

Chapter 1 : Most and least religious U.S. states

Many states were as explicit about the need for a thriving religion as Congress was in its thanksgiving and fast day proclamations. The Massachusetts Constitution of declared, for example, that "the happiness of a people, and the good order and preservation of civil government, essentially.

The Church Act is protected by the Constitution of Finland and the state can not change the Church Act without changing the constitution. The church has a power to tax its members. The state collects these taxes for the church, for a fee. On the other hand, the church is required to give a burial place for everyone in its graveyards. The church does not consider itself a state church, as the Finnish state does not have the power to influence its internal workings or its theology, although it has a veto in those changes of the internal structure which require changing the Church Act. Neither does the Finnish state accord any precedence to Lutherans or the Lutheran faith in its own acts. The Union of Freethinkers of Finland has criticized the official endorsement of the two churches by the Finnish state, and has campaigned for the separation of church and state. A bill passed in and effective as of 1 January created the Church of Norway as an independent legal entity. The actual meaning and implications of "folkekirke" remain contested. In spite of the separation between the state and the church in , the Church of Sweden still has a special status in Sweden. Sweden is therefore often seen as a midway between having a state religion and not. Only the Swedish Riksdag can change this fact. The connections to the Swedish royal family are complicated. For example, the Swedish constitution stipulates that the Monarch of Sweden must be a true Lutheran, accepting the doctrine of the Church of Sweden. All members of the royal house must accept the same doctrine to be able to inherit the Throne of Sweden. The parishes of the Church of Sweden were the smallest administrative entities in Sweden and were used as civil registration and taxation units until 1 January Armenian Apostolic Church is not the state church of Armenia but has a special constitutional agreement with the state, with the constitution recognising "The Republic of Armenia shall recognise the exclusive mission of the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church, as a national church, in the spiritual life of the Armenian people, in the development of their national culture and preservation of their national identity. The local law in Alsace-Moselle accords official status to four religions in this specific region of France: Judaism , Roman Catholicism , Lutheranism and Calvinism. The law is a remnant of the Napoleonic Concordat of , which was abrogated in the rest of France by the law of on the separation of church and state. However, at the time, Alsace-Moselle had been annexed by Germany. The Concordat therefore remained in force in these areas, and it was not abrogated when France regained control of the region in The preamble to the Hungarian Constitution of describes Hungary as "part of Christian Europe" and acknowledges "the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood", while Article VII provides that "the State shall cooperate with the Churches for community goals". However, the constitution also guarantees freedom of religion and separation of church and state. There are 18 officially recognized religious groups in Lebanon, each with its own family law legislation and set of religious courts. In June , Parliament voted to amend the wording of Article 1 of the constitution, thereby making Christianity the state religion. The status of the religion had previously only been mentioned in the preamble, which prime minister Tuilaepa Aiono Sailele Malielegaoi considered legally inadequate. The preamble to the Zambian Constitution of declares Zambia to be "a Christian nation", while also guaranteeing freedom of religion. Political aspects of Islam , Sharia , Caliphate , Islamic religious police , and Islamism Many Muslim-majority countries have constitutionally established Islam, or a specific form of it, as a state religion. Proselytism converting people to another religion is often illegal. Article 2 of the Constitution of Afghanistan: Article 2 of the Algerian Constitution of Article 2A of the Constitution of Bangladesh: Article 2 of the Constitution of Bahrain: Article 3 of the Constitution of Brunei: Preamble to the Constitution of the Comoros: Article 1 of the Constitution of Djibouti: Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution of Article 12 of the Constitution of Iran: Article 2 of the Constitution of Iraq: Article 2 of the Constitution of Jordan: Article 2 of the Constitution of Kuwait: Article 1 of the Libyan interim Constitutional Declaration: Islam shall be the one of the basis of all the laws of the Maldives. Article 3 of the Constitution of Malaysia: Article 5 of the Constitution of Mauritania: Article 3 of the Constitution of

Morocco: Article 2 of the Constitution of Oman: Article 2 of the Constitution of Pakistan: Article 4 of the Basic Law of the State of Palestine: Respect and sanctity of all other heavenly religions shall be maintained. Article 1 of the Constitution of Qatar: Article 1 of the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia: Its religion is Islam. Article 1 and 6 of the Tunisian Constitution of The state is the guardian of religion. It guarantees freedom of conscience and belief, the free exercise of religious practices and the neutrality of mosques and places of worship from all partisan instrumentalisation. Article 7 of the Constitution of the United Arab Emirates: Article 2 of the Constitution of Yemen: Jewish state Israel is defined in several of its laws as a " Jewish and democratic state " *medina yehudit ve-demokratit*. However, the term " Jewish " is a polyseme that can describe the Jewish people as either an ethnic or a religious group. The debate about the meaning of the term "Jewish" and its legal and social applications is one of the most profound issues with which Israeli society deals. The problem of the status of religion in Israel, even though it is relevant to all religions, usually refers to the status of Judaism in Israeli society. Thus, even though from a constitutional point of view Judaism is not the state religion in Israel, its status nevertheless determines relations between religion and state and the extent to which religion influences the political center. The fact that the Muslim population was not defined as a religious community does not affect the rights of the Muslim community to practice their faith. At the end of the period covered by the U. International Religious Freedom Report, several of these denominations were pending official government recognition; however, the Government has allowed adherents of not officially recognized groups freedom to practice. Three additional religious communities have subsequently been recognized by Israeli law: The structure and goals of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel are governed by Israeli law, but the law does not say explicitly that it is a state Rabbinate. However, outspoken Israeli secularists such as Shulamit Aloni and Uri Avnery have long maintained that it is that in practice. Non-recognition of other streams of Judaism such as Reform Judaism and Conservative Judaism is the cause of some controversy; rabbis belonging to these currents are not recognized as such by state institutions and marriages performed by them are not recognized as valid. As pointed out by Avnery and Aloni, the essential problem is that Israel carries on the top-down Ottoman millet system, under which the government reserves the complete discretion of recognizing some religions groups and not recognizing others. As of [update] marriage in Israel provides no provision for civil marriage , marriage between people of different religions, marriages by people who do not belong to one of nine recognised religious communities, or same-sex marriages , although there is recognition of marriages performed abroad. Political religions[edit] In some countries, there is a political ideology sponsored by the government that may be called political religion.

Chapter 2 : 5 Most, Least Religious US States: List

Power, Authority and the State is also an important concept in political sociology. The meaning of power and authority has been summarised by Steven Lukes ().

Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice. At the same time, the concept has remained highly controversial in the popular culture and law. Much of the debate over the application and meaning of the phrase focuses on its historical antecedents. This article briefly examines the historical origins of the concept and its subsequent evolutions in the nineteenth century. Separation of church and state , disestablishment , religious liberty , establishment of religion , First Amendment Religion and Government are certainly very different Things, instituted for different Ends; the design of one being to promote our temporal Happiness; the design of the other to procure the Favour of God, and thereby the Salvation of our Souls. While these are kept distinct and apart, the Peace and welfare of Society is preserved, and the Ends of both are answered. By mixing them together, feuds, animosities and persecutions have been raised, which have deluged the World in Blood, and disgraced human Nature. The immediate context was a controversy over a proposal to appoint the first American bishop of the Church of England, the presumptive established church for the British American colonies. Even before the political crisis arose in , these Americans overwhelmingly identified with the opposition Whigs in England, who criticized the corruption and authoritarianism of the established church. As patriots raised claims of political liberty in those formative years, matters of religious liberty and conscience were also on their minds. Unquestioningly, however, matters of religious liberty were of great concern to the founding generation, though they were secondary to the more pressing issues of military success and national unity. As the new states organized their governments and experimented with various models of representative democracy, they also addressed questions about the appropriate relationship between religion and government. The change that transpired over a short period was truly remarkable. In fifteen years, after the onset of the American Revolution, the number of religious establishments was effectively reversed with ten of fourteen states now including Vermont either disbanding their establishments or declining to enact legislation to support their previous systems. Most states also liberalized rules that had imposed political disabilities e. At the national level, the authors of the Constitution inserted a ban on any religious test for public office holding, while the First Congress drafted a constitutional amendment prohibiting a religious establishment and protecting the free exercise of religion. By the time the last state Massachusetts disestablished in , a phrase had arisen to represent the distinctly American pattern of church-state relations: Judges, politicians, educators, and even religious leaders have embraced church-state separation as central to church-state relations and a cornerstone of American democracy. Although the phrase is not found in the Constitution, no organizing theory has had a greater impact on the way Americans conceptualize the intersection of religion, culture, and politics than the principle of church-state separation. Board of Education , Justice Hugo Black wrote: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. In fact, in Everson, the Court upheld the state reimbursement of transportation expenses for children to attend parochial schools. Like judges, many Americans have disagreed about what the principle means in practice. For some, it means that religious bodies have no official status or formal role in the government, such that each institution acts independently of the other. The government may not maintain a state religion, directly finance religious activities, or coerce actions either on behalf of or against religion. Beyond these core prohibitions, however, the government has significant leeway to interact with religion: The Constitution does not prohibit communal expressions of faith, such as prayers in legislative halls or on public school football fields. This view also permits the government to facilitate private religious activity as a means of enhancing the religious liberty right contained in the Free Exercise Clause. Here, separationism becomes the rationale for protecting the independence of religious institutions, such as by preventing civil courts from adjudicating internal church disputes and affording religious bodies broad discretion over employment matters. One could term this a minimalist view of church-state separation. This perspective is weighted toward the nonestablishment side of the religion clauses, and it advocates a broader understanding of separation to

