferred back to the Ground Forces and 18 new aviation brigades will have been added. A current detailed list of the subordinate units of the four military districts can be found in the respective articles. Almost all are now designated *otdelnaya* separate , with only several brigades retaining the guards honorific title. In , two of these brigades were reactivated as full divisions: These two divisions marked the beginning of the expansion of the Ground Forces as more brigades are being reformed into full divisions within each military district.

**Chapter 6 : Armed Forces of Turkmenistan - Wikipedia**

*For decades Russia, whose largest frontier is with China, has deployed massive air and land forces in north-east Asia, and for many years Vladivostok was the largest non-US naval base in the north-east Asia Pacific.*

Ground air defenses are comprised of one regiment of HQ-2 missiles. The Regional Balance of Forces Khranchikhin engages in this description in order to provide a rough description of the balance of forces in the region. But he does point out a couple of interesting things. First of all, the Chinese forces in just the Lanzhou military region, which is generally a low priority for the Chinese government and receives few modern weapons, are more powerful than all of the other forces in the region put together once again, excluding the NATO forces. Second, none of the other countries in the region present realistic military threats to Russia. Pakistan is more concerned with India and its own internal instability. The only possible scenario where it might present a threat to Russia would involve a violent overthrow of its government by the Taliban and its allies, followed by its joining an anti-Russian effort in Central Asia. If the Taliban were to take over in Pakistan, it would have many more pressing concerns than attacking Russia or even Central Asia. This scenario is therefore sufficiently far-fetched as to be not worth considering for the moment. It has more pressing concerns in every other direction. All five states have sufficiently good relations with Russia that they pose no real threat. In that case, Khranchikhin argues for joining forces with Kazakhstan to keep the radicals in the south, while leaving the governments of the other Central Asian to survive as best they can on their own. He has previously written some fairly alarmist pieces about the potential Chinese threat to Russia, so this time he focuses on the possibility that China would attack Kazakhstan. This seems to be a sufficiently fantastic scenario that it could be dismissed out of hand, but instead he argues that China would easily win such a conflict while absorbing Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with minimal effort. And at this point, Khranchikhin argues that Russia might as well capitulate on the spot. I have never understood the extent of Russian paranoia about Chinese intentions. China is certainly a rising power, but it has accomplished its rise by developing its economy while remaining fairly quiet and conservative on the international scene. While there are certainly circumstances under which China would use its military forces offensively, particularly in Taiwan, the only scenario I can imagine where it feels the need to use armed force in Central Asia would involve defending itself against Islamist forces that have come to power in the region and are assisting Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang. In this scenario, Russia, Kazakhstan and China are all allies uniting to stop the Islamist threat, rather than adversaries. In other words, Russians and Kazakhs should continue to sleep safely, knowing that China is not going to attack €” either now or anytime in the foreseeable future.

## Chapter 7 : Russian Armed Forces - Wikipedia

*Three quarters of Russia's territory lies in Asia, east of the Ural mountains. The country's principal threats now come from Asian countries on its southern borders.*

General Pyotr Deynekin , the former deputy commander-in-chief of the Soviet Air Forces, became the first commander of the new organisation on 24 August . Some aircraft in Belarus and Ukraine such as Tupolev Tu-154 were returned to Russia, sometimes in return for debt reductions, as well as a long range aviation division based at Dolon in Kazakhstan. During the 1990s, the financial stringency felt throughout the armed forces made its mark on the Air Forces as well. These campaigns also presented significant difficulties for the VVS including the terrain, lack of significant fixed targets and insurgents armed with Stinger and Strela-2M surface-to-air missiles. The former Soviet Air Defence Forces remained independent for several years under Russian control, only merging with the Air Forces in 1995. The decree merging the two forces was issued by President Boris Yeltsin on 16 July . During 1995 altogether units and formations were disbanded, reorganized, and over given a new jurisdiction. More than 100,000 tons of material changed location and aircraft changed airfields. Military Transport Aviation planes took more than 40,000 families to new residence areas. The short-lived operational commands were abolished. The former frontal aviation and anti-aircraft forces were organized as Air Force Armies and Anti-Aircraft Defense Armies under the military district commanders. There were initially four such armies with headquarters in St. Petersburg. Two military districts had separate Air and Air Defence Corps. When the Transbaikalian Military District and Siberian Military District were merged, the 14th Air Army was reactivated to serve as the air force formation in the area. The number of servicemen in the Air Force was reduced to about 1,000,000, from the former combined number of 1,500,000. The resignation of other servicemen included 46 generals of which 15 were colonel generals. In December 1995 the aviation assets of the Russian Ground Forces – "mostly helicopters" – were transferred to the VVS, following the shooting down of a Mi-24 helicopter in Chechnya on 19 August , that claimed 19 lives. The former Army Aviation was in its previous form intended for the direct support of the Ground Forces, by providing their tactical air support, conducting tactical aerial reconnaissance, transporting airborne troops, providing fire support of their actions, electronic warfare , setting of minefield barriers and other tasks. This ended a year unilateral suspension due to fuel costs and other economic difficulties after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian military reforms were promptly announced following the war, which according to Western experts were intended to address many inadequacies discovered as a result. The reforms commenced during early 1996, in which air armies were succeeded by commands, and most air regiments becoming airbases. On 5 June 1996, the Chief of the General Staff, Nikolai Makarov said of the Russian Air Force that "They can run bombing missions only in daytime with the sun shining, but they miss their targets anyway". Its planned composition was to include five Air Force units, 10 anti-aircraft units, five technical service and support units and one electronic warfare unit. In terms of flight hours, pilots in the Western Military District averaged 1,000 hours over the training year. Pilots from the Kursk airbase achieved an average of 1,500 hours, with transport aviation averaging 500 hours.

## Chapter 8 : Russian Armed Forces - Sputnik International

*The Russian military's ushanka hats were improved between 1995 and 2000, when the Russian armed forces were being equipped with new uniforms. The new version of the traditional - and somewhat stereotypical - hat features better heat insulation and longer ear flaps.*

## Chapter 9 : Russia's Armed Forces Undergoing 'Unparalleled' Transformation

*China boasts East Asia's strongest armed forces. It ranks below only the United States and Russia worldwide. No wonder Taiwan's defense ministry scrambled two F-16 fighters and two.*