

Chapter 1 : A. J. P. Taylor - Wikipedia

The Origins of the Second World War is a non-fiction book by the English historian A. J. P. Taylor, examining the causes of World War II. It was first published in by Hamish Hamilton.

Perhaps, though, it was not surprising. Adolf Hitler did not mean to start a world war: It was really just a gigantic cock-up. Taylor was no stranger to controversy. Born in , he was a blunt, straight-talking northerner in the radical, nonconformist tradition. A brilliant scholar who had been ensconced at Magdalen in Oxford since , he had established himself as the master of 19th and 20th century diplomatic history with a series of studies famous not only for their detail and insight, but also for wit and literary panache. TV audiences were to be astonished by his ability to talk straight into the camera for half an hour without the aid of notes. It was partly his profound understanding of realpolitik that made him so iconoclastic. The idea that Hitler was aiming at total world domination, and that it was his evil ambition that had caused the war, was, quite simply, nonsense. Powers will be Powers, he wrote the capitals are his. His point was that great powers behave as they do irrespective of whether they are ruled by Nazi race-fanatics, Stalinist bureaucrats, or parliamentarians like Winston Churchill. What matters are the interests of the great power in question, and the opportunities presented by its interactions with other great powers, both friends and enemies. Origins of the Second World War Let us be clear: Taylor was an anti-fascist who hated Hitler and everything he stood for unlike many members of the British Establishment prior to . The problem, Taylor argued, was not Hitler, but Germany. Once united, the German-speaking heart of Europe became an industrial colossus and a geopolitical powerhouse. What, then, caused the war? The war of , says Taylor, far from being welcome, was less wanted by nearly everybody than almost any war in history. In fact, the whole thing was concocted, unwittingly by all concerned, in a diplomatic fog. To rebuild German power after the military defeat of and the economic crisis of , Hitler needed to dominate Central and Eastern Europe. So he pushed repeatedly against the limits of international tolerance. He had no long-term plan. He was a foreign-policy opportunist. But his impulse was expansionist because German territory had been hacked away at Versailles, and German industry needed raw materials as the economy boomed in the mid to late s. Taylor is scathing about the incompetence of British and French statesmen. They first backed Czechoslovakia, then told her to surrender. They encouraged the Poles to resist, considering them militarily formidable, but cold-shouldered the Russians, whom they regarded as aggressive but weak: A Franco-Russian alliance underwritten by British guarantees to the French was perfectly possible in . The failure to achieve this was one of the greatest diplomatic disasters in world history. It led directly to the fall of Poland, the fall of France, and Britain having to fight alone for a year. Only then, in a sense, would the Second World War truly begin. Until that moment, there was a war in Europe and the Mediterranean, mainly between Britain and Germany. The outbreak of war revealed further miscalculations. The British and the French had encouraged Polish resistance partly because they anticipated a slow war of trenches and attrition, like the last. In fact, Poland collapsed in three weeks, France in six, and Britain survived only because Hitler could not get his panzers across the Channel. Wars are much like road accidents, explains Taylor. They have a general cause and particular causes at the same time. But a motorist, charged with dangerous driving, would be ill-advised if he pleaded the existence of motor-cars as his sole defence. This was a legend fostered by wartime propaganda.

Chapter 2 : A. J. P. Taylor Quotes - BrainyQuote

Published in , The Origins of the Second World War is a classic of modern history. A.J.P. Taylor's years of research helped change the long-accepted view that Adolf Hitler had wanted and planned in detail for a war.

The alarm felt at these words by Taylor, who had long believed this title to repose safely with himself, may be readily envisioned. Nobody would have predicted such oblivion to overtake Taylor, who outlived Bryant by only five years but had made himself a public figure as the largely pre-television Bryant had not. Yet Taylor has been forgotten to an extent that middle-aged denizens of former British colonies find almost beyond belief. This neglect has occurred despite his having inspired no fewer than three biographies since his death, much the best of which is the production by Nottingham University professor Chris Wrigley. Today, students in these same lands can become post European history majors—can even achieve doctorates in the field—without noticing the smallest indication that Taylor existed. The temptation is, therefore, to dismiss Taylor as of purely local interest. That temptation must be resisted, on two grounds. First, Taylor found himself caught up in geopolitical struggles that curbed his Little Englander cussedness. The second reason for taking Taylor seriously not solemnly, nor literally is that he wrote remarkably well. Not for the first time, Evelyn Waugh had it right: Obvious risks attach themselves to assessing any historian by the yardstick of how many column-inches in the quotations dictionaries he occupies. Some quips, at random, from Taylor the gadfly: We would thereby be wrong, as so many have so regularly been about Taylor. Here initially plausible comparisons with Clive James—fellow newspaperman, fellow populist, fellow talk-show pundit—break down. Then again, nature and nurture combined to make Taylor, born in , what James never wished to be: Rich but socialistic and unglamorous Lancashire parents of antiwar convictions farmed out young Alan John Percivale Taylor to various Quaker schools that he might be inoculated against Great War militarism. Originally he wanted to be an archaeologist; maybe, deep down, he never stopped being one. He punctuated his s Oxford sojourn, successful but not spectacular, with membership of the Communist Party. After only two years—which included an actual visit to the Soviet Union—his card-carrying ended: Before British welfarism hardly even touched higher education. An American academic born in would have had more reverential audiences than his British counterpart and less bitchy colleagues. An Australian academic born in would have had stupider audiences and still bitchier colleagues but would have been wealthy beyond the dreams of British or American collegiate avarice. A British academic born in had practically the worst of all possible worlds. By his first and in every way most high-maintenance wife, he had four children requiring to be fed somehow. After Thomas had finally drunk himself to death, the cuckolded husband announced payback time: Dylan took both with equal contempt. His great pleasure was just to humiliate people. With certain members of this brigade, notably Hugh Trevor-Roper, Taylor had his own methods of dealing. Trevor-Roper to conceal for some time the fact that he has not yet produced a sustained book of mature historical scholarship. Nonetheless, two major scholarly feats deserve notice above all: Macartney had yet to appear. Part of him—the larger part, it must be admitted—accepted the conventional Whig caricature of them as mere amusing dinosaurs. The Origins of the Second World War forms a rare example of an historian being honest enough to admit that he has discarded his original interpretation when confronted with contrary evidence. Attributing to Taylor a desire to scandalize from day one would be pardonable but false. Then his researches started to disturb his initial suppositions and force on him more nuanced appraisals. What if Hitler had indeed been capable of improvisatory Realpolitik? What if he operated within a national tradition formulated by Tirpitz, Hindenburg, and even Bismarck? Contemplate such appalling premises, and soon you can find yourself writing—as Taylor wrote—conclusions like this one, on the Sudetenland crisis: Bohemia had always been a part of the Holy Roman Empire; it had been part of the German Confederation between and 1918. Independence, not subordination, was the novelty in Czech history. For Taylor, merely suspecting that a genie might exist imbued him with an irresistible impulse to let it out of the bottle. This eventually attracted such Holocaust deniers or Holocaust minimizers as Harry Elmer Barnes and David Hoggan, whom Taylor despised but who formed a rowdy fan club regardless. It trashed his memory, once so retentive. His death

seemed like that of a king in banishment. How to summarize Taylor at his best? The lines with which Clive James praised W. His time will come again. Stove lives in Melbourne, Australia.

Chapter 3 : Review of The Origins of the Second World War | Mises Institute

"A Historical Debate of the s: World War II Historiography" The Origins of the Second World War, A. J. P. Taylor and his Critics" pages from Australian Journal of Politics and History, Volume 26, Issue #3,

Early life[edit] Taylor was born in in Birkdale , Southport , which was then part of Lancashire. His wealthy parents held left-wing views, which he inherited. Both his parents, Percy Lees and Constance Sumner Thompson Taylor, were pacifists who vocally opposed the First World War , and sent their son to Quaker schools as a way of protesting against the war. Taylor has mentioned in his reminiscences that his mother was domineering, but his father enjoyed exasperating her by following his own ways. Taylor himself was recruited into the Communist Party of Great Britain by a friend of the family, the military historian Tom Wintringham , while at Oriel; a member from to , he broke with the Party over what he considered to be its ineffective stand during the General Strike. After leaving, he was an ardent supporter of the Labour Party for the rest of his life, remaining a member for over sixty years. Academic career[edit] Taylor graduated from Oxford in After working briefly as a legal clerk, he began his post-graduate work, going to Vienna to study the impact of the Chartist movement on the Revolution of When this topic turned out not to be feasible, he switched to studying the question of Italian unification over a two-year period. This resulted in his first book, *The Italian Problem in European Diplomacy*, 1949 published in He also lectured in modern history at Oxford from to At Oxford he was such an extraordinarily popular speaker he had to give his lectures at 8: In , Taylor wrote in a review of *The Great Hunger: Ireland* by Cecil Woodham-Smith that: The English governing class ran true to form. They had killed two million Irish people. He was honoured with two more festschriften, in and The festschriften were testaments to his popularity with his former students as receiving even a single festschrift is considered to be an extraordinary and rare honour. These friendships helped to enhance his understanding of the region. In , Taylor wrote: In contrast, the foreign policy of Dr. This apparently sudden decision came in the aftermath of the controversy around his book *The Origins of the Second World War*. Taylor took the position that: Personal life[edit] Taylor married three times. He married his first wife, Margaret Adams, in divorced in and with her he had four children. For a time in the s, he and his wife shared a house with the writer Malcolm Muggeridge and his wife Kitty. It was suggested that he had had an affair with Kitty Muggeridge. His second wife was Eve Crosland, whom Taylor married in and divorced in ; he had two children by her. Even after divorcing Margaret Adams, Taylor continued to live with her, while maintaining a household with Eve. He was especially interested in the Habsburg dynasty and Bismarck. In *The Habsburg Monarchy*, Taylor stated that the Habsburgs saw their realms entirely as a tool for foreign policy and thus could never build a genuine nation-state. To hold their realm together, they resorted to playing one ethnic group off against another and promoted German and Magyar hegemony over the other ethnic groups in Austria-Hungary. *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe* 1954[edit] In he published his masterpiece, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe* 1954 and followed it up with *The Trouble Makers* in , a critical study of British foreign policy. *The Trouble Makers* was a celebration of those who had criticised the government over foreign policy, a subject dear to his heart. *The Trouble Makers* had originally been the Ford Lectures in and was his favourite book by far. When invited to deliver the Ford Lectures, he was initially at a loss for a topic, and it was his friend Alan Bullock who suggested the topic of foreign policy dissent. Taylor controversially argued that the Iron Chancellor had unified Germany more by accident than by design; a theory that contradicted those put forward by the historians Heinrich von Sybel , Leopold von Ranke , and Heinrich von Treitschke in the latter years of the 19th century, and by other historians more recently. The book became a classic and a central point of reference in all discussion on the Second World War. He began his book with the statement that too many people have accepted uncritically what he called the "Nuremberg Thesis", that the Second World War was the result of criminal conspiracy by a small gang comprising Hitler and his associates. He regarded the "Nuremberg Thesis" as too convenient for too many people and held that it shielded the blame for the war from the leaders of other states, let the German people avoid any responsibility for the war and created a situation where West Germany was a respectable Cold War ally against the Soviets. Moreover, in a partial break with his view of

German history advocated in *The Course of German History*, he argued that Hitler was not just a normal German leader but also a normal Western leader. His argument was that Hitler wished to make Germany the strongest power in Europe but he did not want or plan war. Notably, Taylor portrayed Hitler as a grasping opportunist with no beliefs other than the pursuit of power and anti-Semitism. He argued that Hitler did not possess any sort of programme and his foreign policy was one of drift and seizing chances as they offered themselves. In this way, Taylor argued that the Versailles Treaty was destabilising, for sooner or later the innate power of Germany that the Allies had declined to destroy in 1919 would inevitably reassert itself against the Versailles Treaty and the international system established by Versailles that the Germans regarded as unjust and thus had no interest in preserving. Though Taylor argued that the Second World War was not inevitable and that the Versailles Treaty was nowhere near as harsh as contemporaries like John Maynard Keynes believed, what he regarded as a flawed peace settlement made the war more likely than not.