ensure that all government functions remain secular. The government may not encourage religious fealty, support religious institutions financially or otherwise, or use religious means to accomplish public policy. Courtesy of the Office of the Texas Attorney General. Today, it is not uncommon for religious, legal, and cultural conservatives to criticize the concept of church-state separation. Critics charge that a separationist perspective imposes a regime of secularism, one that is not neutral toward religious matters but that privatizes and marginalizes religion. Yale law professor Stephen L. More recently, a group of scholars has challenged the historical bona fides of separationism, arguing that the concept was not only foreign to members of the founding generation, but also that it emerged in the nineteenth century as a means to maintain Protestant dominance at the expense of Catholics and other religious minorities. In this telling, church-state separation is a profane and illiberal concept. Now the church-state decisions do not include laudatory references to separation, and they often express open hostility to the concept. Former Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote: No amount of repetition of historical errors in judicial opinions can make the errors true. In his writings in the fifth century, Augustine of Hippo distinguished the authority and duties of the sacred and temporal worlds. The ideas of church-state separation that were most influential during the founding period, however, can be traced chiefly to the Protestant Reformation, the Enlightenment, and Whig politics. Arguments for disengaging secular authority from the church arose during the Reformation, largely in response to the arrangements that had arisen between the Catholic Church and various kingdoms. Much of this emphasis on separation was theologically based. The institutional distinction between church and state did not lead to disestablishment or any practical sense of separation. But the Puritans did not forswear formal establishments or the state support of religion, tying many of their civil laws to biblical mandates and maintaining a system of taxes to support religion. It fell to radical Separatist and some-time Baptist Roger Williams to make the most complete argument for church-state separation in early colonial America. Quaker Pennsylvania also forswore a religious establishment, though it did not go as far as Rhode Island in rejecting any government role in reinforcing religious morality. Locke envisioned a situation which would restrict the influence of each on the other. The boundaries of both sides are fixed and immovable. John, Lord Bolingbroke, who discounted the divinity of the scriptures and a religious basis of the law. Montesquieu and Bolingbroke were read by the founding generation, particularly Thomas Jefferson. In addition to advocating freedom of conscience, Trenchard and Gordon spoke out against corruption in the Anglican Church. John Cartwright, Richard Price, and Joseph Priestly were later opposition writers who advocated for political and religious reform. Priestly, who corresponded with many of the founding generation before fleeing to America, called for repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts which imposed a religious test for public officeholding and disestablishment of the Church of England, insisting on an even greater separation of religious and secular realms. To be sure, other ideological strains influenced the founding generation, including classical republicanism, the common law, natural law, and even Protestant evangelical and Puritan covenantal thought. The Founders synthesized these seemingly disparate ideological strains into a comprehensive republicanism. No one during the founding generation argued in favor of increasing church-state ties, and only a small number advocated retaining the status quo of religious establishments. The point is that the Founders imbibed multiple sources that promoted various conceptions of religious toleration, freedom of conscience, disestablishment, and church-state separation. What was important to the Founders—and is important to modern efforts to understand the period—is that the ideas about church and state were dynamic and unfolding. Because of that fluid environment, it should not be surprising that few of the Founders offered a complete understanding of church-state arrangements. But most important, there was a clear progression in favor of greater separation. First, the American Revolution followed a period of religious experimentalism and expansion commonly called the First Great Awakening. Although known for its emotional revivals that challenged the staid religious practices of the established churches, the Great Awakening was equally significant for breaking down forces of religious uniformity and substituting notions of religious equality and volunteerism. Historians have documented how democratic ideas flowed into the religious movement and out again, undermining assumptions about the necessity of state supported religion. The Great Awakening cemented the notion that participation in, and support of, religious worship should be voluntary, not compulsory. Granted, church

establishments had never worked well in any of those former colonies or had not worked at all , so disestablishment was not controversial. But none of these new states considered moving in the opposite direction toward increasing church-state ties, even though they were theoretically free to do so. Most disestablished states retained other practices inconsistent with a modern understanding of separation, such as religious requirements for holding public office and participating in legal proceedings i. Nonetheless, all states had taken the first steps toward separation; before long many had abolished other religious disqualifications they had retained from the colonial era. The clear trend was toward liberalizing religious disqualifications. But this description does not indicate the ongoing dynamism in those states. By , four additional states had abandoned their religious establishments or had neglected to fund them , thus allowing them to die. The first Georgia and Maryland Constitutions had allowed for religious assessments but neither state instituted a system. Maryland voters rejected a proposed assessment in , indicating a quick reversal of opinion, while a Georgia law of the same year apparently never went into effect. The new Georgia Constitutions of and , respectively, removed the religious test for officeholding and abolished all assessments. All of these developments reveal a progression of thought about the meaning of church-state separation and freedom of conscience at the state level. But even in those states, the idea of a religious establishment was not particularly popular, and opposition to tax assessments and religious preferences was strong and growing. Experiencing pressure from within and without, officials in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire denied they even had a religious establishment. Here the State do [sic] neither. It is left to each town and parish, not to prescribe rules of faith or doctrine for the members of the corporation but barely to elect a teacher of religion and morality for the society, who is to be maintained at the expense of the whole. The privilege is extended to all denominations. There is no one in this respect superior or inferior to another. Increasingly, early Americans believed that tax support of one religion or of religion generally violated rights of conscience. The movement away from religious assessments and toward expanding notions of rights of conscience demonstrates the transformation in attitudes about church-state arrangements. Indeed, the impetus toward achieving a more complete form of disestablishment foundered early in the next century. Attitudes about disengaging religious and temporal realms shifted as natural rights rationalism lost favor to a new Protestant evangelical ethos that came to dominate the nation culturally by the second third of the century. This attitudinal shift affected perspectives toward church-state relations. Several factors contributed to this transformation in attitudes. First was the American reaction to the French Revolution and the subsequent decline in deistic thought in the United States. That reaction coincided with the wide-scale outbreak of evangelical revivals after , commonly called the Second Great Awakening. Church membership tripled, and Protestant evangelicalism quickly became the dominant cultural expression in America, fueled by a post-millennialist eschatology which taught that the Second Coming of Jesus would occur at the conclusion of a thousand-year golden reign. To facilitate the Second Coming, evangelical leaders created voluntary organizations designed to reform society by addressing issues such as intemperance, biblical illiteracy, and Sabbath observance. Evangelical leader Lyman Beecher believed that moral reform assisted the government by ensuring public piety. Many judges of the antebellum period shared the emerging evangelical perspective. In , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected a claim that blasphemy laws violated the religious liberty provisions of the state constitution. The real object of the [First] amendment was not to countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity: Public acknowledgments of religion were commonplace.

Chapter 3 : Niccolò Machiavelli (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

To what extent can the creation of areas of human life free from God be separated from the state's appropriation of sacred power? The organisers would like to explore these and similar questions in the context of discussions about early modern warfare, civil and religious conflict, toleration, and the confessional and sacred character of the.

References and Further Reading 1. Establishment and Separation of Church and State While the topic of establishment has receded in importance at present, it has been central to political thought in the West since at least the days of Constantine. These arrangements include the following: A church may be supported through taxes and subject to the direction of the government for example, the monarch is still officially the head of the Church of England, and the Prime Minister is responsible for selecting the Archbishop of Canterbury. Particular ecclesiastical officials may have, in virtue of their office, an established role in political institutions. A church may simply have a privileged role in certain public, political ceremonies for example, inaugurations, opening of parliament, etc. What is central to them is they each involve the conferral of some sort of official status. A weaker form of an established church is what Robert Bellah Contemporary philosophical defenses of outright establishment of a church or faith are few, but a famous defense of establishment was given by T. Eliot in the last century , Trained as a philosopher he completed, but did not defend, a dissertation at Harvard on the philosophy of F. Bradley and deeply influenced by Aristotle , Eliot believed that democratic societies rejected the influence of an established church at their peril, for in doing so they cut themselves off from the kind of ethical wisdom that can come only from participation in a tradition. Even today, there are strains of conservatism that argue for establishment by emphasizing the benefits that will accrue to the political system or society at large Scruton, According to this line of thought, the healthy polis requires a substantial amount of pre- or extra-political social cohesion. More specifically, a certain amount of social cohesion is necessary both to ensure that citizens see themselves as sufficiently connected to each other so that they will want to cooperate politically , and to ensure that they have a common framework within which they can make coherent collective political decisions. This cohesion in turn is dependent on a substantial amount of cultural homogeneity, especially with respect to adherence to certain values. One way of ensuring this kind of homogeneity is to enact one of the forms of establishment mentioned above, such as displaying religious symbols in political buildings and monuments, or by including references to a particular religion in political ceremonies. Rather than emphasizing the distinctively political benefits of establishment, a different version of this argument could appeal to the ethical benefits that would accrue to citizens themselves as private individuals. For example, on many understandings of politics, one of the purposes of the polis is to ensure that citizens have the resources necessary for living a choiceworthy, flourishing life. One such resource is a sense of belonging to a common culture that is rooted in a tradition, as opposed to a sense of rootlessness and social fragmentation Sandel, ; MacIntyre, Thus, in order to ensure that citizens have this sense of cultural cohesion, the state must or at least may in some way privilege a religious institution or creed. Of course, a different version of this argument could simply appeal to the truth of a particular religion and to the good of obtaining salvation, but given the persistent intractability of settling such questions, this would be a much more difficult argument to make. Against these positions, the liberal tradition has generally opposed establishment in all of the aforementioned forms. Contemporary liberals typically appeal to the value of fairness. It is claimed, for example, that the state should remain neutral among religions because it is unfairâ€”especially for a democratic government that is supposed to represent all of the people composing its demosâ€”to intentionally disadvantage or unequally favor any group of citizens in their pursuit of the good as they understand it, religious or otherwise Rawls, Similarly, liberals often argue that fairness precludes devoting tax revenues to religious groups because doing so amounts to forcing non-believers to subsidize religions that they reject. If all people have such a right, then it is morally wrong for the state to force them to participate in religious practices and institutions that they would otherwise oppose, such as forcing them to take part in public prayer. It is also wrong, for the same reason, to force people to support financially via taxation religious institutions and communities that they would not otherwise wish to support. In addition, there are liberal consequentialist

concerns about establishment, such as the possibility that it will result in or increase the likelihood of religious repression and curtailment of liberty Audi, While protections and advantages given to one faith may be accompanied by promises to refrain from persecuting adherents of rival faiths, the introduction of political power into religion moves the state closer to interferences which are clearly unjust, and it creates perverse incentives for religious groups to seek more political power in order to get the upper hand over their rivals. From the perspective of many religious people themselves, moreover, there are worries that a political role for their religion may well corrupt their faith community and its mission. Toleration and Accommodation of Religious Belief and Practice As European and American societies faced the growing plurality of religious beliefs, communities, and institutions in the early modern era, one of the paramount social problems was determining whether and to what extent they should be tolerated. A political exile himself at the time of its composition, Locke argues a that it is futile to attempt to coerce belief because it does not fall to the will to accept or reject propositions, b that it is wrong to restrict religious practice so long as it does not interfere with the rights of others, and c that allowing a wide range of religious groups will likely prevent any one of them from becoming so powerful as to threaten the peace. Central to his arguments is a Protestant view of a religious body as a voluntary society composed only of those people who choose to join it, a view that is in sharp contrast to the earlier medieval view of the church as having authority over all people within a particular geographic domain. In contrast to Locke, Thomas Hobbes sees religion and its divisiveness as a source of political instability, and so he argues that the sovereign has the right to determine which opinions may be publicly espoused and disseminated, a power necessary for maintaining civil peace see *Leviathan* xviii, 9. Like the issue of establishment, the general issue of whether people should be allowed to decide for themselves which religion to believe in has not received much attention in recent times, again because of the wide consensus on the right of all people to liberty of conscience. However, despite this agreement on liberty of belief, modern states nevertheless face challenging questions of toleration and accommodation pertaining to religious practice, and these questions are made more difficult by the fact that they often involve multiple ideals which pull in different directions. Some of these questions concern actions which are inspired by religion and are either obviously or typically unjust. For example, violent fundamentalists feel justified in killing and persecuting infidels—how should society respond to them? While no one seriously defends the right to repress other people, it is less clear to what extent, say, religious speech that calls for such actions should be tolerated in the name of a right to free speech. A similar challenge concerns religious objections to certain medical procedures that are necessary to save a life. While it seems clearly wrong to force someone to undergo even lifesaving treatment if she objects to it at least with sufficient rationality, which of course is a difficult topic in itself, and it seems equally wrong to deny lifesaving treatment to someone who needs it and is not refusing it, the issue becomes less clear when parents have religious objections to lifesaving treatment for their children. In such a case, there are at least three values that ordinarily demand great respect and latitude: For example, Quakers and other religious groups are committed to pacifism, and yet many of them live in societies that expect all male citizens to serve in the military or register for the draft. Other groups perform religious rituals that involve the use of illegal substances, such as peyote. Is it fair to exempt such people from the burdens other citizens must bear? Many examples of this second kind of challenge are addressed in the literature on education and schooling. In developed societies and developing ones, for that matter, a substantial education is necessary for citizens to be able to achieve a decent life for themselves. However, the pursuit of this latter goal raises certain issues for religious parents. In the famous case of *Mozert v. Hawkins*, some parents objected for religious reasons to their children being taught from a reading curriculum that presented alternative beliefs and ways of life in a favorable way, and consequently the parents asked that their children be excused from class when that curriculum was being taught. Similarly, many proposals for educational curricula are aimed at developing a measure of autonomy in children, which often involves having them achieve a certain critical distance from their family background, with its traditions, beliefs, and ways of life Callan, ; Brighouse, The idea is that only then can children autonomously choose a way of life for themselves, free of undue influence of upbringing and custom. A related argument holds that this critical distance will allow children to develop a sufficient sense of respect for different social groups, a

respect that is necessary for the practice of democratic citizenship. However, this critical distance is antithetical to authentic religious commitment, at least on some accounts see the following section. Also, religious parents typically wish to pass on their faith to their children, and doing so involves cultivating religious devotion through practices and rituals, rather than presenting their faith as just one among many equally good or true ones. For such parents, passing on their religious faith is central to good parenting, and in this respect it does not differ from passing on good moral values, for instance. Thus, politically mandated education that is aimed at developing autonomy runs up against the right of some parents to practice their religion and the right to raise their children as they choose. Many, though not all, liberals argue that autonomy is such an important good that its promotion justifies using techniques that make it harder for such parents to pass on their faith—such a result is an unfortunate side-effect of a desirable or necessary policy. Yet a different source of political conflict for religious students in recent years concerns the teaching of evolution in science classes. Some religious parents of children in public schools see the teaching of evolution as a direct threat to their faith, insofar as it implies the falsity of their biblical-literalist understanding of the origins of life. They argue that it is unfair to expect them to expose their children to teaching that directly challenges their religion and to fund it with their taxes. Among these parents, some want schools to include discussions of intelligent design and creationism some who write on this issue see intelligent design and creationism as conceptually distinct positions; others see no significant difference between them, while others would be content if schools skirted the issue altogether, refusing to teach anything at all about the origin of life or the evolution of species. Their opponents see the former proposal as an attempt to introduce an explicitly religious worldview into the classroom, hence one that runs afoul of the separation of church and state. Nor would they be satisfied with ignoring the issue altogether, for evolution is an integral part of the framework of modern biology and a well-established scientific theory. Conflicts concerning religion and politics arise outside of curricular contexts, as well. For example, in France, a law was recently passed that made it illegal for students to wear clothing and adornments that are explicitly associated with a religion. This law was especially opposed by students whose religion explicitly requires them to wear particular clothing, such as a hijab or a turban. The justification given by the French government was that such a measure was necessary to honor the separation of church and state, and useful for ensuring that the French citizenry is united into a whole, rather than divided by religion. However, it is also possible to see this law as an unwarranted interference of the state in religious practice. If liberty of conscience includes not simply a right to believe what one chooses, but also to give public expression to that belief, then it seems that people should be free to wear clothing consistent with their religious beliefs. Crucial to this discussion of the effect of public policy on religious groups is an important distinction regarding neutrality. The liberal state is supposed to remain neutral with regard to religion as well as race, sexual orientation, physical status, age, etc. In one sense, neutrality can be understood in terms of a procedure that is justified without appeal to any conception of the human good. In this sense, it is wrong for the state to intend to disadvantage one group of citizens, at least for its own sake and with respect to practices that are not otherwise unjust or politically undesirable. Thus it would be a violation of neutrality in this sense and therefore wrong for the state simply to outlaw the worship of Allah. Alternatively, neutrality can be understood in terms of effect. The state abides by this sense of neutrality by not taking actions whose consequences are such that some individuals or groups in society are disadvantaged in their pursuit of the good. For a state committed to neutrality thus understood, even if it were not explicitly intending to disadvantage a particular group, any such disadvantage that may result is a *prima facie* reason to revoke the policy that causes it. The attendance requirement may nevertheless be unavoidable, but as it stands, it is less than optimal. Obviously, this is a more demanding standard, for it requires the state to consider possible consequences—both short term and long term—on a wide range of social groups and then choose from those policies that do not have bad consequences or the one that has the fewest and least bad. For most, and arguably all, societies, it is a standard that cannot feasibly be met. Consequently, most liberals argue that the state should be neutral in the first sense, but it need not be neutral in the second sense. Thus, if the institutions and practices of a basically just society make it more challenging for some religious people to preserve their ways of life, it is perhaps regrettable, but not unjust, so long as these institutions and practices are justified

impartially. Liberalism and Its Demands on Private Self-Understanding In addition to examining issues of toleration and accommodation on the level of praxis, there has also been much recent work about the extent to which particular political theories themselves are acceptable or unacceptable from religious perspectives. Rather than requiring citizens to accept any particular comprehensive doctrine of liberalism, a theory of justice should aim at deriving principles that each citizen may reasonably accept from his or her own comprehensive doctrine. The aim, then, for a political conception of justice is for all reasonable citizens to be able to affirm principles of justice without having to weaken their hold on their own private comprehensive views. One such argument comes from Eomann Callan, in his book *Creating Citizens*. If Rawlsian liberalism requires acceptance of the burdens of judgment, then the overlapping consensus will not include some kinds of religious citizens. Thus, a religious citizen could feel an acute conflict between her identity qua citizen and qua religious adherent. One way of resolving the conflict is to argue that one aspect of her identity should take priority over the other. For many religious citizens, political authority is subservient toâ€”and perhaps even derived fromâ€”divine authority, and therefore they see their religious commitments as taking precedence over their civic ones. But this tendency makes it more challenging for liberals to adjudicate conflicts between religion and politics. One possibility is for the liberal to argue that the demands of justice are prior to the pursuit of the good which would include religious practice. If so, and if the demands of justice require one to honor duties of citizenship, then one might argue that people should not allow their religious beliefs and practices to restrict or interfere with their roles as citizens.

Religious Reasons in Public Deliberation One recent trend in democratic theory is an emphasis on the need for democratic decisions to emerge from processes that are informed by deliberation on the part of the citizenry, rather than from a mere aggregation of preferences. As a result, there has been much attention devoted to the kinds of reasons that may or may not be appropriate for public deliberation in a pluralistic society. While responses to this issue have made reference to all kinds of beliefs, much of the discussion has centered on religious beliefs. One reason for this emphasis is that, both historically and in contemporary societies, religion has played a central role in political life, and often it has done so for the worse witness the wars of religion in Europe that came in the wake of the Protestant Reformation, for example.

Church and state: Church and state, the concept, largely Christian, that the religious and political powers in society are clearly distinct, though both claim the people's loyalty.

This asymmetry between the justificatory potential of religious and secular reasons, it is further claimed, should shape the political practice of religious believers. According to advocates of the standard view, citizens should not support coercive laws for which they believe there is no plausible secular rationale, although they may support coercive laws for which they believe there is only a secular rationale. Note that not just any secular rationale counts. For the time being, however, we can get a better feel for the character of the DRR by considering the following case. The Doctrine of Religious Restraint Rick is a politically engaged citizen who intends to vote in a referendum on a measure that would criminalize homosexual relations. As he evaluates the relevant considerations, he concludes that the only persuasive rationale for that measure includes as a crucial premise the claim that homosexual relations are contrary to a God-established natural order. Although he finds that rationale compelling, he realizes that many others do not. But because he takes himself to have a general moral obligation to make those political decisions that, as best he can tell, are both just and good, he decides to vote in favor of criminalization. Moreover, he tries to persuade his compatriots to vote with him. In so doing, he offers relevantly different arguments to different audiences. He tries to convince like-minded citizens by appealing to the theistic natural law argument that he finds persuasive. But he realizes that many of his fellow citizens are unpersuaded by the natural law argument that convinces him. He does so even though he doubts that any of those leveraging arguments are cogent, realizes that many of those to whom he addresses them will have comparable doubts about their cogency, and so believes that many coerced by the law he supports have no good reason, from their perspective, to affirm that law. Rather, it is his decision to support a policy that he believes others have no good reason, from their perspective, to endorse. After all, Rick votes to enact a law that authorizes state coercion even though he believes that the only plausible rationale for that decision includes religious claims that many of his compatriots find utterly unpersuasive. In so doing, Rick violates a normative constraint at the heart of the standard view, viz. For the DRR tells us that, if a citizen is trying to determine whether or not she should support some coercive law, and if she believes that there is no plausible secular rationale for that law, then she may not support it. The DRR is a negative constraint; it identifies a kind of reason that cannot itself justify a coercive law and so a kind of reason on which citizens may not exclusively rely when supporting a coercive law. But this negative constraint is typically conjoined with a permission: It will therefore be helpful to dissociate the DRR from various common misunderstandings. First, the DRR is a moral constraint, one that applies to people in virtue of the fact that they are citizens of a liberal democracy. As such, it need not be encoded into law, enforced by state coercion or social stigma, promoted in state educational institutions, or in any other way policed by the powers that be. Of course, advocates of restraint are free to argue that the state should police violations of the DRR see Habermas , What the DRR does require of citizens is that they reasonably believe that they have some plausible secular rationale for each of the coercive laws that they support, which they are prepared to offer in political discussion. In this respect, the present construal of the DRR is weaker than comparable proposals, such as that developed by Robert Audi, which requires that each citizen have and be motivated by some evidentially adequate secular rationale for each of the coercive laws he or she supports see Audi , and Rawls , ff. Third, the DRR places few restrictions on the content of the secular reasons to which citizens can appeal when supporting coercive laws. That having been said, it is worth stressing that some prominent advocates of the standard view adopt a broadly Rawlsian account of the DRR, according to which coercive laws must be justified by appeal to public reason see Gutmann and Thompson , Larmore , Macedo , and Nussbaum We shall have more to say about this view in section 6. Fourth, the DRR itself has no determinate policy implications; it is a constraint not on legislation itself, but on the configuration of reasons to which agents may appeal when supporting coercive legislation. So, for example, it forbids Rick to support the criminalization of homosexuality when he believes that there are no plausible secular reasons to criminalize it. As such, the moral propriety of the DRR has nothing directly

to do with its usefulness in furthering, or discouraging, particular policy aims. The DRR, then, is a norm that is supposed to provide guidance for how citizens of a liberal democracy should conduct themselves when deliberating about or deciding on the implementation of coercive laws. For our purposes, it will be helpful to work with a canonical formulation of it. Let us, then, formulate the DRR as follows: About this formulation of the DRR, let us make two points. For present purposes, we will simply assume that a plausible rationale is one that epistemically and morally competent peers will take seriously as a basis for supporting a coercive law. Second, according to this formulation of the DRR, a citizen can comply with the DRR even if he himself is not persuaded to support a coercive law for any secular reason. What matters is that he believes that he has and can offer a secular rationale that his secular cohorts can take seriously. Suppose, then, we have an adequate working conception of the DRR. The question naturally arises: Why do advocates of the standard view maintain that we should conform to the DRR? For several reasons, most prominent of which are the following three arguments. Of course, there are many more arguments for the DRR than we can address here. The concern expressed here, presumably, is this: In so doing, these citizens will thereby provoke determined resistance and civil conflict. Such a state of affairs, however, threatens the very viability of a liberal democracy and, so, should be avoided at nearly all costs. Accordingly, religious believers should exercise restraint when deliberating about the implementation of coercive laws. Exercising restraint, however, is best accomplished by adhering to the DRR. According to the liberal critics of the standard view, there are several problems with this argument. First, the liberal critics contend, while there may have been a genuine threat of confessional warfare in 17th century Western Europe, there is little reason to believe that there is any such threat in stable liberal democracies such as the United States. Because confessional conflict, the liberal critics continue, is typically rooted in egregious violations of the right to religious freedom, when, for example, people are jailed, tortured, or otherwise abused because of their religious commitments. John Locke puts the point thus: Locke , If Locke is correct, then what we need to prevent confessional conflict is not compliance with a norm such as the DRR, but firm commitment to the right to religious freedom. A stable liberal democracy such as the United States is, however, fully committed to protecting the right to religious freedom and will be for the foreseeable future. True enough, there are passionately felt disagreements about how to interpret the right to religious freedom: But it is difficult to see, the liberal critics claim, that there is a realistic prospect of these disagreements devolving into violent civil conflict. Second, even if there were a realistic prospect of religious conflict, liberal critics claim that it is unclear that adhering to the DRR would lower the probability that such a conflict would occur. After all, the trigger for religious war typically, the violation of the right to religious freedom is not always, or even typically, justified by exclusively religious considerations. Third, the liberal critics maintain, when religious believers have employed coercive power to violate the right to religious freedom, they themselves rarely have done so in a way that violates the DRR. Typically, when such rights have been violated, the justifications offered, even by religious believers, appeal to alleged requirements for social order, such as the need for uniformity of belief on basic normative issues. One theological apologist for religious repression, for example, writes this: Ordinarily, the kind of religious persecution that engenders religious conflict is legitimated by appeal to secular reasons of the sort mandated by the DRR. This is the case even when religious actors are the ones who appeal to those secular reasons. Finally, liberal critics point out that some religious believers affirm the right to religious freedom on religious grounds; they take themselves to have powerful religious reason to affirm the right of each person to worship as she freely chooses, absent state coercion. So, for example, the 4th century Nestorian Mar Aba: I preach my faith and want every man to join it. But I want him to join it of his own free will. Still, there may be other evils that are more likely to occur under current conditions, which compliance with the DRR might help to prevent. For example, it is plausible to suppose that the enactment of a coercive law that cannot be justified except on religious grounds would engender much anger and frustration on the part of those coerced: This in turn breeds division between citizens' anger and distrust between citizens who have to find some amicable way to make collective decisions about common matters. This counts in favor of the DRR precisely because compliance with the DRR diminishes the likelihood of our suffering from such bad consequences. To this argument, liberal critics offer a three-part reply. First, suppose it is true that the implementation of coercive laws that can

be justified only on religious grounds often causes frustration and anger among both secular and religious citizens. The liberal critics maintain that there is reason to believe that compliance with the DRR would also engender frustration and anger among other religious and secular citizens. To this end, they point to the fact that many religious believers believe that conforming to the DRR would compromise their loyalty to God: But for many religious believers this is distressing; they take themselves to have overriding moral and religious obligations to obey God. Similarly, some secular citizens will likely be frustrated by the requirement that the DRR places on religious citizens. According to these secular citizens, all citizens have the right to make political decisions as their conscience dictates. And, on some occasions, these secular citizens hold that exercising that right will lead religious citizens to violate the DRR. But, the liberal critics claim, it is doubtful that we have any such reason: Second, the liberal critics argue, there is reason to believe that conformance to the DRR would only marginally alleviate the frustration that some citizens feel when confronted with religious reasons in public political debate. The DRR, after all, does not forbid citizens from supporting coercive laws on religious grounds, nor does it forbid citizens to articulate religious arguments in public. Furthermore, complying with the DRR does not prevent religious citizens from advocating their favored laws in bigoted, inflammatory, or obnoxious manners; it has nothing to say about political decorum. Third, the liberal critics contend that because most of the laws that have a chance of enactment in a society as pluralistic as the United States will have both religious and secular grounds, it will almost never be the case that any of the actual frustration caused by the public presence of religion supports the DRR. Given that the DRR requires not a complete but only a limited privatization of religious belief, very little of the frustration and anger apparently engendered by the public presence of religion counts in favor of the DRR. To which it is worth adding the following point: The complete privatization of religion is much more objectionable to religious citizens and, thus, more likely to create social foment. Rorty, it should be noted, softened his approach on this issue. There are no doubt other factors that need to be taken into consideration in the calculation required to formulate the argument from divisiveness. But, the liberal critics maintain, it is unclear how those disparate factors would add up. In particular, if the liberal critics are correct, it is not clear whether requiring citizens to obey the DRR would result in less overall frustration, anger, and division than would not requiring them to do so. The issues at stake are empirical in character and the relevant empirical facts are not known. Here we focus on only one formulation of the argument, which has affinities with a version of the argument offered by Charles Larmore see Larmore Each citizen deserves to be respected as a person. If each citizen deserves to be respected as a person, then there is a powerful prima facie presumption against the permissibility of state coercion. On this basic claim, See Gaus, , Gaus and Vallier, So, there is a powerful prima facie presumption against the permissibility of state coercion. If the presumption against state coercion is to be overcome as it sometimes must be , then state coercion must be justified to those who are coerced. If state coercion must be justified to those who are coerced, then any coercive law that lacks a plausible secular rationale is morally illegitimate as there will be many to whom such coercion cannot be justified.

Chapter 5 : Church and state in medieval Europe - Wikipedia

EMPLOYING THE SECTION 5 ENFORCEMENT POWER TO GUARANTEE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE STATE COURTS I. INTRODUCTION A local bishop is concerned that a minister in her bishopric is.

The responses of major religious denominations and of religiously identified individuals to AIDS have been an important feature of the epidemic. Many religious groups have interpreted the AIDS epidemic in the light of their beliefs and teachings. Those interpretations have often led to public pronouncements on AIDS education, prevention, and care, as well as to the shaping of public attitudes toward those afflicted by or at risk of HIV infection. In addition, individuals who identify themselves with particular religious denominations or express particular religious viewpoints have taken positions about AIDS in light of their beliefs. Their positions have often been within the realm of private attitudes, but sometimes they have been manifested in public comments and actions. Given the broad influence of religion in the United States, the response of religious organizations and individuals is a factor in the effort to control the epidemic and to care for those affected by it. In this chapter, religion is used as a general term to describe the positions and policies of major religious denominations in the United States and the views of individuals or groups that associate themselves with a professed religious belief. The chapter begins with a brief overview of religion and the ways in which the religious traditions that are influential in the United States have historically viewed epidemic disease and sexuality, which are key to understanding the reactions of religious groups to the AIDS epidemic. The chapter then turns to those reactions, first in the early years of the epidemic and then in more recent years. The chapter relates the responses of some of the larger denominations to the epidemic and reports what can be reliably ascertained about the responses of individuals and groups that express their views in religious terms. The chapter is about responses to the epidemic by religious institutions and individuals. Those responses have not taken the form of changes in doctrines, beliefs, or adherents. However, the responses of religious institutions affect their activities, which in turn influence health policy, public education, care of the sick, and attitudes toward HIV-infected people. Official statements, media reports, and other published accounts provide one source of information. Another source, perhaps a more important one, is beyond the easy reach of researchers: Certainly, such individuals have expressed both compassion and discrimination, reception and rejection, involvement and indifference. Many stories have been told of such reactions, but the stories are ephemeral. Similarly, collective reactions of communities of religious people at the level of parishes, synagogues, and other local organizations have also spanned the range of responses. This form of religious response, embodied in the private attitudes and actions of individuals and in isolated activities of small communities, is often hidden from or lost to scientific inquiry. This loss is distressing. The institutions of organized religion can take positions, issue statements, and influence the consciences of their adherent. But it is through individuals, with and without public disclosure, that religion finds expression and evolves in response to changing conditions. It is also difficult to sort out a "religious" response from the myriad of other attitudes and motivations that surround any human reaction. Even official pronouncements of religious bodies, written in the idiom of religion and invoking its traditions and beliefs, may be influenced by secular and political concerns. The words and actions of individuals who present themselves as religiously affiliated or as representatives of religion may also reflect other interests. None but the most naive observer will accept every word and action by religious organizations and individuals as a pure reflection only of creeds and canons; none but the most skeptical will scorn all religious affirmations as disguised self-serving. It is limited to selected Jewish and Christian groups because of their size or perceived influence within American culture. Although powerful forces in the personal lives of their adherents, these religions are not ordinarily given to public statements from official representatives about their beliefs. The primary objective of this chapter is to describe how organized religion has responded to the epidemic and to note the ways in which that response has affected the broader public response and the formation of public and health policy. Many Americans have strong feelings about religion and its place in public life. It is difficult to write about religion without making, or suggesting, value judgments, and even strenuous efforts to avoid such judgments will sometimes be interpreted by some readers

as condemnatory or complimentary. In this chapter, the panel has made such efforts to avoid judgments on various religious responses to the epidemic and also to avoid any prescriptions of how religion should respond or what religious should teach. Rather, the intention is to elucidate the role that religious organizations have played in the epidemic and, in so doing, stress the importance of taking that response into account in efforts to understand the impact of AIDS in American society. The response of religion to the epidemic has been multifaceted. Not only are there many religious communities with their distinct traditions, but within the traditions themselves various themes intertwine with varying emphases. This complexity makes generalization difficult and simplification perilous. As discussed in this chapter, certain themes from certain traditions were more noticeable in the early years of the epidemic, which led to the impression that religion in general was unsympathetic toward those touched by the epidemic and hostile toward preventive efforts. A broader view of the religious response shows these negative reactions, to be sure, but also a more complex picture of religion and AIDS in the United States. Realizing that its resources are limited and that the widest possible cooperation with other social institutions is needed, the CDC, through the National Partnership Program of its National AIDS Information and Education Program, began in the development of programmatic relationships with the business and religious sectors of society. Relationships with 30 religious organizations that represent a spectrum of denominations and interests were established. The CDC provides the organizations with technical assistance, referrals, conference support, and information on use of the national AIDS information clearinghouse database. According to the Centers for Disease Control One consequence of the partnership with religious organizations has been an expanded and positive coverage of HIV issues in the religious press Centers for Disease Control, Also, some religious groups are collaborating with public health agencies to provide HIV prevention education to their members. Thus, CDC has recognized the importance of religious organizations as sources of communication and cooperation in the difficult task of devising and implementing educational programs. If the collaboration of religion is to be fostered in the fight against the epidemic, the nature and dynamics of the religious response to the epidemic must be understood. One distinguished scholar of religion wrote of "the striking lack of unanimity among modern students of religion regarding the nature of the concept under analysis" Bertholet, Every attempt to define these terms will miss some important feature or will misrepresent one or another of the many forms religion takes. For the purposes of this chapter, religion and religious refer to those organized communities of people who express adherence to an explicit canon and creed about the ultimate nature of human life and its transcendent source. In a general way, religion in Western societies has taken the form of communities of people identified by some title, such as Roman Catholic, Reform Jew, Southern Baptist, Mormon, and so on. Those communities are structured in quite different ways, some with an authoritative hierarchy, others as consensual gatherings. The communities usually espouse a canon, that is, a set of ideas, often committed to writing, that express the origins and the most salient images, concepts, and histories with which the communities identify. Finally, almost all religious communities have statements of principal beliefs, sometimes called creeds, that express the ideas and commitments that define the community from others. The diverse religious communities with which American society is familiar give varying authority to their canonical scriptures and their creeds: Consequently, within the broad groupings of Christianity and Judaism are many communities that fall along a spectrum from literal and strict interpretation to liberal and figurative interpretation of their basic canons and creeds. These differences are frequently referred to with rough and often inaccurate terms. Despite the difficulty of describing these different positions in a completely accurate way, the differences are real, and they have significant influence on the way in which American denominations have responded to the AIDS epidemic. Religion, as presented here, differs from most other social and cultural institutions in two significant ways. First, the canons and creeds almost always refer to a transcendent, supernatural power, God or Yahweh, whose relationship to the world and to humans is described in the canons and creeds with some specificity. Second, the canons and creeds explicitly contain certain directions about moral behavior on which religious communities have built moral codes and interpretations of conduct for the faithful. The forms of conduct that are prescribed are, for all faiths, vitally related to the meaning, ends, and purposes of human existence in relation to God. Serious adherence to a faith implies dedicated acceptance of its canons, creeds, and codes,

even though believers will admit that they may sometimes, perhaps often, fail to live up to their professed beliefs. Although distinct faiths require adherence to their creeds, canons, and codes with greater or less literalness, religion, almost by definition the word comes from the Latin for "bound" or "tied to" , requires adherence and fidelity to those features. At the same time, religion displays remarkable adaptability. The survival of many religious communities through very diverse, and often adverse, cultural situations is proof of that adaptability. Thus, when organized religions encounter new situations and experiences, their adherents will often interpret them in light of their beliefs. Conversely, when beliefs are challenged as outmoded or inadequate to new circumstances, religions will seek to preserve them or will modify them to the extent that modification does not violate the basic beliefs. It is rare to find a religious denomination deliberately abandoning or radically changing its beliefs: Religious institutions, then, perhaps more than any other institution, respond to unprecedented situations through defining features of their traditions. This sometimes means that a religious response will take the form of hard-line resistance to a new situation judged incompatible with its faith. Sometimes the religious response will consist of a reinterpretation of the tradition that enables it to coexist with a new situation. The doctrines and practices of religious institutions are not static, but even as they undergo change in response to new situations there is usually a strong urge to identify and preserve essential elements of the past. Thus, religion is almost always traditional and adaptive at the same time; its responses to new situations will be a mix of the dogmatic and doctrinal with the practical and pragmatic.

Religion in the United States Religion was a powerful force in the origins and growth of the American republic. From colonial beginnings, Protestant and Catholic Christianity, and later Judaism, provided vital ideas, communal energy, and spiritual enthusiasm for the formulation of American institutions and public life Clebsch, ; Reichley, ; Wuthnow, ; Butler, During much of the twentieth century, however, the place of religion in American culture was anomalous. The dominant cultural view was that religion has lost its influence among Americans and had moved to the margins of American life. The constitutional prohibition of establishment of religion erected a wall of separation between church and state higher than it had ever been, leading policy makers to steer clear of anything that might appear to breach that wall. Many aspects of public life, from education to entertainment, are carried on without reference to religion and, indeed, often seem antithetical to traditional religious teachings. In many respects, American life seems thoroughly secular Clebsch, By the late s it became clear that that view was no longer tenable Martyr, Religion simply cannot be ignored as a social force in U. The sheer number of people who associate themselves with religion and who participate in its activities are testimony to the presence of religion. The constitutional wall may effectively separate governmental and ecclesiastical structures, but it does not keep ideas and influences of the world of religion from filtering into the world of public affairs. In the realm of health alone, current debates over the legality of abortion, the permissibility of fetal research, toleration of assisted suicide, and the rights of parents of religious persuasion to withhold from their children certain therapeutic and preventive health measures are recent examples of the constant interplay between religion and public affairs. The vitality of religious life in the United States is remarkable. In there were more than religious denominations in the United States. The 15 largest religious bodies encompassed 80 percent of the estimated million total membership of congregations. The Roman Catholic church reports the largest membership approximately Although reports of membership from denominations cannot be easily compared due to different definitions of membership, by self-report approximately 90 percent of Americans identify with a denomination Goldman, Frequency of attendance at services provides another measure of religious commitment. The General Social Survey found that 27 percent of respondents attended services once or more per week, 17 percent attended more than once a month, and 20 percent attend from once a month to several times per year. By most measurable indices, the United States is a more religious country than all European nations except Ireland and Poland Gallup Organization, ; Reichley, Claims of religious affiliations and reports of church attendance are not, of course, measures of religious dedication or fervor, and there are several indications of an increase in deeply personal affirmations of religious belief. The Gallup Organization recently reported that 74 percent of adult U. Religious affiliation and personal commitment to religious belief also find expression in patterns of charitable giving. Individual donors, who accounted for 84 percent of all giving in , favored religious charities over all others. Of all

households making contributions, 53 percent gave to religious organizations; human services and health were distant runners-up at 24 percent each. Religious organizations also ranked first in terms of average contribution per household:

Chapter 6 : Religion and Political Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

SECTION I: RELIGIOUS POWER 1. Some history of our problem through a unified and indestructible supreme power in the state. So he thought that the public welfare.

The relationship of Christians and Christian institutions to forms of the political order has shown an extraordinary diversity throughout church history. There have been, for example, theocratically founded monarchies, democracies, and communist communities. In various periods, however, political revolution, based on a brief treatment of church and state follows. For full treatment, see Christianity: Before the advent of Christianity, separate religious and political orders were not clearly defined in most civilizations. People worshipped the gods of the particular state in which they lived, religion in such cases being but a department of the state. The Christian concept of the secular and the spiritual is founded on the words of Jesus: Two distinct, but not altogether separate, areas of human life and activity had to be distinguished; hence, a theory of two powers came to form the basis of Christian thought and teaching from earliest times. During the 1st century ad the Apostles, living under a pagan empire, taught respect for and obedience to the governing powers so long as such obedience did not violate the higher, or divine, law, which superseded political jurisdiction. Among the Church Fathers, who lived in a period when Christianity had become the religion of the empire, the emphasis on the primacy of the spiritual was even stronger. They insisted upon the independence of the church and the right of the church to judge the actions of the secular ruler. With the decline of the Roman Empire in the West, civil authority fell into the hands of the only educated class that remained—the churchmen. The church, which formed the only organized institution, became the seat of temporal as well as spiritual power. In the East the civil authorities, centred in Constantinople, dominated the ecclesiastical throughout the Byzantine period. In the West, under Charlemagne, the empire was restored, and by the 10th century many secular rulers held power throughout Europe. A period of political manipulation of the church hierarchy and a general decline in clerical zeal and piety brought vigorous action from a line of reforming popes, the most famous of whom was Gregory VII. The following centuries were marked by a dramatic struggle of emperors and kings with the popes. During the 12th and 13th centuries, papal power greatly increased. In the 13th century, however, the greatest scholar of the age, St. Thomas Aquinas, borrowing from Aristotle, aided in raising the dignity of the civil power by declaring the state a perfect society the other perfect society was the church and a necessary good. The medieval struggle between secular and religious power came to a climax in the 14th century with the rise of nationalism and the increased prominence of lawyers, both royalist and canon. Numerous theorists contributed to the atmosphere of controversy, and the papacy finally met with disaster, first in the removal of the popes to Avignon under French influence and second with the Great Schism attendant upon an effort to bring the popes back to Rome. Church discipline was relaxed, and church prestige fell in all parts of Europe. The immediate effect of the Reformation was to diminish the power of the church even further. Christianity in its fractured condition could offer no effective opposition to strong rulers, who now claimed divine right for their positions as head of church and state. Many Lutheran churches became, in effect, arms of the state. In the 17th century there were few who believed that diversity of religious belief and a church unconnected with the civil power were possible in a unified state. Common religious standards were looked upon as a principal support of the political order. When the notions of diversity of belief and toleration of dissent did start to grow, they were not generally seen to conflict with the concept of a state church. The Puritans, for example, who fled religious persecution in England in the 17th century, enforced rigid conformity to church ideas among settlers in the American colonies. The concept of secular government as expressed in the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution reflected both the influence of the French Enlightenment on colonial intellectuals and the special interests of the established churches in preserving their separate and distinct identities. The Baptists, notably, held the separation of church and state powers as a principle of their creed. The great wave of migration to the United States by Roman Catholics in the 19th century prompted a reassertion of the principle of secular government by state legislatures fearing allocation of government funds to parochial educational facilities. The 20th century

saw the First and Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution applied with considerable strictness by the courts in the field of education. Late in the century, conservative Christian groups in the United States generated considerable controversy by seeking textbook censorship, reversal of court prohibition of school prayer, and requirements that certain Biblical doctrines be taught in contradistinction to scientific theories. Learn More in these related Britannica articles:

Chapter 7 : Religion and Politics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Buddhist nuns look at the posters showing images of violence attributed to Muslims around the world, during a celebration of the MaBaTha organisation (Committee to Protect Race and Religion) at a monastery in Yangon, Myanmar, on 14 September

It is speculated that he attended the University of Florence, and even a cursory glance at his corpus reveals that he received an excellent humanist education. It is only with his entrance into public view, with his appointment as the Second Chancellor of the Republic of Florence, however, that we begin to acquire a full and accurate picture of his life. For the next fourteen years, Machiavelli engaged in a flurry of diplomatic activity on behalf of Florence, travelling to the major centers of Italy as well as to the royal court of France and to the imperial curia of Maximilian. We have letters, dispatches, and occasional writings that testify to his political assignments as well as to his acute talent for the analysis of personalities and institutions. Florence had been under a republican government since 1494, when the leading Medici family and its supporters had been driven from power. During this time, Machiavelli thrived under the patronage of the Florentine gonfaloniere or chief administrator for life, Piero Soderini. Machiavelli was a direct victim of the regime change: His retirement thereafter to his farm outside of Florence afforded the occasion and the impetus for him to turn to literary pursuits. The first of his writings in a more reflective vein was also ultimately the one most commonly associated with his name, *The Prince*. Written at the end of 1513 and perhaps early 1514, but only formally published posthumously in 1532, *The Prince* was composed in great haste by an author who was, among other things, seeking to regain his status in the Florentine government. Many of his colleagues in the republican government were quickly rehabilitated and returned to service under the Medici. He wrote verse, plays, and short prose, penned a study of *The Art of War* published in 1520, and produced biographical and historical sketches. Most importantly, he composed his other major contribution to political thought, the *Discourses on the Ten Books of Titus Livy*, an exposition of the principles of republican rule masquerading as a commentary on the work of the famous historian of the Roman Republic. Unlike *The Prince*, the *Discourses* was authored over a long period of time commencing perhaps in 1513 or 1514 and completed in 1520, although again only published posthumously in 1557. The book may have been shaped by informal discussions attended by Machiavelli among some of the leading Florentine intellectual and political figures under the sponsorship of Cosimo Rucellai. Near the end of his life, and probably as a result of the aid of well-connected friends whom he never stopped badgering for intervention, Machiavelli began to return to the favor of the Medici family. Other small tasks were forthcoming from the Medici government, but before he could achieve a full rehabilitation, he died on 21 June 1527.

Analyzing Power

It has been a common view among political philosophers that there exists a special relationship between moral goodness and legitimate authority. Many authors especially those who composed mirror-of-princes books or royal advice books during the Middle Ages and Renaissance believed that the use of political power was only rightful if it was exercised by a ruler whose personal moral character was strictly virtuous. Thus rulers were counseled that if they wanted to succeed—that is, if they desired a long and peaceful reign and aimed to pass their office down to their offspring—they must be sure to behave in accordance with conventional standards of ethical goodness. In a sense, it was thought that rulers did well when they did good; they earned the right to be obeyed and respected inasmuch as they showed themselves to be virtuous and morally upright. It is precisely this moralistic view of authority that Machiavelli criticizes at length in his best-known treatise, *The Prince*. For Machiavelli, there is no moral basis on which to judge the difference between legitimate and illegitimate uses of power. Rather, authority and power are essentially coequal: *The Prince* purports to reflect the self-conscious political realism of an author who is fully aware—on the basis of direct experience with the Florentine government—that goodness and right are not sufficient to win and maintain political office. Machiavelli thus seeks to learn and teach the rules of political power. For Machiavelli, power characteristically defines political activity, and hence it is necessary for any successful ruler to know how power is to be used. Only by means of the proper application of power, Machiavelli believes, can individuals be brought to obey and will the ruler be able to maintain the state in safety and security. Nowhere does this

come out more clearly than in his treatment of the relationship between law and force. Machiavelli acknowledges that good laws and good arms constitute the dual foundations of a well-ordered political system. But he immediately adds that since coercion creates legality, he will concentrate his attention on force. In other words, the legitimacy of law rests entirely upon the threat of coercive force; authority is impossible for Machiavelli as a right apart from the power to enforce it. Consequently, Machiavelli is led to conclude that fear is always preferable to affection in subjects, just as violence and deception are superior to legality in effectively controlling them. As a result, Machiavelli cannot really be said to have a theory of obligation separate from the imposition of power; people obey only because they fear the consequences of not doing so, whether the loss of life or of privileges. And of course, power alone cannot obligate one, inasmuch as obligation assumes that one cannot meaningfully do otherwise. Concomitantly, a Machiavellian perspective directly attacks the notion of any grounding for authority independent of the sheer possession of power. For Machiavelli, people are compelled to obey purely in deference to the superior power of the state. If I think that I should not obey a particular law, what eventually leads me to submit to that law will be either a fear of the power of the state or the actual exercise of that power. He substantiates this assertion by reference to the observable realities of political affairs and public life as well as by arguments revealing the self-interested nature of all human conduct. For Machiavelli it is meaningless and futile to speak of any claim to authority and the right to command which is detached from the possession of superior political power. The ruler who lives by his rights alone will surely wither and die by those same rights, because in the rough-and-tumble of political conflict those who prefer power to authority are more likely to succeed. Without exception the authority of states and their laws will never be acknowledged when they are not supported by a show of power which renders obedience inescapable. The methods for achieving obedience are varied, and depend heavily upon the foresight that the prince exercises. Hence, the successful ruler needs special training. For the circumstances of political rule are such that moral viciousness can never be excluded from the realm of possible actions in which the prince may have to engage. Machiavelli sees politics to be a sort of a battlefield on a different scale. Fortuna is the enemy of political order, the ultimate threat to the safety and security of the state. While human Fortuna may be responsible for such success as human beings achieve, no man can act effectively when directly opposed by the goddess Fortuna. Machiavelli reinforces the association of Fortuna with the blind strength of nature by explaining that political success depends upon appreciation of the operational principles of Fortuna. Throughout his corpus, Fortuna is depicted as a primal source of violence especially as directed against humanity and as antithetical to reason. Thus, Machiavelli realizes that only preparation to pose an extreme response to the vicissitudes of Fortuna will ensure victory against her. For many, his teaching adopts the stance of immoralism or, at least, amoralism. Moral values have no place in the sorts of decisions that political leaders must make, and it is a category error of the gravest sort to think otherwise. Concentrating on the claim in *The Prince* that a head of state ought to do good if he can, but must be prepared to commit evil if he must Machiavelli, 58, Skinner argues that Machiavelli prefers conformity to moral virtue *ceteris paribus*. Jean-Jacques Rousseau long ago held that the real lesson of *The Prince* is to teach the people the truth about how princes behave and thus to expose, rather than celebrate, the immorality at the core of one-man rule. Various versions of this thesis have been disseminated more recently. Some scholars, such as Garrett Mattingly, have pronounced Machiavelli the supreme satirist, pointing out the foibles of princes and their advisors. The fact that Machiavelli later wrote biting popular stage comedies is cited as evidence in support of his strong satirical bent. Thus, we should take nothing Machiavelli says about moral conduct at face value, but instead should understand his remarks as sharply humorous commentary on public affairs. Machiavelli was no friend of the institutionalized Christian Church as he knew it. The *Discourses* makes clear that conventional Christianity saps from human beings the vigor required for active civil life Machiavelli, 11. And *The Prince* speaks with equal parts disdain and admiration about the contemporary condition of the Church and its Pope Machiavelli, 29, 44-46, 65, 91. For others, Machiavelli may best be described as a man of conventional, if unenthusiastic, piety, prepared to bow to the externalities of worship but not deeply devoted in either soul or mind to the tenets of Christian faith. *The State and the Prince: Machiavelli* is at best a transitional figure in the process by which the language of the state emerged in early modern

Europe, as Mansfield concludes. Thus, the Machiavellian prince can count on no pre-existing structures of legitimation, as discussed above. This is a precarious position, since Machiavelli insists that the throes of fortune and the conspiracies of other men render the prince constantly vulnerable to the loss of his state. Yet Machiavelli himself apparently harbored severe doubts about whether human beings were psychologically capable of generating such flexible dispositions within themselves. The Discourses on Livy: The Discourses certainly draw upon the same reservoir of language and concepts that fed *The Prince*, but the former treatise leads us to draw conclusions quite different from "many scholars have said contradictory to" the latter. A minimal constitutional order is one in which subjects live securely *vivere sicuro*, ruled by a strong government which holds in check the aspirations of both nobility and people, but is in turn balanced by other legal and institutional mechanisms. In a fully constitutional regime, however, the goal of the political order is the freedom of the community *vivere libero*, created by the active participation of, and contention between, the nobility and the people. Only in a republic, for which Machiavelli expresses a distinct preference, may this goal be attained. Machiavelli adopted this position on both pragmatic and principled grounds. Although Machiavelli makes relatively little comment about the French monarchy in *The Prince*, he devotes a great deal of attention to France in the Discourses. Why would Machiavelli effusively praise let alone even analyze a hereditary monarchy in a work supposedly designed to promote the superiority of republics? Machiavelli asserts that the greatest virtue of the French kingdom and its king is the dedication to law. The explanation for this situation Machiavelli refers to the function of the Parlement. These laws and orders are maintained by Parlements, notably that of Paris: These passages of the Discourses seem to suggest that Machiavelli has great admiration for the institutional arrangements that obtain in France. Specifically, the French king and the nobles, whose power is such that they would be able to oppress the populace, are checked by the laws of the realm which are enforced by the independent authority of the Parlement. He concludes that a few individuals want freedom simply in order to command others; these, he believes, are of sufficiently small number that they can either be eradicated or bought off with honors. By contrast, the vast majority of people confuse liberty with security, imagining that the former is identical to the latter: Although the king cannot give such liberty to the masses, he can provide the security that they crave: And once a prince does this, and the people see that he never breaks such laws, they will shortly begin to live securely *vivere sicuro* and contentedly Machiavelli, The law-abiding character of the French regime ensures security, but that security, while desirable, ought never to be confused with liberty. This is the limit of monarchic rule: Machiavelli holds that one of the consequences of such *vivere sicuro* is the disarmament of the people. This all comes from having disarmed his people and having preferred "to enjoy the immediate profit of being able to plunder the people and of avoiding an imaginary rather than a real danger, instead of doing things that would assure them and make their states perpetually happy. This disorder, if it produces some quiet times, is in time the cause of straitened circumstances, damage and irreparable ruin Machiavelli, A state that makes security a priority cannot afford to arm its populace, for fear that the masses will employ their weapons against the nobility or perhaps the crown. Yet at the same time, such a regime is weakened irredeemably, since it must depend upon foreigners to fight on its behalf. In this sense, any government that takes *vivere sicuro* as its goal generates a passive and impotent populace as an inescapable result. Confirmation of this interpretation of the limits of monarchy for Machiavelli may be found in his further discussion of the disarmament of the people, and its effects, in *The Art of War*. Addressing the question of whether a citizen army is to be preferred to a mercenary one, he insists that the liberty of a state is contingent upon the military preparedness of its subjects. In his view, whatever benefits may accrue to a state by denying a military role to the people are of less importance than the absence of liberty that necessarily accompanies such disarmament. The problem is not merely that the ruler of a disarmed nation is in thrall to the military prowess of foreigners. More crucially, Machiavelli believes, a weapons-bearing citizen militia remains the ultimate assurance that neither the government nor some usurper will tyrannize the populace. Machiavelli is confident that citizens will always fight for their liberty "against internal as well as external oppressors.

Church and State in medieval Europe includes the relationship between the Catholic Church and the various monarchies and other states in Europe, between the end of Roman authority in the West in the fifth century and the beginnings of the Reformation in the early sixteenth century.

Church and State, Politics and Religion Kenneth Cauthen The question of religion and politics is not the same as the question of church and state. Failure to make this distinction results in confusion. Church and State The problem of church and state has to do with institutions and the spheres of action that are appropriate for each. Here the concept of separation is valid. The government does not appoint bishops and pastors for the churches. Churches, meaning here all religious organizations, do not appoint presidents, governors, and judges. No religion can be favored over others or supported by taxes. The state has no role or authority in defining beliefs relating to God and worship. The free exercise of religion is to be guaranteed. The state is neutral between particular religions and permits citizens to believe or not believe in God and to engage or not engage in religious practices or belong to religious organizations according to the dictates of their conscience. There is no religious test for holding office. We are, in this sense, a secular nation. Nevertheless, complications exist that confound any simple notion of religious neutrality or pure secularism in the national life. Incarnate in our history is a kind of "civil religion" Robert Bellah that finds expression in our founding documents, our coins, speeches of presidents, the pledge of allegiance, and so on. This "religion of the Republic" Sidney Mead cannot be defined precisely and has no official status, but it has been operative in the national life from the beginning. This "public theology" Benjamin Franklin affirms the reality of God the Creator as the Author of certain human rights such as liberty and equality, gives a sacred dimension to national holidays such as the 4th of July, Memorial Day, and Thanksgiving, and defines a peculiar American duty and destiny under the providence of God. These beliefs are independent of any particular historic religion or denomination, although they echo the sacred writings of Jews and Christians. The presence of "civil religion" in our national life does not justify the claim of some that we are a "Christian nation. Recently, a California schoolgirl who defines herself as an atheist asserts that it is wrong to require her to recite the pledge of allegiance that contains the words "under God. Enough complexities and ambiguities of this sort abound to frustrate any effort to find some single or simple doctrine defining the relations between church and state or between religion and politics. Our courts are kept busy trying to find workable compromises least offensive to the Constitution and most in harmony with its fundamental intent and directives. Thorny problems arise in two particular areas. The first involves trying to steer between avoiding an establishment of religion and permitting its free exercise. Prayer in public schools is among the most contentious. Clearly state-sponsored prayer is forbidden, but at what point does student-initiated, voluntary prayer in connection with school activities cross the line? Is it legitimate for parents to use school vouchers from a state or local government to send their children to a religious school? The government-sponsored use of religious symbols in public places poses another set of dilemmas. Where is the dividing line between the religious and secular dimensions of certain Christmas symbols, for example, Christmas trees or a creche? In the Supreme Court upheld a city-authorized Christmas display involving a creche because it had mainly a secular purpose. Critics noted that this approval was made possible only by robbing the symbol of its sacred meaning. Should an Orthodox Jew be allowed to wear a yarmulke while on duty in the military? The Court said no. All these conflicts occur between two spheres of authority and activity that are in principle separate but in practice sometimes overlap. One example of principles in tension will illustrate the subtleties and strains in a particularly instructive fashion. Should tax exemption be denied to schools that practice racial discrimination? The University maintained that its policies were based on religious grounds and therefore should have constitutional protection. In listening to the pros and cons, one notes that the defenders of Bob Jones argued from the freedom of religion side. Moreover, tomorrow society may decide it cannot tolerate dissident groups whose values are as far above the social consensus as racial bigots are below that line. The President of Bob Jones University asked whether Jewish synagogues that segregate men and women are to be put under the ban or whether Catholic schools and

churches that refuse to train and ordain women for the priesthood are to be denied tax exemption. After all, he argued, we do not exclude blacks from the college but only forbid interracial dating and marriage, and that applies to both races. The strongest case for Bob Jones University and Catholic Churches is that the practices in question are both intragroup and voluntary. That conclusion makes me nervous, although I appreciate the ambiguity and complexity involved. The complicated relationship of religion to other human interest is illustrated in another sequence of events. The principle stated by the Court was that freedom of religious expression did not take precedence over generally applicable laws. In response to all the outrage expressed, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. It required governments to refrain from limiting religious freedom unless they have a compelling societal reason for doing so. In Rhode Island, Hmong families were unable to prevent autopsies being performed on their dead relatives. They believe that the procedure eliminates future life after death. In Maryland, a number of Catholic teaching hospitals had their accreditation canceled because they refused to perform abortions. Some complained that since RFRA had been enacted, a rise was evident in requests to obtain religious exemptions by organized hate groups and groups with a propensity for violence. The Aryan Nations group, a branch of the Christian Identity religion, was cited as one example. The downfall of this legislation started with a case that involved a Roman Catholic Church in Texas. The city of Boerne refused to issue a construction permit to allow the church to expand into a historical district. Many unrelated cases had been initiated under the RFRA by prison inmates who charged that prison regulation of clothing, diet, and the like are violations of their religious beliefs. On June 25, in *Boerne v. The majority opinion said that Congress had overstepped its legitimate authority when it enacted the legislation. The act set a "much higher hurdle" for government in regulating activities of religious groups than it did for private individuals and organizations. Renewed efforts by groups concerned with religious liberty led to the introduction of The Religious Liberty Protection Act of . After much initial support the coalition behind this new move began to fracture. Many conservative religious groups continued to support it, but other organizations concerned with religious liberty and civil rights began to oppose it. Their fear was that it would have undermined many state and local civil rights laws. Note how many groups of liberal theological and political persuasion felt caught between their commitment to religious freedom and their devotion to civil rights for persons subjected to religiously-motivated bigotry. For a substantial number the latter took priority in their minds over the former. This bill was carved out of the RLPA. Its two purposes are 1. It was embraced by both major political parties and by organizations spanning the ideological spectrum. Because it targets only the two issues specified, it was devoid of the constitutional and civil rights problems that plagued its predecessor. The measure passed both the Senate and the House on July 27, , and became available for the President to sign. Is religion one of many activities that deserves protection so that other interests are equally important in the eyes of the law? Or does it deserve special consideration so that its claims outweigh all others? If the former, our ultimate loyalties and our relationship to God may be demeaned and set aside for lesser values. Yet religion may be the sponsor of what is bigoted, heinous, reprehensible, or even trivial. To put it differently, society has a set of laws and practices regarding justice, medical practice, morality, decency and many other things. When religious beliefs and practices are in conflict with what society has deemed necessary or important for the health and welfare of its citizens or to guard their civil rights, what trumps what? How serious a breach of religious freedom can be tolerated for the sake of making secular law applicable to everyone? How reprehensible must an act be to eliminate its practice in the name of freedom of religion? Should individuals be allowed to discriminate in the name of religion against blacks or homosexuals or unmarried persons of the opposite sex where their own property or private prerogatives are concerned while a public institution should not? How do we distinguish between private and public in these cases? How are we to weigh civil rights against freedom of religion? The Constitution specifically names freedom of religion as a protected right. How much weight does it therefore have in relation to conflicting claims? All of these questions are in the foreground or background of these current controversies. Let me touch briefly on a subject that is still with us. It involves a proposal by President George W. The beauty of religiously-oriented social ministries is the potential for dealing with people as whole selves, i. But this very unity poses the problem of how it is Constitutionally permissible for the government to enable the providing of secular bread without*

funding sectarian religion. But maybe they would just serve more soup. Would the government discriminate against some religious groups? But that is a matter of administrative practice not of Constitutional principle. What is a religious group? Can we think our way through this thicket without falling into confusion? Religion and Politics The problem of religion and politics defines another set of issues. Church and state deals with the relationship of institutions that are structurally independent of each other. Religion and politics has to do with two spheres of activities in the life of the same persons. Citizens who belong to religious groups are also members of the secular society, and this dual association generates complications. Religious beliefs have moral and social implications, and it is appropriate for people of faith to express these through their activities as citizens in the political order. The fact that ethical convictions are rooted in religious faith does not disqualify them from the political realm. A majority of the electorate must be convinced in terms that appeal to them. Since the population is religiously diverse, and many profess no religion at all or prefer an explicit secular orientation, religiously-based moral and social convictions should be expressed in terms acceptable to the widest possible audience.

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the T- model is the World State's equivalent of a religious symbol, which honors Ford inventor of the Model- T car From conception embryos are conditioned and predestined to fit into 1 of the 5 castes.