English History [edit] In he rebounded from the controversy surrounding *The Origins of the Second World War* with the spectacular success of his book *English History*, his only venture into social and cultural history, where he offered a loving, affectionate portrayal of the years between and *English History* was an enormous best-seller and in its first year in print sold more than all of the previous volumes of the *Oxford History of England* combined. Though he felt there was much to be ashamed of in British history, especially in regard to Ireland, he was very proud to be British and more specifically English. He was fond of stressing his nonconformist Northern English background and saw himself as part of a grand tradition of radical dissent that he regarded as the real glorious history of England. He thus became the first English-language historian and the first historian after Hans Mommsen to accept the conclusions of the book, that the Nazis had not set the Reichstag on fire in and that Marinus van der Lubbe had acted alone. Tobias and Taylor argued that the new Nazi government had been looking for something to increase its share of the vote in the elections of 5 March, so as to activate the Enabling Act and that van der Lubbe had serendipitously for the Nazis provided it by burning down the Reichstag. Even without the Reichstag fire, the Nazis were quite determined to destroy German democracy. In particular, Tobias and Taylor pointed out that the so-called "secret tunnels" that supposedly gave the Nazis access to the Reichstag were in fact tunnels for water piping. At the time Taylor was widely attacked by many other historians for endorsing what was considered to be a self-evident perversion of established historical facts.

War by Timetable [edit] In his book *War by Timetable*, Taylor examined the origins of the First World War, concluding that though all of the great powers wished to increase their own power relative to the others, none consciously sought war before. Instead, he argued that all of the great powers believed that if they possessed the ability to mobilise their armed forces faster than any of the others, this would serve as a sufficient deterrent to avoid war and allow them to achieve their foreign policy. Thus, the general staffs of the great powers developed elaborate timetables to mobilise faster than any of their rivals. When the crisis broke in 1914, though none of the statesmen of Europe wanted a world war, the need to mobilise faster than potential rivals created an inexorable movement towards war. Thus Taylor claimed that the leaders of 1914 became prisoners of the logic of the mobilisation timetables and the timetables that were meant to serve as deterrent to war instead relentlessly brought war.

A Biography [edit] In the 1930s and 1940s, Taylor befriended Lord Beaverbrook and later wrote his biography in *Beaverbrook*. Canadian in origin, was a Conservative who believed strongly in the British Empire and whose entry into politics was in support of Bonar Law, a Conservative leader strongly connected with the establishment of Northern Ireland. Despite the disdain for most politicians expressed in his writings, Taylor was fascinated by politics and politicians and often cultivated relations with those who possessed power. Beside Lord Beaverbrook, whose company Taylor very much enjoyed, his favourite politician was the Labour Party leader Michael Foot, whom he often described as the greatest Prime Minister Britain never had. He had long been an advocate of a treaty with the Soviet Union so British Communists expected him to be friendly. In 1955, the British Communist Party, which held the copyright to *Ten Days that Shook the World* in the United Kingdom, offered Taylor the opportunity to write the introduction to a new edition. The introduction Taylor wrote was fairly sympathetic towards the Bolsheviks. The rejection annoyed Taylor. When the copyright expired in 1965 and a non-Communist publisher reissued the book, asking Taylor to write the introduction, he strengthened some of his criticisms. Taylor also

wrote the introduction for *Fighter: Journalism* [edit] Starting in 1937, Taylor worked as book reviewer for the *Manchester Guardian*, and from 1938 he was a columnist with the *Observer*. In 1939 Taylor made his first move into mass-market journalism, spending just over a year as a columnist at the tabloid *Sunday Pictorial*, later renamed the *Sunday Mirror*. His first article was an attack on the stance of the United Nations during the Korean War, in which he argued that the UN was merely a front for American policy. From 1945 until he wrote for the *Sunday Express*, owned by his friend and patron Lord Beaverbrook. After the war Taylor became one of the first television historians. Here he was noted for his argumentative style, and in one episode he declined to acknowledge the presence of the other panellists. The press came to refer to him as the "sulky don" and in 1951 he was dropped. In 1952, he made a number of half-hour programmes on ITV in which he lectured without notes on a variety of topics, such as the Russian Revolution and the First World War. These were huge ratings successes. Despite earlier strong feelings against the BBC, he lectured for a BBC historical series in 1953 and made more series for it in 1954, 1955, and 1956. He also hosted additional series for ITV in 1957, and 1958. In *Edge of Britain* in 1959 he toured the towns of northern England. Taylor had a famous rivalry with the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, with whom he often debated on television. One of the more famous exchanges took place in 1958. Despite their divergent political philosophies, Taylor and Trevor-Roper had been friends since the early 1930s, but with the possibility of the Regius Professorship, both men lobbied for it. In public, Taylor declared that he would never have accepted any honour from a government that had "the blood of Suez on its hands". In private, he was furious with Trevor-Roper for holding an honour that Taylor considered rightfully his. The famously combative Trevor-Roper reciprocated. The feud was given much publicity by the media, not so much because of the merits of their disputes but rather because their acrimonious debates on television made for entertaining viewing. Beyond that, it was fashionable to portray the dispute between Taylor and Trevor-Roper as a battle between generations. Taylor, with his populist, irreverent style, was nearly a decade older than Trevor-Roper, but was represented by the media as a symbol of the younger generation that was coming of age in the 1950s. A subtle but important difference in the style between the two historians was their manner of addressing each other during their TV debates: The frequent television appearances helped to make Taylor the most famous British historian of the 20th century. Another foray into the world of entertainment occurred in the 1950s when he served as the historical consultant for both the stage and film versions of *Oh, What a Lovely War!* Though he possessed great charm and charisma and a sense of humour, as he aged he presented himself as, and came to be seen as, cantankerous and irascible. *Opinions* [edit] Throughout his life, Taylor took public stands on the great issues of his time. In the early 1930s, he was in a left-wing pacifist group called the Manchester Peace Council, for which he frequently spoke in public. Until 1939, Taylor was an opponent of British rearmament as he felt that a re-armed Britain would ally itself with Germany against the Soviet Union. However, after 1939, he resigned from the Manchester Peace Council, urged British rearmament in the face of what Taylor considered to be the Nazi menace, and advocated an Anglo-Soviet alliance to contain Germany.

Chapter 4 : A.J.P. Taylor Quotes (Author of The Origins of the Second World War)

We date the second World war from 3 September , the day when Great Britain and France declared war on Germany (not, incidentally, from 1 September, the day when Germany attacked Poland); and among non-Americans, only professional historians can remember the date of Pearl Harbor.

University of Lancaster new perspective. There is now general agreement amongst historians that the chief responsibility for unleashing war in Europe, in 1939, rests on Hitler and the Nazis. It was not necessarily the war he was planning for; the evidence suggests that Hitler was aiming to prepare Germany for a massive conflict with Russia in the early 1930s. This article aims to summarise some of the most recent interpretations about the causes of the war, by considering the ideology or set of beliefs which lay at the heart of Nazi foreign policy and outlining the ways in which Nazi foreign policy differed from that pursued by previous German governments. It will then examine whether the Nazis pursued any consistent set of foreign policy objectives between 1933 and 1939 and to what extent they were preparing for war by the late 1930s. Nazi Ideology Historians are now generally in agreement that Nazi foreign policy cannot be assessed without a clear understanding of the set of beliefs and strong convictions which shaped it. These concerns centred on the importance of racial purity and on the need for a nation to be prepared to compete with its neighbours in a brutal, uncompromising and ceaseless struggle to survive and to expand. Taylor and The Debate While there is no dispute that such themes run through Nazi speeches and writings of the 1920s and early 1930s, the argument was advanced, in the 1960s, that they did not materially shape Nazi foreign policy once Hitler actually became Chancellor. Once in power, however, Hitler had to temper his views to the prevailing international situation, and acted as a typical German statesman pursuing traditional German objectives. He was not driven by any underlying ideology or timetable for aggressive expansion in eastern Europe, and it was not his fault if other European leaders failed to make a stand against his predictable re-assertion of German power. Having acquiesced in the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, Anschluss union with Austria and the incorporation into Germany of the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia, how was Hitler to know that British and French leaders would actually be serious in making a stand over the Polish Corridor and Danzig? Wide Agreement on the Dominance of Ideology In recent years, there has been considerable agreement amongst historians of the Third Reich that ideology was fundamental to the shaping of Nazi policies after 1933. In a chapter in *Modern Germany Reconsidered* ed. Instead, the domestic and foreign policies of the Third Reich are now seen as two sides of the same coin. The main aim of domestic policies - which involved strengthening and purifying the German race - was to secure the successful implementation of an expansionist foreign policy. We can identify four areas of policy which clearly illustrate a change of policy after 1933 rather than a continuity of aim. As he wrote in *Mein Kampf*: We National Socialists have intentionally drawn a line under the foreign policy of prewar Germany. We are taking up where we left off six hundred years ago. We are putting an end to the perpetual German march towards the South and West of Europe and turning our eyes towards the land in the East. We are finally putting a stop to the colonial and trade policy of the prewar period and passing over to the territorial policy of the future. The change was to have far-reaching implications, as Hitler later declared: Thus, his aim was to ensure that through bilateral trade agreements and the manufacture of synthetic materials, Germany could be in full control of its economic development and therefore master of its political and military destiny. Both Bismarck, after 1871, and Weimar governments of the 1920s recognised the importance of cultivating good relations with Russia, to prevent Germany from becoming encircled by a ring of hostile powers and to allow some freedom to manoeuvre within the European diplomatic system. Even in the period between 1917 and 1919, when Russia and France were in alliance against Germany, there were dynastic ties between the Kaiser and the Tsar, and the recognition of similar domestic social and political goals. He viewed it as an ideological enemy, a monstrous regime based on Communist doctrines of class division and led by racially-unfit Jews. In the long run, there could be no compromise between the Third Reich and Bolshevik Russia. The Russian regime had to be defeated and dismantled to make way for the establishment of an enlarged Aryan empire. Like Bismarck, he sought a pivotal and possibly dominating role in European diplomacy, but he did not aim to overturn the whole system. Hitler, however, viewed alliances

and diplomatic agreements as tactical ploys, which would protect Germany from attack while she was still relatively unarmed and vulnerable, but which could be repudiated later on. Whereas Stresemann and Bismarck worked through diplomacy and negotiated agreement to achieve defined goals, Hitler emphasised the importance of ceaseless struggle to achieve his aims. As he wrote in *Mein Kampf* 'They sought to negotiate with him and were agreeable to the restoration of a considerable degree of German power, so long as it was negotiated within the existing European order. Running through all his writings, speeches, addresses and private conversations was a set of racist and expansionist aims which began to be carried out after in a number of domestic and foreign policies. While the actions did not always follow the exact sequence of the words, they embodied the substance, and both pointed inexorably eastwards, towards lebensraum and the establishment of a racial empire on east European and Russian soil. The strategy was to concentrate first on rearmament and on the removal of the remaining Versailles restrictions. Success in these areas, together with the pursuit of racial purity policies within Germany, would enable the Third Reich to embark on an ambitious programme of eastern expansion. He told his first cabinet meeting on 8 February that rearmament was to have top priority for the next four to five years, and to this end the services, particularly the army and air force, were mobilised for rapid expansion. In 1935, the inhabitants of the Saar region voted to return to Germany, and conscription was introduced, in flagrant defiance of the Treaty of Versailles. Remilitarisation of the Rhineland, in 1936, in contravention of the treaties of both Versailles and Locarno, was followed, in March 1938, by Anschluss with Austria. The Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia were incorporated into Germany as a result of the Munich conference of October 1938 and, by the following March, German troops were in Prague, and Czechoslovakia had disappeared from the map of Europe. Hitler now turned his attention to Danzig and the Polish Corridor, and it was his demand for the return of these areas, heavily populated by Germans, which finally provoked the opposition of Britain and France. The meticulous research which has been carried out in the last two decades, notably by Richard Overy, has revealed the full extent of German rearmament between 1933 and 1939. The Four Year Plan of 1936 aimed to put Germany on a war footing by the end of the decade, and heavy industry, iron and steel and chemical works expanded enormously. There were growing labour shortages, as military spending soared to about 23 per cent of gross national product as against 3 per cent in 1933. By a quarter of the German workforce were working on direct orders for the armed forces. In addition, Germany was stockpiling synthetic materials and building up its supplies of aluminium for aircraft construction. Professor Overy has calculated that a half or more of the German economy by 1939 was devoted to war or war-related products. We should not, therefore, be surprised that a war broke out in eastern Europe in 1939. The only surprise, perhaps, was that the invasion of Poland in 1939 found Nazi Germany and communist Russia for the time being fighting on the same side. He told his army commanders, in May 1941, that: 'It is not Danzig that is at stake. For us it is a matter of expanding our living space in the East and making food supplies secure and also solving the problem of the Baltic states. At this point, however, spirited opposition on the part of Britain and France necessitated a change in tactics. Everything I undertake is directed against the Russians; if the West is too stupid and blind to grasp this, then I shall be compelled to come to an agreement with the Russians, beat the West, and then after their defeat turn against the Soviet Union with all my forces. And, as had happened before, the words were followed in due course by the actions. Words and concepts to note contravention: A Study in Tyranny, rev. She has written three Lancaster Pamphlets, on the origins of the First and Second World Wars and on the Treaty of Versailles and international diplomacy in the 1930s. A textbook in the Longman Advanced History series, *Modern Europe*, co-written with Christopher Culpin, was published this year.

Chapter 5 : A.J.P. Taylor revisionism Origins Second World War

A summary of his argument and its significance.

The evil of war and conflict is always simple in its outer manifestations and mystically obscure in its inner motives. His book on the origins of the Second World War is perhaps the most popular reading on the subject, yet his interpretation cannot be seen as the final truth about the causes of the bloodiest war in human history. It is only a fragment of a bigger canvas that is still waiting for complete revelation. He argues that we should not mistake plans with intentions and fantasies. According to Taylor, Hitler hoped to achieve Eastern expansion not through a great war, but through quick, well targeted offenses or, if it were possible, without a war at all. Hitler also did not expect that France would capitulate from its position of Great Power so easily. He neither had a clear vision how in reality the conquered Ukraine and Poland would be populated with Germans nor was able to militarize Germany faster than the other Great Powers during the s. Hitler also had no plan how he would pull Germany out of the economic depression. His most significant political quality was the ability to wait, or the strong nerves. He was a perfect opportunist in both the domestic and foreign politics. The same approach he applied to foreign policy. He waited patiently for political victories delivered on a plate by his own enemies through their mistakes. When in "The Origins of The Second World War" was published, most of the above mentioned observations were novelty. The harsh clauses of the treaty did not subdue Germany completely. Moreover, Germany, with or without the treaty, was still the greatest power on the continent pp. Everything in Europe worked in favour for a German politician who had an opportunistic talent, patience, and iron will. The tragedy was that when this politician appeared, it was Hitler--a person with a distorted vision for future, moved by lunatic and messianic theories and ambitions. Unfortunately, the big opportunists are not among the best-intended people; German leaders, with a character combining pragmatism, opportunistic talent and good intentions, were practically impossible to emerge in the turbulent years after the First World War. The Versailles Treaty had one serious flaw -- none of the winners and vanquished genuinely believed that this was a fair settlement. See the essay "The Treaty of Versailles: Peace without Justice" The defeated nations felt humiliation and looked at themselves as victims of a robbery; the winners - Britain, France, the U. S, and Italy - had their own doubts about the rightness of their decisions. The common feeling, admitted or not, was that the Allies punished Germany above measure. But the French, concerned with their future security, wanted the Germans on their knees. Meanwhile, the British were not able to disregard the wishes of their continental ally France, nor to ignore the anti-German public opinion at home immediately after the war; on the other hand, the Americans retired in their traditional isolationism and did nothing notable to improve the political situation in Europe. In the years after Versailles, the Allies followed a chaotic foreign policy, pursuing their own interests and goals. But as Taylor observes "there was no deliberate rejection of the wartime partnership. Events pulled the allies apart; and none of them strove hard enough to avert the process" p. After the war Britain felt secure and did not consider Germany as a real danger; France had the opposite feelings, her obsession with the lack of security increased. While Britain was trying to support German recovery, France did everthing in her power to prevent it. The French believed that the First World War had been caused by conscious aggression, while the British tended to think that it had happened by mistake p. Under the pressure of France, the size of the German reparations was not settled immediately after the war. It was an error. The actual profit from the reparations was insignificant for the Allies, and the reparations had no such a bad effect on German economy as it seems at first sight. The money coming from Germany was used by the Allies to pay off the American wartime debts, not for recovery of their economies, while Germany, at the same time, was receiving generous loans from the U. But the constant quarrels over the reparation issue, the inability of a fair deal to be reached, was a constant source of tension. It created a bitter psychological environment in Germany that was impeding the improvement of the relationships between the Powers for years and that was fuelling the anti-western radicalism among Germans. The Germans believed that the reparations were the main cause of their economic troubles. The businessman in difficulties; the underpaid schoolteacher; the unemployed worker, all blamed their troubles on reparations. The cry of a hungry child was a cry against

reparations The great inflation of was attributed to reparations; so was the great depression of The sense of injustice evolved from reparations to all other clauses of Versailles Treaty. At the end all economic troubles, all problems of Germany in the s and s were explained with the punishing clauses of Versailles. But it is a myth, argues Taylor, that the economic troubles of Germany were due only to external causes. The economic difficulties between the wars were due to defects in German domestic policy itself. In the mids Stresemann, MacDonald and the French foreign minister Briand succeeded for a time being to pacify Europeans and normalize the antagonisms between the Great Powers. With the Treaty of Locarno, f or first time after , all sides seemed satisfied. Locarno gave Europe a sip of hope. It was the greatest and only triumph of the policy of "appeasement. The true peace was impossible with a suspicious and insecure France and an unhappy Germany. Hitler destroyed the political order of Locarno ten year later with the reoccupation of the Rhineland. As I said earlier, the dictator came to power in Germany thanks to the intrigues of the conservative political powers. Nobody expected that Hitler would have the potential to begin "revolutionary changes" either at home or abroad. In his foreign policy, accrding to Taylor, Hitler was not a "revolutionary. His mind operated under the simple truths of the ordinary German man, and his will produced actions according to these simple "truths". Taylor says that Hitler had "a powerful, but uninstructed intellect. In his foreign policy outlook there was only one element of systematic thinking, and it was not original: A "terrifying literalism" was the driving force of his political actions and intentions p. The greatest masters of statecraft are those who do not know what they are doing. This action was left without consequences and he would continue to test and use the patience of the Western powers until the debacle of the Second World War. But this first act of independent action without any consequence gave him an assurance that he is free to bluff and check the will of the Allies every time when the occasion permits. This agreement gave him security to outmanoeuvre France and Britain in the future. Hitler spelled out very carefully the failure of the League of Nations to resolve the problem with the Italian aggression in Abyssinia. It showed him that the international community had no prestige to intervene in cases of violation of collective international obligations. Thus, in , he reoccupied the Rhineland. In return, the French practically did nothing, nor did Britain, Poland or anybody else. The reoccupation of Rhineland, says Taylor, annuled the Versailles system. Germany was free to rearm, and the international system returned to the familiar anarchy of the pre-war years. Yet, says Taylor, international anarchy makes war possible, but it does not make war certain In , there was still scepticism that Germany would cause war; indeed the Europeans apprehended a possible conflict in the Mediterranean between France and Italy. Victory goes to the side that has made the fewest mistakes, not to the one that has guessed right" p. In the pre- Second World War period, Hitler is the side that made fewest mistakes. After the reoccupation of Rhineland, there was no serious incentive for rearmament in France and Britain. The general reasons for this were three - Englishmen and Frenchmen still did not believe that the policy of "appeasement" was a failure, they did not want a new war, and the economic troubles prevented any plans for military expenditures. Germany started some militarization, but it was not as sizable as people usually think. The popular opinion is that Germany was the only country except Soviet Russia that enjoyed full employment after and this was due to the rearmament. Indeed that was a typical expression of autocratic state capitalism that for a particular period is very effective in facilitating the vitality of economy through measures such as central control on industries and active state manipulation of prices and investments. Yet, according to Taylor, the watershed between the two world wars was extended over precisely two years. The "Hossbach memorandum" was not a real blueprint for action. The Austrian Anschluss in March came, against the expressed goals in the memorandum, before the "planned" destruction of Czechoslovakia. The politics of Hitler toward Austria had been no different from the traditional German evolutionary approach of awaiting the Austrian Germans to merge with the ethnic mainland without active outside support. But the circumstances permitted an earlier German invasion. After the Anschluss "geography and politics automatically put Czechoslovakia on the agenda" p. Czechoslovakia was a central-European country, composed of national minorities and encircled with unfriendly neighbours except Romania. The destruction of Czech state was easy - its allies France and Soviet Russia had no courage to defend it, Britain was convinced that the risk from its destruction was lesser comparing with the possibility of second great war. Hitler occupied the Sudeten land, where the German minority lived, with the blessing of

Britain and France at Munich. The last station of this unbroken order of narrow but highly effective steps was the free city of Danzig and the Polish Corridor that had been dividing Germany from Eastern Prussia. What were the origins of the Second World War? First, the granule of the future discord had been sowed at Versailles. The Treaty that aimed to create a secure post world war order turned complete failure. It was drawn up without the consent of the defeated nations, it was not a collective agreement, and indeed, it was a compromise with the French fears and the public opinion in the winning states. The Versailles system was incredibly and unduly harming the greatest nation in Europe, Germany, and with this, it was producing constant cankers of instability. Second, the French and the British had different conceptions about post-war world order. France was engaged in actions that were supposed to assure its security, but she was never satisfied; Britain cared about its tranquility and preferred peace. France was obsessed with security issues, but she was not able to resist the German threat without the support of Britain; on the other side, Britain knew that Germany had the right to seek justice and sincerely believed that once her demands were satisfied she would be pacified. Britain looked at France as the main obstacle against German recovery and consequently as the main disturber of peace. It was unthinkable Britain to support France militarily instead to smooth every reason for open conflict. Third, during the interwar period, Germany experienced a number of political and economic woes and for all of them, justifiably or not, Versailles was the alleged reason. The radicalization of German society produced the extremist Nazi movement and made the Nazi regime possible.

Chapter 6 : The origins of the Second World War

*Few books have so shocked received opinion and been as influential as A.J.P. Taylor's *The Origins of the Second World War*. It was a classic exercise in the revisionism that is central to the historical discipline and, after its publication, the study of the diplomatic history of the s would never be the same again.*

Origins[edit] Taylor had previously written *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe* , which covered the period until As he later wrote in his autobiography: I wanted to be writing something and decided that I could carry on my diplomatic history from the point where the *Struggle for Mastery* left off. I had, I thought, done most of the research work needed by reviewing the various books of memoirs and the volumes of German and British diplomatic documents as they came out. At that time no original sources were available: This extraordinary paucity, as it seems now, makes my book a period piece of limited value. He also was opposed to the idea that it was necessary for the Western powers to take a tough stand against the Soviet Union as failure to take a similar stand against Nazi Germany had led to war. He was supported by other Nazis but not by the German people, who were innocent bystanders or victims of the Nazi regime. Sebastian Haffner wrote in his review in *The Observer*: Bitterness has mellowed into quiet sadness and even pity In spite of all this, it will probably become his most controversial book Taylor is in the very first rank. He is among English historians to-day what Evelyn Waugh is among English novelists, a rescuer of forgotten truths, a knight of paradox, a prince of story-telling, and a great, perhaps the greatest, master of his craft". Martin Gilbert came across a copy of the book in a second hand bookshop some years after it was published. When Gilbert looked at the flyleaf, it was inscribed "A. He presented the copy to Taylor, who was much amused. He also accused Taylor of perverting the evidence: I have said enough to show why I think Mr. Taylor intended to demonstrate that Trevor-Roper had selected, suppressed and arranged his evidence in exactly the way he had accused Taylor of doing. Taylor had ignored the interdependence of internal and external factors in the aims of German foreign policy. Hitler cut German armaments plans by 30 per cent after Munich. He cut them again drastically after the fall of France and was reducing them even after the invasion of Russia. Indeed large-scale rearmament began only in the summer of ". Of course there was a general climate of feeling in the Europe of the nineteen-thirties which made war likely Of course historians must explore the profound forces. But I am sometimes tempted to think that they talk so much about these profound forces in order to avoid doing the detailed work. I prefer detail to generalisations: The German conservative historian Gerhard Ritter was also critical. When Taylor flew to Munich for a televised debate with a Swiss historian, the taxi driver who drove him from the airport asked him whether he knew an Englishman called A. Taylor replied that he was A. Taylor finds excuses for Hitler and reasons to blame nearly everybody else With scholarly detachment, Taylor states the case for appeasing Hitler and for resisting him, but his sympathies obviously lie with the appeasers Taylor insists that Hitler was no fanatic. As far as Taylor himself is concerned, his book proves his point. Craig in the *New York Herald Tribune* condemned the book, calling it a "perverse and potentially dangerous book. Taylor has always shown a tendency to strain the truth in order to achieve striking formulations. But he has never before been so intent upon demonstrating his originality as he is here, or so willing to indulge in exaggeration, oversimplification, quibbling, and sheer willfulness in order to achieve his effects". Taylor, *A Personal History* London: Hamish Hamilton, , p.

Chapter 7 : Origin Of The Second World War - A.J.P. Taylor - Google Books

From its first publication in , A.J.P Taylor's book, The Origins of the Second World War has been at the heart of controversy because of his unorthodox treatment of Hitler's contribution to the outbreak of war.

Taylor wrote his book *Origins of the Second World War* in not caused by rival ideologies of fascism and communism and liberalism nor "good" great ideals vs. He is regarded as one of the most important British historians of the 20th century. In he began writing reviews and essays for the *Manchester Guardian* later *The Guardian*. He continued his studies in history, and in his first book, *The Italian Problem in European Diplomacy* , was published. Taylor was a tutor in modern history at *Magdalen College, Oxford*, from to and a research fellow there until He became a panel member of a BBC-TV news analysis program in and made regular television appearances thereafter. He was also popular as a journalist and lecturer. Though often sparking controversy with his unorthodox views, Taylor nonetheless maintained high standards of scholarship. His most widely read and controversial book was *The Origins of the Second World War* , in which he maintained that the war erupted because Great Britain and France vacillated between policies of appeasement and resistance toward Adolf Hitler. Taylor practiced a legitimate revisionism that is found in every field of history. Goldhagen has argued that a deep-rooted anti-Semitism in Germany caused the Holocaust, not just Hitler and the Nazi party. Herbert Bix has challenged the traditional interpretation of Hirohito as a passive, remote figure-head, and has instead argued that the emperor was an active supporter of war policies. John Charmley has written that Churchill unnecessarily warred with Germany and sacrificed the British Empire, rather than follow a Chamberlain-style diplomacy that would have resulted in a German-Russian war. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. HarperCollins, Charmley, John. Churchill, the End of Glory: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. Six Months that Changed the World. This book was originally published in London as *Peacemakers*: Her book was called "splendidly revisionist and daringly politically incorrect" by arguing that the peace conference should not be blamed for causing World War II. University of Georgia Press, *The Origins of the Second World War*. It was taken down in , whereupon I copied it to this website.

Chapter 8 : The Origins of the Second World War - A.J.P. Taylor - Google Books

*A.J.P. Taylor's publication of *The Origins of the Second World War* provoked controversy on its release in and gained Taylor a reputation as a revisionist. Taylor's popularity as a broadcaster brought him into legendary television debates with the likes of Hugh Trevor-Roper and many other historians, this subject being one of the more heated arguments.*

This is less of a history lesson and more of a hand grenade tossed into the street of public opinion. Taylor liked to make pithy comments and outrageous claims; and his book set the course of writing about the origins of WWII for decades. To his credit, in the received opinion was that Hitler had a plan, kept to the schedule, and that Germany alone was guilty. The correction that Taylor made was that the inept leadership of the United Kingdom and France made matters worse, and had to accept some of the blame for the coming of the war. He also was a gambler whose luck eventually ran out. General sentiment scolded Taylor for not putting enough blame on Hitler, a leader with no plan for starting the war, demonstrating no lust for global domination and expansion as a man reacting to the reparations of the Treaty of Versailles with anger and a determination to fix injustice. Oct 22, Michael Gilbride rated it it was amazing That rare book that makes you reconsider conventional wisdom. From the off, Taylor dispels commonly accepted wisdom such as the fact that the Nazis deliberately started the Reichstag fire. Similarly, he refutes the notion that Germany was an all-powerful war machine before World War Two by pointing out that the UK and France had more tanks than Germany when war broke out. Taylor deems Hitler a high stakes gambler who had a series of wins which emboldened him to keep pushing his luck. He dismisses the Hossbach Memorandum that is so often held up as proof of his expansionist mindset by highlighting how it was filed away never to be seen again and how all the generals present were fired in the following months. Why did Hitler sign the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact? He saw a literal quality in Hitler: But they talked as if they did. It is a fascinating, fact-based analysis of the head of the Third Reich. For the first time he Similarly, in regard to Slovakia: Taylor views the capitulation of the supposedly democratic League Of Nations to fascist Italy after their invasion of Abyssinia as critical to its failure.

Chapter 9 : The Taylor Thesis

The Origins of the Second World War A. J. P. Taylor, (Alan John Percivale Taylor), was born in March, , at Birkdale, Lancashire, England into a politically liberal family that enjoyed a definite affluence through involvements in the cotton industry - he was to be the only surviving child.

Hayek There is an almost universal tendency, perhaps an inborn tendency, to suspect the good faith of a man who holds opinions that differ from our own opinions. When I speak of reason or rationalism, all I mean is the conviction that we can learn through criticism of our mistakes and errors, especially through criticism by others, and eventually also through self-criticism. Karl Popper The worst mistake a fighter for our ideals can make is to ascribe to our opponents dishonest or immoral aims. I know it is sometimes difficult not to be irritated into a feeling that most of them are a bunch of irresponsible demagogues who ought to know better. We ought to realize that their conceptions derive from serious thinkers whose ultimate ideals are not so very different from our own and with whom we differ not so much on ultimate values, but on the effective means of achieving them FA Hayek The great virtue of a free market system is that it does not care what colour people are; it does not care what their religion is; it only cares whether they can produce something you want to buy. It is the most effective system we have discovered to enable people who hate one another to deal with one another and help one another. This means that, so long as we keep within the accepted rules, moral pressure can be brought on us only through the esteem of those whom we ourselves respect and not through the allocation of material reward by a social authority. Our conduct ought certainly to be guided by our desire for their esteem. Smith was to put it, we owe our bread not to the benevolence of the baker but to his self-interest, a pedestrian truth which is worthwhile to repeat again and again in view of the ineradicable prejudice that every action intended to serve the profit interest must be anti-social by this fact alone. Joseph Schumpeter Along with many others of my generation, I was a socialist when I started my university studies. But my first few economics courses taught me the power of competition, markets, and incentives, and I quickly became a classical liberal. That means someone who believes in the power of individual responsibility, a market economy, and a crucial but limited role of government. Gary Becker Two seemingly contradictory charges are now rife: They are going to pass it, whatever the defense they may hear; the only success victorious defense may produce is a change in the indictment. Joseph Schumpeter The most important single central fact about a free market is that no exchange takes place unless both parties benefit Milton Friedman Far too many policy proposals are premised on the absurd notion that privately available profit opportunities exist but remain unnoticed by all but professors, politicians, pundits, and preachers "official observers who never offer to stake their own funds and efforts on seizing these opportunities. Seizing with their own private initiative these opportunities if these opportunities are real would not only yield well-deserved profits to the these professors, politicians, pundits, and preachers, but it would also solve the very problems that they assert are so awful. Don Boudreaux For the bulk of mankind Consequently, man has had to learn the hard way that in order to obtain more of this good he must forego some of that: By developed instinct, the economist initially presumes it to be appropriate that payment of the price should be made by those who receive the good. Alchian and Allen Most economic fallacies derive from the tendency to assume that there is a fixed pie, that one party can gain only at the expense of another. That assures lowest prices and highest quality. Milton Friedman The existence and preservation of a competitive situation in private industry makes possible a minimizing of the responsibilities of the sovereign state. It frees the state from the obligation of adjudicating endless, bitter disputes among persons as participants in different industries and among owners of different kinds of productive services. In a word, it makes possible a political policy of laissez faire. Henry Simons Laissez faire has never been more than a slogan in defense of the proposition that every extension of state activity should be examined under a presumption of error. The main tradition of economic liberalism has always assumed a well-established system of law and order designed to harness self-interest to serve the welfare of all. Aaron Director The preservation of a free system is so difficult precisely because it requires a constant rejection of measures which appear to be required to secure particular results, on no stronger grounds than that they conflict with a general

rule [of non-government intervention], and frequently without our knowing what will be the costs of not observing the rule in the particular instance. A successful defense of freedom must therefore be dogmatic and make no concessions to expediency, even where it is not possible to show that, besides the known beneficial effects, some particular harmful result would also follow from its infringement. Freedom will prevail only if it is accepted as a general principle whose application to particular instances requires no justification. It is thus a misunderstanding to blame classical liberalism for having been too doctrinaire. Its defect was not that it adhered too stubbornly to principles, but rather that it lacked principles sufficiently definite to provide clear guidance.

FA Hayek The normal economic system works itself. For its current operation it is under no central control, it needs no central survey. Over the whole range of human activity and human need, supply is adjusted to demand, and production to consumption, by a process that is automatic, elastic and responsive.

Arthur Salter Ever since the beginning of modern science, the best minds have recognized that "the range of acknowledged ignorance will grow with the advance of science. Unfortunately, the popular effect of this scientific advance has been a belief, seemingly shared by many scientists, that the range of our ignorance is steadily diminishing and that we can therefore aim at more comprehensive and deliberate control of all human activities. It is for this reason that those intoxicated by the advance of knowledge so often become the enemies of freedom." The more men know, the smaller the share of all that knowledge becomes that any one mind can absorb. The more civilized we become, the more relatively ignorant must each individual be of the facts on which the working of his civilization depends. One of the great merits of the classical liberal system is that it allows benevolent feelings to express themselves where they can be quite strong – most particularly with family and close friends. Yet it also gives us an intelligent way to interact with perfect strangers. We understand that there is generosity in this world. But we do not want to make too much of a good thing: A market system manages to channel these self-interested energies into socially productive uses, so that we are not afraid of ordinary people making their living by entering into contracts with others. Richard Epstein Society can thus exist only if by a process of selection rules have evolved which lead individuals to behave in a manner which makes social life possible.

F. Hayek Economic progress, in a capitalist society, means turmoil. It is clear that economic progress requires and causes significant changes in social institutions and in the people who are served by them. Bauer and Yamay It is impossible to understand the history of economic thought if one does not pay attention to the fact that economics is such is a challenge to the conceit of those in power.

Ludwig von Mises The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design. To the naive mind that can conceive of order only as the product of deliberate arrangement, it may seem absurd that in complex conditions order, and adaptation to the unknown, can be achieved more effectively by decentralizing decisions and that a division of authority will actually extend the possibility of overall order. Yet that decentralization actually leads to more information being taken into account.

Hayek In choosing between social arrangements within the context of which individual decisions are made, we have to bear in mind that a change in the existing system which will lead to an improvement in some decisions may well lead to a worsening of others. Furthermore we have to take into account the costs involved in operating the various social arrangements whether it be the working of a market or of a government department as well as the costs involved in moving to a new system. In devising and choosing between social arrangements we should have regard for the total effect. This, above all, is the change in approach which I am advocating. Such liberals are not conservative in the traditional meaning of wanting to preserve the status quo. Although classical liberals recognize that what has survived is often functional and contributes to social welfare, they also realize that some hallowed customs and traditions in law, politics, and the economy have survived because of the influence of powerful interest groups that orient public policy in their own favor.

Gary and Guity Becker The essential characteristic of Western civilization that distinguishes it from the arrested and petrified civilizations of the East was and is its concern for freedom from the state. The history of the West, from the age of the Greek polis down to the present-day resistance to socialism, is essentially the history of the fight for liberty against the encroachments of the officeholders.

Ludwig von Mises There is one central fact about the economic history of the twentieth century: No previous era and no previous economy has seen material wealth and productive potential grow at such a pace. Even lower

middle-class households in relatively poor countries have today material standards of living that would make them, in many respects, the envy of the powerful and lordly of past centuries. Brad DeLong Poverty in the relative sense must of course continue to exist outside of any completely egalitarian society: In the West the rise of the great masses to tolerable comfort has been the effect of the general growth of wealth and has been merely slowed down by measures interfering with the market mechanism. Hayek There will not be one kind of community existing and one kind of life led in utopia. Utopia will consist of utopias, of many different and divergent communities in which people lead different kinds of lives under different institutions. Some kinds of communities will be more attractive to most than others; communities will wax and wane. People will leave some for others or spend their whole lives in one. Utopia is a framework for utopias, a place where people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal community but where no one can impose his own utopian vision upon others. Robert Nozick All solutions have costs, and there is no reason to suppose that governmental regulation is called for simply because the problem is not well handled by the market or the firm. Satisfactory views on policy can only come from a patient study of how, in practice, the market, firms and governments handle the problem of harmful effects. It is my belief that economists, and policy-makers generally, have tended to over-estimate the advantages which come from governmental regulation. But this belief, even if justified, does not do more than suggest that government regulation should be curtailed. It does not tell us where the boundary line should be drawn. This, it seems to me, has to come from a detailed investigation of the actual results of handling the problem in different ways. Ronald Coase It would scarcely be too much to claim that the main merit of the individualism which he and his contemporaries advocated is that it is a system under which bad men can do least harm. It is a social system which does not depend for its functioning on our finding good men for running it, or on all men becoming better than they now are, but which makes use of men in all their given variety and complexity, sometimes good and sometimes bad, sometimes intelligent and more often stupid FA Hayek A just war exists when a people tries to ward off the threat of coercive domination by another people, or to overthrow an already-existing domination. A war is unjust, on the other hand, when a people try to impose domination on another people, or try to retain an already existing coercive rule over them. Murray Rothbard There is a profound moral differences between the use of force for liberation and the use of force for conquest Ronald Reagan The House of Commons starts its proceedings with a prayer. The chaplain looks at the assembled members with their varied intelligence and then prays for the country Lord Denning